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THE 



COMPLETE REPORT 



ORGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS ( 

i 

; 

iN^RMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

BY 

aEORQE B. ]VIcOLELLA.]Sr, 



{ 



MAJOR-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, 



WITH ms LAST REVISION. 



{ 



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7 AUG 1905 
D.otD, 



lil 



THE 



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COMPLETE REPORT 

ON THE 

OEGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS 



i <!¥■ 



OF THE 



W 
o ' 

IT 



^RMY OF THE POTOMA.C, 

BY 

GEOHaE B. ]VIcOLE LL A.N, 

MAJORrGENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, 
WITH HIS LAST REVISION. 



FIRST PERIOD.' 

New York, August 4th, 1863. 

BRiG.-bENERAL L. Thomas, Adjutant-General 
U. S. Army. 

Sir: — I have the honor to submit herein 
the Official Report of the operations of the 
Army of the Potomac, while under my charge. 
Accompanjdng it are the reports of the corps, 
division and subordinate commanders, pertain- 
ing to the various engagements, battles, and 
occurrences of the campaigns, and important 
documents connected will i its organization, sup- 
ply and movements. These, 'with list of maps 
and memoranda submitted, will bo found ap- 
pended, duly arranged atrd marked for conve- 
nient reference. 

Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the op- 
erations in the department of the Ohio, which 
included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
and latterly, Western Virginia, it had become 
my dut}' to counteract the hostile designs of 
tho ,enemy in Western Virginia, which were 
immediately directed to the destruction of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and tho posses- 
sion of tho Kanawha Valley, with tho tiltimate 
object of gainnig Wheeling, and the control oi 
the Ohio River. Tlie successful affairs of Phil- 
lippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford, etc., had 
been fought, and I had acquired possession of 
all Westeni Virginia, north of the Kanawha Val- 
ley, as well as of the lower portion ol that val- 
ley. 

I had determined to proceed to the relief of 
the upper Kanawha Valley, as soon as provis-. 
ion was made for the permanent defense of ijic 
mountain passes leading from tho east intr^ q, ^ 
region tuider our control, when I received at 
B(jverly, in Randolph County, on the 2^^st .July 
1861, hitelligenco of the unfortunate, residt of 
tlie battle of Manassas, fought on t'^^^at day. 

On the 22d, I received an order '^y telegraph, 
directing me to turn over my com /^aud to Brig.- 
General Rosecrans,and repair a't once to Vy?'a8h- 
ingtou. 



I had already caused recomioissances to be 
made for intrenchments at the Cheat Moimtain 
Pass ; also on the Huntersville road, near Elk- 
water, and at Red House, near the main road 
from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon 
and the night of the 22d, I gave the final in- 
structions for the construction of these works, 
turned over the command to Brig.-Gen. Rose- 
crans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, 
for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon 
of the 26th. On the 27th, I assumed command 
of the Division of the Potomac, comprising the 
troops in and around Washinghton, on both 
banks of the river. 

With this brief statement of the events which 
immediately prccede-d my being called to the 
command of the troops at Washington, I pro- 
ceed to an account from such authentic data as 
are at hand, of my miiitary operations while 
commander of the Ariny of the Potomac. 

The subjects to be considered, naturally ar- 
range themselves as follows : The organization 
of the Army of th.c Potomac; the military events 
connected wit^i the defenses of Washington, 
from July, 18,<S1, to INIarch, 1862 ; the campaign 
on tlic Penvasula. and that in Maryland. 

The gr' .,o,t resources and capacity for power- 
ful resit-stance, ot the South, at the breaking out 
ol the rebellion, and the full proportions of the 
grco.c coiiflict about to take place, were sought 
t^ bo carefully measured ; and I had also _en- 
'xcavored, by every means in my power, to im- 
|)rcss upon tho authorities tho necessity for 
such immediate aud full preparation as alone 
would cnnable the government to prosecute 
the war on a scale commensurate with tlie re- 
sis tence to be offered. 

On the -Ith of August, 1861, 1 addressed to 
tlie President, the following meraorandum, pre- 
pared at his request: 

Memorandum.— The object of tlie present war 

diff'jrs from those in which nariona aro usually 

engaged, mainly in this : That the purpose of 

■1 ordinarv Avar is to conquer a peace, and make a 



ti-eafcy'on ndviwitagoous terma. In this contest 
it lias become necessary to crnsh a population 
sufliciently nuraeifous, intellij,'eut and warlike 
to constitute a nation. Wo have not only to 
defeat their armed and organized forces in the 
field but to display such an overwhehning 
strength as will convince all our antagonists, 
especially those of the governing, aristocratic 
class, of the utter impossibillity of resistencc. 
Our late reverses make this course imperative. 
Had we been successful in the rscent battle 
(Manassas), it is possible that we might have 
been spared the labor and expense of a great 
e£Fort ; now we have no alternative. Their 
success will enable tlie political leaders of 
the rebels to convince die mass of their peo- 
ple that we are inferior to tliem in force and 
courage, and to command all their resources. 
The contest began witti a class ; now it is with 
a people, our military success can alone restore 
the former issue. 

By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking 
their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly pro- 
tective policy as to private property, and un- 
armed persons, and a lenient course as to pri- 
vate soldiers, we may well hope for a perma- 
nent restoration of a peaceful Union. But, in 
the first instance, the authority of the govern- 
ment must be supported by overwhelmhig phy- 
sical force. 

Our foreign relations and financial credit also 
imperatively demand that the military action 
of the government should be prompt and irre- 
sistible; 

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their bat- 
tle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the 
first great struggle there. But while thus di- 
recting our main efforts, it is necessary to di- 
minish the resistence there offered us, by move- 
ments on other points, both by land and water. 

Without entering at present into details, I 
■would advise that a strong movement be made 
on the Alississippi, and that the rebels be dri- 
ven out of Missouri. 

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that 
Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would 
advise a movement through ti:at State into 
Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting 
the Union men of that region, and of seizing 
the railroads leading from Memphis to the 
east. 

The possession of those roads by us, in con- 
nection wdth the movement on the Mississippi 
would go far towards determining the evacu.'i- 
tion of Virginia by the rebels. In the meantime 
all the passes into Western Virginia, from the 
e^ust, should be securely guarded ; but I would 
advise no movement from that quarter toward 
ilichtiiond, uidcss the political condition of Kon- 
Hjicky renders it in'ipo3sible,or inexpedient for 
us to make the movement upon Eastern Ten- 
nessee, through that State. Every effort should 
however, be made to organize, equip and arm 
us mamy troops as possible in Western Virginia, 
iu order to render the Ohio and Indiana regi- 
ments available for other o|;ierationa. -At as 



early a day aa praoticftble, it would be w«?ll to 
protect and re-open the Baltiruore and Ohio 
Railroad. 

Baltimore and Fort Mnnroe should he occu- 
pied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in 
our possession. The importance of liarper'a 
Ferry and the line of the Potomac, in the direc- 
tion of Leesburg, will be very materially di- 
minshed so sooti as our force in this vicinity 
becomes organized, strong and efticient, be- 
cause |io capable general will cross the river, 
north of this city, when we have a strong^army 
here, ready to cut ofi' his retreat. 

To revert to the West, it is probable that 
no very large additions to the troops now in 
Missouri, will be necessary to secure that 
State. 

I presume that the force required for tho 
movement down the Mississippi, will be de- 
termined by its commander and the Presi- 
dent. If Kentucky assumes the right position, 
not more than 20,000 troops will be needed, 
together with those that can be raised in that >, 
State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure th© 
latter region and its railroads, as well as ultim- 
ately to occupy Nashville. »» 

The Western Virginia troops, with more 
than 5,000 to 10,000 from Ohio and Indiana, 
should, under proper management, suffice for 
its protection. When we have reorganized 
our main army here, 10,000 men ought to ba 
enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road and the Potomac. Five thousand will 
garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and not 
more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the ut- j 
most, for the defense of Washington. 

For the main army of operations, I urge the 
following composition : 

250 RcsLmeuts of Infantiy, say • ■ - 225,000 mea. 
100 Field B ilteries. 600 guns - - - - 15.0(X) " 

28 Regiments Cavalry 25,500 " 

5 " Engineer troops • • • 7,500 " 

Total - - ■ 273,000. 

The force must be supplied with the neces- 
sary engineer and pontoon trains, and with 
transportation for everything save tents. Its 
general line of operations should be so direct- 
ed that water transportation can be availed of 
from point to point, by means of the ocean and 
the rivers emptying into it. An essential fea- 
ture of the plan of opei'ations, will be the em- 
ployment of a strong naval force, to protect 
the movements of a fleet of transports intend- 
ed to convey a considerable body of troops 
from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, 
thus cither creating diversions, and rendering 
it jieccsstiry to detach largely from their main 
body, in order to protect such of their cities 
as muy be threatened, or else lauding and 
forming establishments on their coast at 'an}' 
favorable places that opportunity might oifer. 
This naval force should also co-operate with 
the main army, in its efforts to seize the im- 
portant sea-board town of the rebels. 

It cannot be ignored that the construction 
of railroads, has introduced a new and very 



important element into war, by the great facili- 
ties thus given for concentrating at particular 
positions, large masses of troops from remote 
sections, and by creating new strategic points 
and lines of operations. It is intended to over- 
come this difficulty by the partial operations 
suggested, and such other us the particular 
case may require. We must endeavor to seize 
places on the railways, in the rear of the ene- 
my's ]K)ints of concentration, and we must 
threaten their sea-board cities, in order that 
each State may be forced, by the necessity of 
its own defense to dimLiiish its contingent to 
the Confederate army. 

The prupLised moveiacnl down the Missis- 
sippi, will produce im])urtuHt results in this 
connection. That advance, and the progress 
of the main army at the East, will materially 
assist each other by diminishing the resistance 
to be encountered by each. The tendency of 
the Mississippi movement upon all questions 
connected with cotton, is too well understood 
by tlie President and Cabinet, to need any illus- 
tration from me. There is another independ- 
ent movement which has often been suggested 
and which has always recommended itseli to 
my judgment. I refer ;to a movement from 
Kansas and Nebraska, througli the Indian Ter- 
ritor}' upon Red River and Western Texas, for 
the purpose of protecting and developing the 
latent Union and free state sentiment, well 
known to predominate in Western Texas, and 
which, like a similar sentiment in Western "Vir- 
ginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize 
that section into a free state. How far it will 
be possible to support this movement by an 
advance through New Mexico from California, 
is a matter which I have not stifficiently ex- 
amined to be able to express a decided opinion. 
If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, 
as bringing hito play the resources and war- 
like qualities of the Pacific States, as well as 
identifying them with our cause, and cement- 
ing the bond of Union between them and the 
General Government. 

If it is not departhig too far from my pro- 
vince, I will venture to stiggest the policy of 
an intimate alliance and cordial understanding 
with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests 
are with us ; their antipathies exclusively 
against our enemies, and their institutions. I 
think i.t would not be difficult to obtain from 
the Mexican government the right to use, at 
least during the present contest, tlie road from 
Gua\'mas to New Mexico. This concession 
would very materially reduce the obstacles of 
the cohnnn moving from the Pacific. A similar 
permission to use their territory for the x^'is- 
sage ef troops between the Panuco and the 
Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a col- 
umn of troops, by a good road from Tampico, 
or some of the small harbors north of it, upon 
and across the Rio Grande, without risk, and 
scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any, 
it worJd be desirable to take into service and 
employ Mexicaii soldiers, is a question entirely 



political, on wiiieh I do not venture to offer an 
opinion. 

The force I have recommended is large, the 
expense is great. It is possible that a smaller* 
force might accomplish the* object in view ; 
but I understand it to be the purpose of this 
great nation to re-establish the power of its 
government, and to restore peace to its citi- 
zens, in the shortest possible time. The ques- 
tion to be decided is simply this ; shall we 
crusli the rebellion at one blow, terminate the 
war in one campaign, or ; shall we leave it for 
a legacy to our descendants ? 

When the extent of the possible line of op- 
erations is considered, the force asked for ther 
main army under in}'' command cannot be re- 
garded as unduly large. Every mile we ad- 
vance carries us further from our base of ope» 
rations, and renders detatchments necessary 
to cover our communications, while the enemy 
will be constantly concentrating as he falls 
back. I propose witli* the force which I have 
requested, not only to drive the enemy' out of 
Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy 
Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 
Mobile and New Orleans ; in other words to 
move into the heart of the enemy's country, 
and crush out the rebellion in its very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads -.is wO' 
advance, the difficulties of transportatioii wil) 
be\Qaterially diminished. It is perhaps, unne- 
cessary to state, that in addition to the forces 
named in this memorandum, strong reserves- 
sliould be formed, ready to supply any losses 
that may occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the exi- 
gencies of the treasury maybe lessened by 
malcing only partial payments to our troops} 
v/hen in the enemy's countiy, and by giving* 
the obligations of the United States'* for such 
supplies as may there be obtained. 

Geo. "B. AIcClkllan, 

Major-Gerieral. 

I do not think the events of the war haVe 
proved these views, upon the methods aqd 
plans of its conduct, altogether incorrect. They 
certainly have not proved my estimate of the 
number of troops and scope of operations too 
large. It is probable that I did undcr-estimate 
the time necessary tor the completion of arms 
and equipments. It was not strange, however, 
that by many civilians intrusted with authority 
there should have been an exactly opposite 
opinion held in both these- particulars. 

The result of the first battle of Manassas had 
beeii idmost to destroy the morale and organi- 
zation of our army, and to alarm government 
and people. Tlie national capital was in dan- 
ger. It was necessary, besides holding the 
"enemy in check, to build works for its defense, 
strong and capaVjle of being held by a small 
force. 

It was necessary also to create a new army 
for active operations, and to expedite its or- 
ganization, equipment, and the accumulation of 
the materia! of war, and to this not inconsid- 



eraLle labor all m.y energies for the next three 
months were constantly devoted. 

Time is a necessary element in the creation 
of armies, and I do not therefore think it ne- 
cessary to more than mention the impatience 
with which many regarded the delay in the 
arrival of the new levies, though recruited 
and pressed forward with unexampled uapidi- 
ty — the manufacture and supply of arms and 
equipments, or the vehemence with which an 
immediate advance upon the enemy's works 
directly in our front wa& urged by 4 patriotic 
but sanguine people. 

The President too was anxious for the speedy 
employment of our army, and although possess- 
ed of my plans through frequent conferences, 
desired a paper from me upon the condition of 
the forces under my command, and the imme- 
diate measures to be ^aken to increase their 
efficiency. Accordingly, In tlie latter part of 
October, I addressed the following letter to 
the Secretary of War : 
To THE Hon. Simon Cameron, 
Secretary of War : 
Sir, — In conformity with a personal unaer- 
Btanding with the President, yesterday, I have 
the honor to submit the following statement of 
the condition of the army under my command, 
and the measures required for the preservation 
of the government and the suppression of the 
rebellion :- f 

It will be remembered that, in a memorial 1 
had the honor to address to the President soon 
after my arrival in Washington, and in my coifl- 
munication addressed to Lieut-General Scott, 
under date of 8th of August ; in my letter to 
the President authorizing him, at his request, 
to withdraw the letter written by me to Gen- 
eral Scott ; and in my letter of the 8th of Sep- 
tember, answering your note of inquiry of that 
date, my views on the same subject are frankly 
and fully expressed. 

In these several communications I have 
stated the force I regarded as necessary to 
enable this army to advance with a reasonable 
certainty of success, at the same time leaving 
the capital and the line of the Potomac suffi- 
ciently guarded not only to secure the retreat 
of the main army, in the event of disaster, but 
to render it out of the enemy's power to at- 
tempt a diversion in Maryland. 

So much time has passed, and the winter is 
approaching so rapidly, that but two courses 
are left to the government, viz., either to go 
into winter quarters, or to assume the oifensive 
with forces greatly inferior in numbers to the 
army I regarded as desirable and necessary. 

If political considerations render the first 
course unadvisable the second alone remains. 
While I regret that it has not been deemed 
expedient, or perhaps possible to concentrate 
the forces of the nation in this vicinity, (re- 
iniiining on the dd'eiisive elsewhere,) keeping 
the attention and ciforts of the government 
fixed upon this as the vital point, where the 
issue of the great contest is 'to be decided. 



it may still be that, by introducing unity <-f 
action and design among the various armies 
of the land, by determining the courses to be 
pursued by the various commanders under 
one general plan, transferring from tlic other 
armies the superfluous strength not required 
for the purpose in view, and thus re-inforc- 
ing this main army, whose destiny it is to 
decide the controversy, we may yet be able 
to move with a reasonable prospect of suc- 
cess before the winter is fairly upon us. The 
nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the 
army of the Potomac holds the fate of the 
country in its hands. The stake is so vast, 
the issue so momentous, and the effect of the 
next battle will be so important throughout 
the future, as well as the present, that 1 con- 
tinue to urge, as I have ever done since I en- 
tered upon the command of this army, upon 
the government to devote its energies 'and its 
available resources towards increasing the 
numbers and efficiency of the army on which 
its salvation depends. 

A statement, carefully prepared by the 
chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army^ 
gives as the necessary garrison of this city 
and its fortifications 33,795 men — say 3.5,0!)!). 
The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- 
pendencies is about 10,000. I have sent the 
chief of my staff to make a careful examina- 
tion into the condition of these troops, and to 
obtain the information requisite to enable me 
to decide whether this number can be dimin- 
ished or the reverse. At least 5,000 men will 
be required to watch the river hence to 
Harper's Ferry and its vicinity ; probably 
8,000 to guard the. lower Potomac. 

As you are aware, all the information we 
have from sjaies, prisoners, &c., agree in show- 
ing that the enemy have a force on the Poto- 
mac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled 
and equipped, ably commanded and strongly 
intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that to en- 
sure success, or to render it reasonably 
certain, the active army should not number 
less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 
guns, unless some material change occurs in 
the force iu front of us. 

The requisite force for an advance move- 
ment by the army of the Potomac maybe thus 
estimated : 

Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 guns, 

Garrison of city of Washington 35,000 " 40 " 
To guard Poto'c to Hrp's Ferry 5,000 " 12 " 

To guard lower Potomac 8,000 " 24 " 

Garrison for Bait, and Annapolis 10,000 " 12 ' 



Total effective force required 208,000 men, 488 guns. 

Or an aggre,gate, present and absent, of 
about 240,000 men, should the losses by sick- 
ness. &c., not rise to a higher per-centage than 
at present. 

Having stated what I regard as the requisite 

force to enable this army to advance, I now 

proceed to give the actual strength of the army 

of the Potomac. 

.The aggregate strength of the army of the 



Potomac Dy the ofiScial report on the morning 
of the 27th inst. was 168,318 officers and men 
of all grades and arms. This includes the 
troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the up- 
per and lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. 

The force present for duty was 147,695. 
Of this number 4,268 cavalry were completely 
unarmed, 3,163 cavalry only partially armed, 
5,979 infantry imequipped, making 13,410 un- 
lit for the field, (irrespective of those not j^et 
sufficiently drilled.) and reducing the effective 
force to 134,285, and the number disposable 
for an advance to 76,285. Tlie infantry regi- 
ments are, to a considerable extent, armed 
with unserviceable weapons — quite a large 
number of good arms, which had been intend- 
ed for this army, were ordered elsewhere, 
leaving the army of the Potomac insufficiently 
and, in some case*, badly armed. 

On the 30th of September there were with 
this army 228 field guns ready for the field, 
£<> far as arms and equipments are concerned : 
some of the batteries are still quite raw, and 
imfit.to go into action. I have intelligence 
that eight new batteries are en route hither : 
two others are ready for the field. I will still 
(if the New York batteries have six guns 
each) be 112 guns short of the number requir- 
ed for the active column, saying nothing for 
the present of those necessary ibr the garri- 
sons and corps on the Potomac, which would 
make a total deficiency of 200 guns. 

1 have thus briefly stated our present condi- 
tion and wants : it remains to suggest the 
means of supplying the deficiencies. 

First. That all the cavalry and infantrj'- 
arms, as fast as procured, whether manufac- 
tured in this country or purchased abroad, be 
sent to this army, until it is fully prepared 
for the field. 

Second. That the two companies of the 
4th artillery, now understood to be en route 
from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered 
to this arm}', to be mounted at once ; also that 
the companies of the 3d artiller}', en route 
from California, be sent here. Had not the 
order for Smead's battery to come here from 
Harrisburgh, to replace the battery I gave 
G-eneral Sherman, been so often countermand- 
i-d, I would again ask for it. 

Tliird. That a more effective regulation 
may be made, authorizing the transfer of men 
from the volunteers to the regular batteries, 
infantry and cavalry ; that we may make the 
Ix-st possible use of the invaluable regular 
"' skeletons." 

Fourth. I have no official information as to 
the United States' forces elsewhere ; but from 
the best information I can obtain from the 
War Department, and other sources, I am led 
to beheve that the United States troops are, 

In Western Virginia about 30,000 

la Kentu(4:y about 40,000 

tn Missouri about 80,000 

In Fortress Monroe about 11,000 

Total,.... 101,000 



Besides these, I am informed that more thaa 
100,000 are in progress of organization in other 
nortliern and western states. 
^ I would therefore recommend that, not in- 
terfering with Kentucky, there should be re- 
tained in Western Virginia and Missouri a 
sufficient force for defensive purposes, and 
that the surplus troops be sent to the army 
of the Potomac, to enable it to assume tho 
offensive ; that the same course be pursued in 
respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no fur- 
ther outside expeditions be attempted until 
we have fought the great battle hi front of 
us. 

Fifth. That every nerve be strained fo 
liasten the enrollment, organization, and arma- 
ment of new batteries and regiments of in- 
fantry. 

Sixth. That all the battalions now raised 
for the new regiments of regular infantry bo 
at once ordered to this army, and that the old 
infantry and cavalry en route from California, 
be ordered to this army immediately on their 
arrival in Xew York. 
• I have thus indicated, in a general manner, 
the objects to be accomplished, and the means 
by which we may gain our ends. 

A vigorous employment of these means wiU 
in my opinion, enable the army of the Poto- 
mac 1o assume sucocssfully this season, the 
ofi'ensive operations Avhich, ever since entering 
upon the command, it has been my anxious 
desire and diligent effort to prepare for and 
prosecute. The advance should not be post- 
poned beyond the 25th of November, if possi- 
ble to avoid it. 

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and en- 
ergy in action, are indispensable. The entjre 
military field should be grasped as a whole, 
and not in detatched parts. 

One iDlan should be agreed. upon and pur- 
sued ; a single will should direct and carry 
out these plans. 

The great object to be atcompHshed — the 
crushing defeat of the rebel army [now] at 
Manassas — should never for one instant be 
lost sight of, but all the intellect and means 
and men of the government poured upon that 
point. The loyal States possess ample force 
to effect all this, and more. The rebels have 
displayed energy, unanimity, and • wisdom 
worthy of the most desperate days of tho 
French Revolution — should we do less ? 

The unity of this nation, the preservation of 
our institutions, are so dear to me tliat I have 
willingl}' sacrificed my priA'ate hap])iness, with 
tJiG single object of doing ni}' duty to my 
country. Wlicn the task is accomplished I 
shall be glad to return to the obsciu-ity from 
which events have drawn me. 

Whatever the determination of thc-J;overn- 
ment may be, I will do the best I can with the 
army of the Potomac, and will share its fate,, 
whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 

Permit me to add, that on this occasion as 
heretofore, it has been mv aim neither to ex- 



aggerato nor underrate the power of the ene- 
my, nor fail to express clearly the means by 
■which, in my judgment, that power may be 
broken. Urging the energy of preparation 
and action, wlii^h has ever been my choice, 
but with tlie iixed purpose by no act of mine 
to expose this government to hazard by prema- 
ture movement, and requesting tliat this com- 
munication may be laid before the President, 

I have the lionor to be, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, G. B. ]\fcO. Maj.-Gen, 

When I assumed command in Washington 
on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops 
in and around the city was about 50.000 infan- 
try, less tlian 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery 
men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thir- 
ty pieces. 

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the 
brigade organization of General McDowell still 
existed, and the troops were stationed at and 
in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort 
Albany, at Fort Piunyon, Roach's Mihs, Cole's 
Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, witli 
a detachment at the Theological Seminary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting 
Creek, and many of the regiments were en- 
I camped on the low grounds bordering the Po- 
tomac, — seldom in the best positions for de- 
fense, and entirely inadequate in numbers and 
condition to defend the long line .from Fort 
Corcoran to Alexandria. • 

On the ^laryland side of the river, upon the 
heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two re- 
giments were stationed, whose commanders 
•were independent of each other. 
*» There were no troops on the important Tcn- 
all3'town road, or on the roads entering the 
city from the south. 

The camps were located without regard to 
purposes of defense or instruction ; the roads 
were not i^icketed, and there was no attempt 
at an organization into brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for de- 
fense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to 
a respectable body of the enemy either in the 
positions and numbers of the troops, or the 
number and cliaracter of the defensive works. 
Earthworks in the nature of " tetes-de-pont" 
looked upon the approaches to the George- 
■ town aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, 
and Alexandria by the Little Paver Turnpike 
and some simple defensive arrangements were 
made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter 
exception, not a single defensive work had 
been commenced on the Maryland side. 

Tiiere was nothing to pi-event the enemy 
shelling the city from heights, within easy 
range, which could be occupied by a hostile 
column almost without resistance. ]\[any sol- 
diers had deserted, and the streets of Wash- 
ington were crowded with straggling officers 
and meni absent from their, stations without 
authority, whose behavior indicated the gener- 
al want of discipline and organization. 

1 at once designated an elTicient staff, after- 
wards adding to it, as opportunity offered and 



necessity require<l^ wno zealously co-operatea 
with me in the labor of bringing order out of 
confusion, reassigning troops and commands, 
projecting and throwing up defensive works, 
receiving and organizing, equipping and pro- 
viding for the new levies arriving in the city. 
*The valuable services of these officers in 
tlicir various departments, during this and 
throughout tlie subsequent periods of the his- 
tory of the army of the Potomac, can hard!}' be 
sufficiently appreciated. Their names and du- 
ties will be given in another part of this re- 
port, and they are commended to the favorable 
notice of the War Department. 

The restoration of order in the city of 
Washington was effected througli the appoint- 
ment of a provost marshal, whose authority 
was supported bj^ the few regular troops with- 
in my conmrand. These troops were thus in 
position to act as a reserve, to be sent to any 
point of attack where their services might 
be most wanted. 

The energy and ability displayed by Col. A. 
Porter, the provost marshal and his assistants, 
and the strict discharge of their duty by the 
troops, produced the best results, and Wash- 
ington soon became one of the most quiet 
cities in the Union. 

The new levies of infantry, upon arriving 
in Washington, were' formed into provisional 
brigades, and placed in camp in the suburbs 
of the city for equipment, instruction and dis- 
cipline. As soon as regiments were in fit con- 
dition for transfer to the forces across tlie 
Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades 
serving there. 

Brig.-Gen. F J. Porter was at first assigned 
to the charge of the provisional brigades. 
Brig.-Gen. A. E. Burnside was the next officer 
assigned to this duty, from which, liowever, 
he was soon relieved by Brig.-Gen. S. Casey, 
who continued in charge ot the newly arriving 
regiments until the army of the Potomac de- 
parted for the Peninsida, in March, 1862. The 
newly arriving artillery troops reported to 
Brig.-Gen. Wm. F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, 
and the cavalry to Brig.-Gen. Geo. Stoueman, 
the Chief of Cavalry. 

By the 15th of October, the number of 
troops in and about Washington, inclusive of 
tlie garrison of the city and Alexandria, the 
city guard, and the forces on the Maryland 
shore of the Potomac, below Washington, and 
as far as Cumberland above, the troops under 
the command of Gen. Dix at Baltimore, and its 
dependencies, was as follows : 

Total present for duty f.S.SOl 

" Rick fi,2a0 

" in coafiaeiuent i,15G 



Aggri'giite present 143.647 

absent 8,404 



Grand aggregate.-. 152,031 

The following table exhibits sftnilar data 
for the periods stated, includinji the troops in 
Maryland and Delaware : 



PRESENT. S 


PRKSEKT 
AND 

ABSENT. 

Grand A g. 
gregafe 




For Duty 


Sick. 


In Oon- % 
fiaement. 


1861. 
Dec. 1 
1862. 
Jan. 1 
Feb. 1 
Mch.l 


169,451 

191.480 
190.806 
193,142 


15,102 

14,790 
14,373 
13,167 


2,189 11,470 

2,260 11,707 
2,917 14,110 
2,108 13,570 


198,213 

219,707 
222,196 
221,937 



For convenience of reference, the strength 
of the army of the Potomac at subsequent 
periods is given : 



In organizing the army of tlie Potomac, and 
preparing it for tlie field, the first step taken 
was to organize the infantry into brigades 
of four regiments each ; retaining the newly 
arrived regiments on the itaryland sidp, until 
their armament and equipment were issued, 
and they had obtained some little elementary 
instruction, before assigning them permanent- 
ly to brigades. 

When tlie organization of the brigades was 
well established, and the troops somewhat dia^ 
ciplined and instructed, divisions of three 
brigades each were gradually formed. 

As is elsewhere stated in this report 



al- 



1862. 
April 30 
June 20 
July 10 



For Duty. 



Sick. 



; In Arrest or 
Confiaement. 



Officers] Men. •OfB«ers I Men. 



4,725 
4, .65 
3,834 



104.610 
101,160 
85,715 



233 
496 
685 



5.385 
10,541 
15 959 



41 
44 
60 



Men. 



35« 
3:^0 
213 



Aggre- 
gate. 



115 350 
117.226 
106,466 



By Au- 
thority, 



11.037 
27,700 
34,638 



Without 
Authority 



887 
3,782 



Grand Ag- 
gregate 

present and 
absent. 



126,387 
145,813 
144,886 



tliough I was always in favor of the organiza- 
tion mto army corps as an abstract principle, I 
did not desire to form them until the army had 
been for some little time in the field, in order to 
enable the general officers first to acquire the 
requisite experience as division commanders 
on active service, and that I might be able to 
decide from actual trial who were best fitted 
to exercise those important commands. 

For a similar reason, I carefully abstamed 
from making any recommendations for the 
promotion of officers to the grade of ilajor- 

General. „ .„ • i 

When new batteries of artillery arrived, 
they also were retained in Washington until 
their armament and equipment were com- 
pleted, and their instruction sufficiently ad- 
vanced, to justify their being assigned to 
divisions. 

The same coiu-se was p\u-sued m regard 
to the cavalry. I rcsrret that circurasUuicee 
have delayed the Chief of -Cavalry, Gen. Geo. 
Stoneman, in furnishing his report upon the 
organization of that arm of service. It will, 
however, be forwarded as soon as completed, 
and will, 'doubtless, show tliat the difficult and 
important duties intrusted to him were effi- 
ciently performed. He encountered and 
overcame, as far as it was possible, continual 
and vexatious obstacles arising from the great 
deficiency of cavalry arms and Cvquipments, 
and tho entire inefficiency of many of the re- 
gimental oflicers first appointed ; this last dif- 
ficulty was, to a considerable extent, overcome 
in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and 
artillery, by the continual and prompt action 
of courts-martial and boards of examination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, 
every cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre 
and revolver, and at least two squadrons in 
every regiment with carbinea. 

It was intended to assign at least one regi- 
ment of cavalry to each division of the active 
army, besides fcrming a cavalry reserve of the 



regular regiments, and some picket re3;iment8 
of volunteer cavalry. Circumstances beyond 
my control renderetl it impossible to carry out 
this intention fully, and the cavalry Jorce, 
serving with the army in the field, wa.s never 
as large as it ought to have been. 

It was determined to collect the regular in- 
fantry to form the nucleus of a reserve. Tho 
advantage oi such a body of troops at a 
critical 'moment, especially in an army con- 
stituted mainly of new levies, imperfectly dis- 
ciplined, has been frequently illustrated in 
military history, and was brought to the atten- 
tion of the country at the first battle of Man- 
assas. I have not been disaiipointed in tho 
estimate formed of the value of these troops. 
I have always foimd them to be relied on ; 
whenever they have been brought under fire, 
they have shown the utmost gallantry and 
tenacity. 

The regular infantry, which had been col- 
lected trom distant posts, and which had been 
recruited as rapidly as the slow progress of 
reci-uiting for the regular service would allow, 
added to the small battalion with McDowell's 
army, which I found at Washington, on my 
arrival, amounted, on the 30th of August, to 
1040 men; on the 28th of February, 18o2,to 
20H2, and on the 30th of April, to 4G03. 

On the 17th of May, 1862, they were assign- 
ed to Gen. Porter's corps, for organization as 
a division with the 5th regiment of New lork 
Volunteers, which joined. May 4th, and the 
10th New York Volunteers, which joined sub- 
sequently. They remained from the com- 
mencement, under the command of Bng.-Gen. 
Geo. Sykes, ilajor 14th Infantry, U. S. Army. 
ARTILLERY. 

The creation of an adequate artilloi;y estab- 
lishment, for an army of so large proportions, 
was a formidable undertaking ; and had it not 
been that the country possessed, m the regu- 
lar service, a body of accomplished and oner- 



getic artillery ofticers, the .jtask woulil have 
been almost hopeless. ^. • .j,; , ^ 

The charge of organizing this most impor- 
tant army was confided to Major (afterwards 
Brig.-Geu.) W. M. F. Barry, Cl],ief of Artillery, 
whose industry and zeal achieved the best 
results. The repert of Gen. B. is appended 
among the accompanying documents. By re- 
ferring to it, it will be observed that the fol- 
lowing principles were adopted as the basis 
of organization : 

" 1st. That tlie proi:)ortion of artillery should 
be in the ratio of at least 2i pieces to 1,000 
men, to be expanded, if possible, to 3 pieces 
to 1,000 men. 

"2d. That the proportion of rifled guns 
should be restricted to the system of the U. 
S. Ordnance Department, and of Barrott, and 
the smooth bores (with the exception of a few 
howitzers for special service) to be exclu- 
sively the 12-pounder gun, of the model of 
1857, variously called the ' gun-howitzer,' the 
' light 12-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' 
^ " 3d. That each field-battery should, if prac- 
ticable, be composed of 6 guns, and none to 
be less than 4 guns, and in all cases the guns 
of each battery should be of uniform calibre. 

"_4th. That the field-batteries were to be 
assigned to divisions, and not to brigades, and 
in the proportion of 4 to each division, of which 
one was to be a battery of regulars, th(*Te- 
mainder of volunteers, the captain of the re- 
gular battery to be the commandant of artil- 
lery of the division. In the event of several 
divisions constituting an army corps, at least 
one-half of the divisional artillery was to con- 
stitute the reserve of the corps. 

" 5th. That the artillery reserve of the whole 
army, should consist of 100 guns, and should 
comprise, besides a sufficient number of light 
' mounted batteries,' all the guns of position, 
and until the cavalry was massed, all the 
horse artiller3^ ' ' 

" 6th. That the amount of ammunition to ac- 
company the field batteries, was not to be less 
than 400 rounds per gun. 

" 7th. A siege train of 50 pieces. This was 
subsequently expanded— for special service at 
tlie siege of Yorktown — to very nearly 100 
pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres, 
and enormously heavy weight of metal of 2 
200-pounders ; 5 100-ppunders, and 10 thir- 
ton-inch sea-coast mortars." 
i.. As has been before stated, the Chio£ of 
Artillery reports : 

'• The whole of the field-artillery of the army 
©fthe Potomac, July 28th, 1861, was com- 
prised of 9 imperfectly equipped batteries of 
39 guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. In March, 
1862, when the whole army took the fiL-ld it 
consisted of 92 batteries of 520 guns, 12 500 
men, and i L,0U0 horses, fully equipped, and in 
readmess for active field service. Of the 
whole force, 30 batteries were regulars, and 
6^ batteries volunteers. During the sliort 
period of seven months, all of this immense 



S 



amount of material was issued by the Ordnance 
Dci)artment, and placed in the hands of the 
artdiery troops after their ai rival in Washine- 
ton. ^ 

" About one-fourth of all the volunteer, bat- 
teries brought with them from their respect- 
ive States a few guns and carriages, but they 
v?ere nearly all of such peculiar calibre, as to 
lack uniformity with the more modern and 
more serviceable ordnance, with which the 
other batteries were armed, and they, there- 
fore, had to be withdrawn and replaced by 
more suitable , material. While about one- 
sixth came supplied with horses and harness,, 
less_ than one-tenth were apparently fully 
equipped for service when they reported, and 
every one of these required the supply of 
many deficiencies of material, and very ex- 
tensive instruction in the theory and practice 
of their special arm. 

***** 
" The operations on the Peninsula by the 
army of the Potomac, commenced with a full 
field-artillery force of 52 batteries of 299 gims. 
To this, must be added the field-artillery of 
Franklin's division, of McDowell's corps, 
which joined a few days before the capture of 
Yorktown, but was not disembarked from its 
transports for service until after the battle of 
Williamsburg; and the field-artillery of Mc- 
CaU's division, of McDowell's corps— 4 bat- 
teries, 22 guns — which joined in June, a few 
days before the battle of "Mechanicsville. (June 
2Gtn, 1862), making a grand total of field-artil- 
lery, at any time with the army of the Potomac 
of 60 batteries, of 343 guns. With this large 
force serving in six corps-d'armee of eleven 
divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only 
general and field-officers v^'ere 1 brigadier-gene- 
ral, 4 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, and 3 
majors ;_ a number obviously insufficient, and 
which impaired, to a great degree, in conse- 
quence of the want ot rank and official influ- 
ence of the commanders of corps and division 
artillery, the efficienciy of the arm. As this 
faulty organization can be" suitably corrected 
only by legislative action, it is earnestly hoped 
that the attention of the proper authorities 
may be at an early day invited to it. 

" When there were so many newly organized 
volunteer field-batteries, many of whom re- 
ceived their first and only instruction in the 
intrenched camps covering Washington, during 
the three or four inclement months of the win- 
ter of 1861-62, there was, of course, much to 
be improved. Many of the volunteer batteries, 
however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, 
and availed themselves so industriously of the 
instructions of the regular officers, their com- 
manders and the example of the regular bat- 
teries, their associates, that they made rapid 
progress, and attained a degree of proficiencj 
highly creditable." 

The zeal and services of Major A. S. Webb, 
assistant to General Barry, entitle him to espe- 
cial praise. At the close of the Peninsula 



fainpaign, General Barry assumed the duties 
of chief x)f artillery of the defenses of Wash- 
ington, and was relieved in his former position 
by Ool. 11. J. ilunt, who had commanded tiie 
artillery reserve with marked skill, and brought 
to his duties as chief of artillery the highest 
qualitications. The services of this distin- 
guished officer in r.e-organizing and re-fitting 
the bafteries prioE to and after the battle of 
Anxietam, and his gallant and am'f skillful cou- 
iluct on tiiat field, merit the highest enconiuins 
lu my power to bestow. His -assistant, i\[;ij(?r 
Doull, deserves high credit for his services 
iud gallantry throughout both campaigns. 

[Derailed statement of the distribution of 
various regiments and batteries, as they ar- 
rived in Washington at this period ; and, also, 
au account of the composition of the army on 
the 15th of October, 1862, which are given in 
yiieldon's edition of the Report, are omitted in 
this edition.] 

ARMY CORPS. 

On the 8tb of j\tarch. 1862. the President di- 
rected, by the following order, the organization 
of the active portion of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, into four army corps, and the formation 
ol a tifth corps, from the divisions of Banks 
-wd Shields. The loilowing; is the text of the 
Presideui's order : 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, March 8th, 1862. 
/'resident's General War Order, No. 2. 

Ordered \st. That the Major-General com- 
manding the Army of tlie Potomac, proceed, 
forthVith, to organize that part of said armj' 
designed to enter upon active operations, (in- 
•iuding the reserve, but excluding the troops 
lO be left in the fortifications about \Vasiiing- 
ton), into four arniy corps, to be commanded 
according to seniority of rank, as follows : 

Isl Corps. To consist of four divisions, and 
lo be commanded by I\[o,j.-Geu. I. McDowell. 

2d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and 
to be commanded by iJrig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner. 

'id Corps. To consist of three divisions, and 
to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. S* P. Heintzel- 
inan. 

4i/« Corps. To consist of "three divisions, and 
to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. H D. Keyes. 

2d. That the divisions now commanded by 
the otTicers above assigned to the commands 
of army corps, shall be embi-aced in and form 
part of their respective corps. 

3d. The forces Jeft for the defense of Wash- 
ington, v/iU lie placed in command of Brig.- 
tien. -James 'Wadsworth, wiio shall also be 
Military Governor of the District of Columbia. 

4th. That this order be executed with such 
promptness and dispatch, as not to delay the 
commencement of the operations already di- 
rected to be undertaken by the Army of the 
Potomac. 

5th. A fifth army corps to be conmiandcd by 
Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, will be formed from his 
own, and General Shields', late Gen. Lauder's, 
division. A. Lincoln. 



The follolving order, which v?as made as 
seem £\g circumstances permitted, exliibits the 
steps takcli to carry out the requirements of 
the Preisdent's War Order, No. 2 ': 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 

Fairfax Court House, Va., March 13, 1862. 
General Orders, li'o. 101 : 

In compliuuce with the President's Wac 
Order, No. 2, of March 8th, 1862, the active 
portion of tho army of ihe Potoma'c is formed 
into corps, as follows i 

1«/. Corps, Major-Gen. Irwin McDowell, to 
consist^ for the present, of the divisions of 
Franklin, ^IcCall, and King. 

2d. Corps, Brig.-Gen. E. V, Sumner, divis- 
ions. Ptichardson. Blenker and Sedgwick. 

3(/. Corps, Brig.-Geik S. P. Heintzelman, di- 
jiisions, F. J.Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton. 

Aili. Corps, Brig-Gen. E. D. Keye&, divisions. 
Couch, Smith, and Casey. 

5<7i. Coi-ps. Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, divisions, 
Williams and Shields. 

The ciwalry regiments attached'1;o divisions, 
will, for the present remain so ; subsequent , 
orders will provide for these regiments, ag- 
well as for the reserve artillery, regular infan- 
try, and regular cavalry. ; 

Arrangements will be made to unite the di- 
visions of each army corps, as promptly as 
possible. The -commanders of divisions will 
at once report in person, or where that is im- 
possible, by letter to the commander of their 
army corps. By command of 

jMaj.-Gek. McClellax, 

A. V. CoLBURx, Ass't. Adjt.-Gen'l. 

[The details of the organization of the army^ 
April 1, 1862, are omitted in this edition 
THE STAFF. 

In a staff charged with labors so various 
and important as that of the army of the Poto- 
mac, a chief was indispeusible to supervise 
the various departments, and to relieve tho 
commanding general of details. The office of 
chief-of-staff, well known in European armies, 
had not been considered necessary in our ■ 
small peace establishment. The functions of 
the office were not defined, ■ and, so far as 
exercised, had been included in the adjutant- 
general's department. The small number of 
officers in this department, and the necessity 
for their employment in other duties, have 
obliged commanding generals during this war 
to resort to other branches of the service to 
fm'nish suitable chiefs-of-staft". 

On the 4th of September, 1861, 1 appointed 
Colonel R. B. Maroy, of the inspector-general's 
department, chief-of-staff, and he entered upon 
service innnediately, discharging the various 
and important duties with great fidelity, in- 
dustry, and ability, from this period until I was 
removed from command at Rectortown. 

Many improvements have been made during 
the war in oursysnemof stall' administration; 
but much remains to be done. 
Our own experience and that of other armies 



10 



ajp"ee in determining the necessity i'or an 
efficient and able stiiff. To obtain tliis, our 
staff establisbment sliould be based on correct 
principles and extended to be adequate .to the 
necessities of the service, and should include 
a system of staff and Une education. 

the affairs of the adjutant-gcneraFs depart- 
ment, while I commanded the army of the 
Potomac, Avere conducted by Brig.-Gen. S. 
Williams,- assisted bv Lieiit.-Col. James A. 
Hardie, A. D. C. 

Their management of the department during 
the organization of tin? army, in the fall and 
winter of 1861, and during its subsequent 
"operations in the held, was excellent. 

They were, during the entire period, assist- 
ed by Capt. Rd. B. Irwin, A. D. C, and during 
the organization of the army by the following 
named officers : "^ 

Capt. Jos. Kirkland, A. D. C. ; Capt. Arthur 
McClpllan,.A. D. C. ; Capt. M. T. McMaiion, 
A. D. C. ; Capt. W. P. Mason, A. D. C. ; Capt. 
W. F. Biddlc, A. D. C. 

•^Ty personal staff, when wc embarked for 
the peninsula, consisted of — 

Col. T. M. Key, additional A. D. C. ; Col. E. 
II. "Wright, do.,' and Major 6th U. S. Cavalry ; 
Col. T. T. Gantt, add. A. D. C. ; Col. J. J. Astor, 
Jr., volunteer aid-de-camp ; Lieut.-Col. A. Y. 
Colburn, add. A. D. C, and Captain in adjutant- 
general's department ; Lieut.-Col. N. B. Sweit- 
zer, add. A. D. C, and Capt. 1st U. S. Cavalry -, 
Lieut.-Col. E. M. K. Hudson, add. A. D. C. and 
Capt. 14th U. S. Infantry ; Lieut. Col. Paul Von 
Radowitz, add. A. D. G. ; Maj. II. Von Ham- 
merstein, add. A. D. C. ; Maj.'W. AV. Russell, 
U. S. Marine Corps ; Maj. F. Lecompte, of Swiss 
armv, volunteer tiid-de-camp ; Capt. Jos. Kirk- 
land", add. A. B.C. ; Capt. Arthur McClellan, add. 
A. D. C. ; Capt. L. P. D'Orleana, do. ; Capt. R. 
D'Orleans, do. ; Capt. M. T. McMahon; do. ; 
Capt. W. P. Mason, Jr., do. ; Capt. W. F. Biddle, 
do.; Catp. E. A. Raymond. 

To this number I am tempted to add the 
Prince de Joinville, who constantly accom- 
panied mc through the trying campaign of the 
peninsula, and frequently rendered important 
service. 

Of these officers, Capt. McMahon was as- 
signed to the personal staff of Brig.-Gen. 
Franklin, and Cajtts. Kirkland and Mason to 
that of r.rig.-Gen. F. J. Porter, during the siege 
of Vorktown : they remained subsequently 
with those general officers. 

Major Le'Compte left the army during the 
eiegc of Yorktown ; Col. Gantt, Col. Astor, Maj. 
Russell. Capts. L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, 
and Raymond, at the close of the Peninsula 
campaign. 

Before its termination, Capts. W. S. Abert 
and Chas. R. Lowell, of the 6th U. vS. Cavalry, 
and Capt. (J. A. Custer, 1st Lieut- 5th U. S. Ca- 
valry, joined my staff' as aids-de-camp, and re- 
mained witji me until I was relieved from tiie 
command of the army of the Potomac. 

All of tliese officers served me with great 



gallcintry and devotion ; 'hey were ever ready 
to execute any service, no matter how danger- 
ous, difficult, or fatiguing. 
INSPEGfOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. 

The highly important duties of this depart- 
ment were performed by Col. D. B. Sacket and 
Major N. II. Davis, to my entire .satisfaction, 
They introduced many valuable changes in 
the system of inspections and in (he forms of 
reports, and so systematized the labors of the 
inspectors of corps and divisions that excellent 
results were obtained. The intelligent and 
energetic perforftiance of their duties by these 
officers enabled me to keep myself well in- 
formed of the condition of the troops and cor- 
rect evils promptly. 

ENGINEERS. 

When I assumed command of the Army o1 
tlie Potomac, I found Major J. G. Barnard, U. 
S. Engineers, subseqilently Brig.-Gen. of vol- 
unteers, (.ccupying the position of chief en- 
gineer of the army. I continued him in the 
same office, and at once gave the necessary 
instructions for the completion of the defences 
of the capital, and for tlie entire reoi-ganiza- 
tion of the department. 

Under his direction the entire system ot 
defences was carried into execution. This 
was completed before the army departed for 
Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of 
the skill of the engineers and the dihgent la- 
bor of the troops. 

For some months after the organization of 
the army of the Potomac was commenced, 
there were no engineer troops with it ; at 
length, however, three companies were as- 
signed. Under the skillful management of 
Capt. J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineew;, these new 
companies rapidly became efficient, and, as 
will be seen, rendered most valuable service 
during the ensuing campaigns. 

The number ot engineer troops being entire- 
ly inadequate to the necessities of the army, 
an effort was made to partially remedy this 
defect, by detailing the 1 5th and 50th New York 
Volunteers, which contained many sailors and 
mechanics, as engineer troops. They were first 
placed unrley the immediate superintendence 
of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. Engineers, 
by whom they were instructed in the duties 
of pontooneers, and became somewhat familiar 
with those of sa^Jij^ers and miners. Previous 
to the movement of the army for the Penin- 
sula, this brigade was placed u^ider the com- 
mand of Brig.-Gen. D. P. Woodbury, Major 
U. S. Engineers. 

The labor of preparing the engineer and 
bridge trains devolved chiefly upon Capt. 
Duane, who was instructed to procure the 
new model French bridge train, as I was satis- 
fied that the India-rubber pontoon was entirely 
useless for the general purposes of a cam- 
paign. 

The engineer department presented the fol- 
lowing complete organization when the array 
moved for the Peninsula : 



li 



Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, Cliief Engineer ; 
let Lieut. H. L. Abbott, Top, Engineers, A. D.C. ; 
Brigade Vol. Engineora, ]5rig.-Gen. Woodbury, 
comm'g. ; 15th New York Vols., Col. ^IcLeod 
Murphy ; 50th do.. Col. C. B. Stewart ; Bat- 
talion 3 Cos. U. S. Engineers, Capt. J. C. Duane, 
comm'g. ^ 

Companies respectively commanded by 1st 
Lieut. C.B. Reese, U. S. Enghieers ; 1st C. 
E. Cross, do. ; 1st Lieut 0. E. Bubcock, do. 

The chief engineer was ably assisted in his 
d«ities by Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. 
Engineers ; 1st Lieut. C. R. Comstock, do. ; 1st 
Lieut. M. I). McAlester, do. ; 1st Lieut. Mer- 
rill, do. 

;Capt. C. S. Stewart, and 2d Lieut. F. U. Far- 
quhar, U. S. Engineers, joined after the army 
arrived at Fort M«nroe. 

The necessary bridge equipage for the 
operations of a large army had been collected, 
consisting of batteaux with the anchors and 
flooring material, (French model.) trestles and 
engineers' tools, with the wagons for tlieir 
transportation. 

The small number of officers of this corps 
available rendered it impracticable to detail 
engineers permanently at the headquarters of 
corpf and divisions. 

The companies of regular engineers never 
had their proper number of officers, and it 
was necessary, as a rule, to follow the prin- 
ciple of detailiiag engineer officers temporarily 
where ever tlieir services were required. 
TOrOGRAPHIOAL ENGINEERS. 

To the corps of Topographical Engineers 
wus intrusted the collection of topographical 
information and the preparation of campaign 
mai)s. Until a -short time previous to the de- 
parture of the army for Fort Monroe, Ijieut.- 
("ol. John W. Macomb, was in charge of this 
department, and prepared a large amount of 
valuable material. He was succeeded by 
13rig.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys, who retained 
the position throughout the peninsular cam- 
paign. 

These offiers were assisted by Lieut. H. ^. 
Abbot, Topographical Engineers ; Lieut. 0. G. 
Wagner, do. ; Lieut. N. Bowen, do. ; Lieut. 
John M. Wilson, do. ; Lieut. James H. Wilson, 
do. 

This number, being' the greatest available, 
was so small that much of the duty of the de- 
partment devolved upon parties fui-nisked by 
Professor Bache, Superintendent 'of Coast Sur- 
vey, and other gentlemen from civil life. fj^ 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topo- 
graphical maps, the labors of this corps were 
difficult and ardous in the extreme. Notwith- 
Btauding the energy and ability displayed by 
General Humphreys, Lieut.-Col. Macomb and 
their subordinates, who frequently obtained 
the necessary information under lire, the move- 
ments of the array were sometimes unavoida- 
bly delayed by the difficulty of obtaining 
knowledge of the country in advance. The 
result of their labors has been the preparation 



of an excellent series of maps, whicfi -will be 
invaluable to any army traversing the same 
ground. 

During the campaign it was impossible to 
draw a distinct line of demarcation between 
the duties of tlie two corps of engineers, bo 
that the labors of reconnoissances of roads, of 
lines for trenches, of fields for battle, and of 
the positions of the enemy, as well as the con- 
struction of siege and defensive works, werfe 
habitually perf(jrmed by detail from either 
corps as the convenience of the service de- 
manded. 

I desire to express my higli appreciation of 
the skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by 
the officers of both corps of engiiieers under 
the most trying circumstances. 

Daring the Maryland campaign I united the 
two corps under Captain J. C. Duane, U. S. 
Engineers, and found great advantages, from i 
this arrangement. "' ' " 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

For, the operations of tiie medical depart-, 
ment I refer to the reports transmitted here- 
with, of Surgeon Chas. S. Tripler, and Surgeon 
JoJiathan Letterman, who, in turn, performed 
the duties of medical director of the army of 
the Potomac : the former 'from August 12, 
1861, until July 1, 18^2, and the latter aftef 
that date. 

The difficulties to be overcome, in organiz-;',, 
ing arid making effective the medical depart-' " 
ment, were very great, arising principally 
from the inexperience of the regimental medi- 
cal officers, many of whom were physicians 
taken suddenly from civil life, who, according 
to Surgeon Tripler," had to be instructed in 
their duties from the very alphabet," and from 
the ignorance of the line officers as to their re- 
lations with the medical officers, which gave 
rise to confusion and conflict of authority. 

Boards of examination were instituted, by 
whicn many incompetent officers were re- 
moved, and by the successive exertions of 
Surgeons Tripler and Letterman the medical 
corps was brought to a very high degree of 
efficiency. 

With regard to the sanitary condition of tha 
army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says, 
that the records show a constant!}' increasing 
inmiunity from disease. " In October and 
November, 18G1, with an army averaging 
130,000 men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of 
all sorts; of these about 1,000 were reported 
as cases of typhoid fever. I knew that errors 
of diagnosis were frequently committed, and 
therefore this^nuist be considered as the limit 
of typhoid cases. If any army in the world 
can show such a record as this, I do not know 
when or where it was assembled." 

From September, 18G1, to February, 1862,,, , 
while the army was increasing, the Jiumber oi,- 
sick decreased from 7 per cent, to 6.18 pej",,_ 
cent. ; ot these, the men sick in iho regimentai/.' 
and general hospitals, were less than one-half,,,,, 
the remainder were slight cases uixler tie.at- . ( 



meut in quarters. " During this time, so far 
as rumor was concerned, the army was being 
decimated by disease every month." ' • - 

Of the sanitary condition of the army during 
the peninsular campaign, up to its arrival at 
Harrison's Landing, Dr. Tripler sa3's : 

" During this campaign the army was favor- 
ed with excellent health. No epidemic dis- 
eage appeared. Those scourges of modern 
armies — dysentery, typhus, cholera — were al- 
most unknown. We had some typhoid fever, 
and more malarial fevers ; but even these 
never prevailed to such an extent as to create 
any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes 
larger than we cared to have them, but the 
great majority of the cases reported were 
such as did not threaten life, or permanent 
disability. I regret that I have not before me 
the retained copies of the monthly reports, so 
that I might give accurate statistics. I have 
endeavored to recover them, but have been 
unsuccessful. My recollection is that the 
whole sick report never exceeded 8 per cent. 
of the force, and this included all sorts of 
cases — the trivial as well as the severe. The 
army of the Potomac must be considered to 
have been the most healthy army in the ser- 
vice of the United States." 

His remarks at the conclusion of his report 
npon our system of medical administration, 
and his suggestions for its improvement, are 
especially worthy of attention. 

The severe labors and privations of the 
troops during the seven day's battles, had of 
course a great effect on the health of the army 
after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing 
the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the 
whole force. 

The nature of the military operations had 
also unavoidably placed the medical depart- 
ment in a very unsatisfactory condition. Sup- 
plies had been almost entirely exhausted, or 
necessarily abandoned ; hospital tents aban- 
doned or destroyed ; and the medical officers 
deficient in numbers and broken down by 
fatigue. 

All the remarkable energy 'and ability of 
Surgeon Letterman were required to restore 
the efficiency of his department, but before we 
left Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in 
fitting it out throughout with the supplies it 
required, and the health of the army was vast- 
ly improved by the sanitary measures which 
were enforced at his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army was 
removed from the Peninsula, made it necessa- 
ry to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded 
afterwards, nearly all the baggage and trans- 
portation, including medical stores and ambu- 
lances, all the vessels being required to trans- 
port the trooj)s tliemselves and their ammuni- 
tion ; and when the army of the Potomac re- 
turned to Washington, after General Pope's 
campaign, and tlic medical department came 
once more under Surgeon lietternuiu's control, 
Jio foimd it in a deplorable condition. 



12 

Tlie ollicers were worn out by the labors 
they had performed, and the few supplies that 
had been brought from the Peninsula had been 
exhausted or abandoned,' so tliat tlie work of 
reorganization and resupplying had to be 
again performed, and this while the army was 
moving rapidly and almost in the face of the 
enemy. That it was successfully accomplish- 
ed is shown by the care and attention which 
the wounded received after the battles of South 
Mountain and Antietam. 

Among the improvements introduced into* 
his department by Surgeon Letterman, the 
principal are, the organization of an ambulance 
corps, the system of field-hospitals, and the 
method of supplying by brigades ; all of which 
were instituted during the Maryland cam- 
paign, and have since proved verv efficient. 
QUARTER-MASTER'S DEPARTMENT.] '■■'"■■ 
On assuming command of the troops in and 
about Washington, 1 appoiirted Captain S. 
Van Vliet, A. Q. M., (afterwards Brigadier- 
General.) Chief Quarter-master to my command, 
and gave him the necessary instructions for 
organizing his department, and collecting the 
supplies requisite for the large army then 
called for. ^ 

The disaster at Manassas had but recently 
occurred, and the army was quite destitute of 
quarter-masters' stores. 

General Van Yliet, with great energy and 
zeal, set himself about the task of furnishing 
the supplies immediately necessary, and pre- 
paring to obtain the still larger amounts which 
would be required bj' the new troops which 
were moving in large numbers towards the 
capital. 

The principal depot for supplies in the city 
of Washington Avas under charge of Col. D. H. 
Rucker, A. Q. M., who ably performed his du- 
ties. 

Lieut.-Col. R. Ingalls, A. Q. M., was placed 
in charge of the department on the south side 
of the Potomac. I directed a large depot for 
transportation to be established at Perryville, 
on the left bank of the Susquehaima, a i^oint 
equally accessible by rail and water. Capt. 
C. G. Sawtelle, A. Q. M., had immediate charge 
of the transportation in and about Washing- 
toM, as well as of the large number of horses 
purchased for' the use of tlie artiiler}'- and cav- 
alry. The principal difficulties which Gen. 
A' an Yliet had to encounter arose from the in- 
experience of the majority of the officers of 
his department in the new regiments and brig- 
gades. Tlie necessity of attending personally 
to minor details rendered his duties arduous 
and harassing in the extreme. All obstacles, 
however, were surmounted by the untiring in- 
dustry of the chief-quarter master and his im- 
mediate subordinates, and when the army was 
])repared to move, the organization of the 
de])artment was found to be admirable. 

When it was determined to move the army 
to the peninsula, the duties of providing water 
transportation were dovolvod, bv the Secretary 



of War, upon uis assistant, the Hon. J, Tucker 
The vessels were 'ordered to Alexandria, and 
Lient.-Col. Ingulls was placed in immediate 
charge of the embarkation of the troops, trans- 
portation, and material of every description. 
Operations of this nature on so extensive a 
scale had no parallel in the history of our 
country. 

The arrangements of Lieut.-Col. lugalls were 
perfected with remarkable skill and energ}^ 
and the army and its material, were embarked 
and transported to Fort Monroe in a very short 
space of time, and entirely without loss. 

During the operations on the Peninsula, until 
the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, 
Gen. Van Yliet retained the position of Chief 
Quartermaster, and maintained the thorough 
organization and efficiency of his department. 

The principal depots of supplies were under 
the.immediate chai*ge of Lieut.-Col. Ligalls and 

On the 10th of July^ l8C2, Gen. Tan Yliet, 
having requested to be Tclieved from duty 
with the army ojf the Potomac, I appointed 
Xieut.-Col. Ingalls Chief Quartermaster, and he 
continued to discharge tlae duties of that office 
during the remainder of the Peninsular and 
the Maryland camp^iigns, in a manner which 
fully sustained the high reputation he had pre- 
.viously acquii'ed. 

.. The immense amount of labor accomjalished, 
often under the most difficult circumstances, 
tl\e admirable system under which the duties 
of the department were performed, and the 
entire success which attended the efforts to 
supply so large an army, reflect the highest 
credit upon the officers upon whom these 
onerous duties devolved. The reports of Gen. 
Van Yliet, and Lieut.-Col. lugalls, with the ac- 
companying documents, give, in detail, the 
history of the department, from its organiza- 
tion until I was relieved from the command of 
the army of the Potomac. 

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 
_ On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. I. 
Clarke, C. S., joined my staff, and at once enter- 
ed upon his duties as Chief Commissary of the 
army of the Potomac. In order to realize the 
responsibilities pertaining to this office, as well 
as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount 
of labor which must necessarily devolve jipon 
its occupant, it is only necessary to consider 
the unprepared state of the country to engage 
in a war of such magnitude as the present, 
aud the lack of practical knowledge on the 
part of our officers, with reference to supply- 
ing and subsisting a large, aud, at that time, 
an unorganized army. Yet, notwitastauding 
the existence of these great obstacles, the 
manner in which the duties of the commissary 
department were discharged, was such as to 
merit, and call fuii.h the commendation of the 
entire army. During the stay of the army of 
the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, 
prior to the Peninsular campaign, its subsist- 
ence was drawn chiefly from the depots which 



13 



had been established by the commi ssary de 
partment at Washington, Alexandria, Forts 
Corcoran and Runyon. In the important task 
of designating and establishing depots of sup- 
plies, Colonel Clarke was ably seconded by his 
assistants. Col. Amos Beckwith, C. S., U. S A., 
Lieut.-Col. Geo. Bell, C. S., U. S. A.. Lieut.-Col. 
A. P. Porter, C.S., U.S.A., Capt. Thomas Wil- 
son, C. S., U. S. A,, Capt BrowueU Granger, C.S., 
U. S. Vols., Capt. W. H. Bell. C. S., U.S. A., 
Capt.. I H. Woodward, C. S., U. S. Vols., and 
Captain W. R. Murphy, C. S., I J. S. Vols. For 
a full knowledge of the highly creditabo man- 
ner in which each and all of ihe above men- 
tioned officers discharged their duties,! invite 
attention to the detailed report of Col. Clarke. 
The remarks and suggestions contained in this 
report, are worthy of attention, as affording 
valuable rules for the future guidance of the 
subsistence department, in suppljnng armies 
in the field. The success of the subsistence de- 
partment of the army of the Potomac, was, in 
a great measure, attributable to the fact, that 
the subsistence department at Washington 
made ample previous provision for sending 
supplies to the peninsula, and that it always 
exercised the most intelligent foresight. It 
morever gave its advise and countenance to 
the officers charged with its duties and repu- 
tation in the field , and those officers, I am 
happy to say, worked with it and together,. ifl 
perfect harmony, for the public good. ■■ 

During the entire period that I was in oom- 
mand of the army of the Potomac there was 
no instance within my knowledge, where the 
troops were without their, rations from any 
fault of tlie officers of this department. 
ORDINANCE DEPARTMENT. 
This very important branch of the service 
was placed under tlie. charge of Capt. C. P. 
Kingsbury, ordnance corps, Colonel and A.D. 
C. Great difficulty existed in the proper or- 
ganization ot the department, from the want 
of a sufficient number of suitable officers to 
perform the duties at the various headquarters 
and depots of supply. But far greater obsta- 
cles had to be sm-mounted, from the fact 
that the supply of small arms was totally in- 
adequate to the demands of a large army, and 
a vast proportion of those furnished, were of 
such inferior quality, as to be unsatisfactory 
to the troops, and condemned by their ofiicers. 
The supply of artillery was more abundant, 
but of great varipty. Rifled ordnance was just 
coming into use for the flrst time in this coun- 
try, and the description of gnn and kind of 
projectile, which would prove most eflective, 
and should therefoi'e be adopted, was a mere 
matter of theory. , "i 

To obviate these difficulties, large quantities 
of small arms of foreign manufacture were 
contracted for; private enterprise in the con- 
struction of arras and ammunition was en- 
couraged ; and by the timevthe army was or- 
dered to move to the peninsula, tlie amount 
of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. 



Much, also, had been done to Dnng the quality 
both of arras and ammunition, up to the pro- 
per standard, Boards of officers were in ses- 
sion continually, during the autumn and winter 
of 1861, to test thercia'Ave merits of new arms 
and projectiles. The reports of these boards, 
confirmed by subsequent experience in the 
field, have done much to establish the respec- 
tive claims of different inventions and manu- 
factories. Durifig the campaigns of the Pen- 
insula and Maryland, the officers comiected 
Tvitii the department, were zealous and ener- 
getic, and kept the troops well supplied, not- 
withstanding tlie perplexing and arduous iia- 
iure of their duties. One great source of per- 
plexity, was the fact, that it had been neces- 
sary to issue arms of all varieties and calibres 
giving an equal diversity in tlie kinds of am- 
munition required. Untiring watchfulness was 
therefore incumbent upon the officers in charge 
to prevent confusion anil improper distribu- 
tion of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- 
charged the duties of his office with great 

efficiency,} until the of July, 1862, when 

his health required that he should be relieved. 
1st Lieut. Thomas Cr. Baylor, ordnance corps, 
succeeded him, and peformed his duty during 
tho remainder of the Peninsular and Maryland 
campaigns, with marked ability and success. 
The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury 
and Lieut. Baylor, renders it impossible for me 
to enter, at all, into the details of the organiza- 
tion of the department. 
PROVOST-MARSHAL'S DEPARTMENT. 

Immediately after I was placed in command 
of the " Division of the Potomac'" I appointed 
Col. Andrew Porter, 16th U. S. Infantry, Pro- 
vost-JIarshal of Washington. All the avail- 
able regular infantry, a battery, and a squadron 
of cavalry, were placed under his command ; 
and by his energetic action, he soon corrected 
the serious evils which existed, ai|d restored 
order in the city. 

When the army was about to take the field. 
General Porter was appointed Provost-Marshal 
General of the ai"my of the Potomac, and held 
that most important position until the end of 
the Peninsular campaign, when sickness, con- 
tracted in the untiring discharge of his duties 
compelled him to ask to be relieved from the 
position he had so ably and energetically filled. 
The provost-mai'slial general's department had 
the charge of a class of duties, which had not 
before, in our service, been defined and group- 
ed under the management of a special depart- 
ment. The following subjects indicate the 
sphere of this department : 

Suppression of marauding and depredations 
and of all brawk and disturbances. 

Preservation of good order and suppression 
of drunkeimess beyond the limits of the 
camps. 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 

Suppression of 'gambUng-hoiiseB, drinking- 
houses, or bar-rooms and l)rothel8. 

Reguliition of hotels, taverns, markets, and 
places of public umusemeuU 



14 



Searches, seizures and arrests. 

Execution of sentences of general courts 
martial, involving imprisonment or capital 
punishment. 

Enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale 
of intoxicating liquors, whether by rraflesmen 
or sutlers, and of orders respectin,: jiassea. 

Deserters from the army. -^ 

Prisoners of war taken from the oiu'Miy. 

Countersigning safe-guards. 

Passes to citizens, within tlie liiu.-s and for 
purposes of tra'de. 

Complaints of cititizens as to the conduct of 
the soldiers. 

General Porter was assisted by the follow- 
ing named officers : 

''Alajor W. n Wood, 17th U. S. Infantry ; 
Capt. James ?iicMdlan, A. A. A. G., U. S. Infan- 
try ; Capt. W. T. Gentry, 17th U. S. Infantry ; 
Capt. J. W. Forsyth, 18th U. S. Infautrv ; Lieut. 
J. AV. Jones, 12th U. S. Infantry ; Lient. C. F. 
Trowbridge, 16th U. S. Infantry ; Lieut. 0. D. 
Mehaffey, 1st U. S. Infantry. 

The provost guard was composed of the 2d 
U. S- Cavalry, Major Pleasonton, and a bat- 
talion of the 8th and 17th U. S. Infautrv, Major 
Willard. 

After General Porter was relieved. Major 
Wood was in charge of this department, until 
after the battle of Antietam, when Brigadier- 
General Patrick was appointed Provost Mar- 
shal General. 

COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEAD- 
QUARTERS. 

When the army took the field, for the ptir- 
pose of securing order and regularity in the 
camp of headquarters, and for facilitating its 
movements, the office of commandant of gen- 
eral headquarters was created, and assigned to 
Major G.'O. llaller, 7th U. S. Infantry. Six 
companies of infantry were placed under his 
orders for guard and police duty. Among Hi© 
orders appended to this report, is the one de- 
fining his duties, which were ahvajs satisfac- 
torily performed. 

JUDGE-ADVOCATE. 

From August, 1861, the position of judge- 
advocate was held by Col Thos. (iantt, A. D. C, 
until compelled by ill health to retire, at Har- 
rison's Landing, in August, 1862. His reviews 
of the decisions of courts-martial during this 
period, were of great utilitj' hi correcting the 
practice in military courts, diffusing tnw; no- 
tions of discipline and subordination, and set- 
ting before the army a high standard of sol- 
dierly honor. 

Upon the retirement of Colonel G'antt, the 
duties of judge-advocate were ably performed 
by Col. Thomas M. Key, A. D. C. 
SIGNAL COR.i'S. 

The method of conveying intelligence and 
orders, invented and introduced into the ser- 
vice by JMaj. Albert J. Myor. signal officer, 
U. S. A., was first practically tested in large 
operations, during the organization of the 
arrav of the Potomac. 



Under the direction of Major Myer, a signul 
corps was formed by detailing oificera and 
men from the different regiments of volnn- 
tiers. and instructing them in the use of the 
fl igs by day, and torches by niglit. 

The chief signal officer was indefatigable in 
his exertions to render his corps effective, and 
it soon became available for service, in every 
division of the army. 

In addition to the flags and torches, Major 
Mjer introduced a portable insulated tele- 
graph wire, which could be readily laid from 
point to point, and which co\ild be used under 
the same general system. 

In front of Washington, and on the lower 
Potomac, at any point witliin our lines' not 
reached by the • military telegraph, the great 
usefulness of this system of signals was made 
manifest. But it was not until after the ar- 
rival of the army upon the Peninsula, and 
during the siege and battles of that, and the 
Maryland campaign, that the great benefits to 
be derived from it on the field, and under fii-e, 
were fully appreciated. 

There was scarcely an action or skirmish 
in which the signal corps did not render im- 
portant services. Often, under heavy fire of 
artillery, and not unfrequently while exposed 
to musketry, the officers and men of this corps 
gave information of the movements of the 
enemy, and transmitted directions for the evo- 
lutions of our own troops. 

The report of the chief signal officer, with 
accompanying documents, will give the details 
of the services of this corps, and call attention 
to those iuembers of it who were particularly 
distinguished. 

TELEGRAPHIC. 
The telegraphic operations of the army of 
the Potomac were superintended by Major 
Thos. J. E>>}vert, and under the immediate di- 
rection of INIr. Caldwell, who was with 

the corps of operatives attached to my head- 
quarters during the entire campaigns upon 
the peninsula and in ilaryland. 

The services of this corps were arduous 
and efficient. Under the admirable arrange- 
ments of Major Eckert they were constant!}' 
provided with all the uaterial for construct- 
ing new lines, which were rapidly estab- 
lished whenever the army changed position ; 
and it was not unfrequently the case that 
the operatives worked under fire from the 
enemy's guns, yet they invarialy performed 
all the duties required of them with great 
alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom 
that I was without the means of direct tele- 
graphic communication with the AVar Depart- 
ment, and with the corps commanders. 

From the organization of the army of the 
Potomac, up to Nov. 1, 1862, including the 
Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, upwards 
of 1,200 miles of military telegrajth lines had 
been constructed in connection with the 
"ij»erations of the army, and. the number of 
"'^uatives and builders emoloved was about 



15 

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and en- 
teri)rising aeronaut, who had the management 
of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for 
the valuable information obtained during hia 
ascensions. . "^ 

1 have more than once taken occasion to re- 
commend the members of my staff, both ge- 
neral ami personal, for promotion and reward. 
I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, 
and to record their names in the history of the. 
army of the Potomac as gallant soldiers, to 
whom their country owes a debt of gratitude, 
still unpaid, for the courage, ability and un- 
tiring zeal they displayed during the eventful 
campaigns in which they bore so prominent a 
part. 
POSITION OF THE ARMY, OCT., 18G2. 
On the 15th of October, the main body of 
the army of the Potomac was in the immedi- 
ate vichiity of Washington, with detachments 
on the left bank of the Potomac as far down 
as Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williame- 
port and its vicinity. The different divisions 
were posted as follows : 

Hooker, at Budd's Ferry, lower Potomac ; 
Heintzelman, at Fort Lyon and vicinity ; Frank- 
lin, near the Theological Seminary ; Blenker, 
near Hunter's Chapel ; McDowell, at Upton's 
Hill and Arlington ; F. J. Porter, at Hall's and 
Miner's Hills ; "Smith, at I\f ckall's Hill ; McCiUl, 
at Langley ; Buell, at Tenallytown, Meridian 
Hill, Emory's Chapel, &c., on the left bank of 
the river ; Casey at Washington ; Hunt's Ar- 
tillery, do. ; Banks, at Darnstown, with De- 
tachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, 
Williamsport, &c. ; Stone at Poolesville ; Dix, 
at Baltimore, with detachments on the eastern 
shore. 

THE AFFAIR AT BALL'S BLUFF. 
On the 19th of October, ISGl, Gen. McCall 
marched to Drainesville with his division, in 
order to cover reconnoissances to be made in 
all directions the next day, for the purpose of 
learning the position of the enemy, and of 
covering the operations of the topographical 
engineers in making maps of that region. 

On the 20th, acting in concert with Gen. 
McCall, Gen. Smith pushed strong parties to 
Freedom Hill, Vienna, Fhnt Hill, Peacock Hill, 
&c., to accomplish the same purpose in that 
part of the front. 

These recounoissances were successful. 
On the morning of the 20th I received tiie 
;"ollowing telegram from Gen. Banks' head- 
quarters : ^^ 

® Darxestown, Oct. 20, 1861. 
Gen. Maroy : ' 

Sir, — The signal station at Sngar Loaf tele- 
graphs that the enemy have moved away from 
Leosburg. All quiet here. 

R. M. CopKi.AND, A. A. G. 
Whei'eupon I sent to Gen. Stone, at Pooles- 
ville, the following telegram : 

Camp GiaKv-iN, Oct. 20, 1861. 
Brig.-Gcn. C. P. Stone, Poolesville : 

Gen. McClellan desires rao to inform you 



16 



tliat Gen. McOall occupied DfaftJoesville, yes- 
terday, and is still there. Will send out 
lieavy reconoissances tO'day in all directions 
from that point. The general desires that 
yon keep a good lookout. on Lcesb\n-g. to see 
if this movement has the effect to drive them 
away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on 
your part would have the effect to move them. 

A. Y. OoLBURN, Ass'-Adj.Gcii. 
. Teeming it ]ios8ibIe that Gcn.jMcCaH's 
niovcraont to Drainesville, together with the', 
sulis- qnon'. roconnoissances, might have the 
clR-ct of HKbiciiig the enemy to abandon Lees- 
l»urg, and the dispatch from .Sugar Loaf ap- 
pearing to confirm this view, 1 wished Gen. 
Stone, wiio had only a line of pickets on the 
river, the mass of his lxoo))S being out of, 
and beyoml range trom the Virginia bank, to 
make some display of intention to cross, and 
also to watch the enemy more closely tlian 
usual. 1 did not direct him to cross, nor did 
I intend that he should cross the river in 
force for the purpose of fighting. 

The above dispatch was sent on. tlie 20th.' 
and reached G?n. ^lone as early as 11 a.m. of 
th^. day. I expected him to accomplish all 
that was intended on the sanio day ; and this 
he did, as will be seen from the iollowing dis- 
patch received at my headquarters in AVash- 
ington, from rooiosville, on the evening of 
October 20th. 
To M.\j.-Gkn. McCu<:li,.\k : 

Made a feint of crossing at this place this 
afternoon, and at the same time started a re- 
cc)nnoitriug i)arty towards Leesburg from 
Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets re- 
tired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoit- 
ring party not yet received. I have means 
of crossing 125 men once in ten minutes at 
each of two points. River falling slowly. 
C. P. Stone, Brig. Gen. 

.'Vs it was not foreseen or expected that 
Gen. McCall would be needed to co-operate 
with Gen. Stone in any attack, he was directed 
to fall back from Drainsville to his original 
camp near Prospect Hill, as soon as there(piir- 
ed reconnoissances were completed. Accord- 
ingly he left Drainesville on his return at 
ab'out 8 1-2 A. M. of the 21st, reaching his old 
camp at alx>ut 1 p. m. 

In the meantime I was surprised to hear 
from Gen. Stone that a portion of his troops 
were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, 
and at oiice sent instructions to Geji. McCall to 
remain at Drainesville if he had not left before 
the order reached him. 

■ The order did not reach him until his return 
to his cam]) at Langley. Ke was then ordered 
to rest his men, and hold his division in readi- 
ness to return to Drainesville at a moments no- 
lice, should it become necessary. 

Similar instructions were given to other di- 
■visions during the afternoon. 

The first intimation I received from Gen. 
Stone of the real nature of his movements was 
ia a telegram as follows : 



. f Edward'b Ferry, 11.10 a m. Oct. 21 . 

Maj.-Gen. McGlellan,— 

The enemy have been engaged opposite 
Harrison's Island. Our men are behaving ad- 
mirably. 

C. P. Stonk, Brigadier-Gen. 
At 2 P. .M. Gen. ]5anks' adjutant-general 
sent the following: 

Darnstown, Oct. 2!, 1861, 2 p. M. 
Gen. R. B. Marcy, — 

Gen, Stone safely crossed the river this 
moaning. Some engagements have taken place 
on the other side of the river : !iuw important 
is not known. 

R. M.Coi'Et.ANi), A. A. A. G. 
Gen. Stone sent the following dispatches on 
the same day at the hours indicated : 

.Edwards' Ferry, Oct. 21, 18G1, 2. i- .v. 
Maj.-Gcn. McClellan, — 

There has been sharp firing on the right of 
oiu' line, and our t:roo])s aj^jiear to be advanc- 
ing there under Baker. The left under Gor- 
man, has advanced its skirmishers nearly' one 
mile, and if the movement contiraies successful 
will turn the enemy's right. 

C. P. Stoxr. Brigadier-General. 
.'Edward' Feiry, Oct. 21st. IStjl, 4 p. m. 
Gen. McClellan,— 

Nearly all my force is across the river. Ba- 
ker on the right, Gorman on the left, right 
sharply engaged. 

5 C. P. Stonk, Biigadier-Gcneral. 

Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861, 9.30 r. m. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 

I am occupied in preventing further disas- 
ter, and trj'ing to get into position to redeem. 
We have lost some of our best commanders — 
Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner, or secreted. 
The wotinded are being carefully and rapidly 
removed, and Gorman's wing is being cauti- 
ously witiulrawn. Any advance from Di'aines- 
ville must be made cautiously. All was re- 
l)orted going well up to Baker's death, but in 
the confusion following that, the right wing 
was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless 
a night attack is made, be in the same position 
as last night, save the loss of many good men. 
C, P. Stone, Brigadier-General. 
Although no more fully informed of the 
state of affairs, I had, during the afternoon, as 
a precautionary measure, ordered G%n. Banks 
to send one Brigade to the support of the 
troops at Harrison's Island, and to move with 
the other two to Seneca Mills, ready to suyj- 
port Gen. Stone if necessary. The 9.30 v. m. 
dispatch of Gen. Stone did not give mc an en- 
tire understanding of the state of the case. 
.'Vware of the difficulties, and perhaps fatal 
consequences of recrossin.g such a river as the 
l\)tomac after a repulse, and from tliese tele- 
grams su])posing his Avhole force to be on the 
Virginia side, I directed Gen. Stone to intrench 
himself, .and hold the Virginia side at all haz- 
ards until re-enforcements could arrive, when 
he could safely withdraw to the Mar3-land side, 
or hold his position on the Virginia side, should 
that ptOYfi aiiyissil).!*}. 



17 



Gen. Banks was instructed to move the rest 
of his division to Edward's Ferry, and to send 
over as many men as possible before daylight, 
to re-enforce Stone, lie did not arrive in time 
to effect this, and was instructed to collect all 
the canal boats he could find, and use them 
for crossing at Edwards' Ferry in sufficient 
force to enable the troops ah'eady there to hold 
the opposite side. ^ 

On the 22d I went to tlie ground in person, 
and reaching Poolesville learned for the first 
time the full details of the aftair. 

The following extracts from the evidence of 
Gen. Stone before the " Committee on the Con- 
duct ot the War," on the 5th of January, 1862, 
will throw further light on this occurrence. 

Gen. Stone saj-s he received the orders from 
niy headquarters, to make a slight demonstra- 
tion, at about 11 o'clock a.m of the 20th, and 
that in obedience to that order he made the 
demonstration on the evening of the same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, 
which resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he 
was asked the following questions : 

" Queslion. Did this reconnoissance originate 
with yourself, or had you orders from the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief to make it ?'' 

To wdiich he replied: "It originated with 
myself — the reconnoissance." 

" Question. The order did not proceed from 
General McClellan ?" 

''Answer. I was directed, the day before, to 
make a demonstration. That demonstration 
( was made the day previous'^ 

" Question. Did you receive an order from 
the General-in-Chief to make the reconnois- 
eance ?" 

"Answer. No, sir." 

Making a personal examniation on tne 22d I 
found that the position on the Virginia side at 
Edward's Ferry was not a tenable one, but did 
not think it wise to withdraw the troops by 
daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to 
be jdaced in position on the Maryland side, to 
cover the approaches to the ground held by 
us, and crossed the few additional ti'oops that 
the high wind permitted us to get over, so as 
to be as secure as possible against any attack 
during the day. Before night-fall, all the pre- 
cautions were taken to secure an orderly and 
quiet passage of the troops and guns. The 
movemeht was commenced soon after dark, 
xnider the general supervision of Gen. Stone, 
who received the order for the withdrawal at 
7.15 P.M. By 4 A.M. of the 24th every thing had 
reached the ilaryland shore in safetj'. 

A few daj's afterwards I received informa- 
{',tion, which seems to be authentic, to the effect 
that large bodies of« the eneujy had been or- 
dered from Jlanassas to Leesburg, to cut off 
our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely 
withdrawal had probiibly prevented a still more 
serious disaster. I refer to Gen. Sttme's Report 
of this battle lunuslicd \o the War Department, 
and his published testimony before the " Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War" for further 
details. 



THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITION, 

The records of the War Department show 
my anxiety and efforts to assume active offen- 
sive operations in the fall and early winter. 
It is only just to say, however, that the unpre- 
cedented condition of the roads and Virginia 
soil would have delayed an advance till Febru- 
ary' had the discipline, organization and equip- 
ment of the army been as complete at the close 
of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired 
and labored, against every impediment, to make 
them. While still in comman<l only of the ar- 
my of the Potomac, namely, in early September, 
I proposed the formation of a corps. of New 
Englanders for coast service in the' bays and 
inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac to co- 
operate with .my own command, from which 
most of its material was drawn. %ji 

On the 1st of November, however, I Avas 
called to relieve Liet.-Gen. Scott in the chief 
and general command of the armies of the 
Union. The direction and nature of this coast 
expedition, therefore, were somewhat changed, 
as Avill soon appear in the original plan sub- 
mitted to the Secretary of War, and the letter 
of instructions later issued to Gen. Burnside, 
its commander. The whole country indeed 
had now become the theatre of military opera- 
tions from the Potomac to and beyond the 
ilississippi, and to assist the Navy in perfect- 
ing and sustaining the blockade, it became 
necessary to extend those operations to points 
on the sea-coast, Roanoke Island, Savannah, and 
New Orleans. It remained also to equip and 
organize the armies of the West, whose condi- 
tion was little better than that of the army of 
the Potomac had been. 

The direction of the campaigns in the West, 
and of the operations upon the sea-board en- 
abled me to enter upon larger combinations, 
and to accomplish results the necessity and 
sdvantage of Avhich had not been unforeseen, 
but which had been beyond the ability of the 
single army formerly under my command, to 
effect. 

The following letters and a subsequent pa- 
per addressed to the Secretary of War suffi- 
ciently indicate the nature of those condjina- 
tions to minds accustomed to reason upon mil- 
itary operations. 

Headquarters, Army op the Potomac, 
AVasiiixgton, Sept. 6, 1861. 
Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

Sir : I have the honor to suggest the follow- 
ing proposition, with the request that the ne- 
cessary authority be at once given me to carry 
it out; to organize a force of two brigades of 
five regiments each of New England men, for 
the general service — but particularly adapted 
to coast service. The officers and men to be 
sufficiently conversant with boat service to 
manage steamers, sailing vessels, launches, 
barges, surf boats, floating batteries, itc. To 
charter or buy for the command a sufficient 
number of propellers or tug-boats for trans- 
portation of men and supplies, the machinery 



of which should be amply protected by tim- 
ber : the vessels to have permanent experi 
enced officers from the merchant service, but 
to be manned by details from the command. 
A naval ollicer to be attached to the staff of 
the commanding officer. The flank companies 
of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren 
boat-guns, and carbines with water-proof cart- 
ridges ; the otlier companies to have such arms 
as i may liereaftcr designate, to be uniformed 
and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments 
are. Launches and floating batteries, with 
timber parapets of sufficient capacity to laud 
or bring into action the entire force. 

The entire management and organization of 
the force to be under my control, and to form 
an integral part of the army of the Potomac. 

The immediate object of this force is for 
operations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and 
the Potomac : by enabling me thus to' land 
troops at points where they are needed — this 
force can also be used in conjunction with a 
naval force operating against points on tho 
sea-coast. This coast division to bo com- 
manded by a general officer of my selection. 
The regiments to be organized as other land 
forces. Tlie disbursements for vessels, &c., to 
be maileby the proper department of the army, 
upon the requisitions of the general command- 
ing tlie division, with my approval. 

I thnik the entire force can be organized in 
thirty daj'S, and by no means the least of the 
advantages of this proposition is the fact, that 
it will call into the service a class of men who 
would not otherwise enter the army. 

You will immediately perceive that the object 
■ of this force is to fuliow along the coast, and up 
the inlets am] rivers, the movements of the main 
army when it advances. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
(x. B. McGlellan, Maj.-Gen. Comdg. 

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring 
the requisite vessels, and adapting them to 
the special purposes contemplated, this expe- 
dition was not ready for service until January, 
1862. 

Then in the chief command I deemed it best 
to send it to North Carolina with the design 
indicated in the following letter : 

Head-quarters of the army, Washington, Jan. 
7, 18G2. Jirig.-G-en. A. E. Burnside, Command- 
ing ExpedUlon. 

GKN'KiiAn: — In accordance with verbal in- 
structions heretofore given you — you will, 
after uniting with flag-oflicer Goldsborough, at 
Fort Monroe, proceed under his convey to 
Hattoras Iidet, where you v/ill in connection 
•with him, take the most prompt measures for 
■crossing the fleet over the bulkiicad into the 
waters of the sound. Under the accompany- 
■in,g general order constituting tiie Depaitment 
of North Carolina, you will assiune conunand 
oi the garrison at ilatteras Inlet, and make 
such dispositions in regard to that place, as 
your )flterior operation.s may render necessary 
— alway.s being careful to provide tor thosafc- 



18 



ty of that very important station in any con- 
tingency. ^1 

Yo)u- tirst point of attack will be Roanoko 
Island and its dependencies. 

It is presumed that the navy can reduce tha 
batteries on the marshes, and cover, the land^ 
ing of your troops on the main i!^land by 
which, in connection with a rapid movement 
of the gun-boats to the northern extremity — 
as soon as the marsh battery is reduced — it 
may be hoped to capture the entire garrison 
of tke place. Having occupied the Island and 
its dependeocies, you will at once proceed to 
the erection of the batteries and defenses ne- 
cessary to hold the position with a small force, 
should the flag-officer require any assistance 
in seizing or holding the debouches of the 
canal from Norfolk — you will please afford it 
to him. 

The commodore and yourself having com- 
pleted your arrangments in regard to Roanoke 
Island, and the waters north of it; you will 
please at once make a descent on Newbern ; 
having gained possession of wdiich, and the 
railroad passing through itjou ^Vill at enco 
tlirow a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and 
take the steps neccssarj' to reduce Fort Macon 
and open that port. When j'ou seize New- 
bern, you will endeavor to seize the railroad 
as far west as Goldsborough — should circum- 
stances favor such a movement. The temper 
of the people, the rebel force at hand, &c., will 
go far towards determining the question as to 
how far west the railroad can be occupied and 
held. Should circumstances render it advisa- 
ble to seize and hold Raleigh — the main north 
and south line of railroad passing through 
Goldsborough, should be so effectually des- 
troyed for considerable distances north and 
south of that point, as to render it impossible 
for the rebels to use it to your disadvan- 
tage. A great pohit would be gained in any 
event, by the effectual destruction of the Wil- 
mington and Weldon Railroad. 

I would advise great caution in moving so 
far into the interior as upon Raleigh. Hav- 
ing accomplished the objects mentioned — tho 
next point of interest would probably be Wil- 
mington, the reduction of which may require 
that additional means shall be afforded you. 
I would urge great caution in regard to pro- 
clamations. In no case Avould I go beyond a 
moderate joint proclamation with the naval 
commander, which should say as little as pos- 
sible about politics or the negro, merely state 
that the true issue for which we are fighting 
is the preservation of the Union, and uphold- 
ing the laws of the <reneral government, and 
stating that all who conduct themselves pro- 
perly, will as far as possible be protected in 
their persons and property." 

You will please report your operations as 
often as an opportunity ofl'ers itselt 

With my best wishes for your success. 

I am, <fcc., k,Q., G. B. McClellan, 
Maj. Gen. Com'g. in Chief. 



OPBRATIONS IN THE WEST AND yOUTH. 

The following letters of instructions were 
sent to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman and 
Butler ; and I also comaiiMiicated verbally to 
these officers my views in full, regarding the 
field of operations assigned to each, and gave 
them their instructions as much in detail as 
was necessary at that time. 

Head-Quarters of the Army. 
Washington, D. C, November 11, 1861. 
Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, U. S. A. 
Gomel' g. Depi. of Missouri. 
Gkeerai- : — In assigning you to the com- 
mand of the Department of Missouri, it is pro- 
bably necessary for me to state that I have 
intrusted to you a duty which requires the 
utmost tact and decision. 

■ You have not merely the ordinary duties of 
a military commander to perform ; but the far 
more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, 
of changing probably the majority of the per- 
sonnel of the stafl' of the department, and of 
reducing to a point of economy consistent with 
the interests and necessities of the state, a 
system of reckless expenditure and fraud per- 
haps unheard of before in the history of the 
world. 

You will find in your department many gen- 
eral and staft'-officers holding illegal commis- 
sions and appointments not recognized or ap- 
proved by the President or Secretary of War, 
you will please at once inform these gentlemen 
of the nulity of their appointment, and see 
that no pay or allowances are issued to them 
umtil such time as commissions may be author- 
ized by the President, or Secretary of War. 

If any of them |give the slightest trouble 
you will at once arrest him and send him un- 
der guard, out of the limits of your dei)art- 
ment, informing them that if they return they 
will be placed in close confinement. You will 
please examine into the legality of the organi- 
zation of the troops serving in the department. 
When you find any illegal, unusual, or impro- 
per organizations you will give to the officers 
and men an opportunity to enter the legal mil- 
itary establishment under general laws and 
orders from the War Department ; reporting 
in full to these head-quarters any officer or 
organization that may decline. 

You will please cause competent and reliable 
staff officei's to examine all existing contracts 
immediately, and suspend all payments upon 
them imtil you receive the report in each case. 
Where there is the slightest doubt as to the 
propriety of the contract, you will be good 
enough to refer the matter witli full explanation 
to these head-quarters, statirg in each case 
"what would be a fair conipcnsition for the 
services or materials rendered under the con- 
tract. Discontinue at once the reception of 
material or services under any doubtful con- 
tract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all 
officers who have in any way violated tlieir 
duty to the government. In regard to the po- 
litical conduct of affairs, you Vi'ill please labor 



10 



to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri 
and the adjacent States, that we are figliting 
solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold 
the power of our national government and to 
restore to the nation the blessings of peace 
and good order. ^S' 

With respect to military -operations, it is 
probable, from the best information irf mj 
possession, that the inicirests of the govern- 
ment will be best served by fortifying and 
hoMing in considerable strength, Rolla, Sedalia 
and other interior points, keeping strong pat- 
rols constantly movhig from the terminal sta- 
tions, and concentrating the mass of the troops 
on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such, 
ulterior operations as tlie public interests may 
demand. 

I would be glad to have you make, as soon 
as possible, a personal inspection of all the im- 
portant points in your department and report 
the result to me. I cannot too strongly im- 
press upon jou the absolute necessity of keep- 
ing me constantly advised of the strength, 
condition, and location of your troops, togeth- 
er with all facts that will enable me to main- 
tain that general direction of the armies of the 
United States which it is my purpose to exer- 
cise. I trust to you to maintain thorough or- 
ganization, discipline and economy throughout 
your department. Please inform me, as soon 
as possible, of everything relating to the guji- 
boats now in process of construction, as well 
as those completed. ' 

The militia force authorized to be raised by 
the State of Missouri for its defence, will b« 
under your orders. I am, General, &■., &c., 
Geo. B. McCleli.an, M. G. Com. U. 3. 
Headquarters of the Armv, Washington, 
Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell : Nov. 7, 1861. 

General, — In giving 3'ou instructions for 
your guidance, in command of the department 
of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter 3'ou. I 
merely wish to express i)lainly the general 
ideas which occur to me in relation to the 
conduct of operations there. That portion of 
Kentucky Avest of the Cumberland. River is, 
by its position, so closely related to the States 
of Illinois and Jlissouri that it has seemed best 
to attach it to the Department of Missouri. 
Your operations, then, in Kentucky will be 
confined to that portion of the State east of 
the Cumberland River. I trust I need not re- 
peat to you fliat I regard the importance of 
the territory committed to your care as second 
only to that occupied by tlie army under my 
immediate command. And it is absolutely 
necessary that we shall hold all the State of 
Kentucky ; not only that, hut that the mnjoritj 
of its inhabitiinta shall bo AViirndy in favor of 
our cause, it being that which best subserves 
their interests. It is possible that the con- 
duct of our political affairs in Kentucky is 
more important than that of our military 
operations. I certainly cannot over estimate 
the importance of the former. You will please 
constantly bear in mind the precise issue for 



20 



•whicli wo are figlitiiig — Ihat issue is tlie pre- | 
servation of tlie IJriion, and tlie restoratiou of 
the authority of llie general goverjiincjit over 
all portions of our territory. We shall most 
readily suppress this rebellion and restore the 
authority of the government by religiously 
respecting the constitutional rights of all. I 
know that 1 express the feelings and opinions, 
of the President when I say thai we are light- 
ing only to preserve the integrity of the Union 
and the constitutional authority of the general 
government. "^ 

The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon 
it, that their domer-tic institutions will in no 
manner be interfered with, and that they will 
receive at our hands every constitutional pro- 
tection. I have only to repeat that you will 
in all respects, carefully regard the local in- 
stitutions of the region in which j'ou com- 
mand, allowing nothing but the dictates of 
military necessity to cause you to depart from 
the spirit of these instructions. 

So much in regard to political considera- 
tions. The military problem would be a 
simple one, could it be entirely separated from 
political influences ; such is not the case. 
Were the population among which you are to 
operate, wholly or generally hostile, it is pro- 
bable that Nashville should be your first and 
objective point. It so happens that a large 
majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennes- 
see, are in favor of the Union ; it therefore 
seems proper that you should remain on the 
defensive on the line from Louisville, while 
you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid 
marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's 
Gap, on Knoxuille, in order to occupy the 
railroad at that point, and thus enable the 
loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to use, 
while you at the same time cut off, the rail- 
way communication between eastern Virginia 
and the Mississippi. 

It will be prudent to fortify the pass, before 
leaving it in vour rear. I am, &c., 

Geo. B. M'cCleli^n, M. G. Com., U. S. A. 
Headq's of the Ariry, Washington, Nov. 12, '61. 
Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell, Com. Dep. of the Ohio : 

General, — Upon assuming command of the 
department, I will be glad to have you make, 
as soon as possible, a careful report of the 
condition of your command. The maiii point 
to which I desire to call your attention, is the 
necessity of entering eastern Tennessee as 
soon as it can bo done with reasonable 
chances of success, and I hope that you will, 
with the least possible delay, organize a 
column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding, 
at the same time, the main avenues by which 
the rebels might invade Kentucky. Our con- 
versations on the stibject of military opera- 
tions have been so full, and my confidence in 
your judgment is so great, that I will not 
dwell furtlier on the subject, except to urge 
upon yon the necessity of keeping me fully 
informed as to the state of affairs, both mili- 
tary and political, and your movcmeuts. 



In regard fo political matters, bear in mind 
that we are fighting only to preserve the in- 
tegrity of the Union, and to U[)Ii(ild the gene- 
ral government ; as far as milirary necessity 
will permit, religiously resjiect the covistitu- 
tional rights of all. IVescrve the strictest 
discipline among the troops, and while em- 
ploying the utmost energy in military move- 
ments, be careful so to treat tiio unarmed in- 
habitants as to contract, not widen, the breacVi^ 
existing between us and the rebels. I mean 
by this, that it is the desire of the government 
to ^void unnecessary irritation by causeless 
arrests and persecution of iadividuals. AVhere 
there is good reason to believe that persons 
are actually giving aid, co nfort, or informa- " 
tion to the enemy, it ^is, of :;ourse, necessary 
to arrest them ; but I have aiwa_vs foitnd it is 
the tendency of subordinates to make vexa- 
tious arrests on mere susjiicion. You will 
find it well to direct that no arrest shall be 
made except by yotir order, or that of your 
generals, itnless in extraordinaiy cases, always 
holding the party making the arrest respon- 
sible for the propriety of Jiis course. It should 
be our constant ann to make it apparent to all, 
that their property, their comfort, and their 
personal safety, will be best preserved by ad- 
hering to the cause of the Union. 

If the military suggestions I have made in 
this letter prove to have been founded on 
erroneous data, you are, of course, perfectly 
free to change the plan of operations. I am, 
&c., &c., G. B. McClellan, M. G. Cora., U. S. A. 
Headq's of the Army, Washington, Feb. 14, '62. 
B.-Gen. P. W. Sherman, C'g. at Port Royal, &c. ; 

General, — Your dispatches, in regard to the 
occupation of Dafuskie Island, &c., were re- 
ceived to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first 
time, your requisition for a siege train for Sa- 
vannah. 

After giving the subject all the considera- 
tion in my power, I am forced to the conclu- 
sion that, under present circtimstancas, the 
siege and capture of Savannah do not promise 
results comensurate with the sacrifices neces- 
sary. When I learned that it was possible for 
the gun-boats to reach the Savannah River 
above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested 
themselves to my mind, as its immediate re- 
sults. 

First. The capture of Savannah by a ' coup 
de main,' the result of an instantaneous ad- 
vance and attack by the army and navy. 

Tlie time for this has passed, and your let- 
ter indicates that you are not accountable for 
the failure to seize the propitious moment, 
but tliat, on the contrary, you perceived its 
advantages. 

Secorid. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its 
supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction 
by a bombardment. J^ 

Although we have a long delay fo deplore, the 
second course still remains ojjcn to us ; and I 
strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, 
and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch 



mortars and heavy g'jus reaon you. I am 
confident you can' thus reduce it. With Pu- 
laski, you gain all that is really essential ; you 
obtain complete control of the harbor, you 
reliev43 the blockading fleet, and render the 
main body of your force disposable for other 
operations. " 

I do not consider the possession of Savan- 
nah worth a siege, after Pulaski is in our 
hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of 
the first importance. The expedition to Fer- 
naudina is well, and I shall bo- glad to learn 
that it is om-s. 

But, after all, the greatest moral effect would 
be i^roduced by the reduction of Charleston 
and its defences. There the rebellion .had its 
birth ; there the unnatural hatred of our go- 
vernment is most intense ; there is the centre 
of the boasted power and courage -of the re- 
bels. To gain Fort Sumter, and hold Charles- 
ton, is a task well worthy of our greatest 
efforts, and eousidei'able sacrifices. That is 
the problem I would be glad to have you 
study. Some time must elapse before we can 
be in all respects ready to accomplish that 
purpose. Fleets are en route, and armies in mo- 
tion, which liave certain preliminary objects to 
accomplish before we are ready to take Charles- 
ton in hand. But the time will before. long 
arrive when I shall be prepared to make that 
movement. In the mean time, it is my advice 
and wish that no attempt be made upon Sa- 
vannah, unless it can be carried with certainty 
by a coup de main. 

Please concentrate your attention and forces 
upon Pulaski, and Fernandiua. St. Augustine 
might as well be takeh by way of interlude, 
while awaiting the preparations for Charles- 
ton; Success attends us everywhere at pre- 
sent. Very truly yours, G. B. McC,, Maj. G. C. 
U.S.A. 

Head-Quarters of the Army," Washington, 
Feb. 23, 1862. Maj.-General B. F. Butler, U. 
S. Volunteers, — 

General : — You are assigned to the com- 
mand of the land forces destined to co-operate 
with the navy, in the attack upon New Or- 
leans. You will use every means to keep 
your destination a profoimd secret, even from 
your staff officers, with the exception of your 
chief of staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engi- 
neers. The force at your disposal, will con- 
sist of the first 13 regiments named in your 
meraonindum handed to me in person, the 2lst 
Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Cth Michigan, (old 
and good regiments from Baltimore.) 

Tlic 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Cth 
Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Mon- 
roe. ^ 

Two ctimpanies' of the 21st Indiana, are well 
drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force 
already en route for Ship Island, will be suffi- 
cient for your purposes. 

After full consultation with officers well ac- 
quainted with the country in which it is pro- 
posed to operaie. I liave arrived at the conclu- 



21 



sion that (2) two light batteries fully C(juipi)ed, 
and (1) one vvithout horses, will be all that 
are necessary. 

This will make your force about 14,400 in- 
fantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery ; total lo 205 
men. :^ 

The ^commanding general of the Department 
of Key West, is aulhorized to loan you, tem- 
pororily, 2 regiments ; Fort Pickens can pro- 
bably give you another, which will bring your 
force to nearly 18,000. 

The object of your expedition is one of vital 
importance, the capture of New Orleans. Th© 
route selected is up the Mississippi River, and 
the first obstacle to be encomitered, (perhaps 
the only one), is in the resistance offered by 
Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected 
that the navy can reduce these works ; in that 
case, you Avill, after their captui"e leave a suffi- 
cient gaiTison in them to render them perfect- 
ly secure ; and it is recommended, that on tha 
upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some 
troops, be left at the Pilot Station, (at the 
forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the 
event ot a disaster. These troops and guns, 
will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts 
are captured. 

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, 
you will land your forces and siege train, and 
endeavor to breach the works, silence their 
fire, and carry them by assault. 

The next resistance will be near the English 
Bond, where there are some earthen batteries ; 
here it may be necessary for 3-ou to land your 
troops and co-operate with the naval attack, 
although it is more than i^robable, that the 
navj-, unassisted, can accomplish the result. 
If these works are taken the city of New Or- 
leans necessarily falls. In that event, it will 
probably be best to occu]iy Algiers Avith the 
mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of 
the river above the city, it may be necessary 
to place some troops in the city to preserve 
order, but if there appears sufficient Union sen- 
timent to control the city, it may be best for 
purposes of discipline, to keejj your men out 
of the city. 

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, 
it will be necessary to reduce all the works 
guarding its approaches from the cast, and 
particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton 
Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will 
next claim j'onr attention. 

A feint on Galveston may fivcllitate the ob- 
jects we have in view. I need not call your 
attention to the neceesit}' of gaining possess- 
ion of all the rolling stock you can on (he dif- 
ferent railways, and oF obtaining control of tha 
roads themselves. The occupation of Baton 
Rouge by a combined naval and land fo.rce, 
should be accomplished as soon as [)ossible 
after you have gained New Orleans. Then 
endeavor to open your comnnniication with 
the northern column by the Misslssi}>pi, always 
bearing in mind the necessity of occuj>ying 
Jackson, ATississippi, a-s soon .as you can safely 



do so, oillicr uftur, or before you have effected 
tbe junction. Allow iiotliiiig to divert you 
from obtaining full possessioti of all the ap- 
proaclies to New Orleans. "Wlien that object 
is acconiiilished to its fullest extent, it will be 
necessary to make a combined attack on jSio- 
bile, in ordei- to gain possession of the harbor 
and works, as well as to control the railway 
^ij^Tninus at the city. 

*'jln regard to this, 1 will send more detailed 
instructions as ths operations of the northern 
column develop themselves. 

I may briefly state that the general objects 
of the expedition are : First, The reduction 
of New Orleans and :\11 its approaches ; then 
Mobile and its defenses ; then Pensacola, Gal- 
veston, &c. It is probable that by the time 
Nfew Orleans is reduced it will be hi the pow- 
er of the government to reinforce the land 
forces sufficiently to accomplish all these ob- 
jects ; in the meantime j'ou will please give 
all the assistance in your power to the army 
and navy commanders in your vicinity, never 
losing sight of the fact, that the great object 
to be achieved is the capture and firm reten- 
tion of New Orleans. I am, &c., G. B. McC. 
M. G. C. U. S. A. 

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

The plan indicated in the above letters com- 
prehended in its scope the operations of all 
thearmies in the Union — the army of the Po- 
tomac a,s well. It was my intention, for rea- 
sons easy to. be seen, that its various parts 
should be carried out simultaneously, or near- 
ly so, and in co-operatian along our whole line. 
If this jjlan was wise, and events have failed 
to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessa- 
ry to (Jefend any delay which would have en- 
abled the army of the Potomac to perform its 
share in the execution of the whole work. 

But about the middle of January, 1862, upon 
recovering from a severe illness, I found that 
excessive atixiety for an innnediate movement 
of the array of the Potomac had taken posses- 
sion of the minds of the administration. 

A change had just been made in the "War 
Department, and I was soon urged by the 
New Secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immedi- 
ate steps to secure the reopening of the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad, and to free the banks 
of the lower Potomac from the rebel batteries 
which amioyed passing vessels. 

Ver}' soon after his entrance upon office, I 
laid before him, verbally, my designs as to the 
part of the plan of can)paign to be executed 
by the army of the Potomac, which was to at- 
tack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. 
') He instructed me to develop it to the Presi- 
dent, which I did. Tiie result was, that the 
President ilisa])proved it, and by an order of 
January 31. 18(12 substituted one of liis own. 

On the '2Tth of January, 18G2, the following 
ordor was issued without consultatioiiwith me. 

Executive Mansion, Washingtoc, Jan. 27, 
1802. President's General War Order, No. 1. 

Ord,ircd: That the 22d day of February, 



1862, be the ihiy for a general movement of 
the land and naval forces of tlie United States 
against the insui-gent forces. That, especially 
the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the 
army of the Potomac, the army of "Wi-stern 
Virginia, the army near ]\fumfordsviile, Ken- 
tucky, the army and flf)tilla at Cairo, and a 
naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to 
move on that day. " *», 

That, all other forces, both land and )iaval, 
with their respective commanders, obey exist- 
ing orders for the time, and be ready to obey 
additional orders Avhen dulj' given. 

That the heads of departments, and especi- 
ally the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, 
with all their subordinates, and tlie General-in- 
Chief, with all other commanders and subor- 
dinates of land and naval forces, will severally 
be held to their strict and full responsibilities 
for prompt execution of this order. 

Abraham Lincoln. 

The order of January 31, 1862, is as follows i 
Executive ^f ansion, "Washington, Jan. 31 , 18G2. 

PREsiDENrs Special War Orders, No. 1. 

Ordered: That all the disposable force of the 
army of theJPotomac, after providing safely for 
the defense of Washington, be formed into an 
expedition for the immediate object of seizing 
and occupying a point upon the railroad south- 
westward of what is known as ^fanassas Junc- 
tion, all details to be in the discretion of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and the expedition to move 
before or on the 22d day of February next. 

Abraham Lincoln. 

I asked bis excellency whether this order waf,- 
to be regarded as final, or whether I could be 
permitted to submit, in writing, my objections 
to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my 
own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore 
prepared the letter to the Secretary of "War 
which is given below. Before this had been 
submitted to the President, he addrcsoed the 
following note : 
ExECTTivE Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1 862. 

Maj.-Gen. McClellan — JMy Dear Sir: You 
and I have distinct and different plans for a 
movement of the array of the Potomac. Yours 
to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappa- 
hannock to Urbana, and across and to the ter- 
minus of the railroad on the York River: mine 
to move .directly to a point on the railraad 
southwest of Manassas. 

If you will give me satisfactory answers to 
the following questions, I shall gladly yield my 
plan to yours. 

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly 
larger expenditure of time and monej/ than 
mine? 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain 
by your plan than mine ? 3d. Wherein is a vic- 
tory more valuable by your plan than mine ? 
4th. Ill fact, would it not be less valuable in 
this ; that it would break do great line of the 
enemy's communications, while mine would! 
.^th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be 
more dilficult by your plan -than mine? Your- 
truly, A. LiNCOiJ*. 



These questions were substantially auswoicd 
by tlie following letter of the same date to ihe 
Secretary of War. 'ft- * 

Headquarters of tlie Army, Washington. Feb. 
3, 1862. lion. E. M. Si Asms, Sect' i/ of War: 
Sir, — I aslv your indulgence for the following 
paper rendered necessary by circumstances. 

I assumed command of the troops in the 
vicinity of AVashington on Saturday, July 27, 
1861, s'ix days after the Battle of Bull lUm. I 
found no ai'my to command ; a mere collection 
of regiments, cowering on tlie banks of the Poto- 
mac, some perfectly' raw, others dispirited by the 
recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had 
been done to secure the southern approaches 
to the capital by means of defensive works — 
nothing whatever had been undertaken to de- 
fend the avenues to the city on the northern 
side of the Potomac. The troops were not onlj- 
imdisciplined, undrilled, and disjiirited ; they 
were not even placed in military positions — 
the city was almost in a condition to have been 
/ taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 

Without one day's delay I undertook the 
difficult task assigned io me ; that task the Hon. 
Secretarj' knows was given to me without my 
solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have 
accomplished it will best be shown b}* the past 
and the present. The capital is secure against 
attack ; the extensive fortifications erected by 
the labor of our troops enable a small garrison 
to hold it against a numerous army ; the ene- 
my have been held in check ; the State of ^lary- 
land is securely in our possession ; the detached 
'"'^unties of Yirginia are again within the jiale 

our laws — and all api)rchen9ion of trouble 
.11 Delaware is at an end : the enem}" are con- 
lined to the positions they occiipied before the 
disaster of the 21st July ; more than all this, 
I have now under my commaiid a well drilled 
and reliable army, to which the destinies of the 
country may be confidently conunitted : this 
ami}- is 3'oung and untried in battle — but it is 
animated by the highest spirit, and is capable 
of great deeds. That so much has been ac- 
complished and such an army created, in so 
short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be 
regarded as one of the highest glories of the 
administration and the nation, ilany weeks, I 
may say many months ago, this army ot the Po- 
tomac was full}' in condition to repel any at- 
tack ; but there is a vast difference between 
that and the efficiency required to enable troops 
to attack successfully an army elated by vic- 
tory and intrenched in a position long since 
selected, stutied and fortified. In the earliest 
papers I submitted to the President,! asked 
for an effective and movable force far exceed- 
ing the aggregate now on the banks of the Po- 
tomac. I have not the force 1 asked for. Even 
when in a subordinate position, I always looked 
beyond the operations of the army of the Poto- 
mac : I was never satisfied in my own mind 
with a barren victory — but looked to combined 
and decisive operations. ' When I was placed 
in command of the armies of the Unit<?d States, 



23 
I immediately turned mj attention to the whole 
field of operations, regarding the army of the 
Potomac as only one, -while the most important, 
of the masses under my command. I confess 
that I did not then appreciate the total absence 
of a general plan, which had before existed — 
nor did I know that utter disorganization and 
want of preparation pervaded the "Western 
armies. I took it for granted that they were 
nearly, if not quite, in condition to move toward 
tlie fulfillment of my plans ; I acknowledge that 
I made a great mistake. I sent at once, with 
the approval of the Executive, officers I con- 
sidered competent to 'command in Kentucky 
and Missouri — their instructions looked to 
prompt movements — I soon toimd that the la- 
bor of creation and organization had to be per- 
formed there ; transportation, arms, clothing, 
artillery discipline, all were wanting : these 
things reqiiired time to procure them. The 
generals in command have done their work 
most creditabl}- — but we are still delayed. I 
had hoped that a general advance could bo 
made during the good weather of December ; 
I was mistaken. My wish was to gain posses- 
sion of the Eastern Tennessee Piailroad as a 
preliminary movement — then to follow it up 
immediately by an attack on Nashville aud 
Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possi- 
ble. I have ever regarded our true policy as 
being that of fully preparing ourselves, aud 
then seeking for the most decisive results. I 
do not wish to waste life in useless battles — 
but I prefer to strike at the heart. Two bases 
of operations seem to present themselves for 
the advance of the array of the Potomac. I st. 
That of Washington, its present position, in- 
volving a direct attack upon the intrenched 
positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, 
&c., or else a movement to turn one or both 
flanks of those positions : or a combination of 
the two plans. The relative force of the two 
armies will not justify an attack on both flanks ; 
an attack on his left flanlc alone invoU'es a long 
line of wagon communication, and cannot pre- 
vent him from collecting for the decisive bat- 
tle all the detachments liow on his extreme 
right and left. Sliould we attack his right 
flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a cross- 
ing of the Potomac below that river and near 
his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the 
junction of the enemy's right with his centre 
(we might destroy the former), we would re- 
move the obstructions to the navigation of the 
Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transpor- 
Jption by establishing new depots at the near- 
est points of the Potomac, and strike more di- 
rectly his main railway communication. •► 

The fords of Occoquan, below the mouth of 
Bull Paul, are watched by the rebels ; batte- 
ries arc said to be j>laced on the heights in 
rear, (concealed by the w^oods,) and the ar- 
rangement of his troops is such that he can 
oppose some considerable resistance to a pas- 
sage of that stream. Information has just 
been received, to the effect that the enemy 



24 



arc iiitrcuohiug a line of heights, cxtencUng 
from the vicinity of Sangsters, (Union Mills), 
towards Evansport. Early in January Spri-g's 
Ford was occupied by Gen. lUiodes, with 
3,600 men and eight guns. Tiiere are strong 
reasons for believing that Davis's Ford is oc- 
cupied. These circumstances indicate, or 
prove that tlic enemy anticipates the move- 
ment in question, and is prepared to resist it. 
Assuming, for the present, that this operation 
is deterniined upon, it may be well to examine 
briefly its probable progress. In the present 
state of aflairs, our columns (for the move- 
ment of so large a force must be miade in se- 
veral cohunns, at least five or six,) can reach 
the Accotink without danger ; during the 
march thence to the Occoquan, our right flar.k 
becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax 
Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills : this dan- 
ger must bo met by occupying, in some force, 
cither the two first-named places, or, better, 
the point of junction of the roads leading to 
the village of Occoquan. This occupation 
must be sustained so long as we continue to 
draw supplies by the roads from this city, or 
until a battle is won. 

The crossing of the Occoquan should be 
made at all the fords from ''Volf 's Run to the 
mouth, the points of crossing not beuig neces- 
sarily confined to the fords themselves. Should 
the enemy occupy this line in force we must, 
with what assistance the flottilla can afford, 
endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, 
thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
line, or be taken in flank himself. 

Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it 
would be necessary to throw a column, by the 
the shortest route, to Dumfries, partly to force 
the enemy to abandon his batteries on the 
Potomac, partly to cover cur left flank against 
an attack from the direction of .^cquia; and, 
lastly, to establish our communication witli 
the river b;^the best roads, and thus give 
us new depots. The enemy woidd ty this 
time have occupied the line of the Occoquan 
above Bull Run, hokMng Brents villc in the 
force, and perhaps extending his lines some- 
what further to the south-west. 

Our next step would be to prevent the ene- 
my from crossing the Occoquan bcl ween Bull 
Run and the Broad Run, to fall Ujwn our right 
flank while moving on Brentsville. This 
might be ofi'octed by occupying Bacon Race 
Ciiurch and the cross-roads near the mouth of 
Bull lUui, or still more elfectually, by moving 
to the fords themselves, and })reventing him 
from debouching oji our siile. 

These operations would ]iossibly be resist- 
ed, a.nd it would require some time to cflect 
them. As nearly, at the same time, as pos- 
sible, we should gain tlie fords necessary to 
our jjurposes above Broad Run. Having se- 
cured our right flank, it would become ueces- 
sar}' to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we 
could not leave it between our right flank and 
tlie main body. The flual movement on the 



railroad must be determined by circumstaucea 
existing at the time. 

This brief sketch brings out in bold i-elief 
the great advantage possessed by the enemy 
in the strong central position he occupies, 
with roads diverging in everj'- direction, and 
a strong line of defence, enabling him to re- 
main on the defensive, with a smaU force on 
one flank, while he concentrates everything on 
the other for a decisive action. 

Should we place a portion of OTir force in 
front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the 
Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing 
our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by 
a distance too great to enable the two parts 
to suiiport each other, should cither be at- 
tacked by the masses of the enemy, while the 
other is held in check. 

I should, perhaj")S, have dwelt more de- 
cidedly on the fact that the force left near 
Sangsters must be allowed to remain some- 
where on that side of the Occoqi;an, until the 
decisive battle is over, so as to cover oi;r re- 
treat, in the event of disaster ; unless it should 
be decided to select and intrench a new base 
somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding in- 
volving much time. 

After the passage of the Occoquan by the 
main army, tliis covering force could be drawn 
in to a more central and less exposed posi- 
tion, say Brimstone Plill, or nearer the Occo- 
quan. 

In this latitude the weather will,"for a con- 
siderable period, be very uncertain, and a 
movement commenced in force on roads in 
tolerably firm condition, will be liable, almost 
certain, to be much delayed by rains and 
snow. It will, therefore, be next to impossible 
to surprise the enemy, or take him at a dis- 
advantage by rapid manoiuvres. Our slow 
progress M-ill enable him to divine our pur- 
poses, and take his measures accordingly. 
The probability is, from the best information 
wo possess, that the enemy has improved the 
roads leading (o his line of defence, while we 
will ha\e to work as we advance. 

Bearing in mind what has been said, and 
the present unprecedented and imijassaWe 
condition of the roads, it will be evitlent that 
no precise period can be fixed upon for the 
movement on this line. Nor can its duration 
be closely 'calculated ; it seems certain that 
many weeks may elapse, before it is possible 
to commence the march. Assuming the suc- 
cess of this operation, and the defeat of the 
Aiemy as certain, the question at once arises, 
as to the importance of the results gained. - I 
think these results M-oiild be confined to the 
possession of the field of battle, the evacua- 
tion of the line of the u])per Potomac by the 
enemy, and the moral eflect oi the victory ; 
important results, it is true, but not decisive 
of the war, nor securing the destruction 
of the enemy's main army, for he could fall 
back upon other positions and fight us again 
and again, should the condition of the troops 



poniiit. If he is in no condition to fight us 
again out of range of the intrenchments at 
Richmond, wo would find it a very difficult 
and tedicMS matter to follow him up there, for 
he would destroy his railroad bridges, and 
otherwise impede our progress through a 
region where the roads are as bad as they 
well can be,, and we Avould probably' find our- 
selves forced, at last, to change the whole 
theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route 
to Richmond, with a smaller available force, 
and at an expenditure of much more time than 
were we to adopt the short line at once. We 
woidd also have forced the enen^y to concen- 
trate his forces, and perfect his measures at 
tiio very point where it is desirable to strike 
him when least prepared. 

11. The second base of ojierations available 
for the army of the Potomac, is that of the 
lower Chesa]ieake Bay, Avhich affords the 
shortest jiossible land route to Richmond, and 
strikes directl}' at the heart of the enemy's 
power in the east. 

The roads in that region are passable at all 
seasons of the year. 

The country now alluded to is much m©re 
Rivorable for offensive operations than that in 
front of Washington, (which is. vertf unfavor- 
able,) much more level, more cleared land, the 
woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the 
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A 
movement in force on that line obliges the 
enemy to abandon his intrenched position at 
Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Rich- 
mond and Norfolk. He must do this ; for 
should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his 
destruction can be averted only by entirely 
defeating us in a battle, in which he must be 
the asssilant. This movement, if successful, 
gives us the capital, the communications, the 
supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; 
all the Avaters of the Chesapeake would be 
ours, all Virginia would be in our power ; and 
the enemy foi'ced ta abandon Tennessee and 
North Carolina. The alternative presented to 
the enemy would be to beat us in a position 
selected b}' ourselves ; disperse or pass be- 
neath the Caudine Forks. 

Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a 
perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula 
upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly 
covered by the fleet. During the whole 
movement our flank is. covered by the water, 
our right is secure, for the reason that the 
enemy is too distant to reach us in time ; he 
can only oppose us in front ; we bring our 
fleet in full iday. 

ASiev a successful battle, our position would 
be, Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held 
securely, our centre connecting Burnside with 
lluell, both by Raleigh and Lyncliburg, Ihiell 
ill Eastern Teimessce and Northern Alabama, 
Ifalleck at Nashville and Memphis. 

The next movement wo\ild be to connect 
with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wil- 
mington and Charleston ; to advance our cen- 



25 



tre into South Carolina and Georgia, to push 
Buell either towards Montgomerv, or to unite 
witii the main army in Georgia, to throw Ilal- 
leck southward to meet the naval expedition 
from New Orleans. r 

We should then be in a condition to reduce 
at our leisure, all the southern seaports ; to 
occupy all the avenues of communication, to 
use the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re- 
establish our government and arms in Arkan- 
sas, Louisiana and Texas ; to force the slaves 
to labor for om* subsistence, instead of that of 
the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign in- 
terference. Such is the object I ever had in 
view; this is the general plan which I -hope 
to accomplish. 

For many long months. I have labored to 
prepare the army of the Potomac to play its 
part in the programme ; from the day wlien I 
was placed in command of all our armies, I 
have exerted myself to place all the other 
armies in such a condition, that they too could 
perform their allotted duties. 

Should it be determined to operate from the 
lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which 
promises the most brilliant results, is Urbana, 
on the lower Rappahaimock. This point is 
easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it 
is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy, 
it is but one march from West Point, the key 
of that region, and thence but two marches to 
Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana, 
would probably cut off Magruder in*the Penin- 
sula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before 
it could be strongly reinforced. Should we 
fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of 
the navy, cross the James and show ovu-selves 
in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy 
to come out and attack us, for his position 
would be tintenable, with us on the southern 
bank of the river. 

Should circumstances render it not advisa- 
ble to laud at Urbana, we can tise Mob Jack 
Bay — or the worst coming to the worst, we 
can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate 
with complete security, although with less 
celerity and briUiancy of results, up the Penin- 
sula. 

To reach whatever point may be selected as 
a base, a large amount of cheap water trans- 
portation must be collected, consistuig mainly 
of canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, 
&c., towed by small steamers, all of a very diller- 
ent character from those required for all previ- 
ous expeditions. This cancertainly be accom- 
plished within thirty days from the time the 
order is given. 1 propose as the best possible 
plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to 
select Urbana as a landing-place for the first 
detatchments. To transport by water four di- 
visions of infantry with their batteries, the 
regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge 
train, and a few sqnadrons of cavalry, making 
tlic vicinity of Hooker's position tiie idaco of 
embarkation for as many as possil)k\ To 
move tlie regular cavalry imd reserve artillor/ 



the remaining bridge trains and wagons to a 
point some wliere near Cape Lookout, then ferry 
them over the river by means of North River 
feny-boats, inarcli them over to the Rap^mhan- 
iiock (covering the movement by an infantry 
force near Heathsville) and to cross the Rap- 
pahannock in a similar way. The expense 
and difficulty of the movement will thus be 
vei-y much diminished (a saving of transpor- 
tation of about 10,000 horses) and the result 
non'e the less certain. 

The concentration of the cavalry, &c., in the 
lower counties of ]\[aryland, can be effected 
without exci ing suspicion, and the movement 
made without delay from that cause. 

This •movement, if adopted, will not at all 
expose the city of Washington to danger. 

The total force to be thrown upon the new 
line Avould be, according to circumstances, 
from 110 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter 
number by briuging fresh troops into Wash- 
ington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully 
realize that in all projects offered, time will 
probably be the most valuable consideration. 
It is my decided opinion, that in that point of 
view, the second plan should be adopted. U 
is possible, nay highly jjrobable, that the 
weather and state of the roads, may be such 
as to delay the direct movement from "Wash- 
ington, with its iTnsatisfactory results and 
great risks — far beyond the time required to 
complete the second plan. In the first case 
wo can fix no definite time for an advance. 
The roads litive gone from bad to worse — 
nothing like their present condition has ever 
been known here before ; they are impassible 
at present, we are entirely at the mercy of the 
weather. It is by no means certain that we 
can beat them at Manassas. On the other 
line, I rega»d success as certain by all the 
chances of war. AVe demoralize the enemy 
by forcing him to abandon his prepared posi- 
tion for one which we have chosen, in which 
all is in our favor, and where success must 
produce iuBuense results. 

My judgment as a general, is clearly in favor 
of this project. Nothing is certain in war, 
but all the chances are in favor of this move- 
ment. So much am I in favor of tlie southern 
line of operations, that I would prefer the 
move from Fort Monroe as a base — as a cer- 
tain though less brilliant movement, than that 
from Urbana — to an attack upon Manassas. 

I knew that his Excellenc}^ the President, 
you and I, all agree in our wishes, and that 
these wishes are to- bring the war to a close, 
as promptl}' as the means in our possession 
will permit. I believe that the mass of the 
people have entire confidence in its. I am 
gure of it. Li3t us then look only to the great 
result to bea''complished,and disregard every- 
thing else. I am, very respectfully, your 
obedient servant, G. B. McC, M. G. G. 
iThis letter must have produced some effect 
upon the mind of the President, since the ex- 
ecution of his order was not required, although 



2C 



it was not revoked as formally as it had been 
issited. Many verbal conferences ensued, in 
which among other things, it was determined 
to collect as many canal-boats as possible, with' 
a view to employ them largely in the trans- 
portation of the army to the lower Chesapeake. 
Tlie idea was at one time entertained by the 
President to use them in forming a bridge 
across the Potomac, near Liverpool Point, in 
order to throw the array over at that point, 
but this was subsequently abandoned. It was 
also found by experience, that it would re- 
quire muclf time to- prepare the canal-boats 
for use in transportation to the extent that 
had been anticipated. 

Finally, on the 27th of February, 18G2, the 
Secretary of War, by the authority of the 
President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assist- 
ant Secretary of War, to procure at onco 
the necessary steamers and sailing craft to 
transport the army of the Potomac to its new 
field of operations. 

The following extracts from the report of 
Mr. Tucker, dated April 5th, will show the 
nature and progress of this well-executed ser- 
vice : 

• * * * * * 

" I was called to Washington by telegraph 
on 17th January last, by Assistant-Secretary 
of AVar Thomas A Scott. I was informed that 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan wished to see me. From 
him" I learned that he desired to know if trans- 
portation on smooth water could be obtained, 
to move at one time, for a short distance, 
about 50,000 troops,' 10,000 horses, 1,000 
wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment 
of such an ,army. He frankly stated to me, 
that he had always supposed such a move- 
ment entirely feasible until two experienced 
quarter-masters had recently reported it im- 
practicable, in their judgment. A few days 
afterwards, I reported to Gen. McClellan that 
I was entirely confident the transi^orts could 
be commanded, and stated the mode by which 
his object could be accomplished. A week or 
more afterwards, I had the honor af an inter- 
view with the President and Gen. McClellan, 
when the subject was further discussed, and 
especially as to the time required. 

I expressed the oi^inion, that as the move- 
ment of the horses and wagons would have to 
be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that 
as each schooner would require to be properly 
fitted for the protection of the horses, and fur- 
nished with a supply ot water and forage, and 
each transport for the troops provided with 
water, I did not deem' it prudent to assume 
that such an expedition could start within 
thirty days from the time the order was 
given. 

The President and Gen. McClellan both ur- 
gently 8tate<l the vast importance of an earlier 
movement. J replied that if favorable winds 
prevailed, and tliere was great dispatch in 
loading, tlie time might be materially dimin- 
ished. 



27 



On the 14th of February, [Secretary of 
War] advertised for tniusports of various 
descriptions, inviting bids. On the 27th Feb- 
ruary I was informed tliat the proposed move- 
ment by -^vater Avas decided upon. That 
evening tlie quarter-master-general Avas in- 
formed of the ciecisioji. Directions -Were 
given to secure the transportation, and my 
assistance was tendered. 

" He promptly detailed to this duty two 
most efficient assistants in his department : 
Col. Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Aiuiapolis, 
wliere it was then proj^osed to embark the 
troops, and Capt. Henry C. Hodges was di- 
rected to meet me in Piiiladelphia, to attend 
to chartering the vessels. With these aJli"- 
rangements, I left Washington on the 2Sth 
February. 
< * -x- * * * * -x- 

" I teg to hand herewitii a statement, pre- 
pared by Capt. Hodges, of the vessels char- 
tered, which exhibits the prices paid, and the 
■ Jiarties from whom they were taken, viz. : 
"113 Steamers, 'at an average 

price per day $215 10 
188 Schooners " ■*' . . 24 46 
88 Barges " " . . 14 27 

'■ In thirty-seven days from the time I re- 
rt'ived the order in Washington, (and most of 
it was accomplished in thirty days.) these 
vessels transported frorn Perryville, Alexan- 
dria, 'and Washington, to Fort Monroe — (the 
place of departure having been changed, 
which caused delay) — 121,500 men ; 14,592 
animals ; 1,150 wagons ; 44 batteries 5 74 am- 
bulances ; besides pontoon bridges, telegraph 
)iiaterials, and the enormous quantity of 
'{uipage, &c., required for an army of such 
magnitude. The only loss of which I have 
heard, is eiglit mules and nine barges, which 
latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles 
of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved. 
With this trifling exception, not the slightest 
accident has occurred, to my knowledge. 

" I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, 

for economy and celcritj' of movement, this 

expedition is without a parallel on record. -» 

" .lonN TrcKER, Ass't-Sec. of War." 

THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES ON THE 

POTOMAC. 
In the meantime the destruction of .the bat- 
tei'ies on the lower Potomac, by crossing our 
troops opposite them, was considered, and 
preparations were even made for throwing 
Hooker's division accross the river to carry 
them by assault. Finally, however, after an 
adverse report from Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, 
chief engineer, given below, who made a re- 
connoissance of the positions ; and in view of 
the fact that it Avas still out of the poAver of 
tlie navy department to furnish suitable ves- 
sels to co-operate Avith the land troops, tins 
plan was abandoned as impracticable. A 
close examination of the enemy's works and 
their approaches, made after tliey were eva- 
cuated, showed that the decision was a Avise 



one. The only means, therefore, of accomk 
plishing the capture of these Avorks, so much 
desired by the President, was by a movement 
by land, from the left of our lines, on the 
right, bank of the Potomac, a movement ob- 
viously uuAvise. 

The attention of tlie Navy Department, as 
early as Aug. 12, 1861, had been called to the 
necessity of maintaining a strong force of effi- 
cient Avar vessels on the Potomac. 
Headq's, Div'n. Potomac, Wash., Aug. 1 2, 18C1. 
Hon. GiD. Wem.es, Sec. U. S. NaA^y ': 

Sir,— I ha\'e, to-day, received additional in- 
formation Avhich convinces me that it is more 
than probable that the enemy Avill, Avitljin a 
very short time, attempt to tiu-ow a respec- 
table force from the mouth of Acquia Creek 
into ilaryland. This attempt will probably 
b6 preceded by the erection of batteries at 
Mathias and White House Points. Such a 
movement oji the part of the eneniy, in con- 
nection Avith others probably designed, would 
place Washington in great jeopardy. I most 
eariiestly urge that the strongest possible na- 
val force be at once concentrated near tho 
mouth of Acquia Creek, and that the most vi- 
gilant Avatch be maintained day and night, so 
as to render such passage of the river, abso- 
lutely impossible. 

I recommend that the Miimesota, and any 
other vessels available from Hampton Roads, 
be at once ordered up there, and that a great 
quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity, suffi- 
cient for se\'eral Aveeks' supply. At least one 
strong war vessel should be kept at Alexan- 
dria ; and I again urge thef concentration of a 
strong naval force in the Potomac Avithout 
delay. 

If the naA'al department Avill render it abso- 
lutely impossible for the enemy to cross tho 
river below Washington, the security of the 
capital Avill be great!}' increased. 

I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate 
compliance Avith these requests. 

I am, sir, verv 1 espectfully, j-our ob't serv't. 

G. B. McClellan, M.-G. Com'g. 
It Avas on the 27th Sept'r., 1861, that Gen. 
Barnard, chief engineer, in company Avith Capt. 
Wyman, of the Potomac Flotilla, had been in- 
structed to make a reconnoissance of the ene- 
my's batteries as far as Mathias Point. In his 
report of his observations, he says : — " Bat- 
teries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and 
thence doAvn to Chopawampsic, cannot be pre- 
A^ented. We may, indeed, prevent their con- 
struction on certain points, l)ut along here, 
somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite 
of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What 
is the remedy ? Favorable circumstances, not. 
to be anticipated nor made the basis of any 
calculations, might justify and render success- 
ful the attack of a peculiar battery. To sup- 
pose that we can capture all, and by mere at- 
tacks of this kind prevent the navigation 
being molested, is very much the same as to 
suppose that tho hostile army in our oaath 



28 



front can prevent us building and maintaining 
field-works to protect Arlington and Alexan- 
dria, bj (Capturing them one and all as fast as 
they are .built." .t/* 

In another communication upon the subject 
of crossing troops for ihe purpose of destroy- 
ing the batteries on the Virginia side of the 
Potomac, Gen. Barnard says : 

" The operation involves the forcing of a 
very strong line of defence of the enemy, 
and all that we would have to do, if we were 
really opening a campaign against them there. 
" It is true we hope to force this line by turn- 
ing it, by landing on Freestone Point. 

" With reason to believe that this may be 
successful, it cannot be denied that it involves 
A risk of failure. 

" Should we then, considering all the conse- 
quences which may be involved, enter into 
the operation merely to capture the Potomac 
batteries ? I think not. 

" Will not the Erricson, assisted by one 
other gun-boat, capable of keeping along side 
these batteries, so far control their fire as to 
keep the navigation sufficiently free as long 
as we require it ? Capt. Wyman says yes." 

It was the opinion of competent naval 
officers, and I concur with them, that had an 
adequate force of strong and well armed ves- 
sels been acting upon the Potomac from the 
beginning of August, it would have been next 
to impossible for the rebels to have construct- 
ed or maintained batteries upon the banks of 
the river. The enemy never occupied Mathias 
Point, nor any other point on the river, which 
was out of supporting distance from their 
main army. 

When the enemy commenced the construc- 
tion of these batteries, the army of the Poto- 
mac was not in condition to prevent it; their 
destruction by our army would have afforded 
but a temporarj'^ relief, unless \ve had been 
etrong enough to hold the entire line of the 
Potomac. This could be done either by driv- 
ing the enemy from Manassas and Aquia Creek 
by main force, or by manoeuvring to compel 
them to evacuate their positions. The latter 
course was finally pursued, and with success. 
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILPtOAD. 

About the 20th of Feb., 1862, additional 
measures were taken to secure the re-opening 
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The pre- 
liminary operations of Gen. Lander for this 
object are elsewhere described. 

1 had often observed to tiie President, and 
to members of the Cabinet, that the recon- 
Btruction of this railway could not be under- 
taken, \uitil we were in a condition to figlit a 
battle to secure it. I regarded tjie possession 
of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to 
cover tlie railway in rear, and it was not until 
the month of February, that I felt prepared to 
accomplish tliis very desirable, but iiot vital 
purjjosc. 

The whole of Bank's division, and two bri- 
gades of Sedgwick's division, were thrown 



across tne river at Harper's Ferry, leaving 
one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe 
and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the 
rnouth of the ]\Ionocacy. A sufficient number 
of troops of all arms, were held in readiness 
in the vicinity of Washington, either to march 
via Leesbiirg, or to move by raiito Harper's 
Ferry, should this become necessary in carry- 
ing out the objects in view. The subjoined 
notes from a communication subsequently ad- 
dressed to the War Department, will suffici- 
ently explain the conduct of these operations. 

Notes : — " "W^hen I started for Harper's Fer- 
ry, I plainly stated to the President and Secre- 
tary of War, that the chief object of the ope- 
ration would be to open the Baltimore and 
Ohio Radroad, by crossing the river in force 
at Harper's Ferry; that I had collected the 
material for making a permanent bridge by 
means of canal-boats ; that from the nature of 
the river, it was doubtful whether such a 
bridge could be constructed ; that if it could 
not, I would at least occupy the ground in 
front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the 
rebuilding of the railroad bridge, and finally, 
when the communications were perfectly se- 
cure, move on Winchester. s 

AVhen 1 arrived at the place, I found the 
batteau bridge neaidy completed ; the holding 
ground proved better than had been anticipat- 
ed, the weather was faeorable, there being no 
wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades 
which had arrived, and took steps to hurry up 
the other two, belonging respectively to Bank's 
and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of 
crossing supplies had not then become ajipar- 
ent. That night I telegraphed for a regiment 
of regular cavalry and four batteries of heavy 
artillery, to come up the next day (Thursday) 
besides directing Keyes's division of infantry 
to be moved up on Friday. 

Next morning the attempt was made to 
pass the canal-boats through the lift lock, in 
order to commence at once the construction of 
a permanent bridge ; it was then found for the 
first time that the lock was too small to permit 
the passage of the boats, it havhig been built 
for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah 
Canal, and too narroAv by so)ne four or six 
inches for the canal-boats. The lift locks 
above and below are all large enough for the 
ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edward's 
Ferry tlius used : it had always been repre- 
sented to the iigincers by the military rail- 
road employees and others, that the lock was 
large enough, and the difference being too 
small to be detected by the eye, no one had 
thought of measuruig it, or suspected any 
difficulty. I thus suddenly found mjself una- 
ble to build the permament bridge. A violent 
gale had arisen, which threatened the safety 
of olu- only means of conununicalion ; the nai* 
row ai>proach to the bridge was so crowded 
and clogged with wagons, that it was very 
clear that under existing circumstances noth- 
ing more could bo done than to cross tJ»'er the 



20 



baggage and fiiippnes of the two biLgades : of 
ihese, instead of beiii^ able to cross botli dur- 
ing the morning, the last arrived only in tiiuo 
to go over jnst before dark. It was evident 
tliat the troops under orders, would only be 
in the way. should they arrive, and that it 
would not be possible to subsist them for a 
rapid nvarch for Winchester. It waS therefore 
deemed necessary to countermand the order, 
content ourselves with covering the reopen- 
ing of tlie railroad for the present, and in the 
mean time use every exertion to establish, as 
promptly as possible, depots ot forage and 
subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply 
llie troops and enable them to move on Win- 
cheater, independently of the bridge. The 
next day (Friday) I sent a strong reconnois- 
sance to Charleston, and under its protection 
went there myself. I then determined to hold 
tliat place, and to move the troops composing 
Lander's and Williams' commands at once on 
ilartinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually 
covering the reconstruction of the railroad. 

*' Having done this, and taken all the steps 
in my power to ensure the rapid transmission 
of supplies over the river, I returned to this 
city, well satisfied with what had been accom- 
plished. While up the river I learned that 
the President was dissatisfied with the state 
of affairs — but on ray return here, understood 
from the Sec, of War, that, upon learning the 
whole state of the case, the President was 
full}' satisfied. I contented myself, therefore, 
with giving to the Secretary a brief statement 
about as I have written it liere." 

The design aimed at was entirely com- 
passed, and before the first of April, the date 
of my departure for tlie Peninsula, the 'rail- 
road was in running order. As a demonstra- 
tion upon the left flank of the enemy, this 
movement no doubt assisted in determining 
the evacuation of his lines on the eightlrand 
ninth of March. 

PREPARATIONS TO MOVE FROM WASH- 
INGTON. 

Upon my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 
28th of Feb., the preparations necessary to 
carry out the wishes of the President and Sec. 
of War. in regard to destroying the batteries 
on the lower Potomac, were at once under- 
taken. Mature reflection convinced me that 
this operation would require the movement of 
the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy 
would resist it with his whole strength. I 
undertook it with great reluctance, both on 
account of the extremely unfavorable condi- 
tion of the roads, and my firm conviction that 
the proposed movement to tho lower Chesa- 
peake would necessarily, as it subsequently 
did, force the enemy to abandon all his posi- 
tions ui front of Washington. ]5esides, it did 
not forward my plan of campaign to preci- 
pitate this evacuation by any direct attack, 
nor to subject the army to needless loss of 



which could produce no decisive rojsults. 
The preparations for a movement towards tho 
Oecoquan, to carry the batteries, were, how- 
ever, advanced as rapidly as tho season per- 
mitteil, and I had invited the cominantlcrs of 
divisions to meet at headquarters on the 8th 
of Jilarch, for the purpose of giving them tlieir 
instructions, and receiving their advice and 
opinions in regard to tlicir conunands, when 
an interview with the President indicated to 
me the possibility of a change in my orders. 

His Excellency sent for me at a very early 
hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed 
his expressions of dissatisfaction with the 
aGairs at Harper's Ferry, and with my plans 
for the new movement down the Chesapeake. 
Another recital of the same facts which had 
before given satisfaction to his Excellency, 
again produced, as I supposed, tlio same re- 
sult. The views which I expressed to tho 
President were reinforced by oie results of a 
meeting of my general officers at headquar- 
ters. At that meeting, my plans were laid 
before the division commanders, and were ap- 
proved by a majority of those present. Ne- 
vertheless, on the same day, two important 
orders were issued by the President, without 
consultation with me. The first of tliese was 
tlie General War Order No. 2, directing tho 
formation of army corps, aud assigning their 
commanders. 

I had always been in favor of the principle 
of an organization into army corps," but pre- 
ferred deferring its practical execution, until 
some little experience in campaign, and on tho 
field of battle, should show Avhat general 
officers were most competent to exercise these 
high commands; for it must be [remembered, 
that we then had no officers whose experience 
in war, on a large scale, was sufficient to 
prove that they possessed the necessary qua- 
lifications. An incompetent commander of an 
army corps, might cause irreparable damage, 
while it was not probable that an incompetent 
division commander could cause any very 
serious mischief. These views had frequently 
been expressed by me to the President and 
members of the Cabinet; it v/as, thereforo, 
with as much regret as surprise, tliat I learn- 
ed the existence of this order. 

The first order has been given above, tho 
second order was as follows : 
Executive ilansion, Washington, March 8,'62. 
President's General War Order, No. 3. y 

Ordered: That no change of tlie base of 
operations of the army of the Potomac, shall 
be made without leaving in and about 'Wash- 
ington such a force as, in the opinion of tho 
General-in-Chief, and the commanders of army 
corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. 

That no more than two army corps (about 
fifty thousand troops) of said arm}^ of the Po- 
tomac, shall be moved en I'oute for a new base 
of operations, until the navigation of the Po- 
tomac, from Washington to the Chesapeako 



life aud material, by a battle near Washington, I Bay, shall bo freed froru enemy's batterica, ;«i.d 



30 

on ascoif;\ini;;g fliat such a movement waB in- 
lemled, wliile it roliovcd me from the results 
of ihe uiKiue iiiixiely of my superiors, a))d at- 
tested the cluiracter of tlie design. Avas unfor- 
tunate in tJjat the tlien almost impassable 
roads hetweou our positions arid tiieirs, de- 
prived us of tl'-o oiiporluniiy for inflicting 
damage, usually aflVrded by tlie "A'ithdra^val 
of ;i large arniy in fhe -ace of a poAvcrful ad- 
j Ycrsary. ^ 

I 'J'he jedremenr, of the enemy, and the occu- 
I patiou of the abandoned positions, whieli ne- 
] cossivriiy followed, presented an opportunity 
j for llie troops to gain !<ome experience on the 
mar-/Ii and bivouae, preparatory to the cam- 
paign, and to get rid of the superfluous hag- 
gage and other "impediments," -which accu- 
!iiulatc so easily around an ann\' encamped for 
a long time in one locality. 

A march to Manassas and back could pro- 
duce no dela}- in embarking for the lower Chesa- 
peake, as the transports could not be ready for 
some time, and it afforded a good intermediate- 
step between the quiet and comparative com- 
fort of the camps around Washington, and the 
rigors of active operations, besides accomplish- 
ing the important object of determining the 
positions and perhaps die future designs of the 
enemy, with the^ possibility of being able to 
harrass their rear. 

I therefore issued orders during the night 
of the 9th of ^March for a general Movement of 
the army*the next morning towards Centreville 
and ]\Ianassas, sending in advance two regi- 
ments of cavalry under Col. Averil, with orders 
to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the 
exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he 
could to retard and annoy the enemy, if really 
in retreat. At the same time, I telegraphed to 
the Secretary of War, that it would be neces- 
sary to defer the organization of army corps 
until the comi)letion of the projected advance 
upon Manassas, as the divisions coidd not be 
brought together in time. The Secretary re- 
plied, requiring immediate compliance with the 
President's order ; but on my again represent- 
ing that this would compel the abandonniont 
or postponement of the movement to Manassas, 
he finally consented to its post[)onement. At 
noon, on the lOtli of March, the cavalry ad- 
vance, reached the enemy's lines atCentreviJie, 
passing through his recently occupied camps 
and works, and iiiuling still burning heaps of 
military stores and much valuable i)roport7. 
SECRET SERVICJ']. 
Tnnnediately after being assigned to the co;n- 
mand of'tiio troops around Washington, I or- 
ganized a secret service force under Mr. Allen 
i'inkerton, whose assumed name was E.J.Allen, 
a very OKpericnced and elticicut person. This 
force, up to the time I was relieved from com- 
mand, was continually occupied in procurii5g, 
from all possible sources, information regard- 
ing the strength, positions and movements of 
the enemv. All spies, " contrabands/' defcer- 



o'ther obstnictions, or until the iresiacr.t shall 
hereafter give express permissio;;. 

That any n-iovemeut, as aforesaid, en route 
for a new base of operations, v.'hich may be 
ordered by the Geueral-in-Chief, ant^ -whicli 
may be intended to move upon the Chesa- 
peoike I5ay, shall begin to move upon the bay 
as early as the iSrhof .Nfarcii inst.,and the Gen. - 
in-Chief sliall be responsiiile that it so moves 
as early as that day. 

Ordered: That the army a);d navy co-oper- 
ate in an immediate ollbrt to capture the ene- 
my's batteries upon 'the I'oiomac. betv/een 
Washington and the Ciiesapeake Bay. 

L. Thomas, Adj't. Gen. Ait. f.ivcoi.v. 

After what has been said already in regard 
to the effect of a movement to the lower Chesa- 
peake, it is unnecessary for me to comment 
upon this docitment, further than to say, that 
the time of begimung the movement, depend- 
ed upon the state of readiness of the trans- 
ports, the entire control of which had been 
placed, by the Secretary of War, in the hands 
of one of the assistant secretaries, and not un- 
der the Quartermaster ti-eneral ; so that, even 
if the movement were not impeded by the con- 
dition imposed in regard to the batteries on 
the Potomac, it could not have been iit my 
power to begin it before the 18th of March, 
unless the xiss't. Sec'y. of War had completed 
his arrangements by that time. 

]\feanwhile iniportant events were occurring, 
-which materially modified the designs for the 
8ttbscquent campaign. The appearance of the 
Merrimac off Old Point Comfort, and the en- 
counter with the U. S. Squadron on the 8th of 
March, threatened serious darangement of the 
plan for the Penisular movement. But the 
engagement between the Monitor and the ]\[er- 
rimac, on the 9th of March, demonstrated so 
satisfactorily the power of the former, and the 
other naval preparations were so extensive 
and formidable, that the security of Fort Mon- 
roe, as a base of operations, was placed be- 
yond a doubt ; and, although the James River 
was closed to us, the York River, with its tri- 
butaries, was still open as a line of water com- 
munication with the Fortress. The general 
plan, therefore, remained luidisturbed, al- 
though less promising in its details than wiien 
the James River was in our control. 

On Sunday, the 9th of .March, information 
from various sources iriade it apparent that 
the enemy was evacuating his positions at 
Centreville and Mantissas, as well as on the 
upper and lower Potumac. The President and 
Secretary of AVar were pi-esent when the most 
positive information reached me, and 1 ex- 
pressed to them my intention to cross the 
river immediately, and there gain the nmst 
authentic information, prior to determining 
what, course to pursue. 

^The retirement of the enemy towards Rich- 
mond had been expected, as the natural con- 

BCfiucnco of the movement to the Peninsula ; . . 

but their a<loption of this course innnediately 1 tere, refugees, and many prisoners of war, 



31 



coming into our lines from the front, were 
carefully examined — first, by the outpost and 
division commanders, and theii bymy chiof-of- 
staff and the provost-marshal-general. Their 
statements, taken in writing, and in many cases 
under oath, from day to day, for a long period 
previous to the evacuation of Manassas', com- 
prised a mass of evidence whicli, by careful 
digests and colLxtions, enabled me to estimate 
with considerable accuracy the strength of the 
enemy before us. Summaries, showing the 
character and results of the labors of tlic se- 
cret S'-rvice force, accompany this report, and 
Krefer to them for the facts they contain, and 
as a measure of the ignorance which led some 
journals at that time, and persons in high office, 
unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an 
army, and to delude the country with Quaker- 
gun stories of the defenses, and gross under- 
statements of the numbers, of the enemy. 

The following orders were issued for the 
examination of persons coming from the di- 
rection of the enemy : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potoniac, ^Vash- 
ington, Dec. 16, 1861.— Circuhtr ; The Major- 
General commanding directs. That all deserters, 
prisoners, spies, " contrabands," and all other 
persons whatever, coming or brought within 
our lines from Virginia, shall be taken imme- 
diately to the quarters of the commander of 
the division witliin whose lines they may come 
or be brought, without previous examination 
by any one, except so far as may be necessary 
for the officer commanding the advanced guard, 
to elicit information regarding his particular 
post ; That the division commander examine 
all such persons himself, or delegate such duty 
to a proper officer of his staif, and allow no 
oiher pei'sons to hold any communication with 
them : That he the;i immediately send them, 
with a sufficient guard, to the provost marshal 
in this city for further examination and safe 
keeping ; -and that stringent orders be given to 
all guards having such persons in charge not 
to hold any communication with theoi what- 
ever ; and inrther,that the information elicited 
from such persons shall be inunediately com- 
municated to the major-general commanding, 
or to the chief-of-stafE, and to no other person 
whatever. 

The major-general commanding further di- 
rects that a sufficient guard be placed around 
every telegraph station pertaining to this army, 
and that such guards be instructed not to al- 
low any person, except the regular telegra])li 
corps, general officers, and such stiiff officers as 
may be authorized by their chief, to enter or 
loiter around said stations within hearing of 
the sound of the teiegre.pliic instruments. 

By command of Maj.-Gen. McClcllan, b. Wil- 
liams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, NV'ash- 
ington, Feb. 26, 18G2. 

General Orders, No. 27. 



All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and 



other persons coming within oijr lines will be 
taken at once to tlie provost marshal of the 
nearest division, who will examine them in 
presence of the divisio;i conunander, or an 
officer of his staff designated for the inu-pose. 
This examination will oiily refer to such infyr- 
mation as may affect the division and those near 
it ; especially tiiose remote from general head- 
quarters. As soon as this examination is com- 
pleted, and it must be made as rapidly as pos- 
sible, the persoji will be sent under proper 
guard to the provost-marshal-general, with a 
statement of his replies to the questions asked. 
Upon receiving him tlie provost-marshal-gen- 
eral will at once send him with this statement 
to the chief-of-staff of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, wdio will cause the necessary examina- 
tion to be made. The provost-marshal-general 
vfill have the custody of all such persons. 
Division commanders will at once ^mmuni- 
cate to other division commanders all informa- 
tion thus obtained which affects them 

By command of Jlaj.-Gen. McClellan, 
S. Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 
In addition to the foregoing orders, the di- 
vision comihanders were instructed whenever 
they desired to send out scouts towards the 
cnemj^to make known the object at headquar- 
ters, in Older that I might determine whether 
we had tiie information it was proposed to ob- 
tain, and that I niigiit give the necessary orderg 
to other commanders so that the scouts should 
not be molested by the guards. 

It will be seen from the report of the chief 
of the secret service corps, dated March 8th 
that the forces of the rebel army of the Poto' 
mac at that date were as follows : 

At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper 
Occoquan, and vicinity, 80,000 men ; at Brooks's 
Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicin- 
ity, 18,000 men ; at Leesburg and vicinity, 4,500 
men ; in the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000 men ; 
Total number, 115,500. 

About_ tlu-ee hundred field-guns, and from 
twenty-six to thirty siege-guns were with the 
rebel army in front of Washington. 

The report made on the 17th of Jifarch, after 
the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville 
corroborates the statements contained in the 
repoort of the 8th, and is fortified by the affi- 
davits of several railroad engineers, conductors, 
baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for 
forming correct estimates were unusually good. 
These affidavits will be found in the accompa- 
nying reports of the chief of the secret service 
corps. 

ENEMY'S WORKS AT AND NEAR MA- 
NASSAS. — A reconnoissance of the works at 
Centreville made by Lieut. McAlester, U. S. En- 
gineers, on March'l4th, 1862, and a survey of 
those at xManassas made by a party of the 
U. S. Coast Survey in April, 18G2, confirmed 
also my conclusions as to the streiiglh of the 
enemy's defenscH. 

Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, 
one facing east, and tlie other north. The for- 



mcr co.-8.dted of seven works, viz. : o«ic bas- 
tion-fort, two redoubts, two hniettes, mul two 
batteries : all containing euibrasiiues fur forty 
gvuis, and connected by infantry parapets and 
double capounieres. It; extended along the 
crest of tlie ridge about one mile and three- 
quarters from its junction witli the northern 
front, to ground thickly wooded, and ilnpassa- 
ble to an attacking column. The northern 
front extended about one mile and a quarter to 
Great Rocky Run, and thence three-quarters 
of a mile further, to thickly wooded impassa- 
ble ground in the valley of Cub Run. It Con- 
sisted of six lunettes and batteries. With em- 
brasures for thirty-one giuis, connected by an 
infantry parapet in the form of a crcmalliere 
line with redans. 

At the town of Centreville, on a high hill 
commanding the rear of all the works within 
range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten 
embi"ftsures. 

Manassas Station was defended in all direc- 
tions by a system of detached Avorks, with 
platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine 
carriages, and connected by infantrj' parapets. 
This system was rendered complete by a very 
large work with sixteen embrasures, which 
commanded tliQ highest of the other works by 
about fifty feet. 

Sketches of the reconnoissances above re- 
ferred to will be found among the maps ap- 
pended to this report. 

From this it will be seen that the positions 
selected by the enemy at Centreville and Ma- 
nassas were naturally very strong, with im- 
passable streams and broken ground, aflording 
ample protection to their flaid?;s,and that strong 
lines of intrenchments swept all the available 
approaches. 

Although the history of every former war 
has conclusively shown the great advantages 
which are possessed by an enemy acting on 
the defensive and occupying strong positions 
defended by heavy earthworks, yet, at the com- 
mencement of this war but few civilians in our 
country, and, indeed, not all military men of 
rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. 

New levies that have never been in battle, 
cannot be expected to advance without cover 
under the nnuxlerous fire from such defenses, 
and carry them by assault. This is work in 
which veteran troops frequently falter, and are 
repiUsed with loss. That an assault of the en- 
emy's positions, in front of Washington, Avith 
the new troops composing the army of the Po- 
tomac, during the winter of 1861-2, would have 
resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too 
probable. The same armj^ though eninx'd to 
war in many battles hardly fought and bravely 
won, has thrice, under other generals, sulfered 
Buch disasters as it was no excess of prudence 
then to avoid. 

My letter to the Secretary of War, dated 
February 3d, 18(J2, and given above, expressed 
the opinion that the movement to the Penin- 
Bula, would compel tlie enemy to retire from 



32 

, his position at Manassas, and free Washington 
from danger. 

When the enemy first learned of that plan, 
they did thiis evacuate Manassas. During the 
Peninsula campaign, as at no former period, 
northern Virginia was completely in our pos- 
session, and the vicinity of Washington free 
from the presence of the enemy. The groimd 
so gained was not lost, nor Washington again 
put in danger, until the enemy learned of the 
orders for an evacuation of the Peninsula, sent 
to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left 
free to advance northward, and menace the 
national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts 
that the best defense of Washington, is a Pe- 
ninsula attack on Richmond. 

THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER RELIEVING* 
GEN'L McCLELLAN OF THE COMJIAND- 
IN-CHIEF. — My order for tlie organization of 
the army corps, was issued on the 13th of 
March. It lias been given above. 

While at Fairfax Court House, on March 
12tli, I was inform-ed through the telegraph, 
by ;v member of my §taff, that the following 
document had appeared in the "National In- 
telligencer," of that morning. 

Exec. Mansion, Washington, March 11, 1862. 
President's War Order, No. 3. 

Maj.-Gen. McClellan, having personally taken 
the field at the head of the army of the Poto- 
mac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved 
from the command of the other military de- 
partments, he retaining command of the de- , 
pai'inent ot the Potomac. 

Ordered further, That the departments now 
under the respective commands of Generals 
Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of 
that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north 
and south line indefinitely drawn through 
Koxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and de- 
signated the Department of the Mississippi, 
and that, mitil other^dse ordered, Major.-Gen. 
Halleck have command of said department. 

Ordered also, That the country west of the 
Department of the Potomac, and east of the 
Department of the Mississippi, be a military 
department, to be called the Mountain Depart- 
ment, and that the same be commanded by 
Maj.-Gcn. Fremont. 

That all the commanders of departments, 
after the receipt of this order by them, respec- 
tively report, severally and directly, to the 
Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and 
frequent reports, will be expected of all and 
each of them. Ab. Lincoln. 

Though unaware of the President's inten- 
tion to remove me from the position of gen- 
eral-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the dis- 
position he saw fit to make of my services, 
and so informed him in a note, on the 12th of 
March, in which occur these words : 

" I believe I said to you some weeks since, 
in connection with some Western matters, that 
no feeling of self-interest or ambition, should 
ever prevent me from devoting myself to the 
service. 1 am glad to have the opportunity 



33 



to prove it, and you will find that, under pre- 
Bent circumstances, I shall work just as cheer- 
fully as before, and that no consideration of 
self will, in any manner, interfere with the 
discharge-of mj' public duties. Again thank- 
ing you for official and personal kindness you 
have so often evinced towards me, I am, <fcc." 
A RECONNOISSANCE. 

On the 14tli of March, a reconnoissance of 
a large body of cavalry, with some infantry, 
under command of Gen. Stoneman, was sent 
along the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to 
determine the position of the cnemj^ and, if 
possible, force his rear across the Rappahan- 
nock ; but the roads were in such condition, 
that, finding it impossible to subsist his men. 
Gen. Stoneman was forced to return, after 
reaching Cedar Run. Tlie following dispatch 
from him recites the result of this expedition : 
Headq's., Union Mills, ]\rarch 16. 1862. 

Col. Colburn : — We arrived liere last even- 
ing about dark ; we got corn for horses ; no 
provisions for men ; Bull Run too high to 
cross ; had we staj'ed an hour longer, we 
ehould not have got here to-day, owing to the 
high water in the streams ; felt the enemy 
cautiously, tuid found him in force at Warren- 
ton Junction ; saw two regiments of cavalry, 
and three bodies of infantry, on the other side 
of Cedar Run ; had we crossed, should not 
have been able to get back for high water ; 
had three men of 5th Cavalry hit driving in 
enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in the 
Jfwliead. 

Enemy acted confidently, and followed us 
some way back on the road, but did not mo- 
lest us hi any way. Enemy's force consisted 
of Stewart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of 
artillery, and some infantry : railroad bridges 
all burnt down up to Warrcnton Junction ; 
Btill entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn 
at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled 
upon them ; heard cars running during the 
nigtit before last, probably bringing up troops 
from Rappahannock ; heard of two regiments 
of infantrj' at Warrenton, engaged in impress- 
ing the miiiiia and securing forage ; heard of 
a large force of infantry this siJle of Rappa- 
hannock River, having come up to Warrenton 
Junction from Acquia Creek day before yes- 
terday ; bridges all destroyed this side of 
"■- Broad Run. The aids who take this will give 
you further particulars. Very respectfully, <tc. 
Geo. Stone.max, Brig.-Gen. Com'g. 
DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 

The main body of the army was, on the 11th 
of March, rnoved back to the vicinity of Alex- 
andria to be embarked, leaving a part of Gen. 
Sumner's corps at Manassas, until other troops 
could be sent to relieve it. 

Before it was withi'awn, a strong recon- 
noissance xmder Gen. Howard was sent to- 
wards the Rappahannock, the result of which 
appears in the following dispatch : 

Warrenton Junction, ilarch 29, 1862. 

Gen. S. WilHams : — Express just received 



from Gen. Howard. He drove the enemy 
across the Rappahamiock bridge, and is now 
in camp on this bank of and near the Rappa- 
hannock River. The enemy blew up the 
bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing 
during the march, and a few shots exchanged 
by the artillery, without any u-^.s on our part. 
Their loss, if any, is not known. Gen. Howard 
will return to this camp to-morrow mortiing. 
E. Y. Sumner, Brig.-Gen. 

The line of the Rappahainiock and the Man- 
assas Gap railroad was- thus reasonably secure 
from menace by any considerable body of the 
enem}'. i * 

On the 13th of March, a council of war was 
assembled at the Fairfax Court House, to 
discuss the military status. The President's 
Order No. 3, of March 8tli, was considered. 
Tlie following is a memorandum of the pro- 
ceedings of the council : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fairfax 
Court House, March 13, 1862. 

A council of the Generals commanding array 
corps at the headquarters of the arjiiy of the 
Potomac, were of the opinion : 

I. That the enemy liaving retreated from 
Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rapi^a-, 
hanuock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of gen- 
erals commanding army corps that the opera- 
tions to be carried on will be best undertaken 
from Old Point Comfort, between the York 
and James Rivers. 

Provided — 

1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merriraao, can 
be neutralized. 

2d. That the means of transportation suffi- 
cient for an immediate transfer of the force to 
its new base can be ready at Washington and 
Alexandria, to move down the Potomac, and, 

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be 
had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy'a 
batteries on the York River. 

4th. The force to be left to cover Washing- 
ton shall be such as to give an entire feeling 
of security for its safety from menace. — (Una- 
nimous.) 

H. If the foregoing cannot be, tne army 
should then be moved against the enemy, be- 
hind the Rappahannock, at the earliest pos- 
sible moment, and the means of reconstruting 
bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking 
them with material sufficient forjsupplying the 
army, should at once be collected for both the 
Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Rich- 
morid railroads. — (Unanimous.) 

N. B. That, with the forts on the right bank 
of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on 
tlie left bank occupied, a covering force in 
front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would 
suffice. — (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) 

A total of 40,000 men for tho defense of the 
city would suffice — (Sumner.) 

This was assented to by myself, and imme- 
diately communicated to the War Department. 
The following reply was received the same 
day: 



War Dcparfmetit, March 13, 1862, 
To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,— 

The" President, having considered the plan 
of operations agreed upon b}' yourself and the 
army corps, makes no objection to the same, 
but gives the following directions as to its 
execution : 

1st. ' Leave such force at ^^anassas Junction 
as shall make it entirely certain that the ene- 
my shall not repossess himself of that position 
suid line of communication. 

2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

3d. Move the reraaiiulcr of tlie force down 
the Potomac — choosing a, new base at Fortress 
Monroe, or anywhere between liere and there , 
or, at all events, move such remainder ot the 
army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some 
route. 

Edwin M. Stantox, Sec. of War. 

My preparations were at once begun in ac- 
cordance with tliese directions, and on the 
IGth of March the following instructions were 
sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth. 
lleadq's. Army of the Potomac, March 16, '62. 
' Sir, — You will post yonr command in tlie 
vicinity of Manassas ; intrench yourself strong- 
ly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the 
front. 

Your first care will be the rebuilding of the 
railway from Washington to Manassas, and to 
Strasburg, in order to open your communica- 
tions with the Valley of tlie Shenandoah. As 
soon as Manassas Gap Railway is in running 
order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four 
regiments, with two batteries, at or near tiie 
point wliere the railway crosses the Shenan- 
doah. Something like two regiments ot ca- 
vajry should be left in that vicinity to occupy 
Winchester, and thorougldy scour the country 
south of the railway and up the Shcnamloah 
Valley, as well as through Cliester Gap, wiiich 
might, perhaps, be advaniageously occupied 
by a detachmcT't of infantry well intrencliod. 
"Block houses should be built at all the railway 
bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton 
Junction, or Warrenton itself, and also some 
little more advanced ])oint on the Orange and 
'Alexanilria Ilaihvay, as soon as the railway 
bridge is repaired. 

Great activity should be observed by tlie 
'cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Ma- 
nassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at 
your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, 
and probably a fourth towards LeesDurg. 

To recapitulate : The most important points 
■which should engage your attention are as fol- 
lows : 

1st.. A strong force, well intrenched, in the 
vicinity of Manassas, perhaps cvenCenterville, 
and another force, (a brigade), also well in- 
trenched, near Strasburg. 

2d. Block houses at the Railway bridges. 

3d. Constant employment of the cavalry well 
to the front. "^ ' ••■ • ■ ' ' ' • 

4th. Crraiid Guards at Warrenton Junction, 
and in advance as far as the Rappahannock, if 
possible. 



34 



5th. Great care to bo exercised to obtain 
full and early information as to the enemy. 

6th. The general object is to cover the lino 
of the Potomac and Washington. 

The foregoing is communicated by command 
of Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 

S. Williams; Assistant-Adjt.-Gfn. 
To Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, 

Comd'g. 5th Corps Army of the Potomac, 
lleadq's Army of the Potomac, March 16, '62. 

Sir, — Tlie command to which you have been 
assigned by instructions of the President, as 
Military Governor of the District of Columbia, 
embraces the geograpiiical limits of the dis- 
trict, and will also include the city of Alexan- 
dria, the defensive works south of the Po- 
tomac, from th.e Occoquan to Difficult Creek, 
and the post of Fort Washington. 

I enclose a list of the troops, and of tho 
defenses embraced in these limits. 

General Banks will command at Manassas 
Junction, witli the divisions of AViliiams and 
Shields, composing ihe 5th Corps, but you 
should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in 
your front— carefully guard the approaches in 
that quarter, and maintain the duties of ad- 
vanced guards. You will use the same pre- 
cautions on either flank. 

All troops not actually needed for the police 
of Washington and Georgetown, tor the garri- 
sons north of the Potomac, and for otiier indi- 
cated special duties, should be moved to th» 
south side of the river. 

In the centre of your front yon should post 
the main body of your troops, and proper 
proportions at suitable distances towards your 
right and left flanks. Careful patrols will b« 
made, in order thoroughly to scour the coun- 
try in front from right to left. 

It is specially enjoined upon you to main- 
tain the forts and their armaments in the best 
]K)Ssiblc order, to look carefully to the instruc- 
tion and discipline of their garrisons, as well 
as all other troops under your command, and 
by frequent and rigid inspections to insure 
the attainment of these ends. 

The care* of tho railways, canals, depots, 
bridges and ferries, within the above-named 
limits, will devolve upon you, and you are to 
insure their security and provide for their 
protection by every means in your power. 
You will also protect the depots of the pub- 
lic stores, and transmit the stores to troops in 
active service. 

By means of patrols you will thoroughly 
scour the neighboring country, south of the 
eastern branch, and also on your right, and 
you will use every possible precaution to in- 
tercept mails, goods, and persons passing un- 
authori'/x'd to the enemy's lines. The necessity 
of maintaining good order within your limits, 
and especially in the capital of the nation, 
cannot be too strongly enforced. 

You will forward and facilitate the move- 
ment of all troops destined tor the active part 
of tho army of the Potomac, and especially tho 



35 



4kr»nsit of detachments to their proper regi- 
ments and corps. 

The charge of the new troops arriving in 
Wusliington, and all trooi)S temporarily there, 
will devolve upon j'ou. You will form them 
into provisional brigades, promote tlieir in- 
struction and discipline, and facilitate their 
equipment. 

Report all arrivals of troops — their strength, 
composition and equipment — by every oppor- 
tunity. 

Besides the regular reports and returns, 
which you will be required to render to the 
adjutant-general of the army, yon will make 
to these headquarters a consolidated report 
of 3'onr command every Sunday morning, and 
montlily returns on the lirst day of each nionth. 

The foregoing instructions are comniuui- 
cated by command of jNfaj.-Gen. McClcllau. 

S. Williams, Assistant Adgt.-Gen. 
To Brig.-Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, 

Military (xov. of the District of Ccilumbia. 

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ON THK 
PENINSULA. 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
riicologica! Seminar}^ Va., March 19, 1862. 
Hon. E M. Stanton, Secretarj' of War : 

Sir, — I have the honor to submit the follow- 
ing notes on the proposed operations of the 
active portion of the armj^ of the Potomac. 

The proposed plan of campaign is to assume 
For^ Monroe as the first base of operations, 
r-> taking the line by Yorktown and West Point 
I upon Ilichmond as the line of operations, 
Richmond being the objective point. It is 
assunied that the fall of Kiclunond involves 
that of Norfolk and the whole oi Virginia; 
also that we shall fight a decisive battle be- 
tween West Point and Iiichmond, to give 
which battle the rebels will concentrate all 
their avadable forces, understanding, as they 
will, that it involves the fate of their cause. 
It therefore follows : 

Isl. Tliat we should collect all om- available 
forces and operate upon adjacent lines, main- 
"taining perfect communication between our 
lines. 

2a. That no time should be lost in reaching 
the field of battle. 

The advantages of the Peninsula between 
the York and James Rivers are too obvious 
to need explanation. It is also clear tliat West 
Point should as soon as possible be reached 
and be our mam depot, that we may have tlie 
ehortest line of laud transjiortation for our 
supplies and the use of the York River. 

There are two methods of reaching this 
point. 

\sL Ey moving directly from Fort Monroe 
as a base, and trusting to the roads for our 
supplies, at the same lime landing a strong 
corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order 
tp turn the rebel lines of defense south of 
Yorktown, then to reduce Yorktown and 
Gloucester, by a siege in all probability, in- 
rolving a delay of weeks perhaps. 



2c?. To make a combined naval and land" 
attack upon Yorktown, the first object of the 
campaign. This leads to the most rapid and 
decisive results. To accomplish this the iiavj 
should at once conccnliate upon the York 
River all their available and most powerful 
batteries. Its reduction should not, in that 
case, require many hours. A strbng corps 
would be pushed up the York, under cover of 
the navy, directi}' upon ^Vest Point, irnnicdi- 
ately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could 
at once eskiblish oiu- new base of operations 
at a distance of some twenty-five miles from 
Richmond, witli every facility for develop- 
ing and bringing into play the whole of 
our available force on cither or both banks 
of the James. 

It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- 
solute necessity, of the co-operation of the 
navy, as a part of this progrannnc ; without 
it the oi)erations may be prolonged for many 
weeks, and we may be forced to cany in front 
several strong positions, which, by their aid, 
could bo turned' without serious loss of cither 
time or men. 

It is also of first importance to bear in mind 
the fact already alluded to, that the captm-o of 
Richmond necessarily involves the prompt 
fall of Norfolk ; while an operation against 
Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of tlio 
campaign, facilitates the reduction of Rich- 
mond merely by the demoralization of the 
rebel troops involved, and that after tlio fall 
of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake 
the capture of Richmond by the same means 
which would have accomiilished it in the be- 
ginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels 
am})lc time to i)crfect their defensive arrange- 
ments, for they could well know from the mo- 
ment the army ot the Potomac chaiiged its 
base to Fort Alonroc that Richmoud must be 
its ultimate object. 

It may be summed up in few words, tlidt, 
for the prompt success of this cam[)aign, it is 
absolutely necessary that the navy sliould at 
once throw its whole available force, its mo^t 
powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is 
the most important i)oint — there the knot to 
be cut. An immediate decison upon tlic sub- 
ject matter of this conmiunication i^ liighly 
desirable, and seems called for by tlie exigen- 
cies of the occasion. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't. 
Gko. R. McCi.kllan, Alajoi- General. 
A REDUC'ITON OF FORCE. 

In the meantime the troops destined to form 
the active army were collected in cu:;.ps con- 
venient to the points of embarkation, and 
every preparation made to embark them "as 
rapidly as possible, when the transports weye 
ready. 

A few days befoi'e fiailirg for Fort ^Monroe, 
while still cncjimpcd near Alexandria, I met 
tile Picsident by a[)poiiitment, on a stetuuer. 
lie then informed me that he had been strong- 
ly pressed to take General lUonker's divisloa 



36 



from'my command and give it to Greneral Fre- 
mont. His Excellency was good enough to 
BUggest several reasons for not taking Blenk- 
er's division from me. I assented to the force 
of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified 
ty his decision to allow the division to remain 
with the army of the Potomac. It was, there- 
fore, with sm'prise that I received on the 31st 
the following note ; 

Exec. Mansion, Wusliington, March 31, '62. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 

My Dear Sir : — Tliis morning I felt con- 
Btrained to order Blenker's division to Fre- 
mont ; and I will write this to assure you that 
I did so with great pain, understanding that 
you would wish it otherwise. If 3'ou could 
know the full pressure of the case, I am con- 
fident you would justify it, even beyond a 
mere acknowledgement, that the commander- 
in-chief may order what he pleases. 

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln 
, To this, I replied in substance, that I regret- 
led the order, and could ill-afi'qrd to lose'10,000 
troops, which had been counted upon in form- 
ing my plan of campaign, but as there was no 
remedy I would yield and do the best I could 
without them. In a conversation with the 
President a few hours afterwards, I repeated 
Terbally the same thing, and expressed my 
regret that Blenker's division had been given 
to Fremont, from any " pressure" other thain 
the requirements of the national exigency. I 
was partially relieved, however, by the Presi- 
dent's positive and emphatic assurance that I 
might leave, confident that no more troops be- 
yond these 10,000 should, in any event, be taken 
from me, or in any way detached from my 
command. 

OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH 
VALLEY. 

At the time of the evacuation of Manassas 
hj the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our 
forces occupying Chai-lestown, and Shield's 
reaching Bunker Hill on the 11th. On the 
morning of the 12th, a brigade of Gen. Bank's 
troops, under Gen. Hamilton, entered Win- 
chester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the 
evening before, his rear guard of cavahy leav- 
ing an hour before our advance entered the 
place. The enemy having made his prepara- 
tions for evacuation some days before, it was 
not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 
13th, the mass of Banks' corps was concen- 
trated in the immediate vicinity of Winclies- 
tcr, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. 
On the lOtli Gen. Shields, occupied Strasburg, 
driving the enemy twenty miles south, to 
Mount Jackson. 

On the 20th^'the first^division of Banks' 
Icorps, commenced its movement towards 
Manassas, in compliance Avith my letter of in- 
fitructions of the 16th. 

Jackson probably received information of 
this movement, and supposed that no force of 
any consequence Avas left in the vicinity of 
Winchester, and upon the fahing back of 



Shields to that place on the 20th, for the pur- 
pose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the latter 
promptly' followed, whereupon ensued a skir- 
mish on the 22d, in which Gen. Shields was 
wounded, and an affair at Winchester on the 
23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who 
was pursued as rapidly as the exhaustion of 
our troops, and tlie difficulty of obtaining sup- 
plies, permitted. It is presumed that the fuU 
reports of the battle of Winchester, were for- 
warded direct to the War Department by 
Gen. Banks. 

It being now clear that the enemy had no 
intention of returning by the Manassas route, 
the following letter of April 1st, was Avritten 
to Gen. Banks. 

Head-Quarters, Army of the Pot(miac, on 
Board the Commodore, April 1, 18G2. 
Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, Com'ng Fifth Corps, — 

General : — The change in afiairs in the 
valley of the Shenandoah, has rendered neces- 
sary a corresponding departure, temporarily 
at least, from the plan we some days since ' 
agreed upon. 

In my arrangements, I assume you have with 
you a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson 
before you, provided he is not reinforced 
largely. I also assume, that you may find it 
impossible to detach anything towards Manas- 
sas for some days, probably not until the ope- 
rations of th» main army have drawn all the 
rebel force toward Richmond. ^ 

You are aware that General Sumner has for \ 
some da3's been at Manassas Junction, with 
two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and 
two regiments of cavalry, and that a recon- 
noissance to the Rappahannock, forced the 
enemy to desiroy the railroad bridge at Rap- 
pahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railroad. Since that time our cavalry 
have found nothing on this side of the Rappa- 
hannock in that direction, and it seems clear 
that we have no reason to fear any return of 
the rebels in that quarter. Their movements 
near Fredericksburg, also indicate a final aban- 
donment of that neighborhood. I doubt wheth- 
er Johnson will now reinforce Jackson, with a 
view of offensive operations. The time is pro- 
bably passed when he could have gained any 
thing hj doing so. I have ordered in one of 
Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late 
Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarkation, Blen- 
ker's has been detached from the Army of the 
Potomac, and ordered to report to General Fre- 
mont. 

Abercrombie is probably at Warrcnton Junc- 
tion to-day ; Geary is at AVhite Plains. 

Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered 
out, and arc now on their way to relieve the 
two regiments of Sumner. 

Four thousand infantry, and one battery, 
leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some 
3,000 more will move in one or two days, ^d 
soon after some 3,000 additional. 

I will order Blenker to march on Sti-asburg, 
and to report to you for temporary duty, so 



37 



that, should you find a large force in your 
front, you can avail yourself of his aid. As 
soon as possible, please direct him on Win- 
chester, thence to report to the adjutant-j:;en- 
eral of the army for orders, but keep him until 
you are sure what you have in front. 

In regard to your own movements, the most 
important thing at present is to throw Jackson 
well back, and then to assume such a position 
as to enable you to prevent his return. As 
soon as the railway communications are re-es- 
tablished, it will be, probably, important and 
advisable to move on Staunton, but this would 
require secure communications, and a force of 
from 25,000 to 30,000 for active operations. 
It should also be nearly coincident with my 
own move on Richmond ; at all events, not so 
. long before it as to enable the rebels to con- 
icentrate on you, and then return on me. I 
* fear that you cannot be readj^in time, although 
,it may come in very well with a force less than 
that I have mentioned, after the main battle 
,near Richmond. When General Sumner leaves 
'^' Warrenton Junctton, General Abercrombie will 
'' be placed in immediate command of Manassas 
and Warrenton Junction, under your general 
orders. Please inform me frequently, by tele- 
graph, and otherwise, as to the state of thhigs 
in your front. I am very truly yours, 

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Corn'g. 
■• P. S. — From what I have jvist learned it 
would seem that the two regiments of cavalry 
ntended for Warrenton Junction have gone 
'to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional reg- 
iments placed inider your orders, tw-o should, 
•as promptly as possible, move by the shortest 
route on Warrenton Junction. I am, sir, very 
.respectfully, Your obedient servant, 

Geo. B-. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
This letter needs no further explanation than 
to saj' that it was my intention, had the opera- 
tions in that quarter remanied under my charge, 
either to have resumed the defensive positions 
marked out in the letter of March 16, or to 
have advanced General Banlcs upon Staunton, 
as miglitinthe progress of events seem advis- 
able. It is to be remembered that when I 
■A'rote the preceding and folioiving letters of 
April 1,1 had no-expectation of being relieved 
from the charge of the operations in the She- 
nandoah Valle3' and in front of Wa'shington, 
the President's War Order No. 5 giving no in- 
timation of such an intention ; and that, so far 
as reference was made to tinal operations after 
■driving Jackson back and taking such a posi- 
tion as to prevent his return, no positive 
orders were given in the letter — the matter 
being left for future consideration, when the 
proper time arrived for a decision. 
TliOOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASH- 
INGTON. 
From the following letter to the adjutant- 
general, dated April 1, 1862, it will be seen 
that I left for the defunse of the national capi- 
tal and its approaches, when I sailed for tlie 
Peninsula, 7-3,456 men, with 109 pieces of lig.'it I 



f^ 



artillery, including the 32 pieces in Washings- 
ton alluded to, but not enumerated in my let- 
ter to the adjutant-genera!. It will also be 
seen that I recommended other available ti'oopa 
in New York (more than 4,000) to bo at onca 
ordered forward to reinforce them. 

Headquarters, Array of the Potomac, 
Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. 
Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Ai 

General: — I have to request that you will: 
lay the following commmiication before thek 
Hon. Secretary of War. •; 

Tlie approximate numbers and positions oft 
the troops left near and in rear of the Potomacr 
is as follows : — *> 

Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads 
under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,00(X 
for the defense of Baltimore, and 1,988 availa- 
ble for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &;c. Fort 
Delaware is very well garrisoned by'about 400' 
men. 

The garrisons of the fSi'ts around Washing-^ 
ton amount to 10,600 men, other disposabla 
tioops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about 
11,400 men. 

The troops employed in guarding the vari* 
ous railways in Maryland amount to som» 
3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, 
being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, : 
and to send forward to Manassas. 

Gen. Abercrombie occupies AFarrenton with 
a force which including Col. Geary at White- 
Plains and the cavalry to be at his disposal,, 
will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces • 
of artillery. 

I have the honor to request that all the 
troops organized for service in Pennsylvania 
and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, 
may be ordered to Washington. I learn from . 
Gov. Curtin that there are some 3,500 men. 
now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I 
should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four 
thousand men from Gen. ^Vadsworth I desire 
to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with 
the railroad guards above alluded to, will make 
up a force under the command of Gen. Aber- 
crombie of something like 18,639 men. ': 

It is my design to push Gen. Blenker's divi-' 
sion from Warrenton iqion Strasburg. Ho 
should remain at Strasburg long enough to al- 
low matters to assume a definite form in that 
region, before i5roceeding to his ultimate dca- 
tination. , .. 

The troops in the valley of "the Shenandoah, 
will thus be, including Bleiiker s division, 10,- 
028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery. Banks' 
5th Corps, which eiuliraces the command of 
Gen. Shields, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns — 
some 3,652 disposable cavalry and the railroad 
guards, about 2,100 men — amount to about 
35,467 men. 

It is designed to relievo Gen. Hooker by on© 
regiment, say 850 men, being, with some 500 
cavalry, 1,350 men on tiie lower Potomac. To 
recapitulate; — . ' 



m 



At Warrentoii there is to be, 
At Manassas, say, 
In tlie valley of the Shenandoah, 
■On the lower rotomac, 



7,780 men. 
10,850 '■ 
35,4(i7 " 

isno " 



® In all, 55,456 " 

There would thi!S be left for the p;arrisons 
and the front of Washington under (Jen. Wads- 
worth some 18,000 men, inclusive of the batte- 
ries under instruction. 

The troops organizing or ready for service 
in New York, I learn will probably number 
more than four thousand. These should be 
assembled at Washington, subject to disposi- 
tion where their services may be most requir- 
ed. I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, ■ Geo. B. McCleixan, Maj.-(Jen. Com'g. 

The following letter from (Jen. Barrj' shows 
tliat thirty-two (32) field-guns with men. horses 
and equipments, were also left in Washington 
City when the army sailed. These were tlio 
batteries imder instriTCtion referred to above. 
Headquarters, Inspector of Artillery, 
AVashington. Dec. 16, 18G2. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan, U. S. A. 

General : — It having been stated in various 
publie prints, and in a speech of Senator 
Chandler, of Michigan, in his place in the U. 
B. Senate, quoting what lie stated to be a por- 
tion of the testimony of Brig.-Gen. Wads- 
worth, military governor of Wasliington, be- 
■fore tlie Joint Senate and House Committee, 
on the subject of the war, that j\[aj.-Gen. Mc- 
Clellan had left an hisuificicnt force for the 
defence of Washington, and " noi a gun on 
. wheels." 
■ I have to contradict this charge as follows : 

From official reports made at the time to me 
(the chief of artillery of the army of the Po- 
tomac) and now in my possession, by the 
commanding officer of* the light artillery 
troops left in camp in the cit}' of Washington 
by your order, it appears that the foUowmg 
named field-officers were left ; 

Datlery " G " 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. Barnes, 
2 guns ; battery "K" 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. | that route 
Ci-ounse, 6 guns ; battery " L " 2d N. Y. Artil- 
lery, Capt. Ilobinson, 6 guns ; 9th N. Y. indc- 
pcndant battery, ('apt. ]\Iorozowi, 6 guns ; 
16th N. Y. indeijendent battery, (?apt. Locke ; 
battery " A " 2d battery N. Y. ^Artillery, Capt. 
Hogan, 6 guns ; battery " \\ '' *2d battery, N. 
y. Artillery, Capt. McMalion, 6 guns ; total 
of batteries, 32 guns. 

With the exception of a few horses, which 
co\ild iiave been obtained from the quarter- 
master's department in a few hours, the bat- 
teries were all fit for immediate service, ex- 
cepting the 16th N. Y. battery, which, having 
been previously ordered on Gen. Wadsworth's 
application, to report to him for special ser- 
vice, was unequipped with either guns or 
horses. 

I am, gen., very rcspeetfully, your ob't sev't, 
"Wai. t'\ i'>ARUY. P>.-G. InspcG. of Art., U.S. Army. 

It is tiue tliat Blouker's division, which "is 



included in the forces enumerated by me, wa« 
under orders to reinforce Gen. Fremont, bul 
the following dispatch from the Secretary of 
War, date.l iMarch 31, 1862. will show that I 
was authorized to detain him at Strasburg 
until matters assumeil a definite form in that 
region before proceeding to his ultimate des- 
tination ; in other words, until Jackson was 
disposed of, and had he been detained there, 
instead of moving on to Harper's Ferry and 
Franklin, with other orders, it is probable 
that Gen. BatdvS would have defeated Jackson, 
instead of being himself obliged subsequently 
to retreat to \Villiamsport. W 

War Dept., Washington, D. C, March 31, "62. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan: 

The order in respect to BIcnker is not de- 
signed to hinder or .delay the movement of 
llichardson or any other force. He can re- 
main wherever you desire him so long as 
required for yoiu- movements, and in any po- 
sition you desire. The order is simjdy to 
jdace him in position for reinforcing Fremont^, 
as soon as your dispositions -will permit, and ' 
he may go to Harper's Ferry, by such route 
and at such time, as j^ou shall direct — state 
your own wishes as to the movement — ^wheii 
and how it shall be made. 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

AVithout iiicludhig (Jen. Blenker's division, 
there were left 67,428 men, and 85 pieces of 
light artillery, which, ruider existing circum- 
stances, I deemed more than adequate to in- 
sure the perfect security of Washington against ' , 
any force the enemy could bring against it,, 
for the following reasons : 

The light troops I had thrown forward un- 
der Gen. Stoneman, in pursuit of tlie rebel 
army, after the evacuation of IManassas and 
Centreville, had driven their rearguard across 
Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions from 
Suniner's corps had forced them beyond the 
Rappahannock ; they had destroyed all the 
railway bridges behind them, thereby indi- j 
eating that the}' did not intend to return over 
Indeed, if they had attempted 
such a movement, their progress must have 
been slow and difficult, as it would have in- 
volved the reconstruction of the bridges, and 
if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry 
patrols well out to the front, to give timely 
notice of any approach of the enemy, had been 
strictly enforced, (and I left seven rcgimenta 
of cavalry for this express puiqiose.) they 
could not, by any possibility, have reached 
Wasliington before there would have been 
ample time to coTicentratc the entire forces 
left for its defense, as well as those at Balti- 
more, at any necessary point. *j) 

It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to 
the authorities, that the movement of the army 
to the Feninsiila, would have the effect to draw 
olf the rebel army from Manassas to the de- 
fense of their cajutal, and thus free AVashing- 
ton from menace. 'I'his ojiinion was confirmed 
tlic moment the movement commenced or 



rather as Boon as the enemy became aware of our 

intentions-; for, with the exception of Juckfiou'e 
force of some 15,000, which liis instrnctions show 
to have been irrtended to operate in such away as 
to prevent McDoweU's corps from being sent to 
yeinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude 
made its appearance in front of Washuigton du- 
ring the ])rogress of our operations on the I'e- 
ninsuhi ; nor until the order was given for my 
return from Harrison's Landing jvas AVashington 
again threatened. 

Surrounded as Washington was witli numerous 
and strong fortifications well garrisoned, it was 
manifest that the enemy conld not aiford to dc- 
tacli from his main army a force sufficient to as- 
sail tliem. 

It is proper to remark, that just previous to 
my departure for Fort Monroe, I scut my chief- 
of-staff to Gen. Hitchcock, who at that thuc held 
staff relations with his excellency the President 
and thc^ Secretary of War, to submit to liim a 
list of the troops I proposed to leave for the de- 
fense of Washington, and tlie positions in which 
I designed posting them. Gen. Hitchcock, after 
glancing his eye over the list, observed that he 
was not the judge of wliat was required for de- 
fending the capital', thatGen. McClellan's position 
was such as to enable him to understand the 
subject much better than he did, and he pre- 
sumed that if the force designated was in his 
judgment sufficient, nothing more would be 
required. He was then told by tlie cliief-of- 
Btaif that I would be glad to have his opinion, 
as an old and_,experienced officer. To this he re- 
plied, that as I had the entire control of the de- 
fenses for a long time, I was tlie best judge of 
what was needed, and he declined to give any 
other expression of opinion at tliat time. 

On the 2d of April, the day following my de- 
parture for Fort Alonroe, Generals Hitchcock and 
Thomas were directed by the Secretary of AVar 
to examine and report Avhether the Prwwdent's 
instructions to me of March 8th and 13th had 
been complied with. On the same day their re- 
port was submitted and their decision was, 

" That the requirements of the President, that 
this city (Washington) shall be left entirely se- 
cui e, has not lieen full}^ complied with. " 

The President, in his letter to tne on tho 6th 
of April, says : 

•' And now allow me to ask, do you really think 
1 should permit the line from llichmond, via. Ma- 
nassas Junction, to this city to be entirely open, 
except what resistance could be .presented by 
less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? " 

In the report of Generals Hitchcock and 
Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there 
was do danger of an attack from the direction 
of Manassas in these words : 

" In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as 
the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading 
to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no 
intention of returning for the rc-occnpation of 
tlieir late position, and therefore no large force 
wo\ild be necessary to hold that position." 

That 03 rumarked before, was precisely the 



39 



view I took of it, and this Avas enforced by th« 

subsequent movements of the enemy. 

In another paragrajjli of the report, it is stated 
that 55,000 men was the inmiber consfHered ade- 
quate for the defense of the capital. That Gen. 
McClellan, in his enumeration of the forces left, 
had included Banks' army corps, operating in tho 
Shenandoah Valley, but wliether this corps 
shoidd be regarded as available for the protect- 
ion of Washington, they decline to express an 
(spinion.. 

At the time this report was made, the only 
enemy on any ap])roach to AV^ashington, wan 
Jilckson's force, in front of Banks in the Shenan- 
doah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Railroad 
leading from this valley to "Washington, and it 
will be admitted, I presume, that Banks Occupy- 
ing the Shcnaiidoah Valley, was in the best posi- 
tion to defend, not only that approach to Wash- 
ington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and 
above. Tho numbers of troops left bj' me for 
the defenses of Wasiiington, as given in my let- 
ter to the adjutant-general, were taken from the 
latest official returns of that date, and these, of 
course, constitute the most trustworthy and au- 
thentic source, from which such informatioa 
could be obtained. 

Another statement made by General Hitchcock, 
before the " Committee on the Conduct of tho 
War," in reference to this same order, should bo 
noticed. He was asked the following question : 

" Do you understand now that the movement 
made by (len, M^cClellan to Fort Monroe, and up 
tiie York Piver, was in compliance with the re- 
commendation of the coinicil of generals com- 
manding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House, 
6n the 13th of March last, or in violation of it ?" 

To which he replied as follows : 

" I have considered, and do now consider that, 
it was in violation of the recommendation of 
that conned, in two important particulars ; one 
particular, being that portion of this report 
which represents the council as agreeing to tho 
expedition by way of the Peninsula, provided, 
, the rebel steamer Merrimac could lirst be neu- 
tralized. That important provision Gen. McClel- 
lan disregarded." 

***** 

The second i)artieular alluded to by General 
Hitchcock, was in reference to the troops left for 
Ihe defense of Washington, which has been dis- 
posed of above. 

In regard to the steamer Merrimac,! have also 
stated, that so far as our operations on York 
River were concerned, the power of this vessel 
was neutralized. I now proceed to give some 
of the evidence which influenced me in coming 
to that conclusion. 

Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, 
Mr. AVatson, Assistant-Secretary of War, was 
scut by the President to For.t Monroe, to consult 
with Flag Officer GuUlsborougli upon this sub- 
ject. The result of tlu.t consultation is contain- 
ed in the following extract from the evidence of 
Admiral GoKlsborougU betbre the '• (\tmnhtteo 
on the Conduct of tho War" viz.: "I tuld Mr. 



WalBon, Assistant-Secretary of War, that the 
President might mnke his mind perfectly easy 
about the ^lerrimac going up Yoik River, that 
she could never get there, for I had ample means 
to prevent that." 

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the 

Navy, testifies before the Committee as follows : 

" Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to neu- 

trahze the Merrimac, and I promised that it 

should be done." 

Geu. Keyes, commanding 4th Army Corps, tes- 
tifies as follows before the Committee : 

" During the time that the subject of the 
change of base was discussed, I had refused to 
consent to the Peninsula line of operations, until 
I had sfnt word to the Navy Department and 
asl<:ed two questions. Isi. ^V^hether the Merri- 
mac was certainly neiitralized or not ? 2d. 
Whetlier the navy was in a condition to co-ope- 
rate efficiently with the army, to break through 
between Yorktown and Gloucester Point ? To 
iotli of these questions answers were returned 
h the affirmative, that is, tlie Merrimac was neu- 
Valized, and the uavy was in a conditiou to co- 
operate efficiently to break through between 
Fork town and Gloucester Point." 
OllDRliS FOR THE FORTIFICATION OF 

MANASSAS JUNCTION. 
Before starting for the Pt3ninsula, I instructed 
Lieut.-Col. 13. S. Alexander, of the U. S. corps of 
engineers to visit Manassas Junction and its 
vicinity, for the purpose of determining upon 
the defensive works necessary to enable us to 
hold tliat place with a small force. The accom- 
pan3'ing letters' from Col. Alexander will sliow 
wlrat steps were taken by him to carrj'- into effect 
this iinporiaut order. 

I regret to say that those who succeeded me 
in command of the region in front of Washing- 
ton, whatever were the fears for its safety'-, did 
not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and 
instructions to him. 

Had Manassas been placed in condition for 
a strong defense, and its communications secured 
iH recommended by Col Alexander, the result 
if GciJ. Pope's campaign would probably have 
ijceu different. 

Washington, D. C, April, 2, 1862. 
Sir, — You will proceed to Manassas at as earl}' 
a moment as practicable, and mark on the grounfl 
the works for the defense of tlrat place, on the 
positions which I indicated to you j^esterday. 
You will find two carpenters experienced in this 
kind of work, ready to accompany you, by "call- 
ing on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of 
the 'i'rcasury Extension. 

The genera] idea of the defense of this posi- 
tion, is to occupy thiB fringe of elevations, whicli 
lies about half-way between Manassas depot and 
the junction of the railroad, with a series of 
works. Often' to the rear, so that they n:ay be 
comrn.iiidcd by llie work hereafter to be de- 
scribed.' ' ■ 

There will be at least four of these works, 
three of them being on the left of the railroad 
loading from Alexandria, at tlie positions occu- 



40 



pied by the enemy's work-s. The other on tho 
right of this road, on the position we Examined 
ye^fcrda3'. The works of the enemy to the north 
of this latter position, numbered Nos. 1 and 2 on 
Lieut. Comstock's sketch, may also form part of 
the front line of our defenses ; but the sides of 
these works, looking towards Manassas station 
should be leveled, so that the interior of the works 
may be seen from the latter position. 

Embrasures should be arranged in all these 
works for ^e/J artillery. The approaches should 
be such, that a battery can drive into the works. 
The number of eml)rasures in each battery will 
depend upon its size and the ground to be com- 
manded. It is supposed that there will be from 
four to eight embrasures in each battery. 

The other works of the enemy looking towards 
the east and south, may be strengthened so as to 
afford sufficient defense in these directions. The 
work, No. 3, on Lieut. Comstock's sketch^may bo 
also strengthened and arranged for field artillery 
when time will permit. This work is in a good 
position to cover a retreat, which would be made 
down the valley in which the railroad rtms to- 
wards Bull Run. 

At Manassas station there. should be a fort 
constructed. The railroad will pass through 
this fort, and the depot, if one should be built, 
should be placed in its rear. This latter work 
should be regarded as the key of the position. 
It should be. as large as tho nature of the ground 
will permit. 

By^ going down the slopes, which are not ^ 
steep, it may be made large enough to accommo- 
date 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the position 
need not be cut away, it will be better to throw 
up the earth into a large traverse whicli may 
also be a bomb pr-oof. Its profile should bo 
strong, , and its ditches should be lla'iketl. It 
should I'ecoive a heav}' armament of 2i or 32 
poiuid^s, with some rifled (Parrot) 20 or 30 
pounders. Its guns should command all tho 
exterior works, so that these works could be of 
no ttse to the enemy, sliould he take them. In 
accommodating the fort to the ground, this con- 
sideration should not be lost sight of. 

After tracing these works on the ground, you 
will make a alvctch embracing the whole of them, 
showing their relative positions and size. This 
sketch slrould. embrace the junction of the rail- 
roads and the ground for some distance, around 
the mainwork. It need not be made with ex- 
treme accuracy. The distances may be paced or 
measured Aviik a tape-line. The bearings may 
be taken by compass. 

Having located the works and prepared your 
sketch, you will report to Capt. Frederick E. 
Prime of tlie corps of engineers, who will furm'sh 
you the nfeans of construction. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

B. S.'AlexaxN-der, Lt.-Col. A. D. C. 
To (kipt. Fred. II. Munther. Present. 

Washington, D. C, April 6, 1802. 
Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard, 

Chief Engineer army of the Potomac. 

Sir, — 1 enclose you herewith a copy o# tho 



41 



instructions which I gave to Capt. Munthor, in 
reference to the tlcfenses ot Manassas?. 

As there has been a new department created 
(that of the Rappahannock) it is possible that 
you and T, as well as Gen. McClellan, arc relieved 
from the further consideration of this subject at 
the present time. 

I will, howeyer, state for your information, 
should the subject ever come before you again, 
that in my opinion the communication with 
Manassas by land should bfe secured. 

To effect this hi the best manner, so far as my 
observations extended, I think the bridge over 
Bull Run, near Union Mills and just above the 
railroad bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly 
repaired, and that a small work, or perhaps two 
or three open batteries, should be erected on the 
adjacent heights, to protect it as well as the rail- 
road bridge. 

The communication by land would then be 
through or near Centreville, over the road used 
by the enemy. 

I write this for fear somethuig should detain 
mo here, but I hope to leave here to join you 
<o-raorrow. My health is much improved. 
Very r<?spectfully, your obedient servant, 

B. S. Alexander, Lt.-Col, A.D.C. 

I may be permitted also to mention that the 

■lans also (unexecuted' by my successor) indi- 

•ated by my letter of instructions to General 

i'.anks dated March 16, 18G2, for intrenching 

Chester Gap and the point where ^he Manassas 

Gap Railroad crosses the Shenandoah, were for 

- the purpose of preventing even the attempt at 

such a raid as that of Jackson iu the month of 

May followintr. 

MILITARY' TNCIDENTS OF THE FIRST 

PERIOD. 
Before tukii.g up the history of the embar- 
kation and the Peninsular campaign, I should 
remark that during the fall and winter of lSGl-2, 
while the army of the Potomac was in position 
in front of ^Vashington, reconiioissanccs were 
made from time to time, and skirmishes fre- 
quently occurred, which were of great impor- 
tance in the education of the troops, accustom- 
ing them te the presence of the enemj', and giv- 
ing them confifleuce under fire. There were 
many instances of individual gallantry displayed 
in these atfairs : the reports of most of them 
will be found among the documents which accom- 
pany this report. 

One of the most brilliant of these affairs was 
that which took place at Drainsville on Dec. 20, 
L861, when the 3d brigade of McCall's Division, 
under Brig.-Gen. E. 0. C. Ord, with Easton's 
Battery, routed and pui-sued four regiments of 
infantry, and a battery of six pieces. 

The operations of Brig.-Gen. F. W. Lander on 
the Upper Potomac during the raontlis of Janua- 
ry and February, 18G2, frustrated tlie attempts of 
General Juck^on against the Ohio Railroad, Cum- 
berland, <&c., and obliged him to fall back to 
Winchester. His constitution was impaired by 
the hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d 
of March the fearless General Lander expired, a 
victim to the excessive fatigues of the campaign. 



SECOND PERIOD 

PART I. 

THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA. 
The council, composed of four corps commancfr 
ers, organized by the President of the United 
States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopt- 
ed Fort Mom'oe as the base of operations for the 
cftovemeut of the army of the Potomac upon Rich- 
mond. 

For the prompt and successful execution of 
the projected operation, it was regarded bj' all 
as necessary that the whole of the four corps 
should be employed, with at least the addition of 
ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the 
vicinity of Fortress Monroe : that position and 
its dependencies being regarded as amply pro- 
tected by the naval force in its neighborhood, 
and the advance of the main army up the Penin- 
sula, so that it could be safely left with a small 
garrison. 

In addition to the land forces, the co-operation 
of the navy was desired in the projected attack 
upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, 
as well as in controlling the York and James Riv- 
ers for the protection of out flanks, and the use 
of transports, bringing supplies to the army. 
With these expectations, and for reasons stated 
elsewhere in this report, my original plan of mov- 
ing by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, 
and the line with Fortress jMonroe as a baso 
adopted. In the arrangements for the transpor- 
tation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the 
vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous 
mainly at Annapolis, but upon the evacuation of 
Manassas and the batteries of the lowerPotomac 
by the enemy, it became more convenient to em- 
bark the troops and material at Alexandria, and 
orders to that cticct were at once given. 

In making the preliminary arrangements for 
the movement, it was determined that the First 
Corps (Gen. j^IcDowelFs) should move as a unit, 
first, and effect a landing eitlier at the Sand-Box, 
some four miles south of l^orktown, in order to 
turn all the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, How- 
ard's Bridge, Big Bethel, etc., or else, should ex- 
isting circumstances render it preferable, land on 
the Gloucester side of York River, and move on 
West Point. 

The transports, however, arrived slowly and 
few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite 
matters, I decided to embark the army by divi- 
sions as transports arrived, keeping army corps 
together as much as possible, and to collect tho 
troops at Fortress Monroe. In determining the 
order of embarkation, convenience and expedition 
were especially consulted, except that the First 
Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to 
move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, 
and to land it on either bank of the York, as 
might then be determined. 

On the 17th of Alarch, Hamilton's division of 
the 3d corp* embarked at Alexandria, and pro- 
ceeded to Eort Monroe, with the following or- 
ders : 

Washington, D. C, March 17, 18G2. 
Gen. C. S. Hamilton, Comd'g Division : 

You will, on your arriva.1 at Fort Monroe, re- 



42 



port to Gen. Wool, and rGqnest him to aeeifjjn 
yon fjrouiid for encainpiiig your division. Yon 
will remain at Eort Monroe until further orders 
from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require 
the services of 3'our division in repelling an at- 
tack, yon will please obey his orders, and use 
every effort to carry out his views. 

R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staif. 

On the 22(1 of ^rarch,as soon as transportation 
•was ready, Gen. Fitz John Porter's division of 
the same corps embarked. Gen. Heiulzelman 
was ordered to accompany it, under the follow- 
iug instructions : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Seminary, March 22, 1862. 
Cris^-.Gen. S. P. Ileintzelman, Com'g 3d Corps : 

General: — Upon the disembarkation of Por- 
ter's division at Fort Monroe, I have to request 
that you will move your two divisions (Porter's 
and Hamilton's) some three or four miles out 
fi'om the fort, to find good camping places where 
wood and water can be readily obtained, and 
where your position will be good in a defensive 
point of view. You may find it advisable to 
place one division on. or near the road leading to 
Yorktown from Newport News, the other upon 
that leading to I'^orktown direct from Fort Mon- 
roe. 

If you find that the nature of the country will 
permit easy connnnnication and mutual support 
between the two divisions, it will be best to 
place one on each road. It will be best to re- 
main pretty near the fort for the present, in or- 
der to give the impression that our object is to 
attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will 
do well, however, to push strong reconnoissances 
well to the front, to ascertain tlie position of the 
enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- 
ble, reinforce you by the 3d division of your 
corps, and it is poobable that a jiart or the whole 
of the 4lh corps will also move from Fort Mon- 
roe : tiiis will probably be determined before 
your disembarkation is completed, and you will 
be informed accordingly. 

'My desire would be to make no important 
move in advance until you are fully prepared to 
follow it up, and give the enemy no time to re- 
cover. 

The quartermas'^^rs of j'our corps will receive 
detailed instructions, in regard, to land transpor- 
tation, from Gen. Van Vliet. 

It will be advisable to mobi1i:^e your corps with 
the least possible delay, anvl iiave it prepared for 
an advance. 1 have directed extra clothing, am- 
nnmition, etc., to be sent to Fort ^fonroe, so that 
all deficiencies may l)e supfdied without delay. 

Please report to me frc(piejitly and fully tlie 
condition of things on the new field of opera- 
tions, and whatever intelligence you gain as to 
tlie enemy. 

Engage guides in sivfficient numbers at once, 
and endeavor to send out spies, I am very truly 
yours, Geo. B. Mo('Maj.AN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 

The remaining divislon.s embarked as rapidly 
as transports could be 8npi>lied. 

On thclat of April I euibttrked, with the head- 



quarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached 
Fort Mom-oe on the afternoon of the 2d. 

In consequence of the delay in the arrival of 
the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small 
portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artil- 
lery reserve had not yet completed its disembark- 
ation. 

I found there the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, and 
the 5th Regular Cavalry ; the 2d Regular Cavalry 
and a ^lortion of the 1st had arrived, but not dis- 
embarked : so few wagons had arrived that it 
was not possible to move Casey's division at all 
for sevoral days, while the other divisions wero 
obliged to move with scant supplies-. 

As to the force and position of the enemy, the 
information then in our possession was vaguo 
and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained 
from the staff officers of General Wool, and Mas 
simply to the effect that Yorktown was surround- 
ed by a continuous line of earthworks, with 
strong water batteries on the York River, and 
garrisoned by n.ot less than 15,000 troops, under 
the command of Gen. 5. B. Magruder. Maps 
which had been prepared by the Toi^ographieal 
Engineers under Gen. Wool's command were fur- 
nished me, in which, the AVarwick. River was 
represented as flowing parallel to, but not cross- 
ing the road from Newport News to Williams- 
burg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real 
island ; and we had no information us to the true 
course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, 
nor of the foMtnidable line of worka which it cov- 
ered. 

Information which I had collected during the 
winter placed Gen. Magruder's command at from 
15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General 
Huger's force at Norfolk estimated at about 15,- 
000. It was also known that there were strong 
defensive works at or near Williamsburg. 

Knowing that Gen. linger could easily spare 
some troops to reinforce Yorktown, that he had 
indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of 
Manassas coidd be broiTght rapidly by the James 
and York rivers to the same jjoint, I proceeded 
to invest that town without delay. 

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, Uni- 
ted States Topographical Engineers, attached to 
Gen. Woor& staff, given to me as the residt of 
several months' labors, indicated the feasibility 
of the design. It was also an object of primary 
importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown 
before the enemy was reinforced sufficiently to 
enable him to hold in force his works at Big 
Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, etc., on the 
road from Newport News, This was the more 
lU'gent as it was now evident that some days 
must elapse belbre the 1st corps could arrive. 

Everything possible was done to hasten tho 
disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery aTid wag- 
ons in the harbor, and on the 3d the orders of 
march were given for the following day 

There were at Fort Monroe and its vicinity on 
the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d 
corps two divisions of the 4th corps, one divis- 
ion of tlie 2d corps, and Syke's brigade of regu- 
lar infantry, together with Hunts artillery rie- 



43 



Bfrve, and the regiments of cavalry before nam- 
ed, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Rich- 
ardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 
3d corps had not yet arrived, and Casey's divis- 
ion of the 4th corps was unable to move for 
want of wa";ons. 

ANOTHER REDUCTION OF FORCE. 

Before I left Washington an ordei' had been 
issued by the War Depaitment, placing Fort 
Monroe and its dependencies under my control, 
and authorizing me to di-aw from the troops un- 
der General VVool, a division of about 10,000 
men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. 
During the iiight of the 3d I received a telegram 
from the adjutant-general of the army, stating 
that, by the Presiden'ts order, I was deprived of 
ill control over Gen. Wool and the troops under 
his command, and forbidden to detach any of 
his troops without his sanction. 

This order left me without any base of opera- 
tions under my own control, and to this day I 
am ignorant of the causes wliich led to it. 
COOPERATION OF THE NAVY. 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River 
was declared, by the naval authorities, closed to 
the operations of their vessels, by the combined 
influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks 
and the confederate steamers Merrimae, York- 
town, Jamestown, and Teazer. Fkig-oflicer 
Goldsborough, then in conmiand of the United 
States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it 
(and, no doubt, justly) as his highest and most 
imperative duty to watch and neutralize the 
Merrimac, and as he designed using his most 
powerful vessels in a contest with lier, he did 
not feel able to detach, for the assistance of the 
army, a suitable force to attack the Avater batter- 
ies at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was 
contrary to wliat had been previously stated to 
me, and materially affected my plans. At no 
time during the operations against Yorktown was 
the navy x)rcpared to lend us any material assis- 
tance in its reduction, until after our land batter- 
ies had partially silenced the works. 

ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE. 

I had hoped, let me sa,y, by rapid movements, 
to drive before me or capture the enemy on the 
Ptniasula, open the James River, and press on 
to Richmond before he should be materially re- 
inforced from other portions of his territorj'. 
As the narrative proceeds, the causes will be 
developed winch frustrated these apparently Avell- 
groimded expectations. 

I determined, then, to. move the two divisions 
of the 4th corps by the Newport News and 
Williamsburg road, to take up a position belwcen 
Yorktown and 'Villiamsburgh, while the two 
divisions of the 3d corps moved- direct from 
Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves mov- 
ing so as to support either corps, as might prove 
necessary I designed, should the works at 
Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious re- 
Bistance, to land the 1st corps, reinforced, if ne- 
cessary, on the left bank of the York, or on the 
Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, 
in order to take in reverse whatever force the 



enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel 
him to abundon his positions. 

In the conuneneement of the movement from 
Fort Monroe, serious difliculties were encountered 
from the want of ]u-ecise topographic;il informa- 
tion as to the country in advance. 

Correct local maps were not to bo found, and 
the country, though known in its general fea- 
tures, we found to be inaccurately described, in 
essential particulars, in the only maps and geo- 
graphical memoirs or papers to winch access 
could be had ; erroneous courses to*streams and 
roads were frequently given, and no dependence 
could be ]>laced on the information thus derivcd. 
This dilticulty has been fourid to exist with re- 
spect to most portions of the State of Virginia, 
through wdiich my military operations have et- 
tended. Reconnoissances, frequently inider fire, 
proved the only trustwortliy sources of int\)rma- 
tion. Negroes, liowcver truthful their reports, 
possessed or were able to communicate, very 
little acc'in-atc and no comprehensive topographi- 
cal information. 

On the 3d the following orders were given for 
the movement of the 4th : 

" Porter's and Hamilton's divisions, and Ave- 
rill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's di- 
vision of the 2d cor])8, under Brig.-Gen. lleintz- 
elman, conunanding od corps, will move to-mor- 
row in the following order: Porter's division, 
with Averill's cavalry at 6 a.m.. over the Ne\T 
Afarket and New Bridges to Big Bethel and 
Howard's Bridge. The division will send for- 
ward to the batteries whore the Sliip Pointy road 
intersects the main Yorktown road, a suilicient 
force to hold that point, and cut \(AY the garri- 
son of the Ship Point batteries ; the whole di- 
vision may be used for this purpose, if neccssar 
ry, and if possible the batteries should be occu- 
pied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of 
the division not necessary f(jr this purpose will 
encamp at Howard's Bridge. 

" Hamilton's division Avill march at 7 a.m., hj 
the New JMarket Bridge, takuig the direct road 
to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Iloward'* 
Creek. 

" Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a.m., by 
the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road 
to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard'* 
Bridge. 

" Brig.-Gen. Keyes, commanding 4tli Corps, M'ill 
move with Smith's and Couch's diAisions Jit 5 
a.m., (Smith's division in advance), b}' the James 
River road ; tlie 5th Regular Cavalry, tempora- 
rily assigned to this corps, will move with 
Sinith's division, which will encamp at Young's 
Mills, throwing forward at least one brigaile t^ the 
road from Big Bethel to Warwick ; Couch's di- 
vision will encamp at Fisher's Creek. 

" The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry 
will move at 8.30 a.m, by the New Market Bridgo 
to Big Bethel, where it will encamp; on tlio 
march it will keep in the rear of Sedgwick's di- 
vision." 

The following is an extract from the orders 
iKKued on the 4th for the maich of the 5th : 



44 



" The following movementa of the army will 
be carried ©ut to-morrow (5th) : 

" Gen. Ke^'es will move forward Smith's di- 
vision at 6 A.M., via. Warwick Court House, itnd 
the road leading near the Old Ship Yard, to the 
Half ^Vay House on the Yorktown and Wil- 
liamsburg road. . 

" Gen. Couch's di%'ision will march at 6 a.m., to 
close up on Gen. Smith's division at the Half 
Way House. 

"Gen. Keyes* command will occupy and hold 
the narrow dividing ridge near the Half Way 
House so as to prevent the escape of the garri- 
son at Yorktown by land, and prevent reinforce- 
ments being thrown in. 

."Gen. Heintzelman will move forward Gen. 
Porter's two brigades at 6 a.m,, upon the advanced 
guard, when the entire division will advance to 
a point about two and three quarters miles from 
Yorktown, where the road 'turns abruptly to the 
north, and where a road comes in from AYarwick 
Court House. Gen. Hamilton's division will 
move at 6 a.m., and follow Gen. Porter's division, 
camping as near it as possible. Gen. Sedgwick's 
division will march at 5 a.m., as far as the War- 
wick road, which enters the main YorktoM'n road 
near Dr. Power's house, a^nd will await further 
orders. 

The reserves will march at 6 a.m., upon the 
main Yorktown road, halting for further orders 
at Dr. Power's house ; the infantry leading, the 
artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. 
• " Gen. Sedgwick's division will, for the pres- 
ent, act with the reserve, and he will receive 
orders from head-quarters." 

In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 
5th, it was expected that there would be no seri- 
ous opposition at Big Bethel, and that the ad- 
vance of the 3d Corps beyond that point would 
force the enemy to evacuate the works at 
Young's Jilills, while our possession of the latter 
■v?ould make it necessary for him to abandon 
those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance 
thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in 
our possession, together with its garrison, unless 
they abandoned it promptly. The result answer- 
ed the expectation. 

During the afternoon of the 4th, Gen. Keyes 
obtained information of the presence of some 
5,000 to 8,000 'of the enemy, in a strong posi- 
tion at Lee's Mills : the nature of that position 
in relation to the Warwick not being at that time 
understood, I instructed Gen. Keyes to attack 
and carry this position on coming in front of it. 

Early in the afternoon of the 5th, the advance 
of each column was brought to a halt : that of 
Hcintzchnan (Porter's division) in front of York- 
town, after overcoming some resistance at Big 
Bethel and Howard's Bridge : that of Keyes 
(Smith's division) iniexpectedl}' before the ene- 
my's works at Lee's ilills, where the road from 
Newport News to AVilliarasbuig crosses "War- 
wick River. The ])rogrcss of each column had 
been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which 
had made the roads almost impassable to the in- 
fantry of Keye's column and impracticable to all 



but a small portion of the artillery, while the 
ammunition, provision, and forage could not be 
brought up at all. 

When Gen. Keyes's approached Lee's Mills his 
left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery iire 
from the further bank of the Warwick, -and 
upon reaching the vicinity of the mill^ he found 
it altogether stronger than was expected, unap- 
proachable by reason of the Warwick River, and 
•incapable of being carried by assault. 

The troops composing the advance of each 
column were, during the afternoon under a warm 
artillery fire — the sharpshooters even of the 
right column being engaged, when covering re- 
connoissances. 

THE FIRST CORPS WITHDRAWN BY ORDER 
OF THE PRESIDENT. 

It was at this stage and moment of the cam- 
paign that the following telegram was sent to 
me : 

Adjutant General's Office, April 4th, 18G2. 
Gex. ]\IcClellan, — 

By direction of the President Gen. McDowell's 
army corps has been detached from the force im- 
der your immediate command ; and the general 
is to report to the Secretary of War plotter by 
mail. 

L. Thomas, Adjutant-General. 

The President having promised in our inter- 
view following his order of March 31st, with- 
drawing Blenker's division of 10,00 men from 
my command, that nothing of the sort should be 
repeated, that I might rest assured that the cam- 
paign should proceed with no further deductions 
from the force upon which its operations liad 
been planned, I may confess to having been 
shocked at this order, which, with that of th© 
31st ult., removed nearly 60,000 men from my 
command,, and reduced my force by more than 
one-third after its task had been assigned, its op- 
erations planned, its fighting begun. To me the 
blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all 
my plans for impending operations. It fell when 
I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left 
me incapable of continuing operations which 
had been begun. It compelled the adoption of 
another, a different, and a lo-!S effective plan of 
campaign. It made rapid and brilliant opera- 
tions impossible. It was a fatal error. 

It was now, of course, out of my power to turn 
Yorktown by West Point ; I had, therefore, no 
choice left, but to attack it directly in front, as I 
best could with the force at my command. Re- 
connoissances made untler fire on that and the 
following day, determined that the sources of 
the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com- 
manded bj- its guns, wliile that stream for some 
distance from its mouth on the James River was 
controlled by the confederate gun-boats; that 
the fords had been destro^-ed by dams, the ap- 
proaches to which were. generally through dense 
forests and deep swami)S, and defcnd'eil by ex- 
tensive and formidable works ; that timber 
felled for defensive purposes, and the flooding of 
the roads caused by the dams had mado these 
works apparently inaccessible and impossible to 



45 



turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, 
armed and garrisoned, and connected with tlie 
defenses of the Warwick by forts and intrciich- 
ments, the ground in front of which wa§ swept 
by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascer- 
tained that tlie garrisons had been and were 
daily being reinforced by troojis from JJorfolk, 
and the army under Gen. J. E. Johnston. 

Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe 
impassable and delayed the arrival of trooj)S, 
ammunition and supplies, vhile storms prevented, 
for several days, the sailing of transports from 
Hampton Roads, and the establishment of (Re- 
pots on the creeks of York River near the army, 

The grouiid bordering the Warwick River is 
covered by very dense and extensive • forests, 
the clearings being small and few. This, -^vith 
the comparative flatness of the country, and the 
alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, 
rendered thorough reconnoissances slow, danger- 
ous and difticult : yet, it -was impossible other- 
wise to determine whether any assault was any- 
where practicable, or whether the irfbre tedious, 
but sure operations of a, siege must be resorted 
to. 

I made on the 6th dnd 7th, close personal I^e- 
connoissances of the right and left of the ene- 
my's positions, which, 'Vvith information acquired 
already, convinced me that it was best to pi'e- 
pare for an assault by a preliminary employment 
of heavy guns, and some siege operations. In- 
stant assault would have been simple folly. 

On the 7th, I telegraphed to the President as 
follows : 
Head-quarters Army ef Potomac, April 7th, 1862. 

To the President, Washington, D. C, — 

Your telegram of yesterday received. Ifi re- 
ply I have the honor to state that my entire force 
for duty, amounts to only about (85,000) eighty- 
five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as 
you will observe from the accompanying order, 
has been taken out of my control, although he 
has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The 
only use that can be made of his command, is to 
protect my communications in rear of this point. 
At this time only fifty-three thousand men have 
joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as 
my means of transportation Avill permit. 

Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of 
War of to-night, for the details of our present 
situation. 

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-General. 

On the same day I sent the following : 

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, in front 
of Yorktown. April 7, 1862, 7 p.m. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War, — 

Your telegram of yesterday, arrived here 
•\vhile I jvas absent examining the enemy's right, 
which I did pretty closely. 

The whole line of the Warwick, which really 
heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly de- 
fended by detached redoubts, and other fortifica- 
tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The 
ayjproaches, except at Yorktown, arc covered by 
the Warwick, over which there is but one, or at 
most, two passages, both of which are covered 



by strong batteries. It will be necessary to re- 
sort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege 
operations, before Ave can assault. All the pris- 
oners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston aruived at 
Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. 
It seems clear that I •shall have the whole force 
of the enemy on -my bunds, probably not less 
than (100,000) one hundred thousand" men, and 
jiossibly mope. In consequence of the loss of 
Blenker's division, and the 1st corps, my force is 
possibly less than that of the enemy, while they 
hiiye all the advantage of positions. 

I am under great obligations to you for the 
offer that the whole force and material of the 
government, will be as fully and speedily under 
my command as heretofore, or as if the new de- 
partments had not been created. 

Since my arrangements were made for this 
campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men 
have been taken from my command. 

Since *ny dispatch of the 5th instant, five divi- 
sions have been in close observation of the ene- 
my, aud frequefitly exchanging shots. When my 
present command all joins, I shall have about 
' (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from 
which a large force must be taken for guards, es- 
corts, etc. With this army I could assault the 
enemy's works, and perhaps carry them ; but were 
r in possession of their intrenchments, and as- 
sailed by double my numbers, I should have no 
fears as to the result, 

Under the circumstances that have been devel- 
oped since my arrival here, I feel fully impressed 
with the conviction, that here is to be fought the 
great battle that is to decide the existing contest. 
I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as 
I can get up my siege train, aud shall do all in 
my power to carry the enemy's works ; but to 
do this with a reasonable degree of certainty, re- 
quires, in Diy judgment, that 1 should, if possible, 
have at least, the whole of the 1st Corps to land 
upon "the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in 
the rear. My present strength will not admit of 
a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without 
materially impairing tho efficiency of this column. 
Flag-officer Goldsborough, thinks the works too 
strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn 
Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter, 
and one of the commander of the gunboats here. 
Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. 
THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 

I had provided a small siege train, and mode- 
rate supplies of intrenchmg tools, for such a cou- 
tingency as the present. Immediate steps were 
taken to secure the necessary additions. 

While the engineer officers were engaged !n 
ascertaining the character aud strength of all the 
defenses, and the configuration of the groinid in 
front of Yorktown, in order to determine the point 
of attack, and to develop the approaches, the 
troops were occupied in opening roads to the de- 
pots established at the nearest available points 
on branches of York River. Troojis were brought 
to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 
10th of April the army was posted as follows: 
Ileintzelnian's corps, composed of Porter's, Hook- 

/ 



• 46 

sr'a and Hnmilton's division, in front of York- 
town, extending in the order named from the 
mouth of Wornilcy's Creek to the Warwick road 
opposite Winn'a "Mills ; Sumner's corps, Sedg- 
wick's division only having arrived, on the lett 
cf Hamilton, extending down the Warwick and 
opposite the Winn's Mills works ; Keycs's corps, 
(Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the 
left of Sedgwick, facing the works attlie one-gun 
battery, Lee's- Mills, etc., on the west baiik ot the 
Warwick. Stunner, after the 6tli of April, com- 
manded the left wing, composed of his own and 
Eveves's corps. 

Througliout the preparations for, and during 
the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under 
Gen. Keyes, and afterwards the loft wing under 
Gen. Smuncr, engaged in ascertaining tlie cliarac- 
ter of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, 
and the enemy intrenched on the right bank, with 
the intention, if possible, of overcoming them 
and breaking that line of defense, so as to gain 
possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut 
oif Yorktown from its supports and supplies. 
The forces under Gen. Ileintzelman were enpiged 
in similar efforts upon the works between AVinn's 
Mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report of the 
16th of April, enclosing reports of brigade com- 
manders engaged in reconnoissances up to that 
day, said, " tliat no part of his (the e-nemy's Hue 
opposite his) line, as f;\r as discovered, can be 
taken by assault without an enormous waste of 
life." Reconnoissances on tlie riglit flank dernon- 
Btrated the fact tliat the Warwick was not pass- 
able in that direction except over a narrow dam, 
the approaches to which were swept by several 
batteries and intrenchments, whicli could be till- 
ed quickly with supports sheltered by the timber 
immediately in rear. 

Gen. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of 
the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions 
to the highest consideration, expressed the judg- 
Bient that those formidable works could not, with 
any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried by 
assault, den. Keyes, commanding the 4th army 
corps, after the examination of the enemy's de- 
fenses on the left, before alluded to, addres.=ed 
the following letter to tlie Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. 
Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not 
etrictly olficial, it describes the situation at that 
time in some respects so well that I have taken 
the liberty of introducing it hero. 

Headquarters 4th Corps, 
Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862. 
Mi- Dear Senator :— The plan of campaign on 
this line was made with the distinct understand- 
ing that four army corps should be employed, 
and that tlie navy should co-operate in the taking 
of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) sup- 
port us on our left by moving gunboats up James 
lliver. 

To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which, 
by the President's order, was to embrace four 
divisions, and one division (Bienker'b-) of the 2d 
corps, have been withdniwn aUogethcr from this 
line of oi)erations, and iVoni the Army of the Po- 
tomac. At the Bamo time, as I am informed, the 



navT has not the means to attack Yorktown, and 
is afraid to send gunboata up James lliver for 
fear of the Merrimac. 

Tlie above plan of campaign was adopted 
unanimously by Gen. McDowell and Brig.-Gen's 
Sumner, Ileintzelman and Keyes, and was con- 
curred in by Maj.-Gen. McClellan, who first pro- 
posed Urbana as our base. ^ 

This army being reduced by forty-five thousand 
troops, some of them the be&t in Ihe service, and 
without tiie support of the navy, the plan to 
which we are reduced bears scarcely any resem- 
blance to the one I voted for. 

I command the James River column, and 1 left 
my camp, near Newport News, the morning of 
the 4rh instant. I only succeeded in getting ray 
artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, 
and one of my divisions had not all arrived in 
camp the day I left, and, for the want of trans- 
portation, has not yet joined me. So you Avill 
observe that not a day was lost in the advance; 
and in fact we marched so quickh'and so rapidly 
that many*of our animals were twent^'-four and 
fcn'ty-eight hours without a ration of forage. Rut, 
notwithstanding the ra])idity of our advance, we 
are stopped by a.line of defense nine or ten miles 
long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected 
nearly the whole distance, behind a stream or 
succession of ponds no where fordable, one ter- 
minus being Yorktown and the other ending in 
tlie James River, wliich is commanded by the 
enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all 
around with bastioned works, and on the water 
side, it and Gloucester are so strong that th» 
navy are afraid to attack either. 

The approaches on our side are generallj 
through low, swampy, or thickly-wooded ground, 
over roads which we are obliged to repair or to 
make, before we can get forward our carriages. 
The enemy is in groat force, and is constantly 
receiving reinforcements from the two rivera. 
The line in front of us is therefore one of the 
strongest ever opposed to, an invading force in 
any country. 

You will then ask, why I advocated such a lino 
for our operations? My reasons are few, but, I 
think, good. 

With i)ro])er assistance from the navy, we 
could take Yorktown, and then, with gunl)i)at3 
on both rivers, we could beat any force opjiosed 
to lis on AVarwick liiver, because the shot and 
shells from the gunboats would nearly overlap 
across the Peninsula, so that, if the enemy should 
retreat, and retreat he must, he would have » 
long way to go without rail or steam transporta- 
tion and every soul of his army must fall into 
our hands or be destroyed. 

Another reason for my supporting the new 
base and plan was, that tliis line, it wKs expect- 
ed, would furnish water transportation nearly to 
Richmond. 

Now, supposing wo succeed in breaking 
through the line ill front of us, wliat can we do 
next? The roads are very bad. and if tlie enemy 
retains command of James River, and we do not 
first reduce Yorktown, it would bo imuosbiblo 



for us to subsist this army three marches beyond 
where it is iiow. As the roads are at present, it 
is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist 
in the position it now occupies. 

You will see, therefore, by what I have said, 
that the force originally intended for the capture 
of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I 
thought the four arm}' corps necessary when I 
supposed the navy would co-operate, and when 
I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by 
what I learned from maps and the opinions of 
officers stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all 
other sources, how much more should I tiiink 
tlie full complement of troops requisite, now that 
the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the 
dnemy's lines and the number of his guns and 
men prove to be immeasurably greater tbau I 
had been supposed to expect ! 

The line in front of us, in the ojjiuion of all 
tlie military men here who are at all competent 
to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and 
the force of tlie enemy capable of being increased 
beyond the numbers we now have to oppose^to 
him. Independently of the strengh of the lines 
in front of us, and of the force of the enemy be- 
hind them, we cannot advance until we get com- 
mand of York River or James River. Tiio effi- 
cient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, 
absolutely essential, and so I considered it when 
I voted to change our base from the Potomac to 
Fort Monroe. 

An iron-c^ad boat must attack Yorktown, and 
if several strong giuiboats could be sent up 
James River also, our success will be certain and 
complete, and the rebellion will soon be put 
down. 

On the other hand, we must butt against the 
enemy's works with heavy artillery and a great 
waste of time, life and material. 

If we break through and advance, both our 
flanks will be assailed from two great water- 
courses in the hands of the enemy : our supplies 
would give out, and the enemy, equal, if not 
superior, in numbers, would, with other advan- 
tages, beat and destroy this army. 

The greatest master of the art of war has said 
that •• if 3'ou Svould invade a country successfully, 
you must have one line of operations and one 
array, under one general." But what is our con- 
dition? The State of Virginia is made to con- 
stitute the command, in part or wholl}', of some 
six generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, 
Wool, Burnside,and McClellan, besides the scrap, 
OTer the Chesapeake, in th^are of Dix. 

The great battle of the war is to come off. If 
we win it, the rebellion will be crushed. If we 
lose it, the consequences will be nior« horrible 
than I care to foretell. The plan ol campaign I 
Yoted for, if carried out with tjie means pro- 
posed, will certiinly suecee 1. If any part of the 
means jiroposcd ;uo withheld or diverted, I deem 
it due to myself to say that our success will be 
luicerlaiii. 

It is no doubt agreeable to the connnaiider oi 
Uie Istcorps to have a separate department; and. 
I--; this letter advocates! his return, to Gen. Mc- 



47 



Clellan's command, it is proper to state that I an» 
not at all influenced by personal remark or dis- 
like to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to 
credit all the opinions which have been poured 
into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to 
my pressnt line command, I owe much to (icn. 
McDowell and nothing to Gen. McClellan. But I 
have disregarded all such officiousness, and I 
have from last July to the present day, supportr 
ed Gen. McClellan and ob_>yed all his orders with 
as hearty a good will ; 8 tliough he had been ray 
brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I 
shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as 
he is my commander ; and I ara not desirous to 
displace him, and would not if I could. He 
left "Washington with the understanding that 
he was to execute a defuiitc plan of campaign 
with certain prescribed means. The v\i\n was 
good and the means sufficient, and, without 
modification, the enterprise 'was certain of suc- 
cess. But, with the reduction of force and 
means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a 
bad plan, witli means insufficient for certain suc- 
cess. 

Do not look upon this communication as the 
offspring of despondency. I never desjiond ; 
and when you see me working the hardest, you 
may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me, 
1 am working now, to my utmost. 

Please show this letter to the President, and I 
should like also that Mr. Stanton should know 
its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as 
soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect 
respect, Your obedient servant, 

E. D. Ketks, Brig.-Gen. Comd'g 4th Army Corps. 
Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate. 

On the Tth of April, and before tlie arrival of 
the divisions of Generals Hooker, Richardson and 
Casey, I received the following dispatches from 
the President and Secretary of W'ar : 

Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 p.m. 

Gen. G. B. McClellan. — Yours of 11 a.m. to-daj 
received. Secretary of War informs me that thf 
forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and 
Woodbury's Brigade, under your orders, is no* 
and will not be interfered with. You hav« 
over one hundred thousand troops with you, in- 
dependent of Gen. Wool's command. I think 
3'ou had better break the enemy's line from 
Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will 
probably use time as advantageously as you can. 
A. Lincoln, President. 
Washington, April G, 18G2. 2 p.m. , 

Gen. G. B. McClellan. — The President directs 
me to say that your dispatch to him Inis been 
received. General Sumner's corps is on the road 
to join you, and will go forward as fast as possi- 
ble. Franklin's division is now on the advance 
towards Manassas. There is no meaiis of trans- 
portation here to send it forward in time to bo of 
service to you in your ])re8ent operations. Tele* 
graph frequently, and all in the power of tho 
government shall bo done to sustain you as occa- 
sion requires. - __; 
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty 



.uood knowledge of the enemy'B works and the 
obstacles to be overcome. 

Oa that day I received the following letter 
from the President. 

Washington, April 9th, 1862. 
Major-General JlcClellau :— 

My Dear H'lr, — Your dispatches, complaining 
that you are not properl}' sustained, while they 
do not offend me, do pain me very much. 

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you 
before you left here, and you know the pressure 
under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui- 
esced in it, certainly without reluctance. 

After you left I ascertained that less than 
iwenty thousand unorganized men, without a 
single battery, were all you designed to be left 
for the defense of Washington and ^lanassas 
Junction ; and part of this even was to go to 
Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks' old 
corps, once designed for ^lanassas Junction, was 
diverted and tied up on the Imc of Winchester 
and Strasburg, and could not leave it without 
again exposing the upper Potomac, and the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or 
would present, when McDowell and Sumner 
should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy 
til turn back from the Rappahannock and sack 
Washington. My explicit order that Washing- 
ton should, by the judgment of all the command- 
ers of army corps, be left entirely secure, had 
been neglected. It was precisely this that drove 
me to detain McDowell, 

I do not forget that I was satisfied wath your 
arrangement to leave Banks at ifanassas Junc- 
tion ; but when that arrangement was broken up 
and nolliing was substituted for it, of course I 
was constrained to substitute something for it 
myself. And allow me to ask, " Do you really 
think I should permit the line from PJchmond 
nia. ilanassas Junction to this city to be entirely 
open, except what resistance could be presented 
by twenty thousand unorganized troops ?" This is 
a question which the country will not allow mc 
to evade. 

There is a curious mystery about the ninnhers 
of the troops now with j^ou. When I telegraph- 
ed yuu on the 6th, saj'ing j'ou had over a hundred 
thousand with you, I had just obtained from the 
Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, 
fi-ora your own returns, makhig 108,000 then 
with you and en route to you. You now say 
you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you 
Bhall have reached you. IIow can the discrep- 
anc)-- of 23,000 be accounted for ? 

As to General Wool's command, 1 understand 
it is doing for you precisely what a like number 
of your own would have to do, if that command 
was a^vay. 

I Knpi)ose the whole force which has gone for- 
ward for you is with you by this time, and if so, 
I think it is the precise time to strike a blow. 
By delay the enemy will relativel)' gain upon you 
— that is, he will gain faster, hj fortifications and 
reinforcements, than you can by reinforcements 
alone. 

And once more, let me tell you, it is indispen- 
sable to you that you strike a blow. 7 am 



48 



powerless to help this. You will do me the 
justice to remember. I always insisted that going 
down the bay in search of a field, instead of 
fighting at or near Afanassas, was only shifting 
and not surmounting a difficulty ; that we would 
find the same enemy, and the same or equal in- 
trenchments, at either place. The country will 
not fail to note — is now noting — that the pre- 
sent hesitation to move upon an intrenched ene- 
my, is but the story of Manassas repeated. 

I beg to assure you that I have never written 
3'ou, or spoken to j'ou, in greater kindness of 
feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to 
sustain j'ou, so far as in my most anxious judg- 
ment I consistently can. But you must act. 

Yours, very trul}', A. Lincoln. 

With great deference to the opinions and 
wisfies' of His Excellency the President, I most 
respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which 
I have presented, and those contained in .the ac- 
companying letter of General Kej-es, with the 
reports of General Barnard and other officers, as 
furnishing a reply to the above letter. His Ex- 
cellency could not judge of the formidable char- 
acter of the works before us as well as if he had 
been upon the ground, and whatever might have 
been his desire for prompt action (certainly no 
greater than mine),! feel confident, if he could 
have made a personal insjaection of the enemy's 
defenses, he would have forbidden me from risk- 
ing the safety of the army and the possible suc- 
cesses of the campaign on a sanguinary assai?' 
of an advantageous and formidable position,^ 
which, even if successful, could not have beea ^^ 
followed up to any other or better result than 
v.'ould have been reached by the regular opera- 
tions of a siege. Still less could I forego the 
conclusions of my most instructed judgment for 
the mere sake of avoiding the personal conse- 
quences intimated in the President's dispatch. 

The following extracts from the report of the 
chief engineer — Brig. -Gen. J. G. Barnard, — em- 
body the result of our reconnoissances, and give, 
with some degree of detail, the character and 
strength of the defenses of Yorktown and the 
Warwick, and some of the obstacles which the 
army contended against and overcome. 
EXTP.ACTS FROM GEN. BARNARD'S RE- 
PORT. 

" The accompanying drawing — Map No. 2 — 
gives with accuracy the outline and armament of 
the fortifications of Yorktov.'n proper, with the 
detached works immediately- connected with it. 

" The three bastioned fronts looking towards 
our approaches appear to have been earliest 
biiilt, and have about 15 feet thickness of para- 
pet, and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch ; the 
width varying much, but never leaving lcs3, at 
top of the scrap, than 15 feet : I think, generally, 
much more. 

" The works extending around the town, from 
the western salient of fronts just mentioned, 
appear to have been finished during the last 
winter and spring. They have formidable pro- 
files, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and generally, 
10 feet depth of ditch. 



' 



" The water-batteries had, generally, 18 feet 
parapet, the guns in barbette. 

" They were — as well as the works mentioned 
— carefully constructed with well made sod-re- 
vetments. 

" There were numerous traverses between the 
guns, and ample magazines ; how sufficient in 
bomb-proof qualities, I am unable to say. 

" The two first guns of the works on the 
heights, bear upon the water as well as the land, 
and were of heavy calibre. 

" The list herewith, gives all the guns in posi- 
tion, or for which there were emplacements. 
The vacant emplacements were all occupied be- 
' fore the evacuation by siege-guns, rifled 4j inch, 
24-pounders and 18-pounders. 

" In Fort Magnider — the first exterior work — 
there were found 1 8-inch Columbiad, 1 42- 
pounder, and 1 8-inch siege-howitzer, the two 
former ' en barbettee.' The sketch will show 
the emplacements ,for guns on field and siege- 
carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, 22. 
Two of these were placed behind traverses with 
embrasures covered by bridges. 

" The two external redoubts, with the connect- 
ing parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts 
of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- 
proaches. 

" It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches, 
were swept by the fire of at least 49 guns, nearly 
all of which were heavy, and many of them the 
most formidable guns known ; besides that, two- 
I thirds of the guns of the water-batteries, and all 
[fti'he guns of Gloucester, bore on our right bat- 
Ateries, though under disadvantageous circum- 
stances. 

I " The ravine, behind which the left of the 
' \''orktown fronts of attack was placed, was not 
\ery difiicult, as the heads formed depressions 
fli front of their left imperfectly seen by their 
fj-e, and from which access could be had to the 
a tches, but we could not be sure of this fact 
before the evaciTation. The enemy held, by 
means of a slight breastwork, and rifle trenches, 
a position in advance of the heads of their ra- 
Yines, as far forward as t?ie Brunt House. 

" Tlie r.avines, which head between the York- 
town fortifications and the exterior works, are 
deep and intricate. They were tolerably well 
Been, however, by the works which run west- 
wardly from the Yorktown works, and which 
were too numerous and complicated to be traced 
on paper. 

" Fort Magruder, the first lunette on cur left, 
appears to have been built at an early period. 

" The external connection between this work, 
was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards en- 
larged into a parapet, with external ditch, and an 
emplacement for four guns in or near the small 
redan in the centre. 

" Behind this they had constructed numerous 
epaulmcnts with connecting boyans not fully 
arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, 
probably, to protect their camps and reserves 
against the destructive effects of our artillery. 

" From the ' red redoubt,' these trenches and 
epaulments, ran to the woods and rivulet wliich 
brme a head of the Warwick, and continue al- 



49 



most without break to connect with the works at 
Winn's Mills. This stream just mentioned, (whatr 
ever be its name, the term ' Warwick,' according 
to some, applying only to the tidal channel from 
the James River, up as high as Lees's Mill), was 
inundated by a number of dams, from near where 
its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned, 
down to Lee's Mill. 

" Below Lee's Mill, the Warwick follows a 
tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 
or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises 
up boldly to a height of 40 or 50 feet. 

" The first group of works is at Winn's Mill, 
where there is a dam and bridge. The next is. 
to guard another dam between Winn's and Lee's 
Mills, (this is the point attacked by General 
Smith, on the IGth ultimo, and where Lieut. 
Merrill was wounded; the object of the attack 
was -merely to prevent the further construction 
of works, and feel the strength of the position.) 
A work, of what extent is not now known, was 
at the sharp angle of the stream, just above 
Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works was 
at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and 
bridge. 

" From Lee's JMill a line of works extends across 
Mulberry Island (or it is supposed to do so). 

" At Southall's Landing is another formidable 
group of works, and from here, too, they extend 
apparently across the James. 

" These groups of field works were connected 
by rifle trenches or parapets, for nearly the whole 
distance. 

'• They are far more extensive than may be sujv • 
posed, from the mention of them I make ; and' 
every kind of obstruction which the country af- 
fords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was 
skillfully used. The line is certainly one of tht 
most extensive known to modern times. 

" The country on both sides the Warwick, from 
near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few 
clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impass- 
able during the heavy rains we have constantly 
had, except where our own labors have cordu- 
royed them. 

" If we could have broken the enemy's line 
across the isthmus, we could have invested York- 
town, and it must, with its garrison, have soon 
fallen into our hands. 

"It Was not deemed practicable, considering 
the strength of that line, and the difficulty of han- 
dling onr forces (owing to the impracticable char- 
acter of the country), to do so. 

" If we could take Yorktown, or drive the en- 
emy out of that place, the enemy's line was no 
longer tenable. 'liiiis we could do by siege ope- 
rations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt 
the reduction of the place by assault." 

The plan of the approaches and their defenses, 
as determined upon and finally executed, is ex- 
hibited in the accompanying map. It was, in 
words, to open the first parallel as near as possi- 
ble to the works of the enemy, and under its, pro- 
tection to establish, almost simultaneously, batte- 
ries along the whole' front, extending from York 
River, ou the right, to the Warwick, on the left 
— a chord of about one mile in length. The prin- 
cipal approaches were diieoled against the east 



end of the main work (wluoh was most heavily 
armed, and bore both on the water and land), and 
lay between Wormley's Creek and York River. 
There, also, were placed the most of the batteries 
designed to act against the land front, to enfilade 
the water batteries, and to act upon Ghnicester. 
I designed at the earliest moment to open simul- 
taneously with several batteries, and as soon as 
the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land 
between Wormley's Creek and the Warwick, were 
crippled, and their fire kept down, to push the 
trendies as far forward as iiecessary, and to as- 
sault Yorktow^n and the adjacent works. 

The approaches to the batteries, the necessary 
bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been 
vigorously pushed to completion, by the troops 
Under Gens. Keintzelman and Sumner, and were 
available for infantry, and in some instances for 
artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries 
and iheir connections were comfnenced, and Ta- 
bor upon them kept up, night and day, until fin- 
ished. 

Some of the batteries, on easy ground and con- 
cealed from the view of the enemj^ were early 
completed and ai'med, and held ready for any 
emergency, but not permitted to open, as the re- 
turn fire of the enemy would interfere too much 
with the labor on oLher and more important works. 
The completion of the more exposed and heaviest 
batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the 
landing of guns and ammunition. It having been 
discovered that the enemy were receiving artil- 
lery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 
1st, Battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon 
:he wharf and town. ^ 

On the 22d of April, Gen. Franklin, with his 
division from Gen. McDowell's cor,ps, had arrived 
and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester 
Point had been reinforced and the works strength- 
ened ; but as this division was too small to'^de- 
tach to the Severn, and no more troops could be 
spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by dis- 
embarking it on the north bank of the York River, 
under the protection of the gmiboats. The troops 
were mainly kept on /board ship while the neces- 
sary preparations were made for landing them, 
and supporting them in case of necessity. For a 
full account of this labor, I refer to the report of 
Lieut.-Col. B. S.Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, 
detailed for this expedition. 
' While the siege works were being rapidly 
completed, the roads on the left wing necessary 
for communication and advance were opened and 
corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were 
erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive him 
from his works at Winn's and Lie's Mills, prepar- 
atory to the general attack, active reconnois- 
sanccs were continually going on, and attempts 
in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. 
The result of various rcconnoissances made un- 
der the immediate direction of Gen. W. F. Smith, 
commanding 2d division, 4th corps, led to the be- 
lief that the weakest poin. of that part of the en- 
emy's lines, was opposite a field, where it was 
ascertained that there was a dam covered by a 
battery known to contain at least one gun. It 
was determined to push a (Strong reeonnoissance 
on this point, to silence the enemy's fire, and as- 



ro 

certain the actual strength of the position, being 
prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a 
real attack, if found expedient. 

ijcn. WrF. Smith was directed to undertake 
the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced 
the enemy's guns, discovered the existence of 
other woriis, previously concealed and unknown, 
and sent a siiong party across the stream, which 
'was finally forced to retire with some loss ; but 
Gen. Smith intrenched himself in a position im- 
mediately overlookij\g the dam aiid the enemy's 
works, so as to keep them tinder control, and 
prevent the enemy usiig the dam as a means of 
crossing the Warwick to annoy us. 

Many times towards tLe end of the month, the 
enemy attempted to drive in our pickets and take 
our rifle-pits near YorktowiK but always witho*ut 
success. As the siege prigressd it was with 
great difficulty that the rifle-pits on the right 
could be excavated and held, so little covering- 
could be made against the hot lire of the enemy's 
artillery and infantry. Their guns continued up 
to a late hour of the night of tfte 3d of May. 

Our batteries would have been ready to open 
on the morning of the Gth of J^lay at latest, but 
on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that 
the enemy had already been cora]>elled to evacu- 
ate his position during the night, leaving behind 
him all his heavy guns iminjureu, and a large 
amount of ammunition and suf)plies 

For the details of the labors of this siege, I re- 
fer to the accompanying reports and journals of 
Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged 
with the selection and laying out, and comple- 
tion of the approaches and batteries ; of Brig.- 
Gen. W. F. Barry, chief of ijrtillery, charged with 
arming and suppl^'ing with ammunition all the 
siege and field batteries ; and of Brig.-Gen. Fitz 
John Porter, director of the siege, to whom was 
assigned the guaading of the trenches, the assem- 
bling and distribution of thewotking parties, &c.j 
&c. 

THE PURSUIT TO WILLIAMSBURG 

Early in the morning of t]ie 4th, upon the ene- 
my's altandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered 
ail the available cavalry ftrce, with four batteries 
of horse artillery, under Brig.-Gen. Stoncman, chief 
of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the Yorktown 
and Williamsburg road, with orders to harass 
the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his 
forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and Williams- 
burg road. 

Gen. Heintzelman was directed to send Hook- 
er's division forward on the Yorktown and Wil- 
liamsburg road to support Gon. Stoneman; and 
Gen Smith was ordered to proceed with his divi- 
sion on the Lee's Jlill and Williamsburg road for 
the same purpose ; afterward.s the divisions of 
Gens. Kearney, Couch and Casey were put en 
route, the first on the Yorktown road, and the 
otiiers on the Lee's Mill road. These roads unite 
about a quarter of a mile south of Fort ]\Iagruder, 
and are connected by cross-roads at several 
points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. 
After these directions had been given. Gen. Sum- 
ner, (the ofiicor second in rank in tlie Army of 
the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front 



51 



aud take immediate charge of operations until 
my arrival. 

Gen. Stonemau moved forward promptly with 
his command (consisting of four batteries of liorae- 
artillery under Lieut.-Col. Hays, the 1st and 6th 
U. S. cavahy. the 3d Pennsylvania, and 8th Illi- 
nois and Barker's squadron.) meeting with but 
little opposition until he arrived in front of the 
enemy's works, about t\vo nmlcs east of Williams- 
burg. At a point about eight miles from York- 
town, in accordance with my instructions he de- 
tached Gen. Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d 
Pennsylvania cavalry (Col. Averell) and Barker's 
squadron, to gain the Lee's ]\Iill road, and endea- 
vor, with the assistance of Gen. Smith, to cut olf 
the portion of the enemy's rear-guard, which had 
taken that route. Gen. Emory had some sharp 
skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry, and a bat- 
tery under Gen. Stuart, and drove them in the di- 
rection of Lee's Mill. Gen. Smith having met 
with obstructions in his front, had transferred his 
column by a cross-road to the Yorktown and Wil- 
liamsburg road, so that Gen. Emory finding no 
force to co-operate with him was unable to cut 
off the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escap- 
ing by a circuitous route, along the bank of the 
James River. 

The position in which Gen. Stoneman encoun- 
lered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the 
right resting on College Creek, and the left on 
Queen's Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front 
being covered by tributaries of those two creeks, 
upon which there are ponds. The ground be- 
tween the heads of the tributary streams is a 
cuKivated plain, across which a line of detached 
•works had been constructed, consisting of P"'ort 
Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bas- 
tion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaul- 
ments for field-guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six 
feet high and nine feet thick, the ditch nine feet 
■wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The 
length of the interior crest as about 600 yards. 
The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
small dimensions, having faces of about forty 
yards. The woods in front of the position were 
felled, and the open ground in front of the works 
was dotted with numerous rifle pits. 

The roads leading from the lower part of the 
Peninsula towards Williamsburg, one along -the- 
York River — the Yorktown road — and tiie other 
along the James, — the Lee'a Mill road — unite be- 
tween the heads of the tributary streams a short 
distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which 
they are commanded, and debouch from the 
woods just before uniting. A branch from the 
James River road leaves it about one and three 
qiiarler miles below Fort Magruder, and unites 
with the road from Allen's Landing to Williams- 
burg, which crosses the tributary of College 
Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond, and 
passes just in rear of the line of works, being 
commanded by the throe redoubts on the right of 
the line. 

^^. At about the same distance from Fort Magru- 
der a branch leaves the York River road, and 
crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, 
and passing over the position and through the 



woous m Its tear, nnaiiy eateib vvimamsDarg. 
This road is commanded by redoubts on the left 
of the line of works. 

Gen. Stoneman debouched from the woods with 
his advance guard— consisting of a part of the 
1st U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibson's 
battery, under the command of Gen. Cook — and 
the enemy immediately opened on him with seve- 
ral field-pieces from Fort Magruder, having the 
correct range and doing some execution. Gib- 
son's battery was brought into position as rapid- 
ly as the deep mud would permit, and returned 
the fire, while the 6th U. S. Cavalry was sent to 
feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one 
redoubt, which it found unoccui)icd,and appeared 
in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry 
force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon 
it ; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. 
The rear squadron, under command of Captain 
Saunders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cav- 
alry in the most gallant manner. In the mean- 
time the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, 
and the artillery fire becoming very hot, Gen. 
Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, 
ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This 
was accomplished, with the exception of one 
piece which could not be extricated from the 
mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the 
movement, but their charges were met by the 1st 
U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Colonel 
Grier, and they were driven back, losing several 
officers and one stand of colors. Gen. Stoneman 
then took up a defensive position a short dis- 
tance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival 
of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's 
column reached Skiffs Creek about llj.^ o'clock, 
aud found the bridge over the stream in flames^ 
and the road impassable. A practicable route to 
the Yorktown road having been discovered, the 
division, by order of General Sumner, moved on 
by that road, and reached Gen. Stoneman's posi- 
tion about 5^ o'clock. General Sumner arriving 
with it, assumed command. .J 

Generals lleintzelman and Keyes also arrived 
during the afternoon near the Half- Way House. 
Tlie head of General Hooker's column encounter- 
ed Smith's division, filing into the road, and was 
obliged to halt between three and four hours, 
until it had passed Gen. Hooker then followed 
on, and at Checcecahe Church turned off, by Gen. 
Heintzelman's direction, taking a cross-road, and 
moved out on the Lee's Mill road, thus changing 
places with Gen. Smith. Marching lart of the 
night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early 
in the morning of the 5th. 

General Smith's division, having been deploj'ed 
General Sumner ordered an attack on the works, 
in his front, but the lines having been thrown 
into confusion while moving through the dense 
forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt, for 
that night, was abandoned. The troops bivou- 
acked in the Avoods, and a heavy rain began, 
which continued ujitil the morning of the 6th, 
making the roads, already in a very bad condi- 
tion, almost impassable. 

THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. ' 

During the morning of the 5tli, General Sum- 
ner recounoitercd the position in Iiia front. 



62 



and at 11 o'clock, ordered Hancock's brigade, of 
Smith's division, to take possession of a work on 
the enemy's left, which had been found to be 
tinoccupied. The remainder of Smitli's division 
occupied the woods in front, witliout being actu- 
ally engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey, 
had received orders during tlie night to march at 
daylight, but on account of the terrible condition 
of the roads, and other impediments, were not 
able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock, p.m., 
at which time the first brigade of Couch's divi- 
gion arrived, and was posted in the centre, on 
Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up 
during the afternoon, followed by Casey's divi- 
sion. In the meantime. General Hooker having 
reconnoitered the enemy's position, began the 
attack at 1^ o clock, a.m., and for a while silenced 
the guns of Fort Magruder, and cleared the 
ground in his front. But the enemy being con- 
tinually reinforced, until their strength greatly 
exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavor- 
ing to turn his left. For several hours his divi- 
sion struggled gallantly against the superior 
numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's 
tattery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o'clock, 
his ammunition began to give out. The loss had 
been heavy and the exhaustion of the ti'oops wai 
very great. At this time the division of General 
Kearney came up, who, at 9 a.m., had received 
orders to reinforce Hooker, and who had suc- 
ceeded, by the greatest exertion, in passing 
Casey's troops, and pushing on the front through 
the deep mud. General Kearney at once gal- 
lantly attacked, and thereby prevented the loss 
of another battery, and drove the enemy back at 
every point, enabling Gen. Hooker to extricate 
himself from his position, and withdraw his 
•wearied troops. 

Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been 
mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival, 
ordered by Gen. Sumner to deploy on Hooker's 
right. This was promptly done, and the attacks 
•f the enemy at that point were repulsed. Gen. 
Peck, held his position until late in tlie afternoon, 
■when he was relieved by the other two brigade's 
of Couch's division, and they were in quiet pos- 
session of the ground when night closed the 
contest. 

The vigorous action of these troops relieved 
Gen. Hooker considerably. Gen. Emory, had 
been left with his command, on the niglit of the 
4th, to guard the branch of the Lee's Mill road, 
"which leads to Allen's Farm, and on the morning 
of the 5th, it was ascertained that by this route 
the enemy's right could be turned. A request 
for infantry for this purpose, was made to Gen. 
Heintzelman, who, late in the afternoon, sent 
four regiments and two batteries of Kearney's 
division, the first disposable troops he had, and 
directed Gen. Emory to make the attack. With 
these reinforements,his force amounted to about 
3,000 men, and 3 batteries. Gen. Emory, on ac- 
count of want of knowledge of the ground, and 
the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this 
movement. It involved some risks, but if suc- 
cessful, might have produced important results. 
A.t 11 a.m., as before mentioned, Gen. Smith re- 
ceived orders from General Sumner, to send one 



brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a 
redoubt on the left of the enemy's line ; Han- 
cock's brigade was selected for this purpose. 
He crossed the dam, took possession of the first 
redoubt, and afterwards finding the second one 
vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for rein- 
forcements to enable him to advance further, and 
take the next redoubt, which commanded the 
plain between his j^sition and Fort Magruder. 
and woxild have enabled him to take in reverse, 
and cut the communication of the troops en- 
gaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney. The 
enemy soon began to show himself in strength 
before him, and, as his rear and right flank were 
somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for 
reinforcements. Gen. Smith was twice ordered 
to join him with the rest of his division, but 
each time the order was countermanded at the 
moment of execution ; Gen. Sumner not being 
willing to weaken the centre. At length, in 
reply to Gen. Hancock's repeated messages for 
more troops, Gen. Sumner sent him an order to 
fall back to his first position ; the execution of 
which, Gen. Hancock deferred as long as*possi- 
ble, being unwilling to give up the advantage 
already gained, and fearing to expose his com- 
mand by such a movement. 

During the progress of these events I had re- 
mained at Yorktown, to complete the prepara- 
tions for the departure of Gen. Franklin's and 
other troops to West Point by water, and to 
make the necessary arrangements with the naval 
conmiander, for his co-operation. 

By pushing Gen. Franklin, well supported, by 
water to the right bank of the Pamunkey oppo- 
site West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy 
to abandon whatever works he might have on 
the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. It 
was of paramount importance that the arrange- 
ments to this end should be promptly made. 

At an early hour of the morning, I had sent 
two of my aids (Lieut.-Gol. Sweitzer and Maj. 
Hammerstein) to observe the operations in front, 
with instructions to report to me everything of 
importance that might occur. I received no in- 
formation from them leading me to sujipose that 
there was anything occurring of more import- 
ance than a simple affair of a rear guard, until 
about 1 o'clock, p.m., when a dispatch arrived 
from one of them that everything was not pro- 
gressing favorably ; tliis was confirmed a few 
minutes later by the reports of Governor Sprague 
and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from 
the scene of action. 

Completing the necessary arrangements, I re- 
turned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to 
the front, a distance of some fourteen miles, 
through roads much obstructed by troops and 
wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5, 
p.m., in time to take a rapid survey of tlie 
ground. I soon learned that there was no direct 
communication between our centre and the left 
under Gen. Heintzelman. The centre was chiefly 
in the nearer edge of tlic woods situated between 
us and the enemy. As lieavy firing was heard in 
the direction of Gen. Hancock's conmiand, I im- 
mediately ordered Gen. Smith to proceed with 
his two remaining brigades to support that part 



53 



of the line. Gren. Naglee, with his brigade re- 
ceived similar orders. I then directed our cen- 
tre to advance to the further edge of the woods, 
mentioned above, which was done ; and attempt- 
ed to open direct communication with Gen. 
Ileintzolman, but was prevented bj the marshy 
state of the ground in the direction in which the 
attempt was made. Before Generals Smith and 
Naglee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's 
operations, although they moved with great ra- 
pidity, he had been confronted by a superior 
force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited 
their onset, and then turned upon them : after 
some terrific volleys of musketry he charged 
them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing 
their whole force ; killing, wounding and cap- 
turing from 500 to 600 men, he, himself losing 
only thirty-one men. 

Tills was. one of the most brilliant engagements 
of the war, and Gen. Hancock merits the highest 
praise for the soldierly qualities displayed, and 
his perfect appreciation of the vital importance 
of his position. 

Night put an end to all the operations here, 
and all the troops who had been engaged in this 
contest slept on the muddy field without shelter, 
and many without food. 

Notwithstanding the report I received from 
Gen. Heintzelmau dm-ii^ the night, that Gen. 
Hooker's division had suffered so much that it 
could not be relied upon next day, and that 
Kearney's conld not do more than hold its own, 
without reinforcements — being satisfied that the 
result of Hancock's engagement was to give us 
possession of the decisive point of the battle- 
field — during the night I countermanded the 
order for the advance of the divisions of Sedg- 
wick and Richardson, and directed them to 
return to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point 
bj water. 

Our loss during the .day, the greater part of 
which was sustained by Hooker's division, was 
as follows : killed, 456 ; wounded, 1 ,400 ; missuig, 
372. Total, 2,228. 

On the next morning we found the enemy s 
position abandoned, and occupied fort Magriider 
and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled 
with tlie enemy's wounded, to whose assistance 
eighteen of their surgeons were sent by Gen. J. 
B. Johnston, the officer in command. Several 
guns and caissons which the enemy could not 
carry off on account of the mud were secured. 

Col. Averill was sent forward at once with a 
strong cavalry force, to endeavor to overtake the 
enemy's rear guard. He found several guns 
abandoned and picked up a large number of 
stragglers, but the conditions of the road and the 
state of his supplies forced him to return after 
advancing a few miles. 

It is my opinion \that the enemy opposed us 
here with only a portion of his army. When 
our cavalry first appeared, there was nothing but 
the enemy's rear guard in Williamsburg,: al- 
I though troops were brought back during the 
night and the next day, to hold the works as 
long as possible, in order to gain time for the 
trains, etc., already well on their vf.ay to Rich- 
mond, to make their escape. 



Our troops wore greatly exhausted by th» 
laborious march through the mud from their 
positions in front of Yorktown, and by the pro- 
tracted battle through which they had just 
passed ; many of them were out of rations and 
annnuuition, and one division, in its anxiety to 
make a prompt movement, had marched with 
empty haversacks. The supply trains had been 
forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th, to- 
allow the troops and artillery to pass to th» 
front, and the roads were now in such a 
state, that it was almost impossible to pass even 
empty wagons over them. Gen. Hooker's divi- 
sion had sufiored so bad that it was in no condi- 
tion to follow the enemy even if the roads had 
been good ; under these circumstances, an imme- 
diate pursuit was impossible. 

Steps were at once taken to care for and re- 
move the wounded, and to bring up provisions, 
ammunition and forage. The condition of tho 
roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impos- 
sible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown : 
a temporary depot was therefore promptly es- 
tablished on Queen's Creek, and supplies drawn, 
and the wounded shipped from that point. 

I ADVANCE TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 

The Divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, 
and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by 
water to the right baiik of the Paniunkey, in tho 
vicinity of West Point. The remaining divisions, 
the train, and the reserve artillery moved subse- 
quently by land. 

Early on the morning of the~7th. Gen. Franklin 
had completed the disembarkation of his divi- 
sion, and had placed it in a good position to 
cover the landing place, both his flanks and a 
large portion of the front being protected by 
water. 

Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived 
during the morning. 

At about 9, a.m., a large force of the enemy 
appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and 
other troops, and between 10 and 11, they at- 
tacked the part of the line lield by Newton's 
brigade. * 

'Tiie action continued until 3 p.m., wlien tho 
enemy retired, all his attacks having been re- 
pulsed. This aflair, the most important in which 
the division had been engaged, was highly credi- 
table to Gen. Franklin and his command. For 
the details I refer to tliis report, which is here- 
with submitted. Our loss was 40 killed, 104 
wounded, and 41 missing. Total 194, which in- 
cludes a large proportion of officers. 

Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from 
Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th 
Gen. Stoneman moved, wiili an advance guard of 
cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to open corarauni 
cation with Gen. Eranklin. 

As soon as our supplies liad been received, and 
the condition of the roads had become a little bet- 
ter, though still very bad, the advance of the re- 
maining' troops was begun. Smith's division mov- 
ing on the 8th. 

On the 10th, headquarters were at Roper's 
Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg. All tlie di 
visions which liad moved by land (except Hook 
er's) Ijeiiig in the vicinity of that place. Wo 



4^ 54 

were no in direct communication with the portion 
of the army which had gone by water, and we 
began to draw supplies from Eltham. On ac- 
count of the small number and narrowness of the 
roads in this neighborhood, movements Avere dif- 
ficult and slow. 

On the 13th, headquarters, and the divisions of 
Franklin, Porter, Sykes and Smith, reached Cum- 
berland, which was made a temporary depot. 
Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court 
House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's Church, 
and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. 

On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. 

On the 15th and 16tli the divisions of Franklin, 
Smith and Porter were with great ditficuity mov- 
ed to White House, five miles in advance. So 
bad was the road that the ti'ain of one of these 
divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over 
this short distance. 

Gen. Stoneman had occupied this place .some 
days before, after several successful skirmishes, 
in which our cavahy j^roved superior to that of 
the enemy. The reports of these affairs are ap- 
pended. . 

About this time, with the consent of the Presi- 
dent, two additional corps were organized, viz. : 
the 5th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divi- 
sions of Porter and Sykes, and the Reserve Artil- 
lery, under the command of F. J. Porter ; and the 
6th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions 
of Franklin and Smith, under the command of 
Gen. W. B. Franklin. 

Headquarters reached White House on the 
16th, and a permanent depot was at once organ- 
ized there. 

On the 19th, headquarters, and the corps of 
Porter and Franklin, moved to Tunstall's Station, 
five miles from White House. 
I On the 20th more rain fell. 

On the 21st the position of the troops was as 
follows : — 

Stoneman's Advance Guard, one mile from New 
Bridge. 

Fi|^nklin's Corps, three miles from New P>i-idge,' 
with 

Porter's Corps, at supporting distance in its 
rear. 

Sumner's Corps, on the railroad, about three 
miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the 
rigkt with the left. 

Keyes's Corps, on New Kent Road, near l>ot- 
. tom's Bridge, with 

Heiutzehnan's Corps, at supporting distance in 
its roar. 

The ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our pos- 
session, and the re-building of the bridge, which 
had been destroyed by the enemy, was com- 
menced. 

On the 22d headquarters moved to Coal Har- 
bor. 

On the 2(Jth the railroad was in operation as 
far as the Chickahominy, and tlie railroad bridge 
across that stream nearly completed. 
SKOON'i) PERiui). 

I'AUT II. 

OPERATIONS Hl'^FORE RICn:\fOND. 
When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light 
troops readied the luniks of the Cliicl-ahominy 



River, at Bottom's Bridge, they found iliat this, 
as well as the railroad bridge, about a mile aLove,, 
had been destroyed by the enemy. 

The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about for- 
ty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of 
heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy 
bottom-lands, varying from half a mile to a mile 
in width. 

Our operations embraced that part of the river 
between Bottom's and Meadow Bridges, which 
covered the principal approaches to Richmond 
from the east. 

W'ithin these limits the firm ground, lying above 
high-water mark, seldom approaches near the 
river on either bank, and no locality was found 
within this section, Avhere the high ground came 
near the stream on both sides. It was subject to 
frequent, sudden and great variations in tiie vol- 
ume of water, and a rise of a few feet,overflowed 
the bottom-lands on both sides. f 

At low water it could be forded at almost any 
point, but during high water it rose above a ford- 
ing stage, and could then be crossed only at the 
few points where bridges had been constructed. 
These bridges had all been destroyed by the ene- 
my on our approach, and it was necessary not 
only to reconstruct these, but to build several 
others. 

The west bank of the river, opposite the Nev/ 
and ^rechanicsville bridges, was bordered by ele- 
vated bluffs, which aftbrded the enemy command- 
ing positions to fortify, establish iiis batteries 
enfilading the approaches upon the two princij^a' 
roads to Richmond, in one night, and resist tiie- 
reconstruction of the important bridges. This 
obliged us to select other Ifss exjiosed points foe 
onr crossings. i. 

As the enemy was not in great force opposite 
Bottom's Bridge, on the arrival of our left at that 
point, and as it was important to secure a lodg- 
ment upon the rJglit bai^ before he should have 
time to concentrate his forces and contest the 
passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to 
ford the river and occupy the opjiosite heights 
This was promptly done on the 20th, and recoi:- 
noissances were at once pushed out in advance- 

Tliese troops were directed to throw np de- 
fenses in an advantageous position to secure our 
left flank. Gen. Ileintzelman's corps was thrown 
forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge immedi- 
ately rebuilt. tj— r!?rfi 

In the meantime our centime and right were ad- 
vanced to the river above, and on the 24th we 
carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the 
enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them 
across the bridge Avhich tiiey destroyed. Gen. 
Naglec on the same day dislodged a force of the 
eneni}- from the vicinity of the " Seven PinSR,"' 
f)ii the Bottom's Bridge road, and our advance 
on the left secured a strong position near that 
place. i 

All the information obtained from deserters, 
negroes and spies, indicated that the enemy occu- 
pied in force all the approaches to Richmond 
from the east, and that he intended to dispirte 
every step of our advance be3'0Tid the Chicka- 
hominy, ar.d the passage of the stream opposite 
onr right. Tliat Iheir army was .ojjpe.rior to ours 



55 



in numbers did not admit of a doubt. Strong de- 
fenses had been constructed around Richmond. . 

Impressed by these facts with the necessity of 
strengthening the army for the struggle, I did 
not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the 
importance of reinforcing the Army of the Poto- 
mac with every disposable man, in order to in- 
sure the success of an attack upon tile rebel cap- 
ital. 

On the lOtli of May I telegraphed as follows :— 

Gamp at Swell's Farm, three miles beyond 

WiUiamsbm-g, May 19, 1862, 5 A. M. 
Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War : 

From the information reaching me from every 
source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will 
meet us with all his force, on or near the Chicka- 
hominy. They can concentrate many more men 
than I have, and are collecting troops from all 
quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from 
the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons and 
guartis, have much reduced my numbers, and will 
continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army 
with whatever force I may Lave ; but duty re- 
quires me to urge that every efibrt be made to 
reinforce me Avithout delay with all the dispos- 
able troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we 
concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to 
fight the great battle now impending, and to make 
it decisive, 

It is possible that the enemy may abandon 
Richmond without a serious struggle ; but I do 
not believe he will — and it would be unwise to 
count on anything but a'^tubborn and desperate 
defense, a life and death contest. I see no other 
hope for him than to fight this battle, and we 
must win it. I shall fight them whatever their 
force may be ; but I ask for every man that the 
Department can send me. No troops should now 
be left unemployed. Those who entertain the 
opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond 
without a struggle, are in my judgment badly ad- 
vised, and do not comprehend their situation, 
which is one requiring desperate measures. 

1 beg that the President and Secretary will ma- 
turely weigh what I say, and leave nothing un- 
done to compl}'- with my request. If I am not re- 
kiforced, it is probable that I will be obhged to 
tight nearly double mj' numbers, strongly intrench- 
ad. I do not think it will be at all possible for 
me to bring more than (70,000) seventy thou- 
sand men upon the field of battle. 

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 

On the 14th of May I sent the following tele- 
gram to the President ;■ 

Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 18C2. 

His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of 
the U. S. : 

I have more than twice telegraphed to the 
Secretary of War, stating, that in my opinion 
the enemy were concentrating all their available 
force to fight this army in front of Richmond, 
and that such ought to be their policy. I have 
received no reply whatever to any of these tele- 
graphs. 

I beg leave to repeat their substance to your 
Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration 
which you Jiave ever accorded to my representar 
tions and views. All ray information Iruin every 



source accessible to me, establishes the fixed pur- 
pose of the rebels to defend Richmond agaii^t 
this army by ofl'ering us battle with all the troops 
they can collect from cast, west, and south, and 
my own opinion is confirmed by that of all ray 
commanders whom I have been able to consult. 

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have 
much weakened my force, and will continue ta 
do BO. I cannot bring into actual battle against 
the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the' 
utmost, and with them I must attack in position, 
]erobably intrenched, a wuch larger force — ^per- 
haps double my numbers. It is possible that 
Richmond may be abandoned without a serious 
struggle, but the enemy are actually in great 
strength between here and there, and it wotild b« 
unwise, atid even insane for me to calculate upon 
anything but a stifbborn and desperate resistance, 
if they should abandon Richmond, it maj' well be 
that it is ioixa with the purpose of making the 
stand at some place in Virginia south or west of 
there, and and Ave should be in condition to press 
them without delay. The confederate leaders 
must employ their utmost efforts against this 
army in Virginia, and they will be supported by 
the whole body of their military officers, among 
whom there may be- said to be no Union feeling', 
as there is alse very little among the higher class 
of citizens in the seceding States. 

I have found no fighting men in this I^eninsula 
— all are in the ranks of the opposmg foe. 

Even if more troops than I now have should 
prove inmecessary for purposes of military occu- 
pation, our greatest display of imposing force in 
the capital of the rebel government will have the 
best moral effect. I most respectfully and earn- 
estly urge upon your Excellency that the oppor- 
tunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the 
enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you 
will cause this army to be reinforced without de- 
lay by all the disposable troops of the govern- 
ment. I ask for every man that the government 
can send me. Any commander of the reinforce- 
ments, whom your Excellency may designate, 
Avill be acceptable to me, whatever expression 
I may have heretofore addressed to you on that 
subject. 

I will fight the enemy, whatever their force 
may be, and whatever force I may. have, and I 
firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our 
triumph should be made decisive and complete. 
The soldiers of this army love their government, 
and will fight well in its support : you may rely 
upon them. They have confidence in me as their 
general, and in you as their President. Strong 
reinforcements will at least save the lives of 
many of them. The greater our force, the more 
perfect will be our combinations, and the less 
our loss. 

For obvious reasons, I beg you to give imme- 
diate consideration to this communication, and to 
inform mo fully at the earliest moment of your 
final determination. 

Geo. B. !M'Clellan, Maj.-Gen. Com. 

To which, on the 18th of May, I received (his 
reply : 

Ud.-Qu'rs, Depar't Potomac, May 18th. 1362, 
To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, 



56 



Comd'g Army uf PoLoiiiac before Richmond. 

General, — Your diypatch to the President, ask- 
ing reinforcements, ^as been received and care- 
fully considered. 

The President is not willing to uncover the 
capital entirely, and it is believed that even if 
this were prudent it would require more time to 
effect a junction between your army and that of 
the Rappahannock, by way of the Potomac and 
York River, than by a land march. In order 
therefore to increase the strength of the attack 
upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. 
McDowell has been ordered to march upon that 
city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keep- 
ing himself always in position to save the capital 
from all possible attack, so to operate as to put 
his left wing in coramunication with your right 
wing, and you are instructed toico-operate so as 
toes'iblish this commimication as soon -as pos- 
dlhi^ i 'y extending your right wing to the north 
cf il ■'imond. 

; : iS believed that this communication can be 
saitiy established either north or south of the 
Pamunkey River. 

In any event you will be able to prevent the 
enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and fall- 
ing in overwhelming force upon Gen. McDowell. 
He will move with between thirty-five and forty 
thousand men. 

A copy of the instructions to Gen. ifcDowell 
is with this. The specific task assigned to his 
command, has been to provide against any dan- 
ger to the capital of the nation. 

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is 
sent forward to co-operate in the r«duction of 
Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not 
to uncover the city of Washington, and you will 
give no order, either before or after your junc- 
tion, which can put him out of position to cover 
this city. You and he will communicate with 
each other by telegraph or otherwise, as fre- 
quently as may be necessary for sufficient co-ope- 
ration. When Gen. M'Dowell is in position on 
your right, his supplies must be drawn from 
West Point, and you will instruct your staff-offi- 
cers to be prepared to supply him by that route. 

The President desires that Gen. McDowell re- 
tain the command of the Department of tlie Rap- 
pahannock, and of the forces with M'hich he 
irtoves forward. 

By order of the President, 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

From Washington, May 18, 2 p.m. 

It will be observed, this order rendered it im- 
possible for me to use the James River as a line 
of operations, and forced me to establish our 
depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Rich- 
mond from the north. 

I had advised, and preferred, that reinforbc- 
ments should be sent by water, for the reasons 
that their arrival would be more safe and certain, 
and that I would be loft free to rest the army on 
the James River, whenever the navigation of 
that stream should be opened. Tiie land move- 
ment obliged me to expose my right in order to 
secure the junction, and as the order for Gei!. 
McDowell's march was soon countermanded, 1 
incurred great risk, of wliich tlie enemy finally 



took advantage, and frustrated the plan of the 
campaign. Had Gen. McDowell joined me by 
water, I could have approached Richmond by 
the James, and thus avoided the delays and 
losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, 
and would have had tlie army massed in on© 
body instead of being necessarily divided hj 
that struam. 

The following is a copy of the instructions to 
Gen. McDowell. 

War Dep't., Wash'n., D.C., May 17, 1862. 
To Gen. McDowell, 

Gom'g. Dep't. of Rappahannock, — 

General : — Upon being joined by General 
Shield's division, you will move .upon Richmond 
by the general route of the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburg R-ai!i-oad, co-operating with the forces 
under Gen. McClellan, now threatening Rich- 
mond from the line of the Pamunkey and York 
Rivers. 

While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, 
a communication between your left wing, and 
the right wing of Gen. McClellan, you will hold 
yourself always in such a position, as to cover 
the capital of the nation against a sudden dash 
of the rebel forces. 

Gen. McClellan will be furnished with a copy 
of these instructions, and will be directed to hold 
himself in readiness, to establish communication 
with your left wing, and to prevent the main 
body of the enemy's armj'- from leaving Rich- 
mond, and throwing itself upon yorn- column, 
before the junction of the two armies is effected. 

A copy of his instructions in regard to th«' 
employment of your force is annexed. 

By order of the President, 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, 

Having some doubts from the wordnig of the 
foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority 
over the troops of Gen. McDowell, and as to the 
time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 
21st of May I sent this despatch : ^ 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp 
near Tunstall's Station, Ya. May 21, 1862, 11 p.m. 
Ilis Excellency Abraham Lirfcoln, 

President of the United States, — 

Your dispatch of yesterday respecting our 
situation and the batteries at Fort Darling, was 
received while I was absent with advance, where 
I have been all this day. I have communicated 
personally with Capt. Guldsborough, and by let- 
ter with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do no- 
ithing witliout co-operation on land, which I will 
not be in a condition to afford, for several days ; 
circumstances must determine the propriety of a 
Sand attack. 

It rained again last night, and rain on this soli 

■;oon makes the roads incredibly bad for army 

: nansportation. I personally crossed the Chicka- 

lominy to-day, at Bottom's Bridge Ford, and 

' w ent a mile beyond, "the enemy being about .lalf 

a mile in front. I have three regiments on the 

other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the 

bridge. Keyes's corps is on tlie New Kent Road, 

near Bottom's Bridge. Ilcintzelman is on the 

same road, within supporting distance. Sumner 

is on the railroad, connecting right with left. 

St:oneraan, with advanced guard, is witliin ou9 



inilo of New Inulge. Franklin, with two divi- 
sions, is abuiit two miles this sido of Stoncnum. 
Porter's division, with tho reserves of iiif;uitr\' 
and artillery, is within supporting distance. 
Hea'iquart^rs will probably be at Coal Head to- 
morrow, one niilo this side of Franklin. All the 
bridijps over the Chickahominy are destroyed. 
The enemy are in force on every road leading to 
Richmond, within a mile or two west of the 
stream. Their main body is on the road from 
New Bridge, encamped along it for four or five 
miles, spreading over the open ground on both 
sides. Johnston's head-quarter,s are about two 
miles beyond the bridge. 

All accounts report their numbers as greatly 
exceeding our own. The position of the rebel 
forces, the declaration of the rebel authorities, 
the resolutions of the Virginia legislatiu-e, the 
action of the city government, the conduct of the 
citizens, and all other sources of intormation ac- 
cessible to me, give positive assurance that our 
approach to Richmond involves a desperate 
battle between the opposing armies. 

All our divisions are moving towards the foe. 
I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack 
them according to my best judgment, and in such 
manner as to employ my greatest torce. 

I regret the state ot things as to Gen. McDow- 
ell's command. One division added to this army 
for that eifort would do more to protect; Wash- 
ington than his whole force can possibly do any- 
where else in the field. Tlie rebels are concen- 
trating from all points for the two battles at 
Richmond and Corinth. I would still most res- 
pectfully suggest Jhe policy of your concentrat- 
ing here by movements on water. I have heard 
nothing as to the probabilities of the contem- 
plated junction of McDowell's torce with mine. 
1 have no idea when he can start, what are his 
means of transportation, or when he may be ex- 
pected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is 
little hope that he can join me overland, in time 
for the coming battle ; delays, on my part, will 
be dangerous. 1 fear sickness and demoraliza- 
tion. This region is unhealthy for northern men, 
and unless kept moving I tear tiiat our soldiers 
may become discouraged. j^At present our num- 
bers are' weakening from disease, but our men 
remain in good heart. 

I regret, also, the configuration of the Depart- 
ment ot the Rappahannock. It includes a por- 
tion even of the city of Richmond. I think that 
my own department should embrace the entire 
field of military operations designed for the cajj- 
ture and occupation of that city. 

Again I agree with your Excellency, that one 
good general is better than two bad ones. 

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your 
orders of the 17th inst., addressed to myself and 
Gen. McDowell. If a junction is eifected before 
we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east 
of the railroad to Fredericksburg, and witliiu m}'' 
department. This fact, my superior rank, and 
the express language of the 62d article of war, 
will place his command under my orders, unless 
it is otherwise specially directed by your Excel- 
lency, and I consider that he will be under my 
command, except that I am not to detach any 



portion of |his' forces, or give .my orders which 
can put him out of position to cover Washing 
ton. If I err ui my construction I desiro to bo 
at? once set right. Frankness compels mo to say 
— anxious as I am for an increase of force — that 
the march of McDowell's force upon liichmond, 
by the shortest route, will, in my opinion, uncover 
Washington, as to any interposition by it, as com- 
pletely as its movement hy water. The enemy 
cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Wash- 
ington. 

Should they attempt a movement, which to me 
seems utterly improbable, their route would be 
,hy Gordonsvillo and Manassas. I desire that 
the extent of my authority over McDowell may 
jjQ clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and 
conflicting views may produce some of those in- 
jurious results which a divided command has so 
often caused. I would respectfully suggest that 
this danger can only be surely guarded against 
by explicitly placing Gen. McDowell under my 
orders in the ordinary way, and holding me 
strictly responsible for the closest observance of 
your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it 
is not necessary for me to assure you that your 
instructions woiUd be observed in the utmost 
good faith, and 'that I have no personal feelings 
which could influence me to disregard them in 
any particular. 

I believe that there is a great struggle before 
this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discou- 
raged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as 
I can, but in any event 1 shall fight it with all the 
skill, caution and determination that I possess, 
and I trust that the result may either obtain for 
me the permanent confidence of my government, 
or that it may close my career. 

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Gomd'g. 

On the 24th I received the following reply : 
May 24, 1862. From Washington. 24th. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,— I left Gen. Mc- 
Dowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' 
command is there, but is so worn that he cannot 
move before Monday moiming, the 2Ctli. We 
have so thinned our line to get troops for other 
places, that it was broken yesterday at Front 
Roj'al, with a probable loss to us of one regiment 
infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General 
Banks m^ome peril. 

The enemy's forces under Gen. Anderson, now 
opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have as 
their line of supply and retreat the road to 
Richmond. 

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movements 
against Anderson, you could send a iurco trom 
your right to cut ofi" the enemy's supplies from 
Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across 
the two forks of the Pomunkey, and hitercepl 
t]^ enemy's retreat, you will i)revent the army 
now opposed to you from receiving an accession 
of numbers of ncuriy 1.5,000 men, and if you suc- 
ceed i%savhig the bridges, you will secure a 
line of roalroad for supplies in addition to the 
one you now have. Can you not do this almost 
as well as not, while you are building the Chick- 
ahominy bridges ? McDowell and Shields both 
say they can, and positively will, move Monday 
morning. I wish you to march cautiously and 
safely. 



58 



You will have command of McDowell after 
he ioins yon, precisely as your indicated in your 
long dispatch, to us of the 21st. 

A. Lincoln, President. 
This information that McDowell's corps would 
march for Fredericksburg on the following Mon- 
day (the 2Gth), and that he would be under my 
command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, 
was cheering news, and I now felt confident that 
ho would, on his arrival, be sufaciontly strong to 
overpower the large army confronting xx^. 

At an hour later on the same day I received the 
following : 

May 24. 1862. From Washington, 4 p.m., '62. 
Maj.-Geu. G. B. McClellan,— 

In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical posi- 
tion, 1 have been compelled to suspend Gen. 
McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy 
are -making a desperate push upon Harper's 
Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fre- 
mont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in 
their rear. A. Lincoln, President. 

From which' it w/,11 be seen that I could not 
expect Gen. McDowell to join me in time to 
participate in immediate operations in front of 
Eichraond, and on the same evening I replied to 
the President thati would make my calculations 
accordingly. 

It then only remained for me to make the best 
use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail 
myself, of all artificial auxiliaries, to compensate 
'as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. 
I concurred fully w^ith the President in the in- 
junction contained in his telegram of the 24th, 
tliat it was necessary with my limited force to 
move " cautiously and safely." In view of the 
peculiar character of the Chickahominy and the 
liability of the bottom-lands to sudden inunda- 
tion, it became necessary to construct between 
Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new 
Dridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log- 
way approaches. 

The entire^ army could probably have been 
thrown across the Chickahominy immediately 
after our arrival, but this w^ould have left no 
force on the left bank to guard our communica- 
tions, or to protect our right and rear. If the 
communication with our supply depot had been 
cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated 
on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the 
stage of water as it \Yas for many days after our 
arrival, the bridges i iirried away, and our means 
of transportation n >t furnishing a single day's 
supplies in advance, the troops must have gone 
without rations, and the animals without forage ; 
the army would have been paralyzed. 

It is true, I might have abandoned ray commu- 
nications and pushed forward to Richnioi)4, 
trusting to the spetMly defeat of the enemy and 
the consequent fall "f the city, for a renewal of 
supplies ;■ but the ai'proaches were forti%d, and 
the town itself w;is surrounded with a strong 
line of intrcnchmcius requiring a greater length 
of time to reduce than our troops could have 
dispensed with rations. 

Under these circumstances, I decided to retain 
u portion of the army on the left bank of the 
river until our bridges were completed. 



It will be remembered that the order for the 
co-operation of Gen. McDowell was simply sus- 
pended, not revoked, and therefore I was- not at 
liberty to abandon the northern approach. 

A very dashing and successful reconnoissance 
was made near New Bridge on the 24th of May, 
by Lieut. Bowen, Topographical Engineers es- 
corted by the 4th Michigan Volunteers and a 
squadron of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, commanded 
respectively by Col, Woodbury and Capt. Gor- 
don. 

Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, 
and, with little loss, drove it back upon its 
brigade, killing a large number and capturing 
several prisoners. Great credit is due to the 
staff officers, as well as to Col. Woodirury, Capt. 
Gordon, and their commands, for then- conduct 
on this occasion. 

The work upon the bridges was commenced at 
once, and pushed forward with great vigor ; but 
the rains which from day today continued to 
fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a 
greater height than had been known for twentj 
years. This demolished a great amount of oui 
labor ; and our first bridges with their approaches, 
which were not made with reference io such, 
extreme high water, were carried off or rendered 
impassable. We were obliged, with immense 
labor, to construct others much longer, mo^e 
elevated, and stable. Our men worked in the 
water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the op- 
posite bank. 

On the 25th May I received the following tele- 
gram. 

Washington, May 23, 18G2. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 

Your dispatch received. General Banks was 
at' Strasburg with about 0,000 men — Shields 
having been taken from him to swell a columa 
for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and tlie 
rest of his force scattered at various places. On 
the 23d a rebel force of seven to ten thousand 
fell upon one regiment and two companies guard- 
ing the bridges at Front Royal, destroying it 
entirely — crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 
24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks 
to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with 
them, beating them into Winchester yesterday 
evening. This morning a battle ensued between 
the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten 
back in full retreat towards Martinsburg, and 
probably is broken -up into a total rout. Geary 
on the ]\Ianassas Gap railroad, just now reports 
that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 
following up and supporting, as I understand, 
the fyrce now pursuing Banks. Also that an- 
other force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following 
on in the same direction. Stripped bare as we 
are here, I will do all that we can do to prevent 
theni crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or 
above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces 
moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and 
Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Har- 
risonburg, both these movements intended to get 
in the enemy's rear. 

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered 
through here to Harper's Ferry ; the rest of his 
forces remain for the jircsent at Fredericksbnig- 



We are sending such regiments and dribs from 
here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's 
Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by 
calling in militia from adjacent States. We have 
also eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's 
Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at 
that point. 

This is now our situation. If McDowell's force 
was now beyond our reach we should be cj^ircly 
helpless. Apprehensions of something lil#this, 
and no unwillingness to sustain you has always 
been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces 
from you. 

Please understand this, and do the best you 
can with the forces you have. 

A. Lincoln, President. 
On the 25th, the following was also received : 
Washington, May 25, 1862, 2 P. M. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan : 

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force 
ho drive Gen. Banks before him ; precisely iu 
what force we cannot tell. He is also threaten- 
ing Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap 
Railroad from both north and south — in precisely 
what force we cannot tell. I think the movement 
is a general and a concerted one, such as could 
not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a 
very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the 
time is near Avhen you must either attack Rich- 
mond or give up the job, and come back to the 
defense of Washington. Let me hear from you 
instantly. A. Lincoln, President. 

To which I replied as-follows : 

Coal H:arbor, May 25, 1862. 
Telegram received. Lidependently of it, the 
time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. 
The object, of the movement^is probably to pre- 
vent reinforcements being sent to me. All the 
information obtained from balloons, deserters, 
prisoners, and contrabancte, agrees in the state- 
ment that the mass of the rebel troops are still 
ni the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to 
defend it. 

I have no knowledge of Banks' position and 
force, nor what there is at Manassas, therefore 
cannot form a definite opinion as to the force 
igainst him. 

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 
BIX miles of Richmond, the others on this side at 
otj^er crossings, within same distance, and ready 
to cross when bridges are completed. 

G. B. McClellan, ilaj.-Gen. Com'g. 
His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
On the 26th, I received the following : 

Wasbmgton, May 26, 1862, 12.40 A. M. 
Maj.-Gen. McClellan : 

We have Gen. Banks' official report. Ht; lias 
saved his army and baggage, and has made ;;^afc 
retreat to the river, and is probably safe at T^^il- 
liamsport. He reports the attacking force at fif- 
teen tnousand. A. Lincoln, President. 
On the 26th, I received the following : 

Washington, May 26, 1862. 
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan : 

Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad, 
also what impression have you as^to intrenched 
works for you to contend with in front of Rich- 
mond. Can you get near enough tcf throw shells 
into the city ? A. Lincoln, President. 



59 



operation 
Hope to 
to-night. 



On the same day I sent the following : 

Coal Harbor, May 26, 18C2. 
^Uave cut the Virginia Central road in three 
places between Hanover C. H. and the Chicka- 
hominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not 
think Richmond intrcnchments formidable, but 
am not certain. Hope very soon to be within 
shelling distance. Have railroad in 
from White House to Chickahominy. 
have Chickahominy bridge repaired 
Nothing of interest to-day. 

Geo. B. McCleli.an, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
His Excellency A. Lincoln, President. 
The interruption of the railroad here referred 
to Avas effected by the command of Brig.-Gen. 
Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the ene- 
my from (h-awing supplies by that route, or from 
sendiug reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson. 
At 10 A. ^I. I also sent the following dispatch : 
'• Telegrams of last night received. I am glad 
to know aliairs are not so bad as might have 
been. I avouUI earnestly call your attention to 
nty instructions to Gen. Banks, of March 16th, to 
Gen. Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter 
of April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot 
but think that a prompt return to the principles 
there laid down would relieve all probability of 
danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg 
to urge the importance of Manassas and Front 
Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg. 
Geo. B. ]\IcClellan, Maj.-Gcn. 
His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
Late on the 20Ui I sent the following : 

Camp near New Bridge, 
May 26, 1862, 7.30 P. M. 
Have arranged to carry out yourjlast orders. 
We arre quietly closing in upon the enemy pre- 
paratory to the last struggle. Situated as I am I 
feel forced to take every possible precaution 
against disaster, and to secure my flanks against 
the probably superior force in front of me. My 
arrangements for to-morrow are very important, 
and if successful, will leave me free to sti'ike on 
the return of the force detached. 

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen 
His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 
On the same day I received intelligence that a 
very considerable force of the enemy was in the 
vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the right and 
rear of our army, thus threatening owr communi- 
cations, and in a position either to reinforce Jack- 
son, or to impede McDowell's junction, should he 
finally move to unite with us. 

On the same day I also received information 
from Gen. McDowell, through the Secretary of 
War, that the enemy had fallen back from Frede- 
ricksburg towards Richmond, and that Gen. Mc- 
Dowell's advance was eight miles south of the 
Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dis- 
lodge or defeat this force, independentlj- even of 
the wishes of the President, as expressed in his 
telegram of the 26th. I Entrusted this task to' 
Brig.-Gen. Fitz Jcrfni Porter, commanding the 5th 
corps, with orders to move at daybreak on tlie 
27th. 

Through a heavy lain and c)\'er bad roads, that 
officer moved liis conmiand as follows : 

Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with 



th« 5rti and 6tli regiments D. S. cavalry and Cen 
son's horse battery of the 2d U. S. artillery tak- 
ing the road from New Bridge via MeehanicsviUe 
to Hanover Court Ilouae. 

Gen. ilorell's division, composed of the brig- 
ades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, 
witk Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, and 
three batteries under Capt. Charles Griffin, 5th U. 
S. Artillery, followed on the same road. 

Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional 
brigade composed of the 5th and 13th New York, 
the Ist Connecticut Artillery acting as infantry ; 
the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Weeden's 
Rhode Island battery moved from his station at 
Old Church, by a road running to Hanover Court 
House, parallel to the Pamunkey. After a fa- 
tiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud 
and raiii. Gen. Emory at noon reached a point 
about two miles from Hanover Court House 
where the road forks to Ashland, and found a 
portion of the enemy formed in line across the 
Hanover Court House road. 

Gen. Emory had before this been joined by the 
25th New York (of Martindale's brigade) and 
Berdan's sharpshooters ; these regiments were 
deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and 
advanced slowly towards the enemy until rein- 
forced by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of 
kis brigade, when the enemy was charged and 
quickly routed, one of his guns being captured 
by the 17th New York under Col. Lansing, after 
haying been disabled by the fire of Benson's bat- 
tery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The 
cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately 
ordered in pursuit, followed bj Morell's infantry, 
and artillery, Avith the exception of Martindale's 
brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed 
by repairing bridges &c. now arrived too late to 
participate in this affair ; a portion of this com- 
mand was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy ^bridges 
and captured quite a number of prisoners ; the 
remainder followed Morell's division. In the 
meantime. Gen. Martindale, with the few remain- 
ing regiments of his brigade, and a section of ar- 
tillery advanced on the Ashland road, and found 
a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and ar- 
tillery in position near Peake's Station on the 
Virginia Central Railroad : he soon forced them 
to retire towards Ashland. 

The 25th New York having been ordered to 
rejoin him. Gen. Martindale was directed to form 
his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin 
the rest of the command at Hanover Court 
House. 

He sent one regiment up tho railroad, but re- 
mained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by 
the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main 
column. 

The enemy soon returned to attack Gen. Mar- 
tindale, who at once formed the 2d Maine, 25th 
New York and a portion of of the 44th New Jer- 
sey, with one section of Martin's battery, on the 
New Baidge Road, facing his own position of 
the morning, and then hold his ground for an hour 
against largo otldsimtil reinforced. 

General Porter was at Hanover Court House, 
near the head of his column, when he learned 



bO 



that the rear had been attacked by a largo force, 
He at once faced the whole column about, re- 
called the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ash- 
land, moved the 13th ond 14th New York and 
Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, 
pushed the 9th Massachusetts, and 52d Pennsyl- 
vania of McQuade'e brigade through the woods 
on the right (our original left) aud attacked the 
flank Q^ the enemy, while Butterfield with the 
83d P^nsylvania, and 16th Michigan, hastened 
towards thp scene of action by the railroad and 
through the woods further to the right, and com- 
pleted the rout of the enemy. During the re- 
mainder of this and the following day our cavalry 
was active in the pursuit, taking a number of 
prisoners. Captain Harrison of the U. S. Ca- 
valry with a single company, brought in as pris- 
oners two entire companies of iufantry, with 
their arms and ammunition A part of Rush's 
Lancers also captured an entire company with 
thier arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs were 
some two hnodred of the enemy's dead, buried 
by our troops, seven hundred and thirty prison- 
ers sent to the rear, one 12-pounder howitzer, 
one caisson, a large number of small arms, and 
two railroad trains captured. 

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded 
and missing. 

The force encountered and defeated was Gen. 
Branch's division of North Caroliua and Georgia 
troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. 
Their camp at Hanover Court House was taken 
and destroyed. 

Having reason to believe that Gen. Anderson 
with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I or- 
dered Gen. Syke's division of regulars to move 
on the 28th, from New Bridge to Hanover Court 
House, and remained there until the evening of 
the 20th, when they reierned to their original 
camp. 

On the 28th, Gen. Stoneman's command of 
cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of in- 
fantry, were also placed under General Porter's 
orders. 

On the same day I visited Hanover Court House 
whence I sent the following dispatch. 

Hanover Court House, May 28. 2 p. u. 
Porter's action oi yesterday was truly a glori- 
ous victor}' — too much credit cannot be given to 
his magnificent division and its accomplished 
leader. The rout of the rebels was complete, not 
a defeat but a complete rout. Prisoners are con- 
stantly coming in, two companies have this mo- 
ment arrived, with excellent arms. 

There is no doubt that the enemy are concen- 
trating everything on Richmond. I will do my 
begt to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether 
I calf. 

It is the policy and duty of the government 
to send mc by water all the well drilled troop» 
available. I am confident that Washington is in 
no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers 
have been sent up to bring down Jaokson's com- 
mand. 

I may not be able to cut thera off, but will try ; 
we havo cut all but tho F. &, II R. R. The raal 



issues, is in the cattle about to be fought in tiont 
of Richmond. All our available troops should be 
collected here, not raw regiments, but well drill- 
ed troops. It cannot be ignored that a desper- 
ate battle is before us ; if any regiment of good 
troops remain unemployed it will be an irrepara- 
ble fault committed. 

G. B. McClei.lan, Major-General. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War. 

Having ascertained the state of affairs, instruc- 
tions wei"e given for the operations of the fol- 
lowing day. 

On the 28th a party under Major Williams, Cth 
U. S. Cavalry, destroyed the common road bridges 
over the Famvmkey and the Virginia Central 
Railroad bridge over the South Anna. 

On the 29th, he destroyed the Frederiksburg 
and Richmond bridge over the South Anna, and 
the Turnpike bridge over the same stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover the 
movement of Maj. Williams, Gen. Emory moved 
a column of cavalry toward Ashland, from Ilan- 
over Court House, the advance of this column, 
under Oapt. Chambiiss, 5th U. S. Cavalry, entered 
Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, 
destroyed the railroad bridge over Stoney Creek, 
and broke up the railroad bridge and telegraph. 

Another column, of all arms, under Col. War- 
ren, was sent on the same day, in the direct road 
to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General 
Emory's column had retired, capturing a small 
party there. 

Gen. Stonemari, on the same day, moved to 
Ashland by Leach's- Station, covei'ing well the 
movements of the other column. 

The objects of the expedition having been ac- 
complished, and it being certain that the 1st 
corps would not join us at once, General Porter 
withdrew his command to their camps with the 
main army, on the evening of the 29th. 

On the' night of the 27th and 28th, I sent the 
following dispatch to the Secretary of War. 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 1862. 12.30 a.m. 

Porter has gained two complete victories over 
superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move there 
in the morning with reinforcements, to secure the 
complete destruction of the rebels in that quar- 
ter. In doing so, I run some risk here, but I 
cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater 
force than I had supposed. 1 will do all that 
quick movements can accomplish, but you must 
send me all the troops you can, and leave to me 
full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is 
absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near 
Hanover Court House before I can avvance. 

Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War. 

In reply to which, I received the following 
from" the President : 

Washington, May 28, 1862. 
Major-General McClellan, — 

i am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory ; 
Btill, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am 
puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you 
say you have all the railroads but the Richmond 
an#Fredericksburg. 1 am puzzled to see how, 



lacking that, yoo can have any, except toe scrap 
from Riclimond to West Point ; the scrap of the 
Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover 
without more, is simply nothing. That the whole 
of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I 
think cannot be certainly known to you or me. 
Saxton, at Harper's Perry, informs us that a large 
force, supposed to be Jackson's and McEwell's, 
forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. 
Gen. King telegraphed us from Fredericksburg, 
that contrabands give certain information, that 
fifteen thousand left Hanover Junction Monday 
morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully 
impressed with the importance of the struggle be- 
fore you, and shall aid j'ou all I can consistently 
with my view of due regard to all points. 

A. Lincoln. 

At 6 P.M. of the 29th, I sent the Secretary of 
War the following dispatch. 

Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, ^ 
May 29, 1862, C p.m. 

Gen. Porter has gained information, that Gen. 
Anderson left his position in the vicinity of 
Fredericksburg, at 4 a.m., Sunday, with the fol- 
lowing troops : — 1st S. C., Col. Hamilton, 1 bat- 
talion S. C. Rifles, 3-4th and 38th N. C, 45th 
Georgia, 12th, 13th and 14th S. C, 3d Louisiana, 
2 batteries of 4 guns each, namely, Letcher's Va., 
and Mcintosh's S. C. batteries. General Ander- 
son and his command, passed Ashland yesterday 
evening, en route for Richmond, leaving men be- 
hind to destroy bridges over the telegraph road, 
which they traveled. This information is relia- 
ble. It is also positively certain, that Branch's 
command was from Gordousville, bound for 
Richmond, whither they have now gone. 

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that 
there is no rebel force between Fredericksburg 
and Junction. 

G. B. McClellan, Major-Gen. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

The following was also sent on the same day : 
Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, 
May 29, 1862. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, 

A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's com- 
mand, under Major Williams, 6th Cavalry, des- 
troyed the South Anna railroad bridge, at about 
9 A.M. to-day. A large quantity of confederate 
public property was also destroyed at Ashland 
this morning. R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff. 

In reply to which the following was received : 
Washington, May 29, 1862. 
Gen. R. B. Marcy : 

Your dispatch, as to South Anna and Ashland 
being seized by our forces this morning, is re- 
ceived. Understanding these points to be on 
the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I 
heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen, 
McClellan and his army for the seizure. 

A. Lincoln. 

On the. 30th I sent the following : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
May 30, 1862. 

From tone of your dispatches and President's, 
I do not think that you at all appreciate the value 
and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely 
relieved ray right "flank, which was seriously 



62 



threatt'iied, routed and demoralized a consider- 
able portion of the rebel forces, taken over seven 
hundred and fifty prisoners, killed and wonnded 
large numbers ; one gun, many small arms, and 
much baggage taken. It was one of the hand- 
somest things in the war, both in itself and its 
results. Porter has returned, and my army is 
again well in hand. Another day will make the 
probable field of battle passable for artillery. It 
is quite certain that there is nothing in front of 
McDowell— (Fredericksburg). I regard the burn- 
ing of South Anna bridges as the least important 
result of Porter's movements. 

Q. B. McClellan-, Major-Gen. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of ^Var. 

The results of the brilliant operation of Gen. 
Porter were the dispersal of Gen. Branch's divi- 
Bion, and the clearing of our right flank and rear. 
It was rendered impossible for the enemy to 
communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or 
•with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by| the 
very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road 
"was left entirely open for the advance of McDow- 
ell, had he been permitted to join the array of 
xhe Potomac. 

His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in 
'my judgment, a serious and fatal error ; he could 
■do no good in that direction ; while, had he been 
permitted to carry out the orders of May 11, the 
united forces would have driven the enemy with- 
in the immediate intrenchmentsi^f Richmond be- 
for'Jackson could have returned to its succor, and 
probablj' would have gained possession of that 
place. I respectfully refer to the reports of Gen- 
eral Porter and his subordinate commanders, for 
the names of the officers who deserve especial 
mention for the parts they took in these affairs. 
But I cannot omit here my testimony to the enerr 
gy and ability displayed by Gen. Porter on this 
occasion, since to him is mainly due the suc- 
cesses there gained. 

OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 

On the 20th of May a recounoissance was or- 
dered on the south side of the Chickahominy, to- 
wards James River. This was accomplished by 
Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade 
near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed forward to 
Tvithin two miles of James River, without serious 
resistance, or finding the enemy in force. 

The rest of the 4th Corps, commanded by Gen. 
E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 
23d of May. 

On the 24th, 25th and 26th, a very gallant ro- 
connoissance was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with 
his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the- 
25th the 4th Corps was ordered to take up and 
fortify a position in the vicinity of the_ Seven 
Pines. The order was at once obeyed ; a strong 
line of rifle-pits opened,- and an abattis construct- 
ed a little in the rear of the point where the Nine 
Mile road comes into the AVilliamsburgh road. 
. On the same day General Heintzejman was 
ordered to cross with his corps (the 3d), and 
take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's 
Bridge, Avatching the crossings of White .Oak 
Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of ihe 
left wing of the army. Being the senior officer 
on that side the river, he was placed in command 



of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven 
Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the 
troops from the crossings of "White Qak Swamp, 
unless in an emergency. 

On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to ad- 
vance Casey's division to " Fair Oaks " on the 
the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a 
mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen. 
Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new 
line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field 
guns were commenced, and considerable of the 
timber in front of the line was felled on the two 
days following. The picket line was established, 
reaching from ' the Chickahominy to White Oak 
Swamp. 

On the 30th Gen. Hcintzelman, representing 
that the advatice had met with sharp opposition 
in taking up their position, and that he consider- 
ed the point a critical one, requested and obtain- 
ed authorit}' to make such disposition of his 
troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He 
immediately advaucad two brigades of Kearney's 
division about three-fourth^ of a mile in front of 
Savage's Station, tints placing them within sup- 
porting distance of Casey's division, which held 
the advance of the 4th Corps. • 

BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 

On the 30 th the troops on the south side of 
the Chickahominj' were in position as follows ; 

Casey's division on the right of the Williams- 
burg road, at right angles to it, the centre at 
Fair Oaks ; Couch's division at Seven Pines ; 
Kearney's division on the railroad, from near 
Savage's Station towards the bridge ; Hooker's 
division on the borders of Wiiite Oak Swamp. 
Constant skirmishing had been kept up between 
our pickets and those of the enemy, while these 
lines were being taken up and strengthened. 
Large bodies of Confederate troops were seen 
immediately to the front and right of Casey's po- 
sition. 

Duricg the day and night of the 30ch of May a 
very violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in 
torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and 
bridges impracticable, made the roads almost itu- 
pa.-sable, and threatened the destruction of the 
bridges over the Chickahominy. 
I^The enenjy, perceiving the unfavorable position 
in which we were placed, and the possibility of 
destroying that part of our army which was ap- 
parently cut off from the main body by the rap- 
idly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force 
(grand divisions of Gens. D. H. Hill, Huger, Long- 
street and G. W. Smith) upon the position occu- 
pied by Casey's division. 

It appears, from the official reports of Gen. 
Keyes and his subordinate commanders, that, at 
10 o'clock A. M,, on the 31st of May, an aide-de- 
camp of Gen. J. E. Johnston was captured by 
Gen. Naglee's pickets. But little information as 
to the movements of the enemy was obt;\ined from 
him, but his presence so near our lines excited 
suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the 
troops were ordered by Gen. Kt^yes to be under 
arms at 11 o'clock. 

Between 11 and 12 it was reported to Gen. Ca- 
sey that the enemy were approaciiing in consid- 
erable force on the Williaiusburg road. AUthis 



dine Casey's division was disposed of as follows : 
Naglee's brigade, extending from the Williams- 
burg road to the Garuett field, having one regi- 
ment across the railroad. Gen. Wessels's brig- 
ade in the rifle-pits, and Geu. Palmer's in the rear 
of Geu. Wessels ; ouc battery of artillery iu ad- 
vance, with Gen. Naglee, one battery in rear of 
rifle-pits, to the riget of the redoubt ; one battery 
in real- of the redoubt, and another battery un- 
harnessed in the redoubt. 

Gen. Couch's division, holding the second line, 
had Gen. Abercrombic's brigade on the right, 
along the Nine Mile road, with two regiments and 
one battery across the railroad, near Fair Oaks 
Station ; Gen. Peck's brigade on the right, and 
Gen. Devin's in the centre. 

On the approach ot the enemy. Gen. Casey sent 
forward one of Gen. Palmer's regiments to sup- 
port the picket Hue ; but this regiment gave way, 
without making much, if any, resistance. 
3. Meavy firing at once commenced, and the pick- 
ets were driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. 
Couch to move Gen. Peck's brigade to occupy tlie 
ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, 
which had not before been occnpiecl by our 
forces, and thus to support Gen. Casey's left,, 
where the first attack was the most severe. 
The enemy now came on in heavy force, attack- 
ing Gen. Casey simultaneously in front and on 
both flanks. 

Geu. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman for rein- 
forcements, but the messenger was delayed, so 
that orders were not sent to Gens. Kearney and 
'Hooker until near 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 
P. M. when Gen. Jamison's and Bairy's brigades, 
of Gen. Kearney's division, arrived on (he field. 
Gen. Birney was ordered up the railroad, but, by 
Gen. Kearney's order, halted his brigade before 
arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also 
dispatched for Gen. Hooker to move up from 
White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at 
Savage's Station. 

As soon as the firing was heard at headquar- 
ters, orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his 
command under arma, and bo ready to move at a 
moment's warning. His corps, consisting of Gens. 
Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was en- 
camped on the north side of the Chickahominy, 
some six miles above Bottom's Bridge. Each di- 
vision had thrown a bridge over the stream oppo- 
site to its own position. 

At 1 o'clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divi- 
sions to their respective bridges, with instruc- 
tions to halt and await further orders. 

At 2 o'clock orders were sent from headquar- 
ters to cross these divisions without delay, and 
push them rapidly to Gen. Heintzelman's sup- 
port. This order was received and communicat- 
ed at half-past two, and the passage was immedi- 
ately commenced. 

In the meantime Gen. Naglee's brigade, with 
the batteries of Gen. Casey's division, which Gen. 
Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain 
the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelm- 
ing masses of the enemy. They were reinforced 
by a regiment from Gen. Peck's brigade. 

The artilleiy under the command of Col. G. D. 
Bailey, 1st New York Artillery, and afterwards 



63 



under Gen. Naglee, did g^od execution on the ad- 
vancing columns. Theleltof this position was. 
however, soon tiu-nod, and a sliarp cross-fire 
opei^ed upon the gunners and the men in the ri- 
fle-pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkcnburg, and 
Adj't Ramsey, of the sanie regiment, were killed. 
Some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and 
the whole line was driven back upon the posi- 
tion occupied by Gen. Couch. The brigades of 
Gens. Wessels and Palmer, with the reinforce- 
ments which had been sent them from Gen. 
Couch, had also been driven from the field with 
heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by 
Gen. Casey's division was taken by the enemy. / 
Previous to this time. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. 
Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the 
pressure upon Gen. Casey's right flank. In mak- 
ing this movement Gen. Couch discovered large 
masses of the enemy pushing towards our right 
and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy col- 
umn which had been held in reserve, and which 
was now making its way towards Fair Oaks Sta- 
tion. Gen. Couch at once engaged this column 
with these two regiments, but, though reinforced 
by two additional regiments, he was overpower- 
ed, and the enemy pushed between him and the 
main body of his division. With these four resr- 
iments and one battery Gen. Couch fell back about 
half a mile towards the Grape-Vine Bridge, where, 
hearing that Gen. Sumner had crossed, he formed 
line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and pre- 
pared to hold the position. 

Gens. Berry's and Jamison's brigades had by 
this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. 
Gen. Berry was ordered to take possession of the 
woods on the left, and push forward so as to have 
a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement 
was executed brilliantly ; Gen. Berry pusning his 
regiment forward through the woods, until iheu 
rifles commanded the left of the camp and works 
occupied by Gen. Casey's division in the morn- 
ing. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the 
enemy was very destructive, and assisted materi- 
ally in checking the pursuit in that part of the 
field. He held his position in these woods against 
several attacks of superior numbers, and after 
dark, being cut off by the enemy fiom the main 
body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, 
and, by a circuit, brought his men into our lines 
in good order. 

Gen. Jamison, with two regiments — the other 
two of his brigade having been detached, one to 
Gen. Peck and one to Gen. Birney — moved rapid- 
ly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg 
road, and succeeded for a time iu keeping the 
abattis clear of the enemy, but large numbers of 
the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he 
too was forced to retreat through the woods 
towards White Oak Swamp, and in that way 
gained camp under cover of night. 

Brig.-Gen. Devins, who had held the centre o( 
Gen. Couch's division, had made repeated and 
gallant efforts to regain purtiouslof the ground 
lost in front, hut each time was driven back, and 
finally withdrew behind the rifle pits' near Seven 
Pinea. 

Meantime, Gen. Sumner had arrived with tin- 
advance of his corps, Gen. Sedgwick's division, 



at the point held b.v Ql€n. Conch with four regi- 
ments and one battery. Tlie roads leading from 
the bridge, were 60 miry, that it was only by the 
greatest exertion, Gen. Sedgwick had been able to 
get one of his batteries to the front. 

The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Col. Sul- 
ly) was immediately deployed to the riglit of 
Couch to protect the tiank, and the rest of the di- 
vision formed in line of battle. Kirby's battery 
near the centre in an angle of the woods. One 
of Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open com- 
municatson with Gen. lleintzelman. No sooner 
were these dispositions made, than the enemy 
i;ame in strong force, and opened a heavy fire 
along the hne. He made several charges, but 
was repulsed with great loss, by the steady fire 
of the infantry, and the splendid practice of the 
battery. AfLer sustaining the enemy's fire for a 
considerable time. Gen .Sumner ordered five reg- 
iments (the 3-lth New York, Col. Smith, 82d New 
York, Lieut.-Col. Hudson, 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
Kimball, 20th Mass., Col. Lee, 7th Michigan, Maj. 
Richardson, the three former, of Gen. Gorman's 
brigade, tlie two latter, of Gen. Dana's brigade) 
to advance and charge with bayonet. This charge 
was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our 
tioops, springing over two fences which were 
between them and the enemy, rushed upon his 
lines and drove him in confusion from that part 
of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for 
that day. 

During the night, dispositions were made for 
its early renewal. Gen. Couch's division, and so 
much of Gen. Casey's as could be collected to- 
gether, with Gen. Kearney's, occupied the rifle- 
pits near Seven Pines. Gen. Peck in falling back 
on the left, liad sncceedid, late in the afternoon, 
in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, 
and was taking them once more into the action, 
when he was ordered back into the intrenched 
camp by Gen. Kearney. Gen. Hooker brought 
up his division about dark, having been delayed 
by the lieaviness of the roads, and the throng of 
fugitives from the field, through whom, the Colo- 
nel of the leading regmient (Starr) reports, he 
" was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." 
This division bivouacked for the night, in rear 
of the right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of 
the railroad. Gen. Richardson's division also 
came upon the field about' sunset. He had at- 
tempted the passage of tlie Chickahominy by the 
bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far 
destroyed, that he was forced to move Gen. How- 
ard's and Meagher's brigades, with all his artil- 
lery, around by Gen. Sedgwick's bridge, while 
Gen. French's brigade, with the utmost difficult}^ 
crossed by the other. Gen. Sedgwick's division, 
with the regiments under Gen. Couch, held about 
the same position as when the fight ceased ; and 
Gen. Richardson, on his arrival, was ordered to 
place bis division on the left, to connect with 
Gen. Kearney. Gen. French's brigade was posted 
along ths railroad, and Gens. Howard's and 
Meagher's brigades, in second and third lines. 
All his artillcr}' had been left behind, it being im- 
possible to move it forward through the deep 
mud, as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward 
tlie field, but during the rught, the three batteries 
of the divieion were brought to the front. 



64 

About five o'clock in the morning of the Ist of 
June, skirmishers, and some cavalry oi the ene- 
my, were discovered in front of Gen. Richard- 
son's divieion. Capt. Pettit's battery (B, 1st N. 
Y.) having come upon the ground, threw a few 
shells among them, when thej dispersed. There 
was a wide interval between Gen. Richardson 
and Gen. Kearney. To close this, Gen. Richard- 
son's line was extended to the left, and his first 
line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they 
gained this position, when the enemy appearing 
in large force, from the woods in front, opened a 
heavy fire of musketry at short range, along the 
Avhole line. He approached very rapidly with 
columns of attack, formed on two roads which 
crossed the railroad. These columns were sup- 
ported by infantry in line of battle on each side, 
cutting tien. French's line. He threw out no 
skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry 
all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly 
an hour the first line of Gen. Richardson's divi- 
sion, stood and ret-arned the fire, the lines of the 
enemy being reinforced and relieved, time after 
time, until finally Gen. Howard was ordered, with 
his brigade, to go to Gen. French's assistance. 
He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few 
minutes the fire of the enemy ceased, and his 
whole line fell back on that part of the field. 

On the opening of the firing in the morning, 
Gen. Hooker pushed forward on the railroad, 
with two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey), 
followed by Gen. Sickles' brigade. It was found 
impossible to. move tlie artillery of this division 
from its position, on account of the mud. On 
coming near the woods, which were held by the 
enemy in force. Gen. Hooker found Gen. Birney'g 
brigade. Col. J. HobartWard in command, in line 
of battle. He sent back to hasten Gen. Sickles' 
brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned 
off to the left by Gen. Heintzelman to meet a col- 
umn advancing in that direction. He at once 
made the attack with the two New Jersey regi- 
ments, calling upon Col. Ward to support him 
with Gen. Birney's brigade. This was well done, 
our troops advaiicing into the woods under a 
heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them 
for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge 
with the baj'onet was then ordered by Gen. Hook- 
er, with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine, 
and SSth and 40th New York, and the enemy fled 
in confusion, throwing down arms and even cloth- 
ing in his flight. Gen. Sickles having been or- 
dered to the right, formed line of battle on both 
sides of the ^Villiamsburg road, and advanced 
under a sharp fire from the enemy deployed in 
the woods in front of him. Aften a brisk inter- 
change of musketry fire while crossing the open 
ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the 
timber wiih the bayonet and put the enemy to 
flight. 

On the right the cnem}'' opened fire after half 
an hour's cessation, Avhich was promptly respond- 
ed to by Gen. Richardson's division. Again the 
most vigorous efibrts were made to break our 
line, and again tliey were frustrated by the steady 
courage, of our troops. In about an hour Gen. 
Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in 
their fire at close range, which threw the line of 



the enemy back ia some confusion. This was 
followed up hj a bayonet cliarge, led by Gen. 
French in person, with the .57th and CG'.h New 
York, supported by two regiments sent by Gen, 
Heintzohuan, the 71st and 73d New York, which 
turned the confusion of the enemy into precipi- 
tate flight. One gun captured the previous day 
was retaken. 

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines 
held by. them on the 31st, before the attack. On 
the battle field there were found many of our 
own and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais- 
sons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, 
abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state 
of the roads, and the impossibility of his manoeu- 
vring artillery, prevented further pursuit. 

On the next morning a reconnoissance was 
sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of 
the enemy to'w' ithin five miles of Richmond, but 
♦ again the impossibility of forcing even a few 
batteries forward, precluded our holding-perma- 
neutly this position. The lines held previous to 
. the battle were therefore resumed. 
, Gen. J. E. Johnston reports loss of the 
"♦ enemy in Lousfstreet's and G. W. Smith's. 

divisions at 4,283 

Gen. D. n. Hill, who had taken the ad- 
vance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500 



65 



6,783 



Which would give enemy's loss 
Our loss in Gen. Sumner's corps 1,223 
"' Gen.Heintzelman's corps 1,394 
" Gen. Keyes' corps 3,120 



Total .... 5,737 
Previous to the arrival of Gen. Sumner upon 
the field of battle on the 31st of May, Gen. Ileint- 
zel'man, the senior corps commander present, was 
in the immediate command of the forces engaged. 
The first information I received that the battle 
was in progress, was a dispa'tch from him 
stating that Casey's division had - given way. 
During the night of the 31st I received a dis- 
patch from him dated 8.45 p.m., in which he 
says : " I am just in — when I got to the front, the 
most of Gen. Casey's division had dispersed." * 
* * '•' The rout of , Gen. Casey's men had a 
most dispiriting effect on the troops as they 
came np. I saw no reason why wc should have 
been driven back." * 

■This official statement, together with other 
•accounts, received previous to my arrival upon 
the battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division 
had given way without making a proper resist- 
ance, caused me to state in a telegram to the 
Secretary of War on the let, that this division 
"gave way unaccountably and discreditably." 
Subsequent investigations, however, greatly mo- 
dified the impressions first received, and I accord- 
ingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a 
dispatch on the 5th of June. 

The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey 
and Neglee, show that a very considerable por- 
tion of this division fought well, and tliat 
the brigade of Gen. Naglee is entitled to credit 
for its gallantry. This division, among the regi- 
ments of which were eight of comparatively new 
troops, Wi9 attacked by superior numbers ; yet, 



according to the reports allocked to, it ''stood t' 
attack for three hours before it was reinforceo. 
A portion of the division was thrown into great 
confusion by the first onslaught of the enemy, 
but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colo-^ 
nel Cailey and others, who boldly went to the 
front and encouraged the rncn by their presence 
and example at this critical juncture, rallied a 
great part of the division, and thereby enabled 
it to act a prominent part in this severely con- 
tested battle. It therefore afiords me great satis- 
faction to withdraw the exi^ressiou contained in 
my first dispatch, and I cordially give my in- 
dorsement to the conclusion of the division com- 
mander, " that those parts of his commaKd which 
behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." 

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks com- 
menced, we had two of our lu'idges nearly com- 
pleted, but the rising waters floated the log-way 
approaches, and made them almost impassable, so 
that it was only by the greatest cfibrts that Gen. 
Sumner crossed his corps and participated; in 
that hard-fought engagement. The bridges be- 
came totally useless after this corps had passed, 
and others on a more permanent plan were com- 
menced. % 

On my way to head-quarters, after the battle of 
Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge wlier* 
Gen. Sumner had taken over his corps on the 
day previous. At the time Gen. Sumner crossed, 
this was the only available bridge above Bot- 
tom's Bridge. I found the approach from 'the 
right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the 
depth of several feet, and on reaching the place 
where the bridge had been, I found a great part 
of it carried away, so that I could not get my 
horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bot- 
tom's Bridge, six miles below, as the only prac- 
ticable crossing. 

The approaches to New and Mechanicsvill* 
bridges were also overflowed, and both of them 
were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, estab- 
lished upon commanding heights on the opposite 
side. These batteries were supported by strong 
forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits 
in their front, which would have made it neces- 
sary, even had the approaches been in the best 
possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary 
battle, with but little prospect of success, before 
a passage could have been secured 

The only available means, therefore, of uniting 
our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Bich- 
mond soon after the battle, was to march the 
troops from Mechanicsville and other points on 
the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bot- 
tom's Bridge, and theuce over the Williamsburg 
road to the position near Fair Oaks, a dis- 
tance of about twenty-threo miles. In the con- 
dition of the roads -at that time, this march ^ 
could not have been made with artillery in less 
than two days, by which time the enemy would 
have been secure within his entrenchments 
around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting 
the two wings of the army in time to make a vig- 
orous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of 
overtaking him before he reached Richmond, 
only five miles distant from the field of battle, is : 
simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for s ■ 



moment seriously ciitortainecl by pny one con- 
nected with t!ie army of tiif> Potoraiic. An ad- 
vance involvjp.u- tri'-.poparalion of tlic two wings 
by tiic' iinjiassabl.i Cliickahoinii'.y would have ox- 
posed eacii ti< dcRnt in detail, ^'i'herel'ore 1 held 
the position uh-f^ady gained, and completed our 
crossings as rapiilly as possible. 

In the nieai^tiTno the troops at Fair Oaks were 
directed to strBUgthen their positions by a strong 
line of intreiicliments, whicii protected them 
while the bridges were being built, gave security 
to the trains, liberated a large fighting force, and 
offered a sale retreat in the event of disaster. 

On the second of June 1 sent the following dis- 
patch : — 

• ^ Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
"^ New Bridge, June 2d, 1862, 10.30 a.m. 

Oar left is everywhere advanced considerably 
beyond the positions it occupied before the 
battle. 

I am in strong liopes tliat the Chickahominy 
will foil sufficiently to enable me to cross, the 
right. We have had a terrible time with our 
communications ; bridges and causeways built 
with great care, having baeu washed away with 
the freshet, leaving us almost cut oft' from com- 
munication. All that human labor can do is being 
done to accomplish our purpose. 

Please regard the portion of this relating to 
condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it 
wo lid be serious if the enemy were aware of it. 
I do not yet know our loss ; it has been very 
heavy on both sides, as tlie fighting was desper- 
ate; our victory complete. I expect still more 
fighting before we reach Richmond. 

G. B. MclJr.ELLAN. ^fajor.-Gen. 
lion. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
On the same day I received the following from 
the Secretary of War :— 

Washington, June 3, 18G2. 
Maj.-Ge'u, McC. — Your telegram has been re- 
ceived, and we are greatly rejoiced at your suc- 
cess, not only in itself, but because of the daunt- 
less spirit of the troops. You have received, of 
course, the order maie yesterday in respect to 
Fortress Monroe. Tlio object was to place at 
your command the disposable force of that de- 
partment. The indications are that Fremont or 
McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as kddh 
as ho is disposed of another large body of troo|)s 
will be at your service. The intelligence from 
Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and 
pursued in force from Corinth. All interest nnw 
centres in your operations, and full confid'jiice is 
entertained of your brilliant and glorious success. 
E. M. S., Sec. of War. 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 
On the 3rd 1 received the followuig from I'le 
President : 

Washington, June 3, lKr)2. 
Maj.-Gen. McC. : — With these continuous rains. 
I am very an.xious about the Chickahoniiiiy. so 
close in your rear and crossing your Ime uf (;(i:ii- 
munication. Ploase look well to it. 
* A. L., Presiih'iit, 

To which I replied as follows : — 
Headcpiartera, Army iif the Potomac. N'l-w 
Bridge, Juno 'M, 18(52. Your dispatch of .') )). in. 
just recoived. As the Chickahominy has beoi 



fi6 



almo.-^t the only obstacle in my way lor several 
days, your Excellency may be assured that it has 
been made, and will continue to be, to protect 
the communications across it. Nothing of im- 
[)ortance, except that it is again raining. ^ 
G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 

A. L., President, Washington. 

My views of the condition of our army on the 
4th are explained in the following dispatch to 
the President : — 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New 
Bridge, June 4th, 1862. — Terrible rain storm dur- 
ing' the night and morning ; not yet cleared off; 
Otiickahommy flooded ; bridges in bad condition, 
and still hard at work at them. I have taken 
every possible step to insure the security of th© 
corps on the right bank, but I cannot reinforce 
them from here until my bridges are all safe, as 
my force is too small to insure my right and 
rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, 
as they may probably attempt, I have to be 
very cautious now. Our Iohs in the late battle 
will probably exceed 5,000.^ I have not yet full 
returns. On account of the effect it might have 
on our own men and the enemy, I request that 
you will regard this information as confidential 
for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of 
the enemy was very considerably greater ; they 
were terribly punished. I mention these facta 
now merely to show you that the army of the 
Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's 
play is before it. ; 

You must make your calculations on the sup- 
position that I have been correct from the bo- 
ginning, in asserting that the serious opposition 
was to be made here. 

Geo. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

A. L., Pz'esident, Washington. 

And in the following to the Secretary of War on 
the same day : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New 
Bridge, Juno 4tJi, 1862. — Please inform me at 
once what reinforcements, if any, I can couut. 
upon having at Fortress j\Ionroe or White House 
within the nest three days, and when each regi- 
ment ma3'' be expected to arrive. It is of the 
utmost importance that I should know this imme- 
diately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 
1st will amount to 7,000. Regard this as confi- 
,leutial for the present. 

If I can have five new regiments for Fort Mon- 
rii.-' and its dependencies, I can draw three more 
'il i regiments from there safely. I can well 
''.;spo3e of V(>ur more raw regiments on my 
''•■mmunications. I can well disjiose of from 
.i'V-.Mi to twunly well-rhilU^d regiments among 
t'l.- uid brii;adi.'.s. in l)ringiMg them up to their 
i).i",!i<al effnaive strength, llecruits are espe- 
cially necessary for tluj rt-gnlir atid volunteer 
bilterics of artillery, as wi-ll aa for the regular 
aad volunteer rcg nienls of ini'artry. After the 
losses in our last lialch-., I trust that 1 will be no 
longer regarded :is an iihinuist. I lielievc wo 
liave at Icasl one ui'uv il-'.^;.. tite batilc to fight. 
Gho. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. 

Hon. K. M. S.. S-c. of W ir. 
\!.-;o my iisp.acli to the Secretary of War on 
t H- ."> I. : ' 

II > I l>piarler.s, Army of tho Pjtomac, New 



Bridge June 5, 18G2. — Ilained most of the iiiglit — 
has now ceased, but it is not clca^^. The river 
still very bigli and troublesome. Enemy opened 
with several batteries on our brigades near here 
this morning : our batteries seem to have pretty 
much silenced them, though some firing still 
kept up. The rain forces us to remain in statu 
quo. With great difficulty a division of infantry 
has been crossed this morning to support the 
troops on the other side should the enemy renew 
the attack. I fclt obliged to do this* although it 
leaves us rather weak liere. 

G. B. McO., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Hon. E. M. S. Sec. of War. 

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as fol- 
lows : — 

Washington. June 5, 1862, 8.30, p.m. 

Maj.-Gen. McC, — I will send you five new regi- 
ments as fast as transportation can take them : 
the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. 1 in- 
tend sending you part of McDowell's force as 
soon as it can return from its trip to Front Roj'al, 
probably as many as you want. The order to 
ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has 
already been given. I suppose that they may 
be sent directly to the Fort. Please advise mo of 
tliis as TO '. desire. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
'^ June, 7, 18G2, 4 40 p.m. 

Hon. E. M. S., — In repl^' to your dispatch of 
i p.m., to-day, I have the honor to state that the 
Chickahominy River has risen so as to flood the 
entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. 
I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, 
and the men are working night and day, up to 
their waists in water, to complete them. 

The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, 
entirelj' impassable for artillery or even cavalry, 
except directly in the narrow roads, which I'en- 
ders any general movement either of this or the 
rebel army utterly out of the question, until we 
have more favorable weather. 

I am glad to learn that you are pressing for- 
ward reinforcements so vigorously. I shall be 
in perfect reacWness to move forward- and take 
Riclunond the moment McCall reaches here, and 
the ground will admit tlie passage of artillery. I 
have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, 
driving off the rebel pickets, and securing a ver^' 
advantageous position. 

The rebels have several batteries established, 
commanding the debouches from two of our 
bridges, and fire upon our working parties con- 
tiinialh', but as yet they have killed but very few 
of our men. G. B. McC, ilaj.-General. 

As I did not think it probable that any more 
reinforcements would be sent to me in time for 
the advance on Richmond, I stated in the forego- 
ing dispatch that I should be ready to move 
when (Jen. McOall's Division joined me ; but 1 
did Dot intend to be understood by this, that no 
more reinforcements were wanted, as will be 
seen from the following dispatch : 

June 10. 1862. 8:J0 p.m. — 1 have again informa- 
tion that Beauregard has arrived, and that some 
of his troops are to follow him. No great re- 
liance, perhaps uc.ae whatever, can be attached to 



this; but it is possible, and ought to be their' 
policy. 

I am completely checked by the weather. Th© 
roads and fields are iiterally impassable for artil- 
lery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy 
is in a dreadful staLc ; we have another rain 
storm on our hands. 

I shall attack as 'soon as the weather and 
ground will permit ; but there will be a delay, 
the extent of which no one can forsce, for the 
season is altogether abnormal. ' 

In view of these circumstances, I present for 
your consideration the propriety of detaching 
largely from ilalleck's army to strengthen this j 
for it would seem that llalleck has now no large 
organized force in front of him, while we have. 

If this cannot be done, or even in connection 
with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a 
heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but 
the one can be done, it v.'ould better coniorm to 
military p)rincii)les to strengthen this army ; ana 
even although the reinforcements might not ax 
rive in season to take part in the attack U2)on 
Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and 
tljey would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior 
movements. 

I wish to be distinctly understood that whene- 
ver the wxather permits, I will attack with what- 
ever force I may have, although a larger force 
would enable me to gain much more decisive re- 
sults. 

I would be glad to liave ilcCall's infantry sent 
forward by water at once, without waiting for 
his artillery and cavalry. . ^ 

If Gen. Prim returns via Washington, please, 
converse with him as to the condition of affair* 
here. " G. B. AIcU., Major-Gen. 

lion. E. M. S., Sec.-of-War. 

Our work ui)on the bridges continued to b 
pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during 
which time it rained almost every day, and the 
exj)osure of the men caused nnich sickness. 

On the 11th the following vv'as received front 
the Secretary of War. 

Washington, June 11, 1862. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. !McC. — Your dispatch of three 
thirty (3.30) yesterday has been received. I am 
fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, 
and which no art nor skill can avoid, but only 
endure, and am striving to the uttermost to reu 
der 3'ou every aid in ti.e power of the Govern 
ment. 

Your suggestions will be immediately commu 
nicated to Gen- llalleck, with a request that he 
shall conform to ihein. At last advice he con 
tcmplated sending a column to operate with 
Mitchell against Chattanooga, and thence upon 
lOt.st Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and 
Tennessee to be in a critical condition demanding 
immediate attention. IlalleCk says the main 
body of Beauregard's force is witli him at Oka- 
lona. .McCall's force was roportcll 3'esterday as 
having embarked on its way to join you. It is 
intended to send the residue of McDowell's force 
also to join you a3 6])oedily as pos.-uble. Fjomont 
had a hard fight day before yesterday, wifli 
Jackson's force at Union Cliurch, eight miles 
from Harrisonburg. He clainis the victory, but 



was pretty badlj handled; it is clear that a 
strong force is operating with Jackson, for the 
purpose ot detaiinng the forces here from you. 
I am xirging as fast as possible the new levies. 

Be assured, general, that there never has been 
a moment when my desire has been otherwise 
than to aid you with my wlaole heart, mind and 
strength since the hour we first met ; and what- 
ever others may say for their own purposes, 
you have never bad and never can have any one 
more truly your friend, or more anxious t) sup- 
port, or more joyful than I shall be at the suc- 
cess, which I have no doubt, will soon be achiev- 
ed bv your arras. E, M. S., Sec. of War. 

On the 12th and 13th Gen. McCaU's divisioQ ar- 
rived. 

On the 13th of June tv.'o squadrons of the 5;h 
0. S. Cavalry, under the command of Capt. Roj'a 1, 
stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attack- 
ed and overpowered by a foi-ce of the enemy's 
cavalry, numbering about 15,000 men, Avith four 
guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but 
at somri distance from our main body, and, though 
pursued, very cleverly made the circuit of the 
army, repassing the Chiclcahominy at Long Bridge. 
• The burning of two schooners laden with forage 
and i'ourteen government wagons, the destruction 
of tome sutlers' stores, the killing of several cf 
the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, 
some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and 
a little eclat, were the precise results of this ex- 
pedition. 

On the 14th I sent the following to the Sec'y. 
of War-: — Headq's., Army of the Potomac, Camp 
Lincoln, June 14, 1862, midnight : ■ 

Ail quiet in every direction. The stampede of 
last night has passed away. Weather now very 
favorable. I hope twoda3'S more will make the 
ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as 
the bridges are completed^ and the ground fit for 
artillerj'- to move, at the same time I would be 
glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. 
J can use several new regiments to advantage. It 
fught to be distinctly understood that McDowell 
and his troops are completely under my control. 

I received a telegram from him requesting that 
McCall's division might be placed so as to join 
Uim immediately on his arrival. 

That request does not breathe the proper spirit ; 
■whatever troops come to me must be disposed of 
80 as to do the most good. I do not feel that in 
such circurastaTices as those in which I am now 
placed. Gen. McD. should wi3h the general inter- 
ests to be sacrificed for the jDurpose of increasing 
his command. 

If I cannot fully control all liis troops, I want 
none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle 
Willi what I have, and let others be responsible 
for the results. % 

The department lines should not be allowed to 
interfere with me,. but Gen. McD. and all his troops 
Bcnt to me, should be placed completely at niy 
disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no 
other way can they bo of assistance to me. I 
therefore request that I may have entire and full 
control. The stake at issue is too great to allow 
personal considerations to be entertained. You 
know that I have none. Tho indications are, from 



«8 



our balloon reconnoissances, and from all other 
sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in- 
creasing in numbers, and determined to fight des- 
perately, G. B. MoC, Maj.-Geu. Com'g. 
Hun. E. M. S., Secy, of War. 

On the 20th, the following was communicated 
to the President : — Ildq's. Army of the Potomac,. 
Camp Lincoln, June 20, 18G2, 2 p. m. : 

Your Excellency's dispatch of (11) a. m. receiv- 
ed, also that f)f Gen. Sigel. 

1 have no doubt that Jackson has been rein- 
forced from here. There is reason to believe that 
Gen. Pi. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army, 
with a brigade or, division from Charleston. 
Troo})S have arrived recently from Goldsboro. 
There is not the slightest reason to suppose that 
the enemy intends evacuating Eichmond ; he is 
daily increasing his defenses. I find him every 
where in force, and every reconnoissance cost 
many valuable lives. Yet I am obliged to feel 
my Vv'ay foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great 
are t'ne difficulties of the country. By to-morrow 
night the defensive works covering our position 
on this side of the Chickahomiuy should be com- 
pleted. I am forced to this by my inferiority of 
numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible 
numbers into action-, and secure the army against 
die consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would 
be glad to have permission to lay before your 
Excellency by letter or telegraph, my views as to 
the present state of milittiry affairs throughout 
the Avhole country. In the meantime I would b« 
pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers 
and position, of the troops not under my com- 
mand, in Virginia and elsewhere. 
His Ex'y. A. L., Pres't. G. B. McC, M.-G. Com'g. 

To which I received this rej^ly : 

Washington, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. ]\lcC. — ^Your dispatch of yester- 
day, two p. M., was received this morning. If it 
would not divert too much of your time and at- 
tention from the army under yom* immediate com- 
mand, I would be glad to have your views as to 
the present state of military afi'airs throughout 
the whole country, as you say you would be glad 
to give them. I would rather it should be bj 
letter than by telegraph, because of the better 
chance of secresy. As to the numbers and posi- 
tions of the troops not under your command in 
Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with 
accuracy, >vliich I cannot, I would rather not 
transmit cither by telegraph or letter, because of 
the chances of its reaching the enem3\ I would 
be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot 
leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here. ^ 

' A. L., Presidentc 

To which I sent the following reply : 

Camp Lincoln, June 22, 1 p. m. — I have tho hon- 
or to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram 
of 8 p. M, yesterday. 

Under the circumstances as stated in your dis- 
patch, I perceive that it will be better, at least, 
to defer, for the present, the communication I do- 
siied to make. G. B, McC.,Maj.-Gcn. Com'g. 
His Excellency, the President. ^ 

All the inlormation I could obtain, ])reviou3 to 
the 24th of June, regarding tlio movements of 
Gen. Jackson, led to tlie behef that h© was at 



69 



Godoiisvillc, whera Iua was receiving reinforce- 
ments from ILicIunond. vin. Lynchburg ;inil Staun- 
ton ; but what his purposos were did not appear 
until the date spocilled, when a young man, very 
intelligent, but of susjucious appearance, was 
brouglit ill by our scouts from the direction of 
Hanover Court House. He at lirst stated that he 
was an escaped prisoner from t'ol. ICenly's Mary- 
land regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally 
confessed himself to be a deserter from Jacksons 
command, which ho left near Gordonsville on the 
21st. Jackson's troops were then, as he ftaid, 
moviiig to Fredcrickshall. along t!ie Virginia Cen- 
tral Railroa<l, for the purpose of attacking my 
vear on the '28th. I iininediately rtfspatchcd two 
trusty negroes to proceed along tlie raihoad. and 
ascertain the truth i.f ijio vstatement. They were 
unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court 
House, where tltey encountered the eneniy's picl:- 
cts. and wero forced to turn back without obtain- 
ing the desiroil hif'ormation. On that day I sent 
the followiiig dispatch : 

JIca<lquarters Army of the Potomac, June 2-i, 
12 V. .v., 1S62.— -A very peculiar case of desertion 
has JHst occurred from the enemy. The party 
states he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewell, fifteen 
brigades, at Gordonsville, on the 21st ; that they 
were moving to Fredcrickshall, and that it was 
intended to attack my rear on the 28th. T would 
be glad to learn, at your eai'liest convenience, the 
most exact information you have as to the posi- 
tion and movenie'.its of Jackson, as well as the 
sources fi-om which yoiu* information is derived, 
that I may the better compare it with what 1 have. 

(I. PJ, McC, Maj.-Gen. 
Hon. Vj. .^^. ?., Secretary of War. «». 

The following is his reply : '*^ 

Washington, June 25, '2.3'\' 

Maj.-Gen. McC. — We have uo definite iuforma- 
tfon as to the number's or position of Jackson's 
force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's 
statement that Jackson's force was, nine daj's 
ago, forty tlioiisand men. Some reports place ten 
thousand rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville ; 
others that his foi'ce is at Port Republic, Harrison- 
burg and Luray, Fremont yesterday reported 
rumors that Wostonr Virginia was threatened, 
«nd G Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New 
Creek, where Fremont had liis depots. The last 
telegram fioni Fremont contradicts this rumor. 
The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's 
pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The 
people decUue to give any information of h.is 
whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evi- 
dence is strong that for some purpose tho enemy 
is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in va- 
rious directions, with a view to concerd the real 
point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at 
ihinassas, nor Banks and Frcmoni, who are at 
Middletown, appear to have any accurate know- 
ledge of tho subject. A letter transmitted to the 
department yesterday, purporting to bo dated 
Gordonsvillo, on the litli inst., stated that the 
actual attack was designed for VV'ashington and 
Baltimore, as somi as you attacked Richmond; 
but that, tho rej>ort was to be circulated that 
Jackson lv**» gone to liidunoud, in order to mis- 
lead. This .^eUer looked very much like ^ blind. 



and induces me to suspect that Jackson's reism 
movement now is toward Richmond. It carao 
from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, lik) 
the numerous ruraora put afloat, to mislead. J 
thiidv, therefore, that while tho warning of the 
deserter to yciU may also bo a blind, that it could 
not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you 
;'.!;y further iuformati'-u on this subject that may 
bo received here. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 

On the 25th, our biidgea and intrenchmcnfa 
being at last completed, an advance of our picket 
line on the left was (ordered, preparatory to a 
general forward movement. -^ 

Immediately in front of tlie most advanced 
redoubt on tho Williamsburg road was a large 
open field ; beyond that a swampy belt of thnber 
live hundred y«,rds wide, which had been dis 
puted ground for many days. Fvu-therin advanca 
was an open field crossed by the Willamsburg 
road and the raihoad, and commanded by » 
rcd.oubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. It was 
decided to push our lines to the other side of 
these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain 
the nature of the ground, and to place Generala 
Heinfzelman and Sumner in position to support 
the attack intended to be made on the old Tavern 
on the 26th or 27t1i by Gen. Fi'anklin, by assauI^ 
ing that position in the rear. 

Between S and 9 o'clock on tlie morning of tho 
25tli the advance was begun by Gen. lleintzcl- 
man's corps. Tlie enemy werS found to be In 
strong force along the line, and contested thp 
advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object 
was accomplished. The' troops engaged in thia 
aliair were the whole of Ileintzelman's corps, 
1 'aimer's brigade of Couch's division of Kcycs's 
corps, and a part of Richardson's division of 
Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to tho 
report of Gen. Heintzelman. 

Tiie casualties, (not including those in Palmer's 
brigade, wiiich have not been reported,) were as 
follows : — Officers killed I, wounded 14, missing 
1 : Enlisted men killed 50, wounded SS?, missing 
63 : Total 516. 

The following telegrams were Bent to tho Se- 
cretary of War during the day from the field of 
operations : 

Redoubt, No. 3. June 25, 1862, 1.30 p.m. 

Hon. E. M. S., — We have advanced our pickets 

on the left considerably, under sharp resistanc-. 

Our men behaved v6ry handsomely. Some firing 

still continues. G. B. McC, ^Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862, 3.15 p.m. 

Jlon. B. M. S., Sec of War, — The enemy are 
making a desperate rcsistango to tho advarut of 
our picket lines. Kearney's and 0:5^ half of 
Hooker's arc where Ijjwaiit tbcm. 

I have this moment re-inforced Hookers right 
with a brigade and .a couple of guns, and hope in 
a few minutes to finish the woik intended for 
the day. Our uien are behaving splendidly. VhQ 
encm.y arc ng'iling v.'cll alsn. 

Thia is not a battle, mondy an affair .-f Heint- 
zchnaii's corps, supported by Kcye's,and thus far 
all goes well. We ln'M every fcot wo have 
gained. If wa succeed in wha: we have under- 
taken, it will be a very inijiortant advanta'go 
gained. Loss not large thus far. The lighting 



up to this time has been done by Gen. Ilooker'ff 
division, wliicli has beuaved as iisiuil, tliat ifc 
most splendidly. 

On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's 
batteries in his front. 

G. 15. McC, Maj.-Gcn, Comd'g. 
R,edoubt No. 3, June 2.t, ]S('>2, 5 p.m. 
Hon. E. M. a.. Sec. of War, — The alilriir is over, 
and we have gained our point fully, and witli biit 
little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. 
Oiu' men have done all tliat could bo desired. 
The aftair was partly decided by two guns that 
Capt. J)e Jlussy brought gallantly into action 
under very diflicult circumstances. The enemy 
was driven fiom the camp in front of this place, 
aud is now quiet. G. B. McC, Maj.Gen. Cora'g. 

Also, on the same day, the following : 
.^Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, Camp 
Lincoln. June 2"), 1862, 6.15 p.m. — I have just 
returned from the field, and found your dispatch 
in regard to Jackson. 

Several contrabands just in, give information 
xjonfirming supposition that Jackson's advance is 
at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beai:- 
xegard arrived, with strong reinforcements, in 
Richmond yesterday. 

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my 
right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200.- 
000, including Jackson and Beauregard. 1 shall 
liave to contenci against vastl}' superior odds if 
these reports be true. But this army will do all 
in the power of men, to hold their position and 
repulse any attack. » 

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but 
feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I 
liave nqt failed to represent, repeatedl}^ the ne- 
cessity of reinforcements, that this was the deci- 
Bive pohit, and that all the available means of the 
government, should be concentrated here. I will 
do all that a General can do, with the splendid 
army that I have the honor to command, and if it 
is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at 
least die with it, and sliare its fate. 

But if the result of the action, which will pro- 
bably occur to-raorrov/, or within a short time, is 
a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown 
on my shoulders, it must rest whei-e it belongs. 
Since I commenced this, I have received addi- 
tional intelligence confirnu'ng the supposition in 
regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's 
arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-worrow, 
and now go on the other side of the Chiekahoni'- 
ny, to arrange for the defence of that side. I feel 
that there is no use in my again afiking for rein- 
forcements. G. B. JlcC, Maj.-General. 
E. M. S.. See. of war. ^' 

NUMBERS OP THE ENEMY. 
The report of the Chief of the " Secret Service 
Corps," herewith forwarded, and dated 2(U]\ 
June, shows the estimated strength of the ent-my, 
at the tixe of the ev;icuationo[ Yorktown, to have 
been from 1(10.000 to 120,000. 'i'hc same report 
pats hip numbcjs on the 2()i:h of June, at about 
180,000, and th•^ r.pc^cilic iuiormation ohtained re- 
garding theii oi'ganization, warrants the belief, 
tJKit tliis estimate did uot cxc(M;d his actual 
«treiigth. 

It will be observed that the evidence contain- 



70 



ed in the report, shows the following organiza- 
tions, viz. : — two hundred regiments of infantry 
and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and 
Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of inde- 
pendent troops ; five battalions of artillery ; 
twelve companies o infantry and indejiendent 
cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery ; 
amounting in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. 
There were, inidoubtedly, many others whose de- 
signations we did not learn. The report also 
shows that numerous and heavy earth-works had 
been completed for the defenge of Richmond, 
and, tnat in thirty-six of these, were mounted 
some two huudred guns. 

THE SEVEN DAYS. 

On the 26th. the day upon which I had decided 
as the time for our final advance, the enemy 
attacked oiir right in strong force, and turned 
my attention to the protection of our communica- 
tions and depots of supi)ly. 

The event was a bitter confirmation of the 
military judgment, which had been reiterated to 
my superiors from the inception, and through the 
progress of the Peninsular campaign. 

I notified the Secretary of war in the folllowing 
dispatch : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp 
Tjncoln, June 26, 1862, 12 m. — 1 have just heard 
that our cavalry pickets, on the left Bank of the 
Chickahominy, are being driven in; it is, x)roba- 
bly, Jackson's advanced guard. L this be true,. 
you ina}'' not hear from me for some days, as my 
communications will probably be cut off. The 
case is, perhaps, a difiicult one, but I shall resort 
to desperate meaisiu'es, and Avill do my best to 
out-manoeuvre, outwit, and out-fight the enemy. 
Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be 
discouraged, if you learn that my communications 
are cut ofiv and even Yorktown ,iu possession of 
the enemy. Hope for the best, and I Avill not 
deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. 
G. B. McC, Maj.-General. 

E. .M. S., Secretary of Wai*. 

Headquarters, Army oi the Potomac, Camp 
Lincoln, June 26, 1862. 2.30 p.m. — Your dis- 
patch and that of President received. Jackson 
is driving in my pickets, &.C., on other side of 
the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where 
reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to 
predict result of approaching battle. It will 
probably be better that they should go to Fort 
Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs 
when they arrive. 

It is not probable that I can maintain telegra- 
phic communication more than an hour or two 
longer. G. B. ]\[cC, Major-General. 

lion. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 

On the same day I received the following dis- 
patch from the Secretary of War : 

Washington, June 25, 1862, 11.20 p.m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. MoC— Your telegram of 6.1 u 
has just been received. The civcnm.stances that 
have hitherto rendered it impossible for the gov- 
einment to send you any more reinforcements 
than has been, done, have bee:: so distinctly 
stated to you, by the President, that it is need- 
less tor me to repeat them. 

Every cfibrt has been made l)y the President 



and myself to strengthen yon. King's division 
has reached Falmouth. Shield's division and 
Rickett's division are at Manassas. The Presi- 
dent designs to send a part of that force to aid 
you as speedily as it can be done. 

E. M. S., Sec'y. ofWar. 
Washington, June 26, 1862, 6 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. : — ^Arrangements are being 
made rapidly as possible to send 5,000 men, as 
fast as they can be brought from Manassas to 
Alexandria, and embarked, which can be done 
sooner than to wait for transportation at Frede- 
ricksburg. They will be followed by more, if 
needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force 
will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and 
will operate promptly in your aid by land. No- 
thing will be spared to sustain you, and I have 
undoubting faith in your success. Keep me ad- 
vised fully of your condition. 

E. M. S., Sec'y of War. 

But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in 
tliese communications came to the army of the 
Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar 
after the seven days. In anticipation of a sjieedy 
advance on Richmond, to pro\nde for the contin- 
gency of our communications with the depot at 
the White House being severed by the enemy, 
and at the same time to be prepared for a change 
of the base of our operations to James River, if 
circumstances should render it advisable, I had 
made arrangements more than a week previous 
(un the 18th) to have transports with suppKes 
of provisions and forage, under a convoj^ o gun- 
boats, sent up James River. They reached Har- 
rison's Landing in time to be available tor the 
army on its arrival at this point. Events soon 
proved this change of base to be, though most 
hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. 

In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps 
on the 19th of June, Gen. Reynolds and Gen. Sey- 
'mour's brigades, of Gen. McCall's division (Penn- 
sylvania Reserves) ,were moved from Gaines's Farm 
to a position on the Beaver Dam. Creek; Gen. 
Meade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's 
Farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown 
forward to the heights overlooking Alechanics- 
ville, a line of pickets extended along the Chicka- 
hominy River, between the Mechanicsville and 
M.eadow Bridges. 

As has already been stated, I received, while 
engaged on the 25th, in directing the operations of 
Ileintzelman's corps, information which strength- 
ened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing 
with a large force upon our right and rear. On 
this day, Gen. Casey, at the White House, was in- 
structed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and 
defensive works were ordered at Timstall's Sta- 
tion. Early on the 25th, Gen. Porter was in- 
structed to send out reconnoitering parties to- 
wards Hanover Court House to discover tlie 
position and force of the enemy, and to destroy 
the bridges on the Tolopotamy as far as possible. 

Up to tlie 26th of Juiie, the operations against 
Richmond had been conducted along the roads 
leading to it from the east and north-east. The 
reasons which compelled the choice of this line of 
approach and our continuance upon it have bevn 
iillinlod to above. 



71 



The saperiority of the James River route, as a 
lino of attack and supply, is too obvious to need 
exposition. My own opinion on that subject had 
been early given, and need not be repeated here. 
The dissipation of all hope of co-operation by land 
of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied 
in the defense of Washington, their inability to 
hold or deleat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity 
to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and 
to the long line of supplies from the White Ilouge 
to the Chickahojniny, and forced an immediate 
change of base across the Peninsula. To that 
end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy 
of the army was bent. Sucli a base, in the pre- 
sence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most 
difficult undertakings in war, but I was confident 
in the valor and discipline of my brave army, and 
knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat 
or advance, and to fight the scries of battles now 
inevitable, whether retreating Irom victories, or 
marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had no 
doubt whatever of its ability, even against supe- 
rior numbers, to fight its way through to the 
James, and get a po&ition whence a successful ad- 
vance upon Richmond would be again possible. 
Their superb conduct through the next seven 
days justified my faith. 

On the same day (26th), Gen. Van. Vliet, chief 
quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my 
orders telegraphed to Col. Ingalls, quartermaster 
at the White House, as follows : " Run the cars 
to the last moment, and load them with provisions 
and ammunition. Load every Avagou you liava 
with subsistence, and- send them to Savage Sta- 
tion by way of Bottom's^ Bridge. If you are 
obliged to abandon AVhite House, burn everything 
that you cannot get off. You must throw all our 
supplies up the James River as soon as possible, 
and accompany them yourself with all your force. 
It will bo of vast importance to establish our de- 
pots on James River without delay, if we abandon 
White House. I will keep you advised of every 
movement so long as the wires work ; after that, 
you must exercise your own judgment." 

All these commands were obeyed. So excellent 
were the dispositions of the different officers in 
command of the troops, dcjiots and gun-boats, 
and so timely the warnmg of the approach of the 
enemy, that almost everything was saved, and 
but a small amount of stores destroyed, to pre- 
vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 

Gen. Stoncmau's communications with t'tie main 
army being cnt off, he fell back ui)on the White 
House, and thence to Yorktown when the White 
House was evacuated. 

On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps 
commanders on the right bank of the Chickaho- 
miny to be prepared to send as many troops as 
they could spare on the following day to the left 
bank of the river, as will be seen from the ap- 
pended telegrams. Gen. i'ftinklin received in- 
structions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readi- 
ness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing 
should at tliat time be hcartl in the direction of 
Gen. Porter, to move it at once to his assistance 
without further orders. 

BEAVER DAiM CREEK. 

Ai noof,. o:: t'l.t- '.!(>(•!. tlie r.Mpvtvc! ■>. ihv.- one- 



my, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was 
diecovcred bj the advanced pioketsat that pohit, 
and at 12:30 r. m. they were attacked and driven 
in. All the pickets were now called in, and the 
regiment and batterj at Mechanic«Tiil» with- 
dravrn. 

Meade's brigade •vras- ordered up M a reserve 
in rear of the line, and shortly after Murtindale's 
and Grifilu's brigades, of Morell's division, were 
moved forward and deployed on the right of 
IfcCaU's division, towards Shady Grove Church, 
to coTer that flank. Neither of thesd three brig- 
ades, lio w«ver, were warmly engaged, though two 
of Griflin's regiments relieved a portion of Rey- 
si£)Ids'8 line just at the close of the action. 

The position of .our troops was a strong one, 
•itending along the left bank of Beaver Dam 
Creek, the left resting on the Ghickahominy, and 
the right in thick woods bej'ond the upper road 
from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower 
or river road crossed tiie creek at Ellison's Mills. 
Seymour's brigade held the left of the line, from 
the Cliickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in 
woods and partly in cleared ground, and Reynolds 
the right, ])riricipally in the woods and covering 
th» upper road. Tlie artillery occupied positions 
•ommanding the roads and4;ho open ground across 
tlis creek. 

Timber had bcenMlfcd, rifle-pits" dug, and the 
positioti generally prepared with a care that 
l^reatly contributed to the success of the day. 
The passage of fho creek was difllcult along our 
whole front, and impracticable for artillery, ex- 
cept by tlm two roads, where the 'main efforts of 
tlie enemy were directed. 

At 3 p. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly 
advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our 
whole lino, making at the same time a determined 
attempt to force the passage of the upper road, 
which was successfully resisted by Gen. Rey- 
nolds. After a severe struggle ho was forced to 
retire, with very heavy loss. 

A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmish- 
ing, was nraintained along the whole front, while 
the enemy massed his troops for another effort at 
the lower road, about two hours later, which was 
likewise repulsed by Gen. Seymour, with heavy 
slaughter. The firing ceased and the enemy re- 
tired about 9 p. M., the action liaving lasted six 
hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, 
if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on this 
day; tho portion of the enemy encountered were 
chiefly from the troops on the right bank of tho 
river, who crossed near ileadow Bridge and at 
Mechanicsville. The infonnation in my posses- 
sion eoon after the close of this action convinced 
»;mo that Jackson was really approaching in large 
force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, al- 
though so successfully defended, had its right 
flank too much in the air, and was too far from 
the main body (o make it advisable to retain iti 
longer. I therefore determined tj send the heavy 
guns at Ilogan's and Gaines's houses over the 
Cliickahominy during tho night, with as many of 
the wagons of tho SlIi Corps as possildo, and to 
•withdraw the corps itself to a position stretch- 
ing around tho bridges, where it;? flanks would be 
reaaoT^ably socnr.'*, and it would be within sup- 



porting diskmce of the main army. General 
Porter carried out my ordcr.s to that effect. It 
was not advisable at that time, even had it been 
practicable, to withdraw the 5th (V>rps to tho 
right batdc of tho Chickahonuny, Such a move- 
ment wonld have exposed the rear of the army, 
placed us between two fires, and enablcxl Jack- 
son's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to 
James River by crossing the Cliickahominy in the 
vicinity of Jones Bridge before we couid reach 
Malvern Hill with our traiuB. I determined, then 
toresist Jackson witli ^he 5th Corps, reinforced 
by all our disposable troops, in the new position 
near the brigade heads, in order to cover the 
withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to 
give time for the arrangements to secure the 
adoption of the James River, as our line of sup- 
plies in lieu of the Panumkey. The greater part 
of tlie heavy guns and wagons having been re- 
moved to tlie right bank of the Cliickahominy, 
the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops, 
from Beaver Darn Creek was commenced shortly 
before daylight, and successfully executed. 

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to 
leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered 
the rear with the horse batteries of Captains 
Robertson and Tidball ; but the withdrawal .was 
so skillful and so gradual, and the repulse of tho 
preceding day so complete, that although the 
enemy followed the retreat closely, and some 
skirmishing occurred, ho did not appear in front 
of the new line in force till about noon of the 
.2Tth, when we were prepared to receive him. 
; About this time Gen. Porter, believing tliat 
Gen. Stoneman would be cutoff from him, sent 
him orders to fall back on the White House, and 
afterwards rejoin the army as best he could. 
GAINES^S MILL. 
On the morning of the 27th of June, during the 
withdrawal of his troops to Mechanicsville to the 
selected position already mentioned, Gen. Porter 
telegraphed as follows ; 

" I hope to do without aid, though I request 
that Fianklin or some other command be held 
ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close 
that I expect to be hard pressed in fi.ont. I hope 
to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. 
This is a delicate movement, but relying on the 
good qualities of the commanders of divisions 
and brigades, I expect to get back alid hold the 
new line. 

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was 
followed. 

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during 
the entire night to remove the heavy guns and 
wagons, some of the siege guns were still in po- 
sition at Gaines's House after sunrise, and were 
finally hauled oif by hand. The new position of 
the 5lh Corps was about an arc of a circle, cov- 
ering the approaches to tlie bridges which con- 
nected our right wing Avith tho troops on the op- 
posite side of the river. 

Morell's division held the left lir.e. in a strip of 
woods on the left bank oi the Ganes's Mill 
stream, resting its left Hank on the descent tothd 
Cliickahominy, which was swept by our artiliery 
on both sides of tho river, and extending into 
open ground on the riglU towards New Coal 



Harbor. In this line Gen. Rulterfield's brigade 
held tlic extreme left, Gen. AEartindale's jou^ed 
hia right, and Gen. Gril'nu stiil further to the 
right, joined the left of Gen. Sykea' division, 
which, parti J in woods and partly in open 
ground , extended in rear of Coal Harbor. 

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own 
regiments ; McCall's division, having been engaged 
•n tJie day befoii3, was formed in a second lino in 
rear of the first ; ilcade's brigade on the left, near 
the Ghickaliomin}'- ; Reynolds' brigade on the right, 
corering the approaches from Goal Harbor and 
Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Sey- 
mour's in reserve to the second line still further 
in rear. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, with tive companies 
of the 5th Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the 
1st Regidar Cavalry, and three squadrons of the 
1st Pennsylvania Cavalry (lancers), were posted 
behind a hill in rear of the position, and near the 
Cliickahominy, to aid in watching tlio left flank 
and defending the slope to the river. 

The troops were all in position by noon, with 
the artillery on the commanding grounil, and in 
tlie intervals- between the divisions and brigades. 
Besides the division batteries, there were Robert- 
son's and Tidball's horse batteries from the artil- 
. lery reserve; the latter posted on the right of 
Sykos' division, and the former on the extreme 
left of the line, in tho valley of the Chickahominy. 

Shortly after noon tho enemy were discovered 
upproaching in force, and it soon became evident 
that the entire position was to be attacked. His 
ikirmishcrs advanced rapidly, and soon the fire 
becamo heavy along our whole front. At 2 p.m. 
Gen. Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's 
divison of the 6 th corps was ordered to cross to 
the left bank of the river by AleAnder's Bridge, 
and proceed to his support. . 

■General Porter's first call for reinforcements, 
through Gen. Barnard, did not reach me, nor his 
demand for more axes through the same officer. 
By 3 P.M. the engagement had become so severe, 
and tho enemy were so greatly superior in num- 
bers, that the entire second line and reserves Iiad 
been moved forward to sustain the first line against 
repeated and desperate assaults along the whole 
front. At 3.30 Slocum's division reached the field, 
and was immediately brough't into action at the 
weak points of our line. On tho left the contest 
was for the strip of woods running almost at right 
angles to tho Chickahominy in front of Adam's 
House, or between that and Gaines's House. The 
enemy several times charged up to this wood, but 
were each, time driven back with heavy loss. The 
regulars otSykes' division on the right also re- 
pulsed several strong attacks. But bur own loss, 
under tho tremendous fire of such greatly supe- 
rior nimiberp, was very severe, and the troops, 
most of whom had been un^er arms more than 
two days^wero rapidly becoming exLauated by 
the masses of fresh men constantly brought against 
thern. When Gen. Slocum's division arrived on 
the ground, it increased Gen. Porter's force to 
some 35,000, who were, inobably," contending 
against about 70,000 of the enemy. Tho line was 
severely pressed in several points, and, as its be- 
ing pierced at any one would have been fatal, it 
wda unavoidable for Gen. Porter, who was required 



73 



to hold Ilia position until night, to divide Siocum'a 
division, and send parts of it, even single regi- 
ments, to the points most threatened. About ^5 
P.M., Gen. Porter having reported his position |a» 
critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Rich- 
ardson's division (2d corps), were ordered to crosa 
to his support. The enemy attacked again, in 
great force, at 6 p.m., but failed to break our lines, 
tixough our loss was very heavy. About 7 p.m. 
they threw fresh troops against Gen. Porter with 
still greater fury, and finally gained the woodp 
held by our loft. This reverse, aided by the con- 
fusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by 
five companies of the 5th Cavalry, and followed, 
as it was, by more determined assaults on the re- 
mainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a gen- 
eral retreat from our position, to the hill in rear, 
overlooking tho bridge. French's and ->Ieagher'a 
brigades now appeared, driving before them the 
stragglers, who were thronging toward the bridge. 

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, 
and by their example, as well as by the steadi- 
ness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops, 
and warned the enemy that reinforcements had 
arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy already 
repulsed several times, with terrible slaughter, 
and hearing -the shouts of the fresh troops, failed 
to follow up their advantage. This gave iin op- 
portunity to rally our men behind the brigades 
of Gen. French and Meagher, and they again 
marched up the^ hill, ready to repulse another 
attack. During the night our thinned and ex- 
hausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, 
and by the following morning all had reached tho 
other side of the stream. The regular infantry 
formed the rear guard, and about 6 o clock, on 
tho morning of the 28th, crossed the river, de- 
stroying the bridge behind them. 

Our loss in this battle, in killed, wounded and 
missing, was very heavy, especially in officers, 
many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken 
prisoners, while gallantly leading on their men, or 
rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impos- 
sible to arrive at the exact numbers loat in this 
desperate engagement, owing to the series of 
battles which followed each other in quick suc- 
cession, and in which the whole army was en- 
gaged. No general returns were made, until 
after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, when 
the losses for the whole seven days were esti- 
mated together. 

Although we were finally forced from our first 
line, after the enemy had been repeatedly driven 
back, yet the objegls sought lor had been attain- 
ed. The enemy was held at bay, our siegc-guna 
and material were saved, and the right wing had 
now joined the main body of the army. 

The number of guns captured by the enemy at 
this battle was 22. Three of which were lost by 
being run off the bridge duriTig the final with- 
drawal. 

Great credit is due for the efficiency and brav- 
ery with which this arm of the service (the artil- 
lery) was fought, and it was not until tlie last 
successful charge of tho enem}-, that the can- 
noneers were driven from their pieces, or struck 
down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Kni- 
eriem's, and Grimmis's batteries, took position 



'during the engagement in the front of General 
Smith's line on the right bank of tlic stream, and 
v/ilh a battery of siege-guns, served by the First 
Connecticut Artillery', helped to drive back the 
encm}' in front of Gen. Porter. 

So threatening were tlie movements of the 
enemy, on both banks of the Chickahominy, that 
it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, 
where the real attack would be made. Large 
forces of infantry were seen during the day, near 
the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threaten- 
ing demonstrations were frequently made along 
the entire line, on this side of the river, which 
rendered it necessary to hold a considerable 
force in position to meet them. 

On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps 
comn:aiulers on the right bank of the river, ask- 
ing them how many of their troops could be 
spared to reinforce Gen. Porter, after retaining 
sufficient to hold their ijositions for twenty-four 
hours. 

To this the folloAving replies were received : 
Ileadq's. 3d Corps, June 26, 4 p. m. 
Gen. Pl. B. Marcy : — I think I can hold the in- 
trcrichracnts with four brigades for twenty-four 
hours. That would leave two brigades dispos- 
able for service on the other side of the river ; 
but the men are so tired and worn out, that I 
fear they would not be in a condition to fight 
after making a march of any distance. . . . 

S. P. Heintzelman, Brig.-Gen. 
Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th 
and 26th had indicated that the enemy. was in 
large force in front of Gen's. Hooker and Kear- 
ney, and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, 
Hill and Huger),and Gen. Heintzelman expressed 
the opinion on the night of the 25th that he 
could not hold his advanced position without rc- 
uiforcemcnts. 

Gen. Kcyes telegraphed : 

" As to how many men will be able to hold this 
j)osition for 21 hours, I must answer, all I have, if 
the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having 
at all times appeared to me that our forces on 
this flank are small enough." 

On the morning of the 27th, the following dis- 
I)atch was set to Gen. Sumner : 
lloadq^s. Army of the Potomac, June 27, 8.45 a.m. 
Gen. E. V. Sumnei- : — Gen. Smith just reports 
that "six or eight regiments have moved down 
to the woods in front of Gen. Sumner." 

P. 13. I\[ARcy, Chief-of-Staff. 
At 11 o'clock A.M., Gen. Sumner telegraphed as 
follows : — " The enemy threatens an attack on my 
riglit, near Smith." A t 1 2.30 p.m. he telegraphed : 
"Sharp shelling on both sides." At 2.45p.m.: 
" Sharp miiskctr}^ firing in front of Burns. We 
are replying with artiHery and infantry. The 
man on the look-out reports some troops drawn 
Uj) in line of battle aiiout opposite my right and 
Smitii's left ; the number cannot be made out." 

In accordance wifi orders given on the night 
of the 2Gth, Gen. S. ocum's division commenced 
crossing the river to support Gen. Porter, soon 
after daybreak on the morning of the 27th ; but, 
as the firing in front of Gen. Porter ceased, the 
Hi'ivemcnt was suspended. At 2 p.m. Gen. Porter 
tailed for reinforcements. I ordered them at 
yuce. and at 3.25 p.m. sent him the following : 



74 



" Slocum is now crossing at Alexander's Bridge 
with his whole command. Enemy has com- 
menced an infantry attack on Smith's left. I have 
ordered down Sunmer's and Heintzelman's re- 
serves, and you can count on the whole of Slo- 
cum's. Go on as you have begun." 

During the day the following dispatches were 
received; Nvhich will show the co'ndition of afiairs 
on the right bank of the Chickahominy : 

June 27, 1862. 
To Col. A. V. Colburn, Ass't.-Adj.-Gen. : 

Gen. Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy 
columns to the right of James Garnett's House, 
and on the other side of the river opposite it. 
Three regiments are reported to be moving from 
Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are 
very good — made by Smith. 

W. B. Franklin, Brig.-Gen. 
Afterwards he telegraphed : " The enemy haa 
begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I 
know no details." 

Afterwards the following : " The enemy has 
opened'on Smith from a battery of three pieces, 
to the right of the White House. Our shells are 
bursting Avell, and Smith tliinks Sumner will soon 
have a cross fire upon them that will silence • 
them." 

Afterwards, at 5.50 p.m., the following was sent 
to Gen. Keyes : "Please send one brigade of 
Couch's division to these headquarters Avithout a 
moment's delaj'. A staff officer will be here to 
direct the brigade where to go." 

Subsequently the following was sent to Gens. 
Sumner and Franklin : 

" Is there anjjf sign of the enemy being in force 
in 3'our front ? Can you spare any more force to 
be sent to Gen. Porter ? . Answer at once." 

At 5.15 P.M. the following w^as received from 
Gen. Franklin : 

" I do not think it prudent to take any more 
ti^oops from here at present." 
Gen. Sumner replied as follows : 
" If the general desires to trust the defense of 
my position to the front line alone, I can send 
French with three regiments, and Meagher with 
his brigade to the rio,'ht ; everything is so uncer- 
tain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it." 
These two brigades were sent to reinforce 
Gen. Porter, as has been observed. 

At 5.25 I sent the following to Gen. Franklin : 
" Porter is hard pressed, it is not a question of 
prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly 
maintain your position until dark with two bri- 
gades ? I have ordered eight regimeiwts of Sum- 
ner's to support Portor, one brigade of Couch to 
this place ; Heintzelman's brigade to go in rear 
of Sumner. If ^lossible send a brigade to sup- 
port Porter ; it shojdd follow the regiments or- 
dered from Sumner." ' 

" If it is possible send another brigade to rein- 
force Gen. Smith. It is said three heavy columns 
oF infantry arc moving on him." 

From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen 
that all disposable troops were sent from the 
right bank of the river to reiTiforce Gen. Porter, 
and that the corps commanders were left with 
smaller forces to hohl their ])osition3 than they 
deemed adequate. 



To luive (hjiju more, even tliough Porter's re- 
verse liail been prevented, would have had the 
6til! more disastrous result of imperilling the 
whole movement across the Peninsula. 
CHANGE OF BASE. 

The operations of this day proved the numer- 
ical superiority of the enemy, and made it evi- 
dent that while' he had a large army on the 
left bank of the Chickahominy, which liad al- 
ready tr.rncd our right, and was in position t« 
intercept the communications with our depots at 
the White House ; ho was also in large force be- 
tween our army and Eichmond. I therefore ef- 
fected a junction of our forces. 

Tliis miglit probably have been executed on 
either side of the Chickahominy, and if the con- 
centration iiad been effected on the left bank, it is 
]K>ssiblc wo might, with our entire force have de- 
feated tho enemy there ; but at that time they held 
the roads leading to the White House, so that it 
would Li;evo been impossible to have sent forward 
eupjily trains in advance of the army in that di- 
rection, and the guarding of these trains would 
have seriously embarrassed mw operations in the 
battle. Wo would have been compelled to fight 
if concentrated on that bank of the river. More- 
over, we would at once liave been followed by 
the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of 
the river operating upon our rear, and if in tlie 
chances of war, \j'e had been ourselves defeated 
in the effort, we would have been forced to fall 
back to the White House, and probably to Fort 
Monroe ; and as liuth our flanks and rear would 
ythen liave been entirely cx])Ose'd, aur entire sup- 
ply train, if not the greater part of the army 
itself (night have been lost. 

Tlie movements ol the enemy showed that they 
exi)ected this, and as they themselv<;s ackow- 
ledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat 
hi that direction. I therefore concentrated all 
our forces on the right bari^c of the river during 
the night -f (he 2()th and the morning of iBie 
27th, all our vagoiis, heavy guns, &e^ were ga- 
tlurcd there. 

T may be aske.i why, after the concentration of 
our forces on the right haul; of the Chickahominy, 
witli a large part of the enemy drawn away from 
Piichniond, upon the opposite side, I did not, in- 
stead of striking for James River, fifteen miles 
below that place, at once march directly on Rich- 
mond. 

It will be remembered, that at thi^ juncture the 
enenn- was on our rear, and tliere was every rea- 
Bon to believe that ]ie would sever our communi- 
cations with our supply depot at the White 
House. 

We had on hand a limited supply of rations, 
and if wc had advanced directly on Richmond it 
would have required considerable time to carry 
the strong works around that place, during which 
our men would have been destitute of food ; and 
even if P»ichmoiid had fallen before our armsythe 
enemy could still have occupied our supply com- 
munications between that place? and tho gun- 
boats, and turned their dfsaster into victory. If, 
on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated 
all his forces at Richmond during the progress of 
our attack, and we had been defeated, we must 



75 
in all probability have lost our trains before 
reaching the flotilla. 

Tho battles which continued day after day, in 
the progress of our flank movement to the James, 
with the exception of the one at GainesV, Mill, 
were sjiccesses to our arms, and the closing en- 
gagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive 
of all, 

0»i the evening of the 27th of June, I assem- 
bled the corps commanders at my headquarters, 
and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and 
my clioice of route and method of execution. 

Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, 
with its artillery and baggage, across the White 
Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions 
on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover tho 
passage of the other troops and traii\^. 

This order was executed on the 28th ty noon. 
Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's 
Station, and remained there durinj^ the day and 
night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and 
supplies of the armj'. 

Orders were given to the different commanders 
to load their wagons with ammunition and pro- 
visions and the necessary baggage of the officers 
and men, and to destroy all property which could 
not be transported with the army. Orders, were 
also given to leave with those of tho sick and 
wounded who could not be transported, a proper 
comiDlement of surgeons and attendants, with a 
bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. 

'Jilie large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by tho 
chief commissary. Col. Clarke, transferred to the 
James River without loss. 

On the mo?-ning of the 28th, while Gen. Frank- 
lin was withdrawing his command from Golding 
Farm, the enemy opened upon Gen. Smith's divi- 
sion, Irom Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, 
and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of 
■ the Chickaliominy, and shortly afterwards two 
Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works 
about to be evacuated, but this attack was re- 
pulsed by the 23d New York, and the 49 th Penn- 
sylvania Volunteers on picket, and a section of 
Mott's battery. 

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak 
Swamp during the day and night, and took up 
positions covering the roads leading from Rich- 
mond towards White Oak Swamp and Long 
Bridge. McCall's division was «rdered, on the 
nigiit of the 28th, to move across the Swamp and 
take a proper positiou to assist in covering tho 
remaining troops and trains. During the same 
night the corps ot Sumner, Heintzclniaii, and tho 
division of Smith, were ordered to 'an interior 
hue, the left resting on Keyes's old intrcnclimcnts, 
and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's 
Station. Gen. Slocuni's division, of Franklin's 
corps, was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve. 
They were ordered to hold this position until 
dark of tlie 29th, in order to cover (lie withdraw- 
al of the trains, and then to fall back across tho 
Swamp and unite -with the remainder of the armj'. 

On the 28th I sent tho following to the Secre- 
tary of War : x 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Sava?f*i 

Station, June 28, 18G2. 12.20 a. m. 
I now know the wliolc history o|" the day. On 



76 



fehia side of the river, tlio right bank, we repulsed 
geveral strong attacks : on the left bank onr men 
did all tliat men could do — all that soldiers could 
accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly 
superior numbers soon after I had brought my 
last reserves into action. The loss on both sides 
ii terrible. 1 believe it will prove t o be tke most 
desperate battle of the war. The sad remf5ants 
of my men behave as men — those battalions who 
fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still 
in the best order. My regulars were superb ; 
»nd I count iipon what are left to turn anotlier 
battle in company with their gallant comrades of 
the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even 
ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow I 
©ould .take Richmond ; but I have not a man in 
reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and 
•ave the material and personnel of the army. 

If Y,'e4iave lost the day, we have yet preserved 
©ur honor, and no one need blush for the army of 
the Potomac. I have lost this battle, because my 
force was too small. 

I again repeat that I am not responsible for 
this, and I say it with the earnestness of a gener- 
al, who feels in his heart the loss of every brave 
man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. 
I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this, 
the governraentmust view the matter in the same 
earnest light that I do. You must send me very 
large reiuforcemen.ts, and send them at once. 
■ 1 sliaii draw back 1^ this side ©f the Chicka- 
hominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. 
Please understaTid that in this battle we have lost 
nothing but men, and those the best we have. 

In addition to what I have already said, I only 
wish to say to the President that I think he is 
wrong in regarding me as ungenerous, when I said 
that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated 
s truth, which to-day has been too plainly proved. 
If at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand 
fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. 

I know that a few thousand more men, would 
have changed this battle from a defeat to a vic- 
tory ; as it is, the government must not, and can- 
not, hold me responsible for the result. 

I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too 
many dead and wounded comrades, to feel other- 
wise tlian that the government has not sustained 
this aimy. If you do not do so now, tsie game is 
lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other per- 
lons in Washington, 

Yon have done your best to sacrifice this army. 

G. B. M^:0., Maj.-Gen., to Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
Sec. of War.^ 

The headquarter's camp at Savage's Station, 
waa broken up early on tlio morning of the 29th, 
»nd moved across White Oak Swamp. 

As the essential part of this day's operations 
was the passage of the trains across tlie Suamp, 
their protection against attack from the direction 
of New Market and Riohmond, as well as the im- 
mediate and secure establishment of our commu- 
nications with the gun-boats, I passed the day in 
•xamining the ground, directing tlie posting-of 
the tn)0i)»,and assiuing the uninterrupted move- 
ment of the trains. 

In ili» afternoon [ inHlructed Gen. Keyes to 



move during the night to James River, and occu- 
py a defensive position near Malrern Hill, to se- 
cure our extseme left flank. 

Gen. F. J. Porter was ordered to follow hint, and 
prolong the line towards the right. The trains 
were to be puslied on towards James River in 
rear of these corps, and placed under the protec- 
tion of the gnn-boats aS fhey arrived. 

A sharp skirmisli with the enemy's cavalry, 
early this day on the Quaker Road, showed that 
his efforts were at^outto be directed towards im- 
peding our progress to the river, and rendered 
my presence in that quarter necessary. 
ALLENS' FIELD. 

Gen, Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oakt 
on June 29tii, at day-light, and marched Ifis com- 
mand to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's Field", 
between Orchard and Savage's Stations. 

Tiie division of Richardson and Sedgwick, were 
formed on the right of the railroad, facing to- 
wards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, 
and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's 
corps. 

The first line of Richardson's division was held 
by Gen. French, Gen. Caklweil supporting in tho 
second. A log building in front of Richardson'* 
division, was held by Col. Brooks with one regi- 
ment, (53d Pennsylvania Volunteers.) with Haz- 
zard's battery on an elevated piece of groimd, « 
little in rear of Col. Brook's command. 

At 9 A.M., the enemy commenc«d a furious af» 
tack on the right of Gen. Sedgwick, but were re- 
pulsed. The left of Gen. Richardson was next 
attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry 
tlie position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard's 
battery, and Capt. Pettit's .battery, which after- 
wards replaced it, were served with great effect, 
while the* 5.3d Pennsylvania kept up a steady 
fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at 
last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed 
the attack three times, but were as often re- 
pulsed. 

SAVAGE'S STATION. 

Gen. Slociim arrived at Savage's Station at an 
early hour on the 29lh, and was ordered to cross 
White Oak Swamp and relieve Gen. Keyes' corpsi 
As- soon a3 Gen. Keyes was tlius relieved, ho 
moved towayds James River, which he reached 
in safety, wiili all his artillery and bagg.agc, early 
on the morning of the 30th, and took Uja a posi- 
tion below Turkey Creek Bridge. 

During the morning Gen. Franklin heard that 
the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, 
was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, 
and advancing toward Savage's Station. He com- 
municated this information to Gen. Suninei* at 
Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division, to Sa- 
vage's Station. 

A little aftQP aoon Gen. Sumner imiterl his 
forces with those of Gen. Franklin, and assumed 
command. ■ - • 

I liad ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with his 
corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark 
at a point where were several field works, and a 
skirt of timber between tlieso works and the rail- 
road ; but he fell back before night, and crossed 
Wiiite Oak Swamp at Brackcti's Ford. 

Gen. Sinnner in his report of the battle of Sa- 



vage'8 Station, sajs : *• When tlic enemy rtppear- 
ed on the AViUiamsburg road, I could not imagine 
why Gen. Heintzelraau did not attack him, and 
not till some time afterwards did I learn, to mj 
ntter amazement, that Gen. Ileintzelman hadjeft 
the field and retreated with his whole corps 
(about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. 
This defection might have been attended with 
the most disastrous consequences, and although 
■we beat the enemy signally and drove him from 
the field, we should certainly have given him a 
more crushing blow if Gen. Heintzelman had been 
there with his corps." 

Gen. Heintzelman, in the report of the opera- 
tions of his corps, says : 

" On the niglit of the 28th of June I received 
orders to witlidraw the troops of my corps from 
the advanced position they had taken on the 25th 
of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about 
ft mile in rear. A map was sent me showing me 
the positions Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Franklin's 
corps would occupy. About sunrise the next 
day our troops clowly lell back to the new posi- 
tion, cautiously followed by the enemy taking 
possession of our camps as soon as we left them. 
From some mssapprehension, Gen. Sumner held 
a more advanced position than was indicated on 
the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of 
about three-fourths of a mile between the right 
of his corps and Gen. Smith's division of Gen. 
Franklin's corps 

At 11 A. M., on the 29th, the enemy commenced 
jlu attack on Gen. Sumner's troops, a few shells 
falling within my lines. Late in the afternoon 
reports reached me that the rebels w^ere in posses- 
sion of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a hatf 
from Savage's Station. I sent several cavalry 
reconnoissance.s, and finally W'as satisfied of the 
fact- Gen. Franklin came to my headquarters, 
when I learned of the interval between his left 
and Gen. ^Sunuier's right, in which space Dr. 
Trent's house is. Also that the rebels had re- 
paired one of the bridges across the Chickahorai- 
ny, and Avere advancing. 

'' I rode forward to see Gen- Sumner, and met 
his troops falling back on the Williamsburg road, 
through my lines. Gen. Sumner informed me that 
he intended to make a stand at Savage's Station, 
and for mo to join him to determine upon the 
• position. This movement of Gen. Sumner's nn- 
covering my right flank, it became necessary for 
me at once to withdraw my troops 

" 1 rode back to find Gen. Sumner ; after some 
delay from the mass of troops in the field, I found 
^ him and leariied that the course of action had 
been determined on ; so returned to my command 
and to give the necessary orders for the destruc- 
tion of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provis- 
ions still remaining on the ground 

'• The whole open space near Savage's Station 
was crowded with, troops, more thaii I supposed 
could be brought into action judiciously. An 
aide frpm the commanding general had in the 
morning reported to me, to point out a road across 
the White Oak Swamp, starting from the left of 
Gen. Kearney's position, and leading by Brack- 
ett's Ford. • , . . The advance of the column 
reached the Charles City Road at 6 1-2 p. m., a.ud 
the reaj" at 10 p. m , without accident. 



'Hie orders given bj me to Generals Suaanw, 
Heintzelman, and Franklin, wcre_^ to hold tlie posi- 
tions assigned them until dark. Ab stated bj 
Gen. Heintzelman, Gen. Sumner did not occup/ 
the designated position, but as ho "was the senior 
ollicer present on that side of the White Oak 
Swamp, ho may have thought that the move- 
ments of the enemy justified a deviation from 
the letter of the orders. It appears from his re- 
port that he assumed command of all the troopi 
near Savage's Station, and determined to resist' 
the enemy there, and that he gave Gen. Heintzel- 
man orders to hold the same position as I had 
assigned him. 

The aide sent by me to Gen. Heintzelman, t« 
point out the road across the swamp, was to guid« 
him in retiring after dark. 

On reaching Savage's Station Sumner's and 
Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of 
battle in the large open field to the left of th« 
railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woode, 
and the right extending down to the railroad. 

Gen. Brooks, with hie brigade, held the wood 
to the left of the field, w'here he did excellent 
service, receiving a wovmd, but retaining his com- 
mand. 

Gen. Hancock's brigade was thrown into th« 
woods on the right and front. 

At 4 p. M. the enemy commenced his attack i« 
large force by the AVilliamsburg road. It vra« 
gallantly met by Gen. Burns' brigade, supported 
and reinforced by two ines in reserve, and final- 
ly by the New York 69th, Hazzard'e and Pettit'i 
batteries again doing good service. Osborne'a 
and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively 
in this action, which was continued with great 
obstinacy nntil between 8 and 9 p. m., when th« 
enemv were driven from the field. 

MOVEMENTS TOWARDS JAMES RIVER. 

Immediately after the battle the orders wer« 
repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross 
White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished du- 
ring the night, in good order. 

By midnight all the troops were on the road to 
"White Oak Swamp Bridge, Gen. French, with hit 
brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. ,on 
tlie'SOth all had crossed, and the bridge was de- 
stroyed. 

On the afternoon and night of the 29th, I gava 
the corps commanders their instructions for th« 
operations of the folldwing day. As stated be- 
fore, Porter's corps was to move forward to Jamei 
River, and with the corps of Gen. Keycs, to oc- 
cupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a lin« 
perpendicular to the river, thus covering th« 
Charles City road to Richmond, opening commu- 
nication with the gun-boats, and covering the pas- 
sage of the supply trains, which were pushed 
forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plan- 
tation. Tke remaining corps were pressed on- 
ward, and posted so as to guard the approaches 
from Richmond as well as the crossing of the 
AN'hite Oak Swamp, over -which the army had 
passed. 

, Gen. Franklin was ordered to hold the passage 
of White-Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the 
withdrawal of the trains from that point. His 
command consisted of his own corps, with Geu 



Ricluivdsoii's Jivisiou ami fieii. Nagleo'b brigade 
placed uiuler liis orderH Cor tlie occusion. 

Gcii. Sldcum's division was on the right of the 
Cliarle.s City road. 

On the nmniing of (lie 30th I a.::;ain gave to the 
corps commanders within reacli*instractions for 
posthig their troops. I found tliat, notwith- 
standing all the efforts of my personal staff an 1 
other oflicers,the roads were blocked by wagons, 
and there was great ditllculty iu keeping the 
trains in motion. 

The engineer officers wliom I had sent forward 
on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads, had neither 
returned nor sent me any reports or guides. 

Gens. Keyes and Porter had been delayed, one 
i-y losing the road, and the other in repairing an 
old road, and had not been able to send me any 
information. AVe then kn^w of but one road for 
the movement of troops and our immense trains. 
It was therefore necessary to post the troops 
in advance of this road, as well as our limited 
knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to 
cover tiie movements of the trains in rear. 

I thou examined the whole line from the 
swamj* to the left, giving final instructions for 
the posting of the troops and the obstruction of 
the roads towards Richmond, and all corps com- 
manders were directed to hold their positions 
until the trains had passed, after which a more 
concentrated position was to fee taken up near 
James Iliver, 

Oar force was too small to occupy and hold 
the entire line from the White-Oak Swamp to the 
river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse 
by a movement across the lower part of the 
swamp, or across the Ghickahominy below the 
swamp. Moreover the troops were then greatly 
exhausted, and required rest iu a more secure 
position. 

I extended ray examinatiohs of the country as 
far as llaxall's, looking at all the approaches to 
Malvern, which position I perceived to be the 
key to our oi)erations in this quarter, and was 
thus enabled to expedite very considerably the 
passage of the trains, and to rectify th« positions 
of the troops. 

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the 
different corps commanders to inform them what 
I had done on the left, and to bring mo infohna- 
tion of the condition of aff.i rs on the right. 1 
returned from Malvern to llaxall's, and, liavi'ng 
made arrangements Un- instant communication 
from Malvern by signals, went "U board of Cai)t. 
Rodgers's gun-boat, lying near, to confer witli 
him in reference to the condition of our .su[)ply 
vessels, and the state of thnigs on the river. 

It was his opinion tiiat it »\onIl be necessary 
for the army to fall l)ack to a [josition beiow dity 
Point, as the channel t'lere was so near tlie 
southern shore that it would not be possible to 
bring up tlic transports slionid the enemy occupy 
it. Ilarrison's Landing was, in his opinion, tiie 
nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of 
this interview, I retm-ned to Malv<'rn Hill, and 
remained there until sliortly before daylight. 

On the morning of tin-. 30th Gen. Sunnier was 
ordered to march with S.;dgvvJck'B division to 
Glendale (" Nelson's Farm"). 



78 



Gen. McCaH's division (rennsylvania Reserves) 
was halted dnring lh« morning on the New Mar- 
ket road, just in advance of the point where a 
road turns off to Quaker Church. His line was 
formed perpendiculariy to the New Market load, 
with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on 
the left, and Ileynolu'.*! brigade, coniinanded by 
Col. S. G. Sinnnons, of the 5th Pennsylvania, in 
reserve. liandall's regular battery on" the right, 
Kern's and Cooper "s batteries opposite the sen- 
tre, and Deitrich's and Kanerhem's batteries, of 
the artillery reserve, on the left — all in iront of 
the artillery line. The country in Gen. McCall'a 
front was open, intersected toward the right by 
the New Market road, and a small strip of timber 
parallel to it. The open front was about 800 
3'ards, its depth about 1,000 .yards. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heintzelman 
ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be de- 
stroyed, and trees to be felled across that road 
and the Charles City road. 

Gen. Slocum's division v>as to extend to tbo 
Charles City road. 

Gen. Kearney's right to connect with Gen. Slo- 
cum's left. 

Gen. McCall's position was to the left of the 
Long Bridge road, in connection with Gen. Kear- 
ney's left. Gen. Hooker was on the left of Gen, 
McCall. 

WHITE-OAK SWAMP BRIDGE. 
Between 12 and 1 o'clk the enemy opened a 
fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and 
Richardson and Naglce's brigade at AVhite-Oak 
Swamp Bridge, This artillery fire was continued 
by the enemy through the day, and he crossed 
some infantry below our position. RichardsoH's 
division suffered severely. Captain Ayres di- 
rected our artillery with great eflect. Capt. Ilaz- 
zard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and 
Capt. Hazzard being mortally wounded, was com- 
pelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's bat- 
terj^ which partially silenced the enemy's guns. 

Gen. Franklin held his position until after dark, 
repeatedl}' driving back the enemy in their at- 
tcm])(s to cross the White-Oak Swamp. 

CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS, &c. 
At 2 o'clock in the daj' the enemy were reported 
advancing in force by the Charles City road, and 
at half-'past 2 o'clock the attack was made down 
the road on Gen. Slocum's left, but was checked 
by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large 
force, comprising the divisions of Long.street and 
A P. Hill, attacked Gen. McCall. whose division, 
after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. 
General .McCall, in his report says; .... 
" Al)oni lialf-past two my pickets wei'e driven 
in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing 
without loss on our part. A! 3 o'clock the ene- 
my sent forward a regiment. <>n the left centre and 
an ther on the right centre, to feel for a weak 
point. They were under cover of a shower of 
shell'.?, and boldly advanced but were both driven 
hack :u the left by the 12th regiment, and on the 

: i;-!;! ')y the 7th regiment For near- two 

ho'.'.i-s the battle raged hotly here 

" At last the enemy was compelled to retire be- 
fore the well-directed musketry fire of the reserves. 
The German batteries were driven to the rear. 



79 



but I rodo Tin and. sent them back. It was, how- 
ever, of little avail, and they were soon after 
abandoned by the cannoneers. * * * 
The batteries in front of the centre were boldly 
charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced 
back. * * * . 

''Soon after this a most determined charge was 
made on Randall's battery by a full brigade ad- 
vancing in wedge-shape, without order, but in 
perfect recklessness. 

''Suuiriwliat similar charges had, I ha'^e stated, 
been [irevious'iy made on Cooper's and Kern's bat- 
teries by single regiments without success, they 
having recoiled before the storm of cairister hurled 
against ihem. 

" A Idco result was anticipated by Randall's bat- 
tery, and tiio 4th regiment was requested not to 
fire until the battery had done with them. Its 
gallanl. (Mmmander did not doubt his ability to 
repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow 
down the advancing host, but still the gaps were 
closed, and the enomy came in upon a run to the 
very muzzle of his guns. 

" It was a perfet torrent of men, and they were 
in his battery before the guns could be removed. 
Two guns that were indeed successfully limbered 
had their horses killed and wounded, and were 
ovcriurned on the spot, and the enemy dashing 
past drove the greater part of the 4th regiment 
before them. Tlie left company (B) nevertheless 
stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Con- 
rad, as did likewise certain men of other compa- 
nies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeav. 
ored to check them, but with only partial success- 
There was no running ; but my division, re- 
duced by the previous battles to less than 6,000, 
bad to contend with the divisions of Longstrcet 
and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest 
anil best among many of the Confederate army, 
numbering tlia't day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it 
was reluctantly compelled to give way before 
heavier force accumulated upon them." 

Gen. Ileintztlman states, that about 5 p.m. Gen. 
McCull's division was attacked in large force, 
evidently the principal attack ; that in less than 
an lidur the division gave way, and adds : 

"Gen. Hooker, being on his left, by moving to 
the right, repulsed the rebels in the handsomest 
manner, with great slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who 
was with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also 
greatly aided with his artillery and hifantry in 
driving back the enemy. The^' now renewed 
their attack with vigor on Gen. Kearney's left, 
and were again repulsed witli heavy loss. 

" 'I'his attack commenced about 4 p.m., and was 
pushed by heavy masses with the utmost deter- 
mination and vigor. Capt. Thompson's battery, 
directed with great precision, firing double 
charges, swept them back. The whole open 
Bpace. 200 paces wide, was filled with tlie enemy ; 
eacli repulse brought fresh troops. The third 
attack was only repulsed by the rapid vollej's 
and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, 
Col Hays, and half -of the 37 th New York Volun- 
teers.** 

Gen. McCall's troops soon began to emerge 
froin the woods into the open field. Several bat- 
teries were in position and began to fire into the 
woods over the heads of our men in front Cap- 



tain De Pfcussy's battery was placed on tlie right 
of Gen. Simmer's artillery, with orders to slicll 
the woods. Gen. Burns's brigade was tlien ad- 
vanced to meet the enemy, and soou drove liim 
back. Other troops began to return from the 
^\"hite Oak Swamp. 

Later in the day, at the call of Gen. Kearney. 
Gen. Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's 
division, was sent to occupy a portion of Gen. 
McCall's deserted position, a battery accompany- 
ing tlie brigade. "They soon drove back the ene- 
my, who shortly after gave up the attack, con- 
tenting tliemselves with keeping up a desultory 
firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock 
at night Gen. Heintzelman, commenced to with- 
draw his corps, and soon after daylight both of 
his divisions, with Gen. Slocum's division, and a 
portion of Gen. Sumner's command, reached Mal- 
vern Hill. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sunnier, in 
obedience to orders, had moved promptly to | 
Glendale, and upon a call from Gen. Franklin for • 
reinforcements, sent him two brigades, vvhich re- 
turned in time to participate and render good 
service in the battle near Glendale. Gen. Sumner 
says of this battle : C 

" The battle of Glendale was the most severe j 
action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 I 
o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a ' 
furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy 
was routed at all points and driven from the 
held." 

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve 
artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 
4 P.M. At about this time the enemy began to 
appear in Gen. Porter's, front, and at 5 o'clock 
advanced in large force against his left flank, 
posting artillery under cover of a skirt of tim- 
ber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern 
Hill, while with his in fan tr^- and some artillery 
lie attacked Colonel "Warren's brigade. A con- 
centrated fire of about tliirty guns were broughi 
to bear on the enemy, v/hicli, with the infaiiti \ 
(ire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him 
to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Col. 
Warren. 

The gunboats rendei'cd most efTicient-aid at 
this time, and helped to drive, back .the enemy. ' 
It was very late at night befoie my aides fe- 
turned to give me the result of the day's fighting 
along the whole Hue, and the true position of 
affairs. While waiting to hear from Gen. Franklin 
before sending orders to Gens. Siftnner and 
Heintzelman, I received a message from the 
latter that Gen. Franklin was falling back ; where- 
upon I sent Col. Coburn of my stall with orders 
to verify this, and if it were true, to order in 
Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He • 
had not gone far when he met two ofliceiR from 
Gen. Franklin's headquarters with the informa- 
tion that he was fallhig back. Orders were then 
sent to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman to fall 
back also, and definite instructions were given as 
to the movement, which was to commence on 
the right. The orders met these troops already 
en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent 
to Gen. "Franklin as to the route he was to fol- 
low. 

General Barnard then received full instructions 



m 



for posting the troops as they arrived. 1 then re- 
turned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern 
soon after daybreak, accompanied by several gen- 
eral officers. I once more made' the entire cir- 
cuit of the position, and then returned to HaxalTs 
whence 1 went witli Captain Piodgers to select 
the iinal location for the army and its depots. I 
returned to i^falvern before the serious fighting 
commenced, and after riding along the lines and 
seeing most cause to feel ansious about the riglit, 
remained in that vicinity. 

MALVERN HILL. 

The position selected for resisting the further 
advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, was 
with the left and centre of our lines resting on 
'• Maivern Hill," while the right curved backwards 
through a wooded country toward a point below 
llaxall's on James River. Malvern Hill is an ele- 
vated plateau about a mile and a half by three- 
fourths of a mile area, well cleared of timber, 
and with several converging roads running over 
it. In front arc numerous-defensible ravines, and 
the ground slopes gradually toward the north and 
east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for ar- 
tillery in those directions. Toward the north- 
west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ra- 
vine which exeends to James River. From the 
position of the enemj^, his most obvious lines 0/ 
attack would come from the directions of Rich- 
mond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost 
of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, 
therefore, the lines were strengthened by mass- 
ing the troops, and collecting the princijjal part 
of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of 
the line (Sykes' division on the left, Merell's on 
the right) with the artillery of his two divisions 
advantageontly posted ; and the artillery of the 
reserve so disposed on the high ground that 
a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be 
brought to bear on any point in Iris front or left. 
Colonel Tj'ler also had, witli great exertion suc- 
ceededin getting ten of his siege guns in posi- 
tion on the highest point of the hill. 

Couch's division was placed en the right of 
Porter, next came Kearney and Hooker, nest 
Sedgwiek and Richardson, next Smith and Slo- 
cum, then tlie remainder of Kej'cs' corps, ex- 
tending by a backward curve nearly to the river. 
The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in re- 
serve and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's 
position. Que brigade of Porter's Avas thrown 
to the left on the low ground, to protect the 
flank from any movement direct from the Rich- 
mond road. 'J'he line was very strong along the 
whole front of the open plateau ; but from thcnco 
to the extreme right, the troops were more de- 
ployed. This formation was imperative, as an at- 
tack v/ould probabl}' be made on our left. 

The rigiit was rendered as secure as possible 
by slasliing the timber and by barricading the 
roa<!s. C'.i)!P.iiod(>re Rodgers, commanding the 
flotilla 01! J;vr>es River, placed his gun-boats so 
as to protect our flanks, and to connnand the ap- 
proaches from Richmond. 

Between 9 and 10 a. .ai. the enemy commenced 
feeling along our whole left wing with his artil- 
lery and skinuisjiers, as far to the right as Hook- 
er'e division. 



About two o'clock a column of the enemy tv»8 
observed moving towards our right, within the 
skirt of woods in front of lleint/.ohnan's corps, 
but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- 
ments were at once made to meet the anticipated 
attack in that quarter : but though the column 
was long, occupying more than two hours in i>ass- 
ing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. 
The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, 
and participated in the attack afterwards made on 
our left. 

About 3 1'. M. a hcav}' fire of artillery opened 
on Kearney's left, find Couch's division, speedily 
followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on 
Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with 
good effect by our own, and the infantry of 
Couch's division remained lying on the ground 
until the advancing column^was within short mus- 
ketry rangCj when they sprang to their feet, and 
poured in a deadly volley, which entirelj' broko 
the attacking force, and drove them in disorder y 
back over their own groiuid. This advantaga 
was followed up xuitil we had advanced the right 
of our line some seven or eight hundred yai-ds^ 
and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us 
a stronger position, and a better fire. 

Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased 
along the whole front ; but no disposition was 
evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw 
from the field. 

Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from 
Richardson's division, was stationed upon Cou6h's 
right, by Gen. Porter, to whom" he had been err 
dered to report. The whole line was surveyd bj 
the generals, and everj'thing held in readiness 
to meet the coming attack. At G o'clock the ene- 
my suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with 
the whole strength of his artillery, and at onco 
began pushing forward his columns of attack to 
carrj' the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed 
under cover of the woods, started at a run to 
cross the open space, and charge our batteries ; 
but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and 
steady vollej^s of our infantry, in every case, sent 
them reeling back to shelter, and covered the 
ground with their dead and wounded. In sev- 
eral instances our infantry withheld their firo 
jiintil the attacking cohunus, which rushed through 
the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, 
had reached within a few j'ards of our lines. 
They then poured in a single volley, and dashed 
forward with the ba^j'onet, capturing prisoners 
and colors, and driving the routed columns in 
confusion from the field. 

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were ac- 
cumulating in front of Porter and Couch, I\Ieagher 
and Sickles wei'e sent with their brigades as soon 
as it was considered prudent to withdraw anj, 
portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's' troops to ' 
reinforce that part of the line, and hold the posi- 
tion. These brigades relieved such rcgimei'.ts of 
Porter's corps and Couch's division, as hail ex- 
pended their ammunition, and batteries fium tho ' 
rescj've were pushed forward to reijlace those 
whose boxes were empty. Until dark tlio enemy 
persisted in bis efforts to take jmsiticm so tena- 
ciously defended ; but despite his vastly superior 
numbers his repeated and desnerate attacks, wore 



81 



repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the 
battle of Jlalveni Hill, flioiigh jl was not until 
after 9 o'clock that the artillery 'coasod its fire. 

During the whole battle Com. I'od^'^crs added, 
greatly to the disconifUmo of the enemy, by^ 
throw'ing shells aiftot-g his rcseijes and advacingj 
columns. r^ • ■, 

As the army in its movement from the Chicka- 
honiiny to Harrison's Landing', was contiimally^ 
occnincd in marching' by tnght and fightrngbyi 
day, its commanders found no time or onportnni- 
ty'fov collecting' data, -which would cnabie thcni' 
to give exact return of casnliltics in each engage- 
ment. The aggregate of our entire' losses,' from 
ihe 26th of -Tune to the Hr-^t of July, inclu.sive.w^s 
ascertained, af^ • ^Tavrison's Landing, 

to be as follov,'- : - 
List of the hUh-'d, woumM atid missirify, ^'i 'f^''^ 

arnvj offi" Poiomar.from the 2Q'k'Ju-ne,\%^2, 

to tl'w 1-' \-^i(l>/, lBo'.2, inclr^lve. • '" 
( . ->. ' Kiiicfr 

1st.— ■Mci-'r.i. !• .cim; Reservt'3 253 



2(1.— S.iuin> .. 

4th.- Ken- s .. 

6th.— Poiti- ■'«! . . 

6th.-- Frankiir.'s 
Engineers 
Cavtili-y . . 



187 
189 
69 
6'20 
245 



Tb'fai;. 



. 19 

.1:582 



Won'd. 

1,24:0, 

1,07G 

1,051' 

507 

2,4(!0 

4,313 

2 

60 



MiflS'g'.' Apfrr. 1 
ly'jSl 3,074 



848 

833 

201 

1,198 

1,179 

21 

97 



2.111 
2,07:; : 

777 

4,278 

2,737 

23 

17 



7,709 ■ 5,958 15,219 



MOYEViENT TO ni\.RRrS0N'3 LANDIKG. 

Althir.'-': I'lO result of the battle^'of Malvern 
was a coH'] '. 't.3 victory, it was ncveHheless ne- 
cessary to lull bock still fnrtliet, in order. to reach 
a point where our supplies could be' brought to 
ts with certainty. As before stated, in the 
opinion of Capt. "llodgers, commanding the gmi- 
boat flotilla, this cduld only be dons below Cily 
Point. Concurring in his opinion, I seleqted Har- 
.rison's Bar as the new position of our snppliea of 
food; forage, and ammunition, made it imperative 
to reach the transports immediately. 

Tiie greater' portion of th.e transportation of the 
array having b.een started for Harrison's Landing 
during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of 
July, the order for the movement of the troops 
was at once issued npon the final rep'TjTse of the 
enemy at Malvern Hilh ' • ■'' ' ''" . _ 

The order prescribed a movement by the. left 
and rear — Gen. Keyes' corps to cover the mancc- 
vi-e'. It was not carried out in detail as regards ;■ 
the divisions on the. left, the roads being some- 
what blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter 
and Couch were not able to move out as early as 
had been anticipated, and Porter found it neccs- 
sar}' to place a rear-guard between his command 
and the enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate 
duty. He had imder'his command his own regi- 
ment and Lieut.-Col. Buchanan's brigade of regu- 
lar infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use 
of the resonrces at his' command, he deceived the 
enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left 
•wing v.'ithoiit bchig attacked, remaining himselt 
on the previous day's battle-field mitil about 7 
o'clock' of the 2d July. Ideantime, Gen. Keyes 
Laving received his orders, commenced vigorous 
preparations for covering the niov<5ment of the 
entire army, and protecting the trains. It being 



evident that the immense number of wagons and 
artillery carriages pertaining to the army couJd 
not move with celerity along a single road, Gen. 
Keyes took .advantage of every accident of the 
ground, to open new avenues, and to facilitate the 
mo"^cmcnt.' He made preparations for obstruct- 
nrig the roads a:fter the army had passed, so as to 
prevent any rai)id pursuit, destroying ciicctually 
Tm'key Bridge, on the main road, and rendering 
other roads and approaches temporarily impass- 
able bjj, felling trees across them.. He kept the 
traiirs Well closed up, and directed the marcU so 
tliat the troops cotilcl march on each side of the ' 
roads, not obstructing the passage, bni. 1.>eing in 
good position to repel an attack from any qua,^- 
ter. His dispositions were so successful l.liiit, io 
use his OAvn words : "I do not think mor.o vehi- 
cles or more public proi)erty were abandoned on 
the march froin Turkey Bridge thrtn would have 
been left, in the' same slate of the roads, if the 
ami}' had been' moving toward the enemy, in- 
stead "of away from him; and when it is .under- 
stood that the carriages and teams belonging to 
this army, stretched out in one line, would extend 
U'lt far from forty miles, the energy and caution 
necessary for their safe withdrawal from the pre- 
sence of an enemy vastly superior in nmnbers, 
Avill be appreciated." ,", 

The' last of the wagons did not reach the sitfe 
selected at Harrison's Bar, until after dark on the 
3d of July, audi he rear guard did' not move intro 
their canip' nntil everything was secure. The 
enemy followed npwith a .?mall ,force,and on tho 
3d threw a few shells at tho rear guard, but were 
quickly dispersed by our batteries, and the fire 
of ■ the gun-boats. 

Great credit must be awarded to Gen. Keyes, 
for the skill and energy which characterized his 
performance of the important and delicate duties 
entrusted to his charge. 

High praise is also du| to the officers and men 
of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, Col. Tyler, for 
the manner in which they withdrew all th.e heavy 
guns during the seven "^days, and from i^Talvern 
Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, 
the teams could, pot be brought within a couple 
of miles of the position, but these cn#(>-etic sol- 
diers removed the guns by hand ' '■ ''■ ■+ dis- 
tance, leaving nothing behhid. 

THIRD PERIOD. 

CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CVjrPAIGN. 

On the 1st of July, I received the following 
from the President : 

Washhigton, July 1,1862. 8.30 p. Jr. Maj.- 
Gcn. Geo. B.McClei!an,— 

It is impossible to reinforcS'yon for your pres- 
ent emergency. If we had a million of men, wo 
coiildnot get them to give you in lime. Wo 
have not tiie men to send. If you are not strong 
enough to face the enemy, you must find a place 
of sc'curity and wait, rest and repair. 

Maintain your ground if you can, but save the 
army at all evenfs. even if you fall back to Fort 
Jlonroc. We still have strength enough in th;! 
country, and will bring it out. . A. Linoolx. 

In a dispatch from the President to mc on the 
2d of July, he says': 

" If you think you are not strong enongh io 



lake R'tchmond just, now, I do not ask you to. 
Try just now to save the army material and per- 
sonnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive 
again as fast as I can. 

" The governors of eighteen states offer ine a 
new levy of three hundred thousand, which I 
accept." 

On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch 
was received from the President: 
[Extract...) 
Washington, July 3, 1S62. 3 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McO. — Yours of 5.30 yesterday 
is just received. I am' satisfied that yourself, of- 
ficers and men have done the best you could. 
All accounts say better lighting was never done. 
Ten thousand thanks for it A. Lincoln. 

To G. B. McC. 

On tlie 4tli, I sent the following to the President : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Harri- 
son's Bar, Jaraes River, July 4, 1862. 

To the President ; — I have the honor to ac- 
knowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 
2d instant. 

I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor 
to give my men the repose they so much reqnire. 

After sending my communication on Tuesday, 
ihe enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a 
fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they 
were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their 
attack succeeded, the consequences would have 
been disastrous in the extreme. This clos'ed the 
hard fighting which had continued from the af- 
ternoon of the 26th ult. in a daily series of en- 
gagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent 
for determination and slaughter on both sides. 

The mutual loss in killed and wounded, is enor- 
mous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On 
Tuesday evening the 1st., our army commenced 
its movement from Haxall's to this point. Our 
line of defence there, lu?ing too cxteiiiled to be 
maintained by our wealcened forces. Our train 
was immense, and about 4 a. m. on the 2d, a heavy 
storm of rain began, which continued during 
the entire day, and until the forenoon of yester- 
day'. 

The r(^d became horrible. Troops, artiller}'', 
and wagons, moved on steadily, and our whole 
army, men and material, was finally brought safe 
into this camp. The last of the wagons reached 
here at noon yesterdaj'. The exhaustion was 
very great, but the army preserved its morale, 
and would have repelled any attack which the 
enemy was in coiulitiou to make. 

\Vc now occupy a line of heights about two 
miles from the James, a plain extending from there 
to the river. Our front is about three miles long. 
Tliesd lieights command our whole position, and 
must be maintained. 'J'hc gunboats can render 
.valuable supi)ort.oa both Hanks. If the enemy 
attack us in front, we must hold our ground as 
best we maj', and at whatever cost. 

Our positions can be carried only by over- 
whelming numbers. The spirit of tlie army is 
excellent. Stragglers are liiuiing their regiments, 
and the soldiery exhibit tlie best results of dis- 
cipline. Our position is b}' no means impregna- 
ble, espccialiy as a niorass o.xtends on this side of 
Iho liigh ground from our ceutro to the James ou 



our right. The enemy may attack in vast num- 
bers, and if so our front will be the scene of a 
desperate battle which if lost, will be decisive. 
Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wound- 
ed, and prisoners, I cannot now approximate to 
any statement of' our losses, but we ara not beat- 
en in any conflict. The enemy were unable by 
their utmost efforts to drive us from any field. 
Never did such a change of base, involving a 
retrogade movement, and under incessant attacks 
from a most deternKned and vastly more nume- 
rous foe, partake so little of disorder. \Vc have 
lost no guns except 25 on the field of battle, 21 
of which were lost hy the giving way of McCall'i 
division under the onset of superior numbers. 

Our corumunications by the James River are 
not secure. There are points where the enemy 
can establish themselves with cannon or musket- 
ry and command the river, and where it is not 
certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In 
case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will 
still make every cfibrt to preserve at least the 
personnel of the army, and the events of the last 
few days leave no question that the troops will 
do all that their country can ask. Send such re- 
inforcements as you can. I will do what I can. 
We are shipping our wounded and sick, and land- 
ing supplies. The navy departiucMt should co- 
operate with us to the extent of its resources. 
Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the 
kindest and most efficient manner. 

When all the circumstances of the case are 
known, it will be acknowledged by all competent 
judges that the movement just completed bj 
this army is unparalleled in the aimals of war. 
Under the most diflicult circumstances, we have 
preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, 
above all, our honor. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 

To which I received the following repi}' : * 
Washington, July a, 1662. 9 a. m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC,. Commanding army of tho 
Potomac. 

A thousand thanks for the relief your two des- 
patches of 12 and 1 r. m. yesterday, gave me. 
Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself, of- 
ficers, and men, is and forever will be apprecia- 
ted. 

If you can hold your present position, we shall 
hive the enemy yet. A. Lincoln. 

The following letters were received from his 
Excellency the President. 

War Department, Washington City, D. C. July 
4th. 1862. 

Maj.-Gen. SIcC. — I imderstaud your position, 
as stated in your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. To 
reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the 
oflensive within a month, or even six weeks, is 
impossible. In addition to that arrived and now 
arriving from the Potomac (about ten thousand, I 
sujipose), and about ten thousand I hope you will 
have from Burnside very soon, and about five 
tlion.sai;d from Hunter a liHic later, I do not eeo 
how I can send you another man within a month. 
Under these circiinistanccs, the defensive, for 
the present, must be your only care. Save the 
army first, where you arc, if you can, and sec- 
ondly, by removal, it you must. You, on the 
ground, must bo tlie judge as to which you will 



83 



attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but 
give it as my opinion, tliat with the aid of the 
gunboats aiui the reinforcements mentioned above 
you can hold your present position, provided, 
and so long as, you can keep the James lliver 
open below you. If you are not tolerably conli- 
dent you can keep the James River open, you 
had better remove as soon as possible. I do not 
remember that you have expressed any appre- 
hension as to the danger of having your commu- 
uication cut on the river below- you, yet I do not 
•appose it can have escaped your attention, 

Yours very truh', A. L. 

P.3. — If at any time yon feel able to take the 
offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. 

A. L. 

The following telegram was sent on the 7th: 

Lisa {quarters. Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
July 7, 1862, 8.30 p.m. — As boat is starting, I have 
•only time to acknowledge receipt of dispatch by 
Gen. Marc}'. Enemy have not attacked. My po- 
•ition is very strong, and daily becoming more 
80. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugti at them. 
I have been anxious about my communications. 
Had long consultation about it with Flag-o'Hicer 
Goldsborough last night; he is confident he can 
keep river 'open. He sliould have all gun-boats 
possible. Will see him again this morning. My 
men iu splendid spirits, and anxious to try it 
again. 

Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, 
*nd don't lose confidence iu this army. 

A. L., President. G. B. McC. 

Willie General-in-Chief, and directing the oper- 
ations of all our armies in the field, I had become 
deeply impressed with the importance of adopt- 
ing and carrying out certain views regarding .the 
-conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were 
essential to it* objects and its success. During 
an active campaign of three mouths i!i the eue- 
tny's country these were so fuliy confirmed that 
I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we 
then occupied, not to withhold a candid cxpres- 
Bion of the more important of these view.s liom 
the conmiauder-in-chief whom tlie constitution 
places at tlie head of the armies and navies, as 
well as of the government of the nation. 'I'he 
following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : 

Ileadquaiters, Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Jiarrison'.s Landings Va., July 7, 1862. 

Mr. President, — You have been fully informed 
that the rebel army is iu our front, with tlie i>ur- 
pose of overwhelming us by attacking our posi- 
tions or reducing us by blocking our river com- 
munications. I can not but regard our condition 
as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos- 
Bible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, 
for your private consideration, my general views 
concerning the existing state of the rebellion, 
although they do not strictly relate to the situa- 
tion of this army, or strictly come within scope 
of my official duties. These views amount to 
convictions, and arc deeply impressed upon my 
mind and heart. Our cause must never be aban- 
doned; it is the cause of free institutions and 
self goverimient. The Constitution and the 
Union must bo preserved, whatever may be the 
cost in time treasure or blood. If secession is 



successful, other dissolutions are clcirlj^tbbo 
seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, 
political faction, or foreign war, shake your sBt^ 
tied purpose to enforce the equal operation of 
the laws of the United States upon the people of 
ever}' State. 

The time has come when the government must 
determine upon a civil and military polic}' cover- 
ing the Avhole ground of our national trouble. 
Tiie responsibility of determining, declaring, find 
supporthig such civil and military ])olic3\ and of 
directing the whole course of national affair's In 
regard to the rebellion must now be assumed 
and exercised by you, or our cause will bo lost; 
The constitution gives you power sufticient eveu 
for thepi'eseut terrible exigency. "^-.t 

This rebellion has assumed the character of 
war; as such it should be regarded; and it 
should be conducted upon the highest principles 
known to Christian civilization. It should not be 
a war looking to the subjugation of the people of 
any State in any event. It should not be at all'a 
war upon poprdation, but against armed forces 
and political organizations. Neither contiscatio'n 
of property, political executions of persons, ter- 
ritorial organization of States, or forcible abolition 
of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. 
In prosecuting the war, all private property arid 
unarmed persons should be strictly protected, 
subject only to the necessity of military opera- 
tions. All private property taken fnr military 
use should be paid or receipted for ; jiillage ai^d 
waste should be treated as high crimes : all tin- 
necessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offen- 
sive demeanor by the military towards citizens 
promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not 
be tolerated, except in places where active hos- 
tilities exist, and oaths not required by ejiaqt- 
ments constitutionally made, should be ireitlWr 
demanded nor received. Military government 
should be confined to the preservation of public 
<u-der and the protection of political righ'ft. 
Military power should not be allowed to interfere 
with the relations of servitude, either by snp- 
porting or impairing the authority of the master, 
except for suiiprcssing disorder, as in oth^r 
cases. Slaves contraliand under th.e act of Cbh- 
gress, seeking uiilitury protection, should receive 
it. The riglit of the 'government to appropriate 
permanently to its own service, claims to slave 
labor, should be asserted, and the riglit of the 
owner to compensation therefor should be recog- 
nized. 

This principle might he extended, up on gro\lnds 
of military necessity and securit}', to all the slaves 
within a particular State, thus working manu- 
mission in such State ; and in Missouri, perhaps 
in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in 
Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is 
only a question of time. 

A 63'stem of policy thus constitutional and coti- 
servative, and pervaded by the infiuences of 
Christianity and freedom, would receive the sup- 
port of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply 
impress the rebel masseij and all foreign nations, 
and it might be humbly hopeil that it would cotn- 
mcnd itself to the favor of the Almighty. 

Unless the orinciples o'ovcrning the futnro oon- 



duel, of our stniggle sluill be made known and 
approved, the cffun to obtain requisite forces 
will be aln:iost liopclcss. A declaration of radical 
views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disin- 
tegrate our i>resent araiies. 

The pohuy of the government must be sup- 
ported by ooJioontiatious of military powtT. The 
national forces sliould not be dispersed in expe- 
ditions, posts of occujiation, and liiinierous ar- 
mies, but shonld be mauily collected inr.o masses, 
and brought to bear upon the armies of the con- 
federate States. Those armies thoroughly de- 
feated, the political structure which they support 
would soon cease to exist. 

In carrying out any system of policy which you 
may form, you will require a commander-in-chief 
of the army ; one who possesses your confidence; 
understands your views, and who is competent 
to execute your orders by directing the military 
forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the 
objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place 
for myself. I am willing to serve you in such 
position as you may assign me, and I will do so 
as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. 
I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I 
hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have 
written this letter with sincerity towards you, 
and from love of my country. Very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
Ccmd'g. 

,ttHis Excellency A. L., President. 
' 'l telegraphed the President on the 11th as fol- 
Jows: 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
July 11, 1862. 3 p.m. 

We are very strong here now so far as defen- 
eive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us 
strong enough to advance and try it again. All 
in fine spirits. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
A. L., President. 

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th 
and 18th, to his Excellency the President. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
July 12, 18G2, 7.15 p.m.— Hill and Longstreet 
crossed into New Kent County via Long Bridge. 
1 am still ignorant what road they afterwards 
took, but will know shortly. 

Nothing else of 'interest since last dispatch, 
rain ceased and everything quiet. Men resting 
well, but beginning to be impatient for another 

I am more and more convinced that tin's army 
ought not to bo withdr.awn from here: but 
promplly reinforced and thrown again iipoi! Rioli- 
mond. If we have a littlo more than half a 
chance wo can take it. I dreaj the effects of any 
retreat n]>()n the moialc of t!ie men. 

G. B. .McC. to A. r... iVesidejit. 

IJeadquartcrs, Army of the iV'tomac, Berkeley, 
Jnly 1^. 16C>'1, 8 a.m. — I have Cf-jsultc'd fully with 
Gen. BurnMdn_ nij,] would comm.cud to yonr fav- 
orabh- con8:der.iLion the gonenl's plan inv l>ring- 
ing sevor. '.idditK-nal retnm'^nt'i from Nurtii Caro- 
lina, i.'V ieavhig Nf^nb^rn to the caro of the gun- 
boato Ir .ippo:«rH v.Tnifcstiy to be our polii-j^ to 
conci'utrato here ev^ryt'iuig wo can possibly 
epare I'lom less in'portani I'ointb. to make sureuf 
crushing the euciuy at Richmond, which seems 



■ht here. 



.lat. 



to Maj.-Gen. H. W. U., Comd'g. U". 
• to tlio general- 



84 

clearly to be the most important ])oint in rebel-- 
dum. Nothing s!iouidbeIf>ft to chanco here. I 
Would rocoiumend that Gen. Bunisicie, with all 
his Troopfe, be ordered to this army, *o enable it 
to assume the oifensive as .soon as possible. 
G. B. McO; to A. ]j. ' ^ •■ '- •. ' ,- ■ ■ 

Headquarters, .ivittyofth^ .Potpniac, Beii<c!ey, 
July 18-, 1862. 8 a.m. — No change worth reporting 
in the state of affairs. Sonw twenty t>5 twenty - 
five thousand of enemy at Petersburg, and others 
theivce to liichmond. Those at Petersburg say 
they are part of F>eaurc-'gard"s arnv}'. New troojis 
arriving via Petersburg. Am anxi<ms to have 
determination of government, that no time nuvy 
be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very pre- 
cious now, and perfect unity of action jiecessary. 

G. B. McC. to A. L. . 

The following was telegraphed to Gen. Halleck 
on the 28th': 

Headquarters, Army of the Potonuic, Berkeley, 
July 28, 1862/ 8 a.m. — Nothing especially new 
except corroboration of reports that reinforce- 
ments reaching Richmond from South. It is not 
conBrmed that anAi- of Bragg's troops arf ; 
My ppinion is more and more fir'" 
defense of Washington, and t'.! 
once reinforced by all availalile ;;", 
me to advance. Retreat would be i' 
the armv and the cause. I am 'confide ht 

G. B. McC. 
S. Army. 

On the 30th I sent the followin,^ 
in-chief: 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, erkeley, 
July 30, 1862, 7 p. m. 

I hope that it nray soon be decided what is to 
be done by his army ; and that the :iecision may 
bo to reinforce it at once. We are losing much 
vahiable time, and that at a moment when energy 
and decision are sadly needed. • 

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. IL, Com. U. S. A. 

About half an hour after midnight, on the 
morning of A.ugust 1st, the enemy brought somo 
light batteries to Coggin's Point and tlie Coles 
House on tlio riglit bank of James River, directly 
opposite Harrison's Lai;ding, and opened a heavy 
firo upon cur ship|iing and encampments. It was 
continued riipidly tor about tiiirty minutes, when 
they were driven hack by the fire of our guns. 
This afffdr was reported in the following dis- 
patch : Headq's. Armv of the I'otomac, I'erkeley. 
Aug. 2. .1862, 8 A.M. 

Firing of nr.;ht before ia.'^t killed some 10 men, 
and woninled about 1.5. No harm of the slight- 
est conseqno.'ice done to the shipjnng, although 
several stjiick. Sent part}- across river yester- 
day to the ('oles House ; destroyed it ami cut 
down the tim])er ; will complete work to-day ; 
and also send ])arty to Coggin's Point, which I 
will probably occupy. 1 will attend to ynnr tele- 
graph about presshig, at once, will send Hooker 
out. Give me Bitrnside, and I will stir these 
jiciiple up. I )ieed more cavalry, liavo only 3,700 
for iluty in cavalry divisioii. ^j 

' Ad j -General's office forgot to send- ^ykos's 
C'lr.-.mission, as maj.-gen.. with those of other odni- 
m;i,ud'jrs. Do me ihe iavor to hurry it on. 

G. B. MeG. to iL-Geii. H.-W, H. 
• .Ex" Old "10 .-'ii :£rj. :<uit :n ,\bC.' 



85 



To prevent another demonstration of this cha- 
racter, and to secure a debouche on the south 
side of tlie James, it became necessary to occuj)y 
Coggiu's Point, whicli was done on the 3d, and 
the euemy, as will be seen from the following 
dispatch, driven back towards Petersburg : 

Ueadq's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
Aug. 3, 1862, 10 p. M. 

Coggiu's Point was occupied to-day, and tim- 
ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I 
went over the ground myself, and found that Du- 
aae had, as usual, selected an admirable position, 
which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
labor, so as to make it a formidable tetc-dc-pont, 
covering the landing of a large force. I shall be- 
gin intrencliing it by the labor of contrabands to- 
morrow. The position covers the Coles House, 
which is directly in front of Westover. We have 
now a safe debouche on the south bank, and are 
secure against midnight cannonading. A few 
thousands more men would place us in condition 
at least to annoy and disconcert tlio enemy very 
much. 

I sent Col. Averell this morning with 300 cav- 
alry, to examine the country south side of the 
James, and trj^ to catch some cavalry at Sycamore 
Qhurch, which is on the maui road from Peters- 
burg to Suffolk, and some five mijes from Coles 
Ho.use. ' , , 

lie found a cavalry force of 550 men, attacked 
them at once, drove in their advanced guard to 
their camp, where he ha,d a .sharp skitaiis'ii, and 
dr^'e them oft in disorder. 

*e burned their entire camp, v 
missary and c[uartcr-mastei's stores, and liion re- 
turned and recro.gsed the river. lie took but two 
prisoners, had .one mauwaunded by a ball, and 
one by. a sabro. cut. Capi !MeTnlosh made a 
handsomo charge". The '. o, of 

the 5th regulars, and tl)., cav- 

:alry. 
. Col. Averell conducted this airair,!as he,d<>cs 
everything he iiucfertakes, to ray entire satisfac- 
tion., - . ■ ., 
- G. B. ^leC. to jraj.-Gen.H. ^Y. IT., Com'g. U. S. A. 

On the 1st (ti August, I I'ecelved the following 
•disp^jchcs : 

Washington, July 30, 18G2. 8 p.xr. 

Maj.-Gcn. G. B. McC. — A dispatch just received 
from Gen. Pope, says that desei-ters report that 
the enemy is moving soutlr of James River, and 
that the force in Ptichmond is very small. I sug- 
gest that he be pressed in that direction, so as to 
ascertain the facts of the case. 

IT. W. n., i\Iaj.-Gen. 

Washington, July 30, 1SG2. 8 p.ji.— Maj.-Gen. 
G. B. McC. — In order to enable you to move in 
any direction, it "is necessary to relieve you of 
your sick. The surgeon-general has therefore 
been directed to make arrangements for them at 
other places, and the quarter-master-gencral to 
provide transportation. . I I^ope you will rend 
them away as quickly as po-ssibio, and a<lvise me 
M Uicir removal. i 11. W. II., iraj.-Gcn. 
wIe la clear that tlic general-in-cliiof attaciied 
some weiglt to the report received from Ge)i. 
Pope, and I was justified in supposing; r.hat tlie 
:aiordcr in ri-gard to removing tlio sick, fontcni- 



platcd an offensive movement, rather than a re- 
treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams 
just given, from which to form an opinion as to 
the intentions of the government. The following 
telegram strengthened me in that belief. 

Washington, July 31, 162. 10 a.m. 

Jlaj.-Gen. G. B. jNIcC. — General Pope again tele- 
graphs that the encnw is reported to be evacua- 
ting Richmond, and falling back on Danville and 
Lynchburg. II. W. II., Maj.-Gen. 

In occupying Coggiu's Point, as already de- 
scribed,- I was hifluenced by the ncccssi*}' of pos- 
sessing a secure debouche on the south of the 
James, in order to" enable me to move on the com- 
mimications of Richmond in that direction, as well 
as to prevent a repetition of midnight canouaii- 
ades. 

To carry out Gen. IlallecFs first order of July 
30th, it was necessary lirst to gain po.ssession of 
j\Ialvern Hill, which was occupied b}' the enemy, 
apitarently in some little force, and controlled iho 
direct approach to Richmond, Its temporary oc- 
cupation, at least, was equally necessary in tlis 
event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even 
the abandonment ot the Peninsula. Gen. lIooKer, 
with his own division and Pleasouton'.s cavalry, 
was therefore directed to gain possession of Mal- 
vern Hill on the night of the 2d August." He 
failed lO do so, as the following dispatch recites: 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkley, 
August 9, 1862. 10.20 p.m. . _ , 

T';:- ;:ioyemcnt undortakcii up. tlie river last 

lod, on account ot" the incompetency of 

The proper steps have bscn taken fp- 

iU\,y lo remed}' this evil, and I hope to be ready 

to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as- 

to pressing ; at least, to accompli.sh the first in- 

.dispensable step. G. B. JiIcC, M:ij-Gen.,Coind)'g-. 

' Maj.-Gen. llallcck, Comd'g U. S. A ruiv. 

Oa the 4th Gen. Hooker was rcinforded by Gon. 
]3odgwick's division, and, having obtained a knowl- 
edge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Mal- 
xi'hi Ilill, and driving tho enemy back towards 
Richmond. The following is my icport of this 
aftair at the time : 

. Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862. 1 p.m. 

Maj.-Gen. H, W. Halloek, Comd'g. U. S- Army : 
General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a 
very considerable force of infantry and artillery 
stationed at this i^lace, and carried it handsomely 
driving the enemy towards New Market, which 
is four miles distant, and where it is said they 
have a large force. We have captured 100 pris- 
oners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on 
our part of only three killod and eleveii wounded 
— among the latter two officers. 

I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to 
act as circumstances may require, after tho re- 
' turn of my cavaky reconnoissanccs. 

Tho mass of tlie enemy escaped under the 
cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry arc still in 
pursuit, :.nfi I tiust nvjy succeed ni capturing 
many mor?. 

Thi:^ is a very ;<dvui,t..,ceous i ■ ^•tioll to cover 
.V.I 'advance on' Richmond, uid only I434 miles 
distai)t, and I feel confident that, with reinforce- 
nie'.iib, I could march tliis army (here in live 
d;n f^. 



I this TrisLaiiL learn tiiat sevcr.il brig.ifii'j^ ol t!ic 
enemy iirc four niilcs from liere, on the Quaker 
road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet 
them. ^ 

Gen. ITookei-'s dispositions wore admirable, 
and his ,oificf-rs and men displayed their usual 
gallantry. G. B. McO., Major-Gen. 

On U'lC same day the following telegram was 
sent : 

^falvern Hill, Aug 5, 1862, 8 p.m. 

Jlaj.-Gen. IT, W. H., Commauding U. S. Army. 
— Since my last dispatch Colonel Averell has re- 
turned from a recoinioissancc in the dire'ction of 
Savage's Station, towards Richmond. He en- 
countered the 10th Virginia cavalry near "White 
Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove_ them 
Bonie distance towards Bichmond, capturing 28 
men and horses, and killing and wounding se- 
veral. 

Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one 
direction, and seventeen in another, towards 
Riclnnond, to-day. 

We have secured a strong position on Coggin's 
Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which 
■will effectually prevent the rebels from using ai"- 
tillery hereafter against our camps. 

I learn this evening that there is a foi-ce of 
20,000 men about six miles back from this point, 
on the south bank of the river, what their object 
is I do not know, but will keep a sharp look out 
on their movements. 

I am sending off sick as rapidly as onr trans- 
ports will take thera. I am also doing every- 
thing in my power to carry out your orders, to 
push reconnoisances towards the rebel capital, 
and hope soon to find out whether the reports 
regarding the abandonment of that place arc true. 
G. B. McC, Major-Gen. 

To the dispatch of 1 p.m., August 5, the follow- 
ing ansv/er was received : 

Wasliington, Angnst 6, 1862, .3 a.m. 

Maj.-Gcn. G. B. McC. — 1 have no reinforce- 
ments to send you. II. W. II. Maj.-Gen. 

And soon after the following : 

Washington, August G, ]862. 

Maj,-Gen. G. B. MeC. — You will immediately 
seiid a regiment of cavalry and several batteries 
of artillery to Biu'nside's command at Acquia 
Creek, It is reported that Jackson is moving 
north witli a very large force. 

il. W. II , Major-General. 

On the 4(h I had received Gen. Ilalleck's order 
of the 3d (which appears below), directing mo to 
withdraw the army to Acquia, and on the same 
day sent an earnest protest against it. 

A few hours before this, Gen. Hooker had in- 
formed me that his cavalry pickets reported large 
bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them 
in, and that he would probably be attacked at, 
daybreak. Under these circumstances I had de- 
tc'injied to support him, but as I could not get 
tliu whole army in position until tho next after- 
noon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above 
telegram from lite general-in-chief, to withdraw 
Gen. Hook( r, that there mi.uht be the least jvos- 
siblc delay in oonformiug to Ocn. ilalleck's orders. 
1 therefore sent to Gen. llnokor tho following 
letter : 



86 



Headquartcis, Aimv of the Polomae, 
Berkeley, August G', 1862. 10 p.m. 

My dear General: — I lind it will not be possi^ 
ble to get the whole army in position before some 
time to-morrow afternoon, which will he too late 
to support you and hold the entire position, 
should the enemy attack in large torce at day- 
break, Avhich there is strong reason to suppose 
he intends doing. 

Should we light a general battle at Malvern, h 
will be necessary to abandon the whole of our 
works here, and run tho aisk of getting baci 
here. ' • 

Under advices I have received from Washing- 
ton, I think it necessary for you to abandon the 
position to-night, getting everything awty before 
daylight.. 

Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with 
orders to destroy the Turkey Greek Bridge wher 
they are forced back. 

The roads leading into Ilaxalls from the right 
should be strongl}' v,-atched, and Haxalls at least 
held by strong cavalry force and some light bat- 
teries, as long as possible. 

I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely 
to your discretion. 

Please signal to tho fleet when the withdrawal 
is about completed. 

Report frequently to these headquarters. Gen. 
Sumner w.as ordered up to support you, but will 
halt where this passes liim. and will inform you 
where he is. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Gen. J. n., Comd'g at Malvern Hill. 

And the following reply was sent to Gtn. 
Ilalleck: ^ 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1862, 11.30 p. m. 

Dispatli of to-day received. I have not quifo 
four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry divi- 
sion, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. I 
really need many more than I now have, to carry 
out your instructions. 

The enemy are moving a large force upon 
jVIalvern Hill. In view of your dispatches, and 
the fact that I can not place the whole army in 
position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker 
to Avithdraw during the night, if it is po.spible. 
If he can not do so, I must support him. •Until 
this matter is developed, I can not send any bat- 
teries. 1 hope I can do so to-morrow, if trans- 
portation is on hand., 

I willbbey the ordVr as soon as circumstances 
will admit. My .artillery is none too nnnerous 
now. I Jiave only been able to send oil some 
twelve hundred sick; no transportation. Thero 
shall be no tlelay that I can avoid. G. B. Mc(!., 
M;;j.-(jcn. Comd'sr. 

Maj.-Gen. H. \V. H., Comd'g U. S. Army. 

Five batteries, with their horses and equip- 
ments com))lete, were embarked on the 7th and 
8lh. Simultaneously with Gen. Hooker's opera- 
tions upon Malvern, I despatched a cavalry force 
under Col, Averell towards Savage's Station, to 
ascertain if the enemy Avere making any move- 
ments towards our left flank. He Unmd a rebel 
cavalry regiment near the White-Oak Swamp 
Hriilge, and cnmfiletcly routed it, pursuing' well 
towards Savage's Station. 



b7 



These important pieliimnaiy operatione assieted 
my preparations for the removal of the army to 
Acquia Creek, and the sending off our eick and 
supplies was pushed both day and night a3 ra- 
pidly as the means of transportation permitted. 

Oa the subject of the witlulrawal ot the army 
from Harrison's Landing, the followmg corres- 
pondence passed between the Gcneral-in-chiet 
and myself while the reconuoissances towards 
Richmond were in progress : _ . 

On the 2d of August I received the following . 

Washington, Aug. 1, 1862, 3.4o p. m. 
Mai -Gen G. B. McG- :— You have not answered 
my telegram [of July 30, 8 p.m.] about the re- 
moval o1- your sick. Remove them as rapidly as 
possible, and telegraph me when they will be out 
of your way. The President wishes an answer 
as early as possible. tt j . a 

To which this reply was sent : Ileadq s, Army 
of the Potomac, Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862 11 p. m. 

Your telegram of 2d is received. The answer 
rto dispatch of July 30] was sent this morning. 
We have about 12,500 sick, of whom perhaps 
4 000 might make easy marches. We have here 
the means to transport 1,200, and will embark to- 
morrow that number of the worst cases. With 
allthe.meansatthe disposal of the medical di- 
rector, the reinairider could be shipped in trorn , 
to 10 davs. It is impossible for me to decide 
what cases to send off, unless I know what is to 
be done with this army. 

Were the disastrous measures of a retreat 
adopted, all the sick who can not march and fignt 
should be despatched by water. Should the 
army advance, many of the sick could be of ser- 
vice at the depots. " If it is to remain here any 
length of time, the question assumes still a diiiei'- 
ent phase. , ■, t 

Until I am informed what is to be done, 1 can- 
not act uiiderstaudingly, or for the good of the 
service. If I am kept longer in ignorance^ ot 
what is to be elfected, I cannot be expected to 
accomplish the obje'ct in view. In the meantime 
I will do all in my power to carry out what I con- 
ceive to be your wishes. 
" G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A. 

The moment I received the instructions for re- 
moving the sick, I at once gave the necessary di- 
rections for carrying them out. With the small 
amount of transportation at hand, the removal ot 
the severe cases alone would necessarily take 
several days, and in the meantime I desired in- 
formation to determine what I should do with 
others. 

. The order required mo to send them away " as 
quickly as possible, and to notify the Gen.-in-Chief 
when ihey were removed." 

Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the 
2'd of August, not havhig been advised of what 
ihe army under my command was expected to do, 
or which way it was lo move, if it moved at all, I 
sent the following dispatch : 

Ileadti's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
Aug. 3, 1862. 
I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe : are they 
for removing my sick? If so, to what extent am 
I required to go in sending them off? 
There are not many who need go 



As 1 iiin not in any way informed of the intea- 
tions of the government in regard to tliis army, I 
am unable to judge what proportion of the sick 
should leave here, and must ask for specific 
orders. „ ,„ „ 

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H. ^ 
If the army %vas to retreat to Fort Monroe, it 
was important that it should be unincumbered 
with any sick, wounded, or other men who might 
at all interfere with its mobility ; but if the ob- 
ject was to operate directly on Richmond from the 
position we then occupied, there were many cases 
of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, 
and the patients returned to duty. As the ser- 
vice of every man would be important in the 
event of a forward offensive movement, I con- 
ceived it to be of the utmost consequence that I 
should know what was to be done. It was to 
ascertain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 P. Jt. 
on the 3d, before receiving the following tele- 
gram : ^ ,^ 

Washington, Aug. 3,1862. 7.45 p. m. 
Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McC— I have waited most 
anxiously to learn the result of your forced re- 
connoissance towards Richmond, and also wheth- 
er all your sick have been sent away, and I can 
get no ansAver to my telegram. It is determined 
to withdraw your army from flie Peninsula ta 
Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures 
to effect this, covering the movement the best 
you can. Its real object and withdrawal should 
be concealed even from your own officers. Year 
material and transportation should be removed 
first. You will assume control of all the means,. 
of transportation within your reach, and apply 
to the naval forces for all the assistance they cam 
render you. You will consult freely with the 
commander of these forces. Tho entire execu- 
tion of the movement is left to your discretion 
and judgment. You will leave such forces a« 
you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, 
and other places which we must occupy. 

H. W. H„ Maj-Gen. Comd'g Q. S. A. ^ 
I proceeded to obey this order with all possi- 
ble rapidity, tirmly impressed, however, with the 
conviction that the withdrawal of the army of 
the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its 
communications had, by the co-operalion of the 
gun-boats, been rendered perfectly secure, would 
at the time have the most disastrous effect upon 
our cause. I did not, as the ooimuanderof that 
army, allow the occasion to pass without distinct- 
ly setting forth my views upon the subject to 
the authorities, as in the following telegram. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkely, 
Aug. 4,1862. 12 m. , . . , . 

Your telegram of last evening is received, i 
must confess that it has caused me the greatest 
pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that 
the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek 
will prove disastrous to our cause. 
I fear it will be a fatal blow. 
Several days are necessary to complete the 
preparations for so important amovementas this; 
and while they arc in progress, I beg that car<v, 
ful consideration may be given to my statomeDts, 
This army is now in excellent discipline and, 
condition. We hold a debouche on both bank* 



88 



of the James R,ivcr, so (liaL we are free to act in 
any direction, ami with the assistance of the gun- 
boats I consider our coinniuuications as now se- 
cure. We are twenty-five miles from Richinond, 
and are not likcJy to meet the enemy in force suf- 
ficient to tiglit a battle, until we have marched 
fifteen to eighteen miles, whicii brings us practi- 
cally within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest 
line of land transportation would be from this 
point twenty-five miles : but witli the aid' of the 
gun-boats we can supply the army by water du- 
ring its advance, cettuhily to within twelve miles 
of Richmond. 

At Acquia Creek we would be scventy-fiY.e 
miles from RicTiniond, with land transpbrtdtiou 
all the way. '.' . 

From here to Fort Monroe, is a march of ab'out 
seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable 
to withdraw this arni^ and its material, except 
by land. ' '■' 

I iThe result of the movement would thus 'be a 
marcli of one hundred and forty-five miles to 
reacfli a point now only twentj'-five miles distant, 
and to deprive ourselves entire'}'' of the power- 
ful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. 
Add to t'lis the certain demoralization of this ar- 
my, v.-'iich would.cnsuc,, the terribly dcpresshig 
ett'c't upon thepicop'lc of.thcNort''i,;u!d tt-estVong 
prub:!,biiii:y that itwonhl inflin'.'i-c t'o. ■','■■-•; dow- 
6VS to recognize our advovria: 
tOTne sufficient reasons t>) ;:i'. 
duty to'iii-.';o,in Ll: lerms a ' 

onrii;\:ii"i;i;j,\ that may be ; 

4ind thai:, l\a' from rcca.liug Lais army it be ].)i\;iiip|- 
ly reinforced to enable .it to resiune the offensive. 

It may be said tliat there are tvorfiihfoi"cerne'nts 
available.' I ])oint fo ]>urnside's force.io that of- 
P6pe,"not nec^ssai-y to maintain a'strict defensive 
in front of ^Vasi liiig ton ami liar ncr's Ferry, to 
ifiose portions of the array of tlio west not rc- 
qixircd for'a strict defensive there, llcrc direct!}^ 
in front of this army, is tueheitrfof the rebcHion; 
it is here that all our rcsoni'ces siuiuldbo collect 
ed to sirike the blow which will" determine- the 
fate of the nation,. All points of secondary 'im- 
portance elscwlicrc' s!io:i! ! Iv^ aUaiidoiied, and 
ever}' available man h)\y\ a decided vic- 

tory here, and the milil.!. , a of the rebel- 

lion is crushed — ib-niattcrt; not what partial rc- 
verscs'we may meet with elsewhere.. Here is the 
true defense of AVasliington ; it isliero on the 
banks of the James that the fate of the Union 
'Bliould be deciiled 

Clear in my coir right, strong in tlie 

consciousness that i ...i^. v >^r been, 'and still am 
actfiated solely by love of my country, knowing" 
that no ambitious or sellish motives have influ- 
enced me IVonr the coin'mencement of this war, I 
do nov\', w't'! T I) 'ver'did in my life before, I c\\- 

■ may iio rescinded. 

■ OS )i(it ])r(ivail, I w';!l \> '. i 
tiad lio.a'l, obi.-y .);>'ur orders to the ui'.nu.sl, of n\y 
power, directing to the movement, Avhicii I clearly 
foresee will I)e one of tlie utmost, delicacy and 
diiUcult}', ■■.v'ii:itevcr skill I jaay possess. 

Whatv; ' csu't may bo, and God grant 

tliatlii!;: i in ii'.y forebodings, I shall al, 

leiist have ...v .utornal dati'iiiic'.tion tliat'l" have 
writtoji and Kuokcii frankly, u,ud have tiuagliL lo 



do tlic best in my power to avert disaster from 
niv countr}'. G. B. iMcC, Maj.-t^on. Comd'g. 

■-Maj.-Gen. II. W. 11., Connbg U. S. A. 

Soon after sending this telegram,! received Iho 
following in reply to mine of II p.-m. of tiie 3d: 
Washington, Aug. 4, 18'62, 12.45 r. m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. Mc. C: — My telegram to you 
yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future ope- 
rations. It was expected that you would havo 
S(^it oif your sick as directed, without waiting to 
know what were or would be the intentions of 
the govennnent respecting future movementa. 
The President expects that the instructions which 
were sent to you yestorday, with his ajiproval, 
will be carried out with aU possible dispatch and 
caution. .Ti)o quartcr-mttster-gencral is sending 
to Fort ]\Ionroe all the' traiisportatiou he can col- 
lect. II. W. II., Maj.-Gen. • •. 

To which tl\e following is my reply : 

Headquarters, Army of the Pofomac, 
Berkeley, Aug list 5, 18G2, 7 a. m. 

Your telegram of ycsterilay received, and ia 
being carried out as [)roniptly as possible. With 
the means at my command, no human power 
could have niovetl the sick in the time you say 
you expected them to be moved. A}. B. i\lcO., 
Alaj-Gen. 

iMaj.-Gcn. W; H. II. , Cbmd g U. S.'A. 

My" efforts" for bringing; about a change of 
policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen from 
t'le following te.egram and letter VeCeivcd by mo 
i;; reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th : 

Washington, A":r-.-t :\ 1802, 12 m. 

Maj.-Gen. G.B. i\rcU.: mot regret tho 

order of ■\Vit!tdraw'-aI"^'m I did the neces- 

sity of giviug it. it will iioL be rescinded, and 
you will be exj)ccted to execute it with all possi- 
ble promptness. It is believed that it can bo 
done now without serious diinger. This may 
not be so if Hiero should be anj' delay. 

I will write j'ou mv views more fully by mail. 
11. W. 11/, Maj.-Gen. Couv.l'g U. S. A. 

The letter was as follows : 

'■■ ■' Headquarters of the Army, 

\V;vshington, Aug. G, 18()2. 
Miij.-Gcn. MoO., Comd'g. .^ci^Bcrkeley.Va. 

(reneral, — Your telegram of ycsterd-ay was re- 
ceived this morning, and 1 inniiediately telegraph- 
ed a brief reply, promising to write you more 
fully by mail. ■' 

You, General, ccrbvinl}'^ could not' havo Dccn 
more piiincd at receiving my order, than I was at 
the necessity of issuing it. ''1 'was advised by 
high oflicers, in whoso judgiuent Iliad great con- 
fidence, to make the ord6r 'i'ntiiiediately on my 
arrival licrc, but I determined nOt to do so until 
I could learn your. wishes from a personal inter- 
view : and even iifter that interview I tried every 
viicans in my poacr to avoid withdrawing your 
army, and delayed my decision 'as l.o:ig as 1 dared 
to delay it. ' ' -••■'•' 

1 assurp you, General, vt was not a hasty and 
Hnconsidcred act, but on6 '.hat caused mc more 
anxious thought than, any odicr of my life. But 
after full and mature consideration of all the pros 
andcortii, I Was reluctantly forced to the conclu- 
&\o\\ that the order must he issued. There was, 
to my mind, no'nite.riiativc. ' • 

Aiiow uie U) allude to a few of the facts in Iho 



casi- You and your officers, at our interview, 
estimated the enemy's forces in and around 
l^cluuond at two hundred thousand men. Since 
then, you and others report that tliey have re- 
ceived and are ~ receivintj large reinlbrcenients 
from the South.' •••■ - 

Gen.' Popc'a array, now (Jo'*^erinsj Washington, 
is only about forty thousand. Your effective 
force is oiily about ninety thousand. You, arc 
atjout thirty miles from Richmond, au<l Gen. Pope 
eighty or ninety, with tho enemy directly bc- 
tweiertyou, ready to fall with his superior num- 
bers upon: one or the other, as he may elect. 
Neither can reinforce the other in case of such 
an attack. If Gen. Pope s army be diminished to 
reinforce you, Washington, Mar3dand, and Penn- 
sylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. 
If your foi'ce bo reduced to strengthen Pope, you 
would bo too weak to even hold the position you 
now occupy, should tho enem}' turn round and 
attack you in full fore<». In other words, the old 
army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with 
the ;'.;e of" tliO enemy directly between 

the an not be united by land without 

exp« •.,.:_ ,n,.ii to destruction, and yet they must 
be united. To send Pope's forces by water to 
the V .ii'iisi!; I v- ni.i<T rtresent circumstances, a 
mil The only alternative is to 

sen Peninsula ■ to some point 

by .UsbWrg, Avliere th6 two 

ari-i- -"'^ 

1. ) some of the objections 

^v*!' Yoiv <?ay that the witb- 

will cause the 

:rrf, '• which is 

conditioii," I 

iiange of posi- 

•b iLstant base, will 

;;t discipline, unless 

'■'' H'at demoraliza- 

'^jjl ndt. ' Your 

:'3 right at Han- 

ov ;L position was 

ov • ;. heard that it 

deniorai.'/.-t your iio'.njrf, nut'.vithsranding the 

severe lus-jes they sustained, in eS'ecting'it. 

\ new base on the Kappahaiinock at Freder- 
^bnrg brings you within about sixty miles of 
i;ivliniond, and secures a reinforcement of forty 
' or liffy thousand fresh and disci]dined troops. 
'Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction 
might be ertbcted at Yorktown; but that a liank 
niarcli a'-;'' '' ■ rsthmns would be more hazar- 
dous t! i to Fort Monroe. Y'ou Avill 
remeiii ;ctown is two or three miles 
further aond than Fredericksburg is. 
■Be.s: I !■:•.; . i.i \'( t'v-evi T!;riiniond and 
Was^ii;.) from anv 
attack , ^ " 

The ] ilio witiidrawal may at 

lirst be M tliiiik the public are 

bcginni necessity, and that 

they wi:: •nhdctiec in a xmited 

army, than 1:1 ,'..3 sc;^.:ir;;t<.! iragmonts. ' ' 

Ikit you <\-iU repjy, why not reiuforce rae herd, 
so that I can strike' Richmond from my present 
po^sition? ' To do this you said at our intervie\'^, 

thnt vol! i.-qti'VcuV tliirfv r!,.,,ic.:.,,,l -Tirlitional 



89 



troops. I told you that it was impossible to give 
you so majiy. You Ihially thought ycu would 
have "some chance" of success with twenty 
thousand. But you afterwards tclcgrtphed mo 
that you would require thirty-five thousand, as 
the enemy was being largely reinforced. If your 
estimate of tho enemy's strength was correct, 
your requisition was perfectly reasonable ; but it 
was utterly impossible to fill '^ until new troops 
could be enhsted and orgamzcd, which, would 
require several weeks. 

To keep your army in its present position un- 
til it could be so reinforced, would almost destroy 
it in that climate. The months of August and 
September are almost fntal to whites who live on 
that part of James River, and even after j-ou re- 
ceive the reinforcements asked for, j^ou admitted 
that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river 
batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. 
It is by no means certain that the reduction of 
these fortifications wotdd not require considerable 
time, perhaps as much as tliose at Y'orktown. 
This delay might not only be fatal tp the health 
of your army, but in the meantime Gen. Pope's 
forces would bo exposed to the heavy blows of 
the enemy withoiit the slightest hopf of assist- 
ance from you. . '"' 

In regard to, the demoralizing effect of a with- 
drawal from the Penmsula to the Rappahanr.ock, 
I must reniark that a lai'g'e number of your high- 
est officers, indeed, a jnojority of those whoso 
opinions have been reported to nie, are decidedly 
iu favor of the movement. Even severnl of those 
who originally advoctited th'c lii _ Tonin- 

sula, now advise its abandoHrnent. 

I halve not inquired, and do not wis;: to know 
b}-^ whose advice, or for wluit reasons the army of 
the Potomac was separated into two parts with 
the enemy between them. I must take things as 
I find them. I find the forces divide<l, and I wish 
to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been 
pre.scntcd for doing this. If you or any one else 
had presented a better plan, I certainly should 
have adopted it. ■ But all of your plans require 
reinforcements, which it is impossible to give 
3'ou. It is A'ery easj' to asJc for reinforcements ; 
but it is not so easy to give them when you have 
no disposable troops at your command. 
' I have written very plainly', as I luiderstand 
the case, and I hope you will give me credit for 
having fully considered the matter, although I 
niay have arrived at very different conlusions 
from your own,. 

Very respcctTully, youv obedient servant, • 
; ir. W. II., Gen'.-in-Chief. 

On the Tth T received the following telegram: 
Washington,. Aug. 7, 18G2. 10 a.m. 

Maj.-Gen, G. B. McO. : — You will immediately 
report the number of sick sent otf since you re- 
ceived my order ; the nnmber still to be shipped, 
and the amount of transportation at your dis- 
posal ; that is, the number of persons that can bo 
carried on all tjic vessels which by ray order you 
were authorized to control. 

_ H. W. H., .Maj.-Gen. 

To which \ made this reply : 
Ilradq's., Ar.iiv of tlie J'ot'c, A-.ig. 7, 'C,2. lO.-lO p.m. 

iMaj.-Oen. H. W. H..C.nn.i; i:!. A. :~In reply to 



your despatch of 10 a. m. to-day I report the inim- 
ber of eick sent off since I received your order, 
as follows : 3,740, inchiding some that are em- 
barked ta-iiiglit, and will leave to-morrow morn- 
ing. The nnmbcr still to be shipped, is, as near- 
ly as can be ascertained, 5,700. 

The embarkation of five battei-ies of artillcrj', 
horses, wagons, etc., required most of our availa- 
ble boats except the ferry-boats. All the trans- 
ports that can ascAid to this place, have been or- 
dered up, the}' will be here to-morrow evening. 
Col. Ingalls reports to me that there are no trans- 
ports now available for cavalry, and will not be 
for two or three days. As soon as they can be ob- 
tained, I shall send off the 1st New York cavahy. 
After tlie transports with sick and wounded 
have returned, including some heavy draft steam- 
ers at Fort Monroe, tliat cannot come to tliis point, 
we can transport 25,000 men at a time. We have 
Bomo propellers here, but they are laden with 
commissary supplies, and are not available. The 
transports now employed in transporting sick and 
wounded,. will carry 12.000 well infantry soldiers. 
Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to 
come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. 
Several of the largest steamers have beon used 
for transporting prisoners of war, and have only 
been available for the si(5k to-day. 

G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
The report of my chief quartermaster upon tlic 
Bubject is as follows : 

lieadipiarters, Army of the Potomac, Office of 
chief Quartermaster, Harrison's Landing, Au"-. 7, 
I8G2. 

General: — I have the honor to return the }-a- 
pers herewith, which you sent me, with the fol- 
lowing remarks : 

AVe are embarking five batteries of artillery, 
with their horses, baggage, etc., which requires 
the detailing of most of our available boats, ex- 
cept the ferry-boats. 

The medical departmen has 10 or 12 of our 
largest transport vessels which, if disposable, 
could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some 
lieavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot 
come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 fir 
10,000 infantry. 

I have ordered all up here that can ascend lo 
this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. 
As it now is. after tl '; details already made, we 
cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 
infantr}'. 

There are no transjorts now available for cav- 
ahy. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels 
arrive, I could transpurt 10,000 infanluy. In two 
or thi'.ce days a regiment of cavalry can be sent 
if required. 

If you wait and ship from Yorktown or Fort 
Monroe, after the sick and wounded transports 
are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a 
time. The number (hat can be transported, is 
contingent on circumstances referred to. 

Jlost of the projjcllers here are laden with 
commissary, or other supplies, and most of the 
tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft, also la- 
den with supplies. 

I am very respectfully, your most obedient ser- 
vant, RuFUR Inqali.s, Ciiicf Quartermaster. 
C.Mi.n. B. Marcy, Chief of Stafl". 



90 



On the 9th I received this despatch : 

Washington, Aug. 9, 1SG2. 12.45 p. a, 
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC— I am of opinion that the 
enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals 
Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush 
them, and move forward to the Potomac. You 
must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia 
Creek. 

Considering the amount of transportation at 
your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory, 
you must move with all possible celerity. 

H. W. H. Maj-Gen. 
To wliich I sent the following reply : 
Headquarters, Array of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
Aug. 10,1862. ■8 a.m. 

Telegram of yesterday received. The batter- 
ies sent to Burnside, took the last available trans- 
port yesterday morning. Enough have since ar- 
rived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. 
_ The sick are being embarked as rapidly as i)os- 
sible. There has been no unnecessary i\e\ny as 
you assert, not an hour, but everything has been, 
and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to car- 
ry out your orders. 
■ G. B. JIcC. to Maj..Gen, H. W. H., Comd'g D. 

CI A J > JO 

b. Army. 

The following report, made on the same day 
by the officer then in charge of the transisor'ta, 
ex2>oses the injustice of the remark in the dis* 
I)atch of the general-in-chief, that, " considering • 
the amount of transportation at your disposal, 
your delay is not satisfactory." 

Assistant Quartermaster's office. Army of the 
Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Ya., Aug. 10, 1862. 

Gen. M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General U. S. 
Army, Washington : — Col, Ingalls being himself 
ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concern- 
ing the state and capacity of the transports now 
here. 

On the night of the 8th I despatch.ed eleven 
steamers, principally small ones, and six schoon- 
ers, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery^ 
none of which have yet returned. 

Requisition is made this morning for transports 
ation of one thousand cavalry to Acquia Creek,^ 
All tlie schooners that had been cliartered for 
carrj'ing horses, have been long since discharged 
or changed into freight vessels. 

A large proportion of the steamers now here 
are still loaded witji stores, or are in the floating 
hospital service, engaged in removing the sick. 
To traTisport the one thousand cavalry to-day will 
take all the available steamers now here not en- 
gaged in the service of the harbor. These steam- 
ers could take a large number of infantry ; but 
are not v/cll adapted to the carrying of horses, 
and much space is thus lost. 

Several steamers are expected here to-day, and 
we are unloading schooers rapidly. !Most of these 
are not chartered, but are being t dcen for the 
service required at same rates of pay as other 
chartered schooners. 

If you could cause a more speedy return of 
the steamers sent away from here, it would facili- 
tate matters. C. G. Sawtelle. 

Capt. and A. Q. M. ConuFg Dejiof, 

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were 
very limited, admitting but few vessels at one 
time. These were continually in use as long aa 



there were disposable vessels, and the officers of 
the medical and quartermaster's departments, 
with all their available forces, were incessantly 
occupied, day and night, in embarking and Fend- 
ing off the sick men, troops and material. 

Notwithstanding the repeated representations 
I made to the general-in-chief that such were the 

ots, on the lOlh I received the folloAving : 

Washington, Aug. 10, 1862, 12 r. m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. : — The enemy is crossing 
the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting 
Gen. Pope to-day ; there must be no further delay 
in your movements. That which has already oc- 
curred Avas entirely unexpected, and must be 
satisfactorily explaiTied. Let not a moment's time 
be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress 
you have made in executing the order to transfer 
your troops. H. W. IT., Maj.-Gen. 

To which I sent this reply : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Berkeley, Aug. 10, 18C2, 12.30 p. m. 

Your desjiatch of to-da}' is received. I assure 
you again that there has not been an}'' unneces- 
sary delay in carrying out your orders. You are 
probably laboring under some great mistake as 
to the amount of transportation available here. I 
have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off 
our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside. 

Col. Ingalls has more than once informed the 
Quartermaster General of the condition of our 
water transportation. From the fact that you 
, directed me to keep the order secret, I took it 
for granted that you would take the steps neces- 
sary to provide the requisite transportation. A 
large number of transports for all arms of ser- 
vice, and for wagons, should at once be sent to 
Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to 
move the whole army by land, the moment the 
sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not 
an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I 
fear j'ou do not realize the difficulty of the ope- 
ration proposed. The regiment of cavalry for 
Burnside has been in course of embarkatio'n to- 
day and to-night. Ten si earners were required 
for the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty-eight 
sick loaded to-day and to-night. Oar means ex- 
hausted, except one vessel retvifning to Fort 
Monroe in the morning, which will take some 
five hundred cases of slight sickness. 

The present moment is probably not the proper 

• one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and 

unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, 

however, make no difference in my official action' 

G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. U. Corad'g U. S. 
Arm3^ 

On the 11th th's report was made : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potcmac, Berkclv 
Aug. 11,1862. 11.40 r.M. 

The embarkation of eight hundred and fifty 
cavalry and one brigade of infantry will be com- 
pleted by two o'clock in the morning, five hun- 
dred sick were embarked to-day ; another vessel 
arrived to-night, and six hundred more sick arc 
now being embarked. I still have some four 
thousand sick to dispose of. You have been 
grossly misled as- to the amount of transporta- 
tion at my disposal. Vessels loa^ied to their ut- 
most capacity with stores and others indispensa- 



91 

ble for service here, have been reported to you as 
available for carrying sick and well. I am send- 
mg off all that can be unloaded at Fort l^fonroe, 
to have them return here. I repeat tliat I have 
lost no time in carrying out your orders. 

G. B. McC, Maj-Gen. Comd'g to Maj-Gon H. W. 
H. Comd'g U. S. Army. 

On the same day I received the following from 
the quartermaster in charge of the depot : 

Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the 
Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 11, 1862,- 

Colonel :— In reply to the communication froiQ 
Gen. .Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I 
have to state that there arc now in this' harbor 
no disposable transports not already detailed 
either for the use of the hosi)Ital depavlment, or 
the transportation of the N. Y. cavalry, or for the 
necessary service of the harbor. I think the 
steamers loading, and to be loaded with cavalry, 
could take in addition, tJn-ee thousand wfantry; 
these boats are however directed to leave as fast 
as they are loaded ; some have alrea,dy started. 
The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going 
on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hur- 
ry the matter, although I have had severai agents 
of the department, and one commissioned officer 
at the wharf to render all thje assistance possi- 
ble. The entire army is this morning turning in 
to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officer's bag- 
gage and other surplus property, and with our 
limited Avharf facilities, it is impossible, imless. 
the regular issues of forage, &c. are suspended,, 
to avoid great confusion and delay with what ia 
already ordered to be done ; of course, if any in- 
fantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry 
transports, the confusion and difficulties will be 
increased. 

I know of no boats that may be expected here 
to-day, except the " South America" and " Fanny 
Cadwallader" (a propeller) which were ordered 
to be sent back from Fort Mom-oc. 

The transports with the artillery left for Acquia. 
Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of 
the 9th. They were ordered to return nnmedi 
ately. I am, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, T. G. Sawtelle. 

Capt. and A. Q. II. Comd'g Depot. 
Licut.-Col. Rufus Ingalls, A. D. C. and chief Q. M. 
Army of the Potomac. 

On the 12th I received the following : 

Washington, Aug. 12. 1802. 12 m. 

Maj-Gen. G. B. ilcClellan —The quartermaster 
general informs me that nearly every available 
steam vessel in the country is now under your 
control. To send more from Philadelphia, Balti- 
more, and New York, Avould interfere with the- 
transportation of army supi)lics, and break up 
the channels of travel by which we arc to bring 
forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly 
thirteen thousand troops to Acquia Creek, in less 
than two days, and his transports were immedi- 
ately sent back to j'on. All vessels in the James 
River and Chesapeake Bay were placed, at your 
disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten 
thousand of your men could be transported dai- 
ly. In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet 
of sailing vessels which could be used as trans- 
ports, "The bulk of your material on shore, it 



92 



•was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe cov- 
ered by that part of the army which could not 
get water transportation. Such were the views 
of tlie government here ; perhaps we were mis- 
informed as to the facts ; if so, the delay could 
be explained. Nothing in my, telej^ram was in- 
tentionally harsh or unjust ; but the delay Avas 
•Bonn expected, that an 'explanation Avas required. 
There has been and is the most nrgent necessity 
for dispatch, and not a single moment must l)e 
lost in getting additional troo])S in front of 
Washington. H. W. 11. JTapGcn. 

I telegraphed the following reidy: Ileadq's., 
Army oi" the Pot'c, Berkeley, Aug. 12, '62, 11 p.m. 

Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is 
positivelj^ the tact that no more men could have 
•embarked heiice than have gone, and that no un- 
necessary' delay lias occurred. Before' your or- 
ders received. Col. Ingalls directed all available 
•vessels to come from ifonroe. Officers have been 
sent to take personal direction, itave heard no- 
thing here of JSurnside's fleet. There are some 
vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic," 
which draw too much to come here. Hoajntal ac- 
commodations exhausted this side New York. Pro- 
pose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases 
for New York, and to encamp slight cases for the 
present at Afonroc. In this way can probably get 
off tlie'8.4t;0 sick still on hand liy day after to- 
morrow night. I am sure that yon have been mis- 
informed as to the availability of vessels on hand. 
We cannot use heavy loaded supply vessels for 
troops or animals, and such constitute the mass 
of those here, which have been represented to 
you as cajrable of transporting this arm}'. I fear 
you will find very great delay in -embarking 
troops and marerial at Yorktown and Monroe, 
both from want of vessels and of facilities for 
embarkation. At least two- additional Avharvcs 
shoidd be built at each place. I ordered two at 
the latter some two weeks ago, but you counter- 
manded the order. 

I l"arn that wharf, accommodations at Acquia 
are altogether inadequate for landing troops and 
sup{)lies to any la|pe extent. Not an hour should 
be lost ill remedying this. Great delays will en- 
sue thev6 from shallow water. You will find a 
large deficiency in horse transports; -sve had 
nearly 20U when we came here. I learn of only 
20 \\rovided now ; they carr}' about 50 horses 
-each. More hospital accommodations should bo 
provided. We are much impeded here because 
our wharv(is are used night and day to land cur- 
rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty Avill 
occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and 
Waslungtoii, six weeks about were occupied in 
embarking this army and its material. 

Burnside's troops arc not a fair criterion for 
rate of embarkation. All his mcaiis were in hand 
— his outfit specially prepared for that purpose, 
and his men habituated to the movement. 

There shall be no muieccssary delay, but I can- 
not maind'acture vessels. I state these difficul- 
ties from experience, and because it appears to 
me that we have been lately Avorking at cross 
puriioses, because j'ou have not been properly 
informed by those around j'on v/ho ought to 
kt!<,w the inherent difficulties of S'lch an mider- 
takiif 



It is not possible for any one to place this array 
where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a 
month. If Washington is in danger now, this 
army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is 
in much better position to do so from here than 
from Acquia. -Our material can. only be saved by 
using the whole army to cover it if we are pres- 
sed. If sensibly v/eakened by detachments, the 
result might be the loss of much material and 
many men. I will be at the telegraph office to- 
morrow morning to talk with you. 

G. B. McC. to II. W. H., Washington, D. C. 
To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch, 
to show why Gen. Burnside's movement from 
Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our ope- 
rations, the following may be added : 

He was not encumbered by cither sick or 
wounded men. 

He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons or teams 
His force consisted of infantrj'- alone; with a few 
ambulances and officers' horses. 

His baggage was already on the transports 
where it had remained since his arrival fromv 
North Carolina, and his men had only to resume 
their places on board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentiojiod in my dis 
patches of- the 7th, 10th and 11th were sent^ to 
supply his-total deficiency in those arms. 

, 1 ma_y<iIso repeat that the vessels used by Gen 
Burnside had not returned fr-oin Acquia when 
the army left Ilarrisoii's Bar. . "■ 

It will be seen from the concluding paragraph 
of the foregoing dispach, tljat in order to h-ive a 
more direct, speedy and full oxplanatioh of the 
condition of affairs in the army than I couid by 
sending a single dispatch by steamer to the 
' nearest telegraph ofiice at Jamestown Island 
some sevcntv niiles distant, and waiting ten hom'S 
for a r.ep]}', I proposed to .go in pertion to the 
office.' On my arrival at Jamestown Island there 
was an interruption in the electric current, Avhicb 
rendered it necessarj' for me to continue on to 
Fort Monroe, and cross the Chesapc;ake Bay to 
Cherry Stone Inlet on the, " Eastern Shore,' 
where I arrived late n\ the evening and immc 
diatclv sent the annexed dispatches. 

Cherry Stone, Aug. 13, 1862, lL30.r.w.— Please 
come to office : wish to talk to you. What news 
from Pope-? G. B. McO., J; 

Maj.-Gen. II. AY. II., AVasliii:gton. 
Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862, 12.oU a.m.— 
Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; 
found cable broken, and came here. Please read 
my long telegram. [See above dispatch of Aug, 
12, 11 I'.M.] All quiet at camp. Enemy burned 
wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel 
pickets within eiglit miles of Coggin's Point yester- 
da_y. Richmond prisoners state that large force, 
with guns, left Richmond, northward. Sund-a}'. 
G. B.^AIcC. Maj.-Gen. ]\laj-Gen. II. W. n.,Wash. 
To which the following reply was received: 
Washington, August 14, 18C2, 1.40 a.m.— 1 have 
read your disjuitch. There is no change of 
]ilans. You will send up your troops as rapidly 
as possible. There is no difficulty in landing 
them. According to your own accounts tJiere^s 
now no difliculty in withdrawing your forces. 
Do so with all possible rapidity. 
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. 11. \V. 11., .Maj.-Gen. 



93 



Before 1 ha I time to decipher and reply to this 
dispatch, tlie telegrajjh operator in Wasliington 
informed nie that Gen. Ilalieck had gone out of the 
office immediately after writing this dispatch, 
witliont leavnig'any intimation of the fact for 
me or waiting for any information as to the ob- 
ject of my journey across the bay. As there was 
no possibility of other communication with him 
at that time, I sent the following dispatch, and 
returned to Harrison's Landing. 

Chen-y Stone Inlet. Aug. 14, 1862, 1.40 a. m. 

Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. 
I liad hoped to have had a longer and fuller con- 
versation with 3'ou, after traveliiig so far for tlu? 
pm-pose. G. B. McC, ^raj.-Oen. 

Maj.-Gen. W. H. H., Washington, D. C. 

On the 14th and 15tb, and before we had been 
able to embark all our sick men, two army corps 
were put in motion tow^irds Fort Monroe. . This 
was reported in the annexed despatch : 

Headquarters, Armv of the Potomac, 
Berkeley, Aug. 16, 1862, II p. m. 

Movement has commenced by land and water. 
All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every- 
thing being done to carry out your orders. I 
don t like Jackson s movements, he will suddenly 
appear where least expected. Will telegraph 
fully a^iid understandingly in'the morning. G. B. 
McC., Maj.-Gen. 

Maj.-Gen. H., Washington, D. C. 

The phrase "movement has commenced," it 
need not be remarked, referred obviously to the 
movement of the main army, after completing the 
necessary preliminary movements of the sick, 
etc., etc. 

The perversion of the terra to wliich the gene- 
ral-in-chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to 
the Seci-etary of War, should have been here 
rendered impossible by the dispatches Avhich 
precede this of the 14th, which show that the 
movement really began immediately after the re- 
ceipt of the order of August 4th. 

The progress made in the movement on the 
15th was reported in the following dispatches : 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
August 15, 1862, 12 u. 

Maj.-Gen. H, W. H., Comd'g U. S. A. :— Col. 
Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking 
the remaining brigade of ^McCuH's division, wnth 
the sick which are constantly accumulating, the 
transports now disposable will be consumed. 

Two of ray army corps marched last night and 
this raornrag en route for Yorktown, one via 
Jones's Bridge, and the other via Barrett's Ferry, 
'"where Ave have a pontoon bridge. The other 
corps wUl be pushed forward as fast as the roads 
are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning 
to have tlie entire army in motion. 

A rei>ort has just been received from my pick- 
ets that the enemy in force is advancing on us 
from the Chickahoraiu}', but I do not credit it — 
shall know soon. Should any more transports 
arrive here before my departure, and the enemy 
do not show such a force in our front as to re- 
quire all the troops I have remaining to insure 
tlie safety of the«land movement wicb its hn- 
mense train, I shall send every man by water 
that the transports will canv. G. B. McC., Mai.- 
Geu. 



Headquarters, Army of the Poloraac. 
Berkeley, Aug. 15, 1862, 1.30 i-. m". 

The advance corjis and the trains are fairly^ 
started. I learn notlving more in relation to re- 
reported advance of rebels via Jones's Bridge, 
Siiall push the movement as rapidly as possible. 
G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 

Maj.-Gen. II. W. II., Washington, D. C. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
August 15, 18G2. 10 p.m. 

Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of 
McCall's division, with its artillery', is now on 
route for Burnside. We have not yet transpor-. 
tation sufficient for our sick. I hojjc we will get 
it to-morrow. Porter is across the Chickahominy, 
near its mouth, Avith his Avagons and the res\.^rve- 
artillery. 

Heintzelman at Jones's Bridge, with a portion 
of his corps. They Avill all be up by morning. 

Averell's cavalry on the other side. All quiet 
thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as- 
far as Charles City Court-house before some time 
to-morrow afternoon. I am hurrying matters 
with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons Avill 
move all night. %. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C. 

After the commencement of the movement, it 
Avas continued with the utmost rapidity, until all 
the troops arfd material AA'fere en route, both by 
land and water, on the morning of the 16th. 

Late in the afternoon of that day, Avhen the last 
man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I 
followed with my personal staff in the track oi 
the grand army of the Potomac, bidding farewell 
to the scene still covered Avith the marks of its 
presence, and to be forever memorable in history 
as the A'icinity of its most brilliant exploits. 
THE RETURN TO THE POTOMAC. 

Previous to the departure of the troops, I had 
directed Capt. Duane, of the Engineer Corps, to 
proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth oJ 
the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at 
that point a pontoon bridge. This was executed 
promptly and satisfactorily, under the cover oi 
gun-boats, and an excellent bridge of about t\v( 
thousand feet in length Avas ready for the fii'S* 
ariival of troops. The greater part of the army 
with its artillery, wagon trains, etc., crossed it 
rapidly, and in^ perfect order and safety, so that 
on the night of the 17th, everythuig was across 
the Chickahominy, except the rear-guard, whicl 
crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when 
the pontoon bridge was immediately removed. 

Gen. Porter's corps, Avhich Avas the first ir 
march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed 
forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Wil 
liamsburg, where I had directed hi?li to halt until 
the army Avas across the Chickahominy. 

On h"is arrival at ^Villiamsburg, however, he 
received an intercepted letter, Avhich led to the 
belief that Gen. Pope Avould have to contend 
against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen 
Porter, therefore, very properly took tisc rcspon 
sibility of cov.tinuing his march directly on tc 
Kew]jort News, which pkn-.e he reached on the 
moniing of tlie 18th of August, having marclied 
his corps sixty miles in the short period of tiireo 
days and one night, halting one day at Uie crosf 
injr of the Chickaliominv. 



The embaikatiou of this corps commenced as 
Boon as transports were rea,dy, and on tlie 'iOthit 
had all sailed for Acipiia Creek. I made the fol- 
lowing report from Barretts Ferry: 

Ueadquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Barrett's Ferry, Chickahomiuy, 
August 17, 1862, 11a. m. 

Everything is removed from our camp at Har- 
rison's Bar — no projierty nor men left behind. 
The Fifth Corps is at Williamsburg, with all its 
wagons and the reserve artillery. The Third 
Corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to 
Williamsburg, via Diascund Bridge, and has pro- 
bably passed the latter before this hour. Aver- 
ell's cavalry watches everything in that direction. 

The mass of the wagons have passed the pon- 
toon bridge here, and are parked on the other 
aide. Peck's wagons are now crossing ; his di- 
vision Avill soon be over. Ileadquarters wagons 
follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over 
to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. 
May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to 
Bee Burnside ; otherwise should have remained 
with the rear-guard. Thus fa#all is quiet, and 
not a shot iirod that I know of since we began 
the march. I shall not feel entirely secure until 
1 have the whole army beyond the Chickahomiuy. 
I will then begin to forward troops by water as 
fast as transportation permits. G. B McC, Maj.- 
Gen. Comd'g. 

Maj.-Gen. W. il. lb, Comd'g U. S. A., Washing- 
ton, I). C. 

On the 18th and IQthour march was continired 
to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th 
the remainder of the army was ready to embark 
at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and Newport News. 
The movement of the main body of the army on 
this march was covered by Gen. Pleasonton, with 
his cavalry and horse-artillery. That officer re- 
mained at llaxall's until the army had ])asscd 
Charles City Court House, when he gradually fel[ 
back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, 
and crossed the bridge over the Chickahomiuy 
after the main body had marched towards Wil- 
liamsburg. Ilis troops were the last to cross 
the bridge, and he deserves great credit for the 
manner in which he performed his duty. Gen. 
Averell did a similar service in the same satis- 
factory way, iu covering the march of the 3d 
Corps. 

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated 
here, I camiot close this part of my report with- 
out giving an expression of my sincere thanks 
and gratitude to the officers and men I liad the 
honor to command. 

From the ccfnmicncement to the termination of 
this most arduous campaign, the army of the Po- 
tomac always evinced the most perfect subordi- 
nation, zeal and alacrity in the performance of 
all the duties required of it. 

Tlie amount of severe labor accomplished by 
tins army in the construction of intrenchments, 
roads, bridges, &c., was enormous ; yet all the 
work was performed with the most gratif3'iiig 
cheerfulness and devotion to tho interests of the 
service. 

•During the campaign ten severely contested 
and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides 
Humorous amail engagements, in which tho troops 



94 



exhibited tho most det;ormined enthusiasm and 
bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, 
and even death without a murmur. Indeed they 
had become veterans in their country's cau5e, 
and richly deserved the warm commendation _of 
the government. 

It was in view of these facts that this seemed 
to me an appropriate occasion for the general-in- 
chief to give, in general orders, some api)recia- 
tive expression of the services of the army while 
upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th, I 
sent him the following dispatch : 

Headquarter?, Army of the Potomac, August 
18, 1862, 11 P.M. — Please say a kind word to the 
army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, 
in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Wil- 
liamsburg, West Pohit, Hanover Court House, 
and on the Chickaiiorainy, as well as in regard to 
the seven days, and the recent retreat. 

No one has ever said au3'th'ing to cheer them 
but myself. Say nothing about me, merely give 
my men and officers credit for what they have 
done. It will do you much good, and strengthen 
you much with them if you issue a handsome 
order to them in regard to what they have ac- 
complishctl. They deserve it. 

G. B. McC, Major-Gen. " 
Major-Gen. II., Comd'g. U.S. Army, 
Washington, D. C. 

As no reply was received to this communica- 
tion, and no order was issued by the general-in- 
chief, I conclude that my suggestion did not 
meet with his ai^probation. 

All the personnel and material of the array had 
been transferred from Harrison's Landing to the 
different points of embarkation in the very brief 
period of five days, without the slightest loss or 
damage. Porter's Corps sailed from Newport 
News on the 19th and 20th ; Ileintzelman's corps 
sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that day 
I received the following telegram from the gcne- 
ral-in-chi(;f : 

Washington, Aug. 21, 1862, 6 p.m. 

Gen. McC. : — Leave such garrisons in Fort 
j\Ionroe, Yorktown, &;c., as you may deem pro- 
per. They will be rejslaced b}' new troops as soon 
as possible. The forces of Burnside and Pope are 
hard pushed, and require aid as I'apidiy as you 
can send it. Come yourself as soon as j'ou can. 
By all means see that the troops sent have islenty 
of ammunition. We have no time here to supply 
them, oreover they Mmay have to light as soon 
as they land. II. W, II.. M.-Gen Com. 

To which the followuig are replies : 
Ilcadq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
August 21, 1862, 7.30 P.M. 

Your dispatch of G p-m- received. I have not 
lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Frank- 
lin is here, and I will try to get some of his 
troops on board to-night. I had already (udcrcd 
all the ammunition forward. I will put head- 
quarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, 
so that I can leave at a moment's notice. I hope 
that I can get oiT to-morrow. Shall I go in per- 
son to xVccpiia, or do you wish to sec me first in 
Washington? If you wish *t, I can probably 
ship quite an amount of ammunition for other 
trooi)8 than this army. 

G B. McC. to'Maj-Gen.IL, Washington. 



Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
Aug. 21, 1862, 10.25 p.m. 

I have ample supplies of ammuuition for in- 
fantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. 
I can supply any deficieneies that may exist in 
Gen. Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled 
field-guns are on hand here. The forage is the 
only question for you to attend to. Please have 
that ready for me at Acquia. I want many more 
schooners for cavalry horses. They should have 
■vrater on board when they come here. 

If you have leisure, and there is no objection, 
please communicate to me fully the state of affairs 
^nd your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange 
details understandingly. 

G. B. McO. to Maj.-Gen. H., Washington. 

Immediately on reaching Fort Mt)nroe, I gave 
directions for strengthening the defenses of York- 
town, to resist an attack from the direction of 
Richmond, and left Gen. Kej'es, with his corps, 
to perform the work, and temporarily garrison 
the place. 

I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : 

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
Aug. 22, 1862, 2.15 p.m. 

Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps 
is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sunmer's 
corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as 
fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at 
Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. 
I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to- 
■ day, and hope to commence with Sumner to- 
morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and 
wagons. 

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Wash'n. 
Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
Aug. 22, 1862, 3.40 p.m. 

Two good ordnance sergeants are needed im- 
mediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new 
defenses are arranged and commenced. I recom- 
mend that 5,000 new troops be sent immediately 
to garrison York and Gloucester. TPliey should 
be commanded by an experienced general-officer, 
who can discipline and instruct them. About 
900 should be artillery. I recommend that a new 
regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or 
graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and 
sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely ne- 
cessary here. 
, Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A. 

On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported 
this in the following despatch : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort 
Monroe, Aug. 23, 1862. 1.30 p. m. 
• Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for 
Acquia in about half an hour. No transports yet 
for Sumner's corps. 

G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. W. H., 
C>omd'g U. S. Army. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 

On that evening T sailed with my staff for Ac- 
quia Creek, wiier.' I arrived at dayliglit on the 
Irollowing morniiy?, reporting as follows : 

Headquarters, Army of tho Potomac, Acquia 
:reck, Aug. 24, 1861. 

1 have reached here, and respectfully report 
for orders, 

! G.B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. Comd'g U. 
3. Army. 



95 



I also telegraphed as follovvs . 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Acquia 
Creek, August 24, 1862. 2 p- m. 

Your telegram received. Morell'd scouts re- 
port Rappahannock Station burned and abandoned 
by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes: 
Tliis was telegraphed you some hours ago. Rey- 
nolds, Reno, and Stevens, are supposed to be 
with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to- 
day. Morell and Sykes arc near Morrisvillo 
Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappa- 
hannock, with no troops between them and Rap- 
pahannock Station, which is reported abandoned 
by Pope. Please inform me immediately exactly 
where Pope is, and what doing ; until I know 
that, I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; ho 
is much exposed now, and decided measures 
should be taken at once. Until I know what my 
command and position are to be, and whether 
you still intend t) place me in tho command iu- 
dicated in your first letter to me, and orally 
through Gen, Burnside at the Chickahominy, I 
cannot decide where I can be of most use. If 
j-our determination is unchanged, I ought to go 
to Alexandria at once. Please define my position 
and duties. 

G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H^ 
comd'g U. S. Army. 

To which I received the following reply : 

Washington, Aug. 24, 1862. 

Maj-Gen. McC. — You ask nie for information 
which I cannot give. I do not know either 
where General Pope is, or where the enen>y' in 
force is. These are matters which I have been 
all day most anxious to ascertain. 

H. W. IL, General-in-chief. 

On the 26th, I received the foUownig : 

Washington, Aug. 26th, 1862. 11 a. m. 

Maj-Gen. G. B. McC. — There is reason to be- 
lieve that the enemy is moving a large force into 
the Shenandoah Valley. Reconnoissances will 
soon determine. Gen. Ileintzelman's corps wa« 
ordered to report to Gen. Pope, and Kearney's 
will probably be sent to-day against the enemy's 
flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappa- 
hannock at present. We shall probably want 
them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. 
P-erhaps you had better leave Gen. Burnside in 
charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, 
as very great irregularities are reported there 
Gen. Franklin's corps will march as soou as it re- 
ceives transportation. ■*» 
H. W. H., General-n-Chiet: 

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for 
Alexandria, and reported as follows : , 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 8 a.m. — I arrived 
here last night, and liave taken mcasnres to as- 
certain the state of affairs here, and (hat proper 
remedies may be api)lied. Just received a rumor 
that railway bridge over Bull Run was burnt lasi 
night. G. B. .McC. iMajor-Gcn 

Maiof-Gen. II., Comd'g U. S. A. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 9.40 a.m.— The 
town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers who 
arc said to be chiefly convalescent.-^. The affairs 
of the quartermaster's department are reported 
as going on well. It is said that tho Bull Run 
bridge will be repaired by to-morrow." The dis- 
embarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at 



i)(j 



Acqula yesterday afternoon. I found that he 
could reach Har4)ahaiiuock Station earlier that 
way tlian from liere. G. B. McC. :Maj.-Gen. 

Major-Gen. II. W. IT., Comd'g U. S. A. _ 
Oil the same day I received the following : 

Washington, August 27, 1862. 
israior-Cen. I\IeO.— Telegrams from General 
Porter to General Burnsidc just received says 
that Banks is at Favctteville. McDowell, Sigt-l, 
and Uicket's near Warrcnton, Reno on his right. 
Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re- 
inforce Pope. Notliing said of Heintzelman. 
Porter reports a general battle imminent. FrauK- 
lin's corps should move out by forced marches, 
carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be 
supplied as lar as possible by railroad. Perhaps 
you may prefer -some other road than to Centre- 
ville. Colonel Ilaupt has just telegraphed about 
sending out troops, &c. Please see him and give 
him your directions. There has been some se- 
rious neglect to guard the railroad, which should 
be immediately remedied. 

11. W. n., General-in-Chief. 

I reidied as follows : 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 10.20 a.m.— Tele- 
gram this moment received. I have sent orders 
to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps 
at once, and to repair here in person to ^inform 
me as to his means of transportation. Kearney 
was yesterday at Rappahannock Station. Porter 
at Bealton, Kelly's Darnell's, &c. Sumner will 
commence reaching Falmouth to day. ^Vdhams s 
Massachusetts Cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth 
to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort, 
1st squadron Fourth Regulars, to scout down 
Rappahannock, -l have sent for Couch's division 
to come at once. As fast as I gain any informa- 
tion I will forward it, although you may already 
have it. G. B. ]\IcC., ]\Iajor-Gen. 

ilajor-Gen. 11. W. 11., Washington, D. C. 
I also received the following telegrams : 

Washington, August 27, 1862. 
Major-Gen. McC— Direct General Casey to fur- 
oish you about five thousand of the new troops 
under his command. Take entire direction of 
the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. 
Determine questions of priority in transportation, 
and the places they shall occupy. Pope's head- 
quarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I can 
not ascerkvin the present position of his troops. 
II. W. II., General-in-Chie.f 
Washington, Aug. 27, 1862. 
Maj.-Gen. McC. :— I can get no satisfactory in- 
formation from the trout, either of the enemy or 
our trofji^s. There seems to have been great neg- 
lect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's 
corps should march in ' that direction as soon as 
possible. A competent officer shouldbe sent out 
to take direction of affairs in that vicinity. 

11. W. II., Gen.-in-Chief. 

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent 
the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman 

and Porter : , . . t.^- -m^o 

Alexandria, Aug. 2 1, 180J. 
Where are you, and what is stat* of afl'airs ? 
What troops in your front, right and left ? Sum- 
ner is now lauding at Acquia. Where is Pope s 



left, and what of enemy '! Enemy bin ucd Bull 
Run bride-e last night with cavalry force. 

^ G. B. McC, Ma>-Gen. 

M.-G. lleintz'n, Warrenton, ]\f.-G. Porter, Bealton. 

P. S. If these general ofilcersarti no4. at the 
places named, nearest operator will V-^'" 

message forwarded. , . " 

I also telegraphed the GQU^ra).-in-CLiiL.i a.s loi- 

laws : - ' ■.. );: , .l j-'' ' 

Alexandria, Aug. 27, 62,10.50 p.m. 
I have sent all the information, I possess to 
Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his 
right flank between the Rap|)ahannock and Poto- 
laac, and to send no trains to Porter without aiv 
escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed fvt Bull 
Run last night may trouble Burnside a littk. I 
have sent to ^ohimunicate with Porter and Heint- 
zelman via Falmouth, and hope to give, you some 
definite information in a few. hours. I shall land 
the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it 
out to keep open the comtj-iuuication between 
Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manr- 
assas. Please send me a number of copies of the 
best maps of present field of ppeiatiqns. ^I can 
usp no to advantage. 

G. B. McC to ]\Iai.-Gen. 11., Com g. 
Alexandria, Aug. 27, '62, 11.20 a.m. ^ 
In view of Burnside's dispatch, just receiveu, 
would it not be advisable to throw the mass of 
Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin 
to Centreville or vicinity? If, a decisive battle 
fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any 
troops on lower Rappahannock in a dangeroua^ 
position. They would do better service in front 
of Washinu-ton. 

G.^B. McC. to ;M.-Geu. IL, Vrashington. 
Alexandria. Aug. 27, '62, 12.5 h.m. ^ 
xMy aid has just returned from Gen. Franklin's 
camp. Reports that Gen's. Franklin, Smith, and 
Plocum are* all in Washington. He gave the or- 
der to next in rank to place the corps in readiness 
to move at ©nee. I learn that heavy firing nas 
been heard this morning at Centreville, and have 
sent to ascertain the truth, i can find no cavalry 
to send out on the roads. . Are the works gar- 
risoned and ready for defense ? ^^^ , . ^ 

G. B. McC to M.-Gen. H-, Wasiungtoii. 
Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 12.20 p. ;.. 
What bridges exist over B-U Run? have 
steps been taken to construct bridges lor the ad- 
vance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable 
him to retreat if in, trouble? There should be 
two gun-boats at Acquia Creek at once, bliall 1 
push the rest of Sumner's corps liere, or is 1 opo 
so strong astche re^isonably certain of success? 
I have sent to,ii)spect the, works near here, and 
their garrisons. As soon as I can find Gen.: Ca- 
sey or some other comnianding ofllcer, 1 wili 
seeto the railway, etc. It would be well to liave 
them report to me, as,I do not know where liiey 
,are. I am trving to find them, and wil lose no 
time in carrying out your orders "^A oidd like to 
see Burnside. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
Mai. -Gen. W. }l, AVashington. 

Alexandria, August 27. 1862, 1 .lo p. m. 
Franklin's artillery have no horses, except tor 
four guns without caissons ; I can pick up no 
cavahT. lu view of these facts, will it not be 



97 



well to push Sumner's corps here by water as 
rapidly as possible ; to make immediate arrange- 
ments for placing; the works in front of Wash- 
ington in an efficient condition of defense. I 
have no means of knowing the enemy's force be- 
tween Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, with- 
out liis artillery or cavalry, effect any useful 
purpose in front ? Should not Burnside at once 
lake steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at 
the same time covering the retreat of any of 
Pope's troops who may fall back in that direc- 
tion. I do not see that we have force enough in 
hand to form a connection with Pope, whose ex- 
act position we do not know. Are we safe in 
the direction of the valley ? G. B. McC, Major- 
Geu. 

Maj.-Gen. 11., Washington. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 1.35 p. m. 

I learn that Taylor's brigade sent this morning 
to Bull Run bridge, is either cut to pieces or 
captured. That the force against them had 
many guns, and about five thousand infantry, re- 
ceiving reinforcements every moment. Also, 
that Gainsville is in possession of the enemy. 
Please send some cavahy out towards Draines- 
ville via Cliain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and 
Drainesvilie, and go as far as they can. If you 
will give me even one squadron of good cavalry 
here, I will ascertain the state of the case. I 
think our policy now is to make these works 
perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as 
soon as possible ; but not to advance them until 
they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have 
sent for Col T_yler to place his artillerymen in 
the works, bs Fwrt Marcy securely held ? ifcC. 

Gqu. H. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. 11. W. H., Comd'g U. S. Army :— 
Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his 
corps that are within reach. Orders have been 
sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with 
the least possible delay. But one squadron of 
my cavalry has arrived ; that will be disembarked 
at once, and sent to the front. If there is any 
cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to 
report to me at once. 

I still think that we should first provide for 
dhe immediate defense of Washington on both 
^ides of tlie Potomac. I am not responsible for 
the past, and can not be for the future, unless I 
receive authority to dispose of the available 
troops according to my judgment. Please inform 
me at once what my position is. I do not wish 
to act in the dark. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. A. :— I have 
just received the copy of a dispatch from Gen. 
Pope to you, dated lO a.m. this morning, m which 
he says :' "All tbrces now sent forward should be 
sent to my right at Gainsville." 

I now have at my disposal here about ten 
thousand men of Franklin's corps, abouttwenty- 
eiglit hundred of Gen. Tyler's brigade and Col. 
Tylev'.s 1st Conjiecticut artillery, wliicli I recom- 
meml should be held in hand for the dcfensQ of 
Washington. If you wish me to order any part 
of this force to the front, it is in readiness to 
march at a moment*^ notice to any ppintypu may 
indicate. 



In view of the existing state of things in our 
front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey 
to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to 
move : but not to send them off till further or- 
ders. G. B. McC, Maj-Gcn. 

On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : 

Headquarters, Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 28, 
1862. 4.10 ? M. 

Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know 
in a few luinutes the condition of artillery and 
cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move, 
may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut 
through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. 
I have ordered troops to garrison the works at 
Upton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. 
As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I 
will send a corps of good troops there. It is the 
key to Washington, which cannot be seriously 
menaced as long as it is held. 

G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H., Washington, D. C. 

I received the following from the general-in 
chief. 

Washington, Aug. 28, 1862. 

Maj.-Gen. McC. — I think you had better place 
Snmner's corps, as it arrives, near the guns, and 
particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal 
thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this 
city, especially in the night-time. Use Cox's and 
Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same 
object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burn- 
side from Bristol, 9.30 a. ^r. yesterday, that Pope's 
J'orces were then movirig on Manassas, and that 
Burnside would soon hear of them by way of 
Alexandria. Gen. Cullum has gone to Harper's 
Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for 
duty in the office. Please send some of your of- 
ficers to-day to see that every precaution is taken 
at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. 
Please answer. H. W. H., General in Chief. 

On the 29th the following dispatch was tele- 
graphed : ■ 

Camp Kear Alexandria, Ang. 29, 1862. 10.20 
A. M. — Franklin's corps is in motion. Started 
about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons 
of cavalry. 'I propose moving Gen. Cox to Up- 
ton's Hill, to hold that important point, with'its 
works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna 
via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has 
two squadrons cavalry. Please answer at once 
whether this meets yoi;r approval. I have di- 
rected Woodbury, with the engineer brigade to 
hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night 
two regiments to vicinity of Forts " Ethan Allen" 
and "Marcy." Meagher's brigade is still at Ac- 
quia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it 
leaves us without any reliable troops in and near 
Washington, yet Franklin is too weak alone. 
AVhat shall be done ? No more cavalry arrived ■ 
have but three squadrons, Franklin has but for- 
ty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move 
more. I do not think Franjclin is in condition to 
accomplish much if he meets with serious re- 
sistance. 

I should not have moved him but for yoiu- 
pressing order of last night. What have you 
from Vienna and Drainesviile ? 

Geo. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H,. Washington. 

To whicli the following is a reply : 



98 



Washington, August 29, 1862, 12 m. 

Major-Gen. McO. — Upton's Hill arrangement is 
all right. We must send wagons and ammuni- 
tion to Franklin as fast as tliey arrive. Meagher's 
brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Leo 
was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria 
on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing 
from Drainesville. 11. W. H., Gen.-in Chief. 

On the same day the following v/as received 
from his Excellency the President : 

Washington, August 29, 18t)2, 2.30 p.m. 

Maj.-Gen. McC. — Wliat news from direction of 
Manassas Junction ? What, generally ? A. L. 

To which I replied as follows : 

Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 2.45 
P.M. — The last news I received from the direction 
of Manassas was from stragglers, to the eifect 
that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and 
retiring towards Thoro'fare Gap. This by no 
means reliable, 1 am clear that one of two 
courses should be adopted : 1st. To concentrate 
all our available forces to open communication 
with Pope. 2d. To leave Pope to get out of his 
scrape, and at o}»ce use all our means to make 
the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground 
will now answer. 

Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do 
all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to 
know what my orders and authority are. I ask 
for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you 
gire. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may 
at once give the necessary orders. It will not do 
to delay any longer. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. 

A. L., President, 
and copy to Gen. Ilalleck. 

To which the following is a reply : 

Wasliington. August 29. 1862, 4.10 p.m. 

JIajor-Gen. McC. — Yours of to-day just re- 
ceived. I think your first , alternative, to wit: 
"To concentrate all our available forces to open 
communication with Pope," is the right one, but 
I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. 
Halleck, aided by your counsels. . A. L. 

It had been officially reported to m« from 
Washington, that the enemy in strong force was 
moving through Vienna, in the direction of the 
Chain Bridge, and had a largo force at Vienna. 
This report, in connection with the dispatch of 
the general-in-chief on the 28tli, before noted, in- 
duced me to direct Franklin to halt his command 
near Annadale, until it could be determined by 
reconnoissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, 
whether these reports were true. General Cox 
was ordered to send his small cavalry force from 
Upton's Hill towards Vienna and Drainesville in 
one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House 
in the other, and Franklin to push his two squad- 
rons towards Lewinsvillc, it would have been 
very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small 
force beyond Annadale. It must be remembered 
that at this time we were cut off from direct 
communication with General Pope ; that the ene- 
my was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in 
strong force ; and that Franklin had only from 
10,000 to 11,00 men, with an entirely insufficient 
force of cavalry and artillery. 

In order to represent this condition of affairs 
in its proper light to the general-in-chiof, and to 



obtain definite mstructioua from him, I telegraph- 
ed as follows : 

Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 12 m. 
— Have ordered most of the 12th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting 
duty towards Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If you 
apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of the 
river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sum- 
ner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or 
three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, 
they can watcli Chain Bridge and Tenallytown. 
Would it meet yotir views to post rest of Sum- 
ner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corco- 
ran, whence they can either support Cox, Frank- 
lin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown? 
Fr.iiiklin has only between 10,000 and 11,00 for 
duly. How far do you wish this force to ad- 
vance? G. B.-McC. 

Major-Gen. IL, Washington. 
Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 1 p.m. 

I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in 
regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at 
once. Please authorize me to attach new regi- 
ments permanently to my old brigades. I can do 
much good to new and pld troops in that way. I 
shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts 
Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced 
guards- I wish to hold the line tlirough Prospect 
Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hills. This 
will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems 
best to me with all the troops in the vicinity, in- 
cluding Franklin, who, I really think, ought not, , 
under present circumstances, to advance beyond 
Annandale ? G. B. McC to Gen. IT. 

On the same day I received a dispatch from 
the general-in-chief, in which he asks me why I 
halted Franklin at Annandale, to^which I replied 
as follows : 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 8 p-m. 

By referring to my telegrams of 10-30 a.m., 12 
M-, and 1 r-M-, together with your reply of 2.40 
P.M., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at 
Annandale. His small cavalry force — all I had to 
give him — was ordered to push on as far as pos- 
sible towards Manassas. It was not safe for 
Franklin to move beyond Annandale under the 
circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna- 
Gen- Franklin remained here until about 1 p.M,, -j, 
endeavoring to arrange for supplies for liis com- 
mand. I am responsible for both these circum- 
stances, and do not see that either was in dis- 
obedience to your orders. Please give distinct 
orders in reference to Franklin's movements to- 
morrow. I have sent to Col. Hau.pt to push out 
construction and supply trains as soon as pos- 
sible. General Tyler to furnish the necessary 
guards. I have directed Gen- Banks's supply 
trains to start out to-night at least as far as An- 
nandale, with an escort from Gen- Tyler. In re- 
gard to to-morrow's movements, I desire definite 
instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be ac- 
cused of disobeying orders, when I have simply 
exercised the discretion you committed to me. 
G. B. McC. to .M-Gen. IL, Wash'n-, D. C. 

On the same evening I sent the following dis- 
patches : 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, '62, 10 p.m- 

Not bearing from you, I have sent orders to 



Gen. Franklin to place himself id coramunication 
with Gen. Pope as soon as possible, and at the 
same time cover the transit of Pope's supplier-. 
Orders have been given for railway and wagon 
trains to move to Pope, with least possible delay- 
I am having inspections made of all the forts 
around city by members of my staff, with instruc- 
tions to give all requisite orders- I inspected 
Worth and Ward m3-self this evening ; fuuiul 
them in good order. Reports, so far as heard 
from, are favorable as to condition of works. 
G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. II., Washington. 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 10 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., General-in-Chief U. S. A., 
Washington, D. C. : — Your dispatch received. 
Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 
o'clock to-mori^ow morning. Sumner lias about 
fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or 
artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments 
is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of 
two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. 
Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little 
drilled, is also here. All these troops will be or- 
dered to hold themselves ready to march to-mor- 
row morning, and all, except Franklin's, to await 
further orders. If you wish any of them to move 
towards Manassas, please inform me. 

Col. Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just 
come in from the front. He reports strong in- 
fantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax 
Court House ; reports rumors, from various 
sources, that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, 
are at Manassas. That the enemy with one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing 
on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, 
with a vie\y of attacking Washington and Balti- 
more. Gen. Barnard telegraphs me to-night that 
the length of the line ot fortifications on this side 
of the Potomac, requires two thousand additional 
artillery men, and additional troops to defend in- 
tervals, according to circumstances. At all 
events, he says an old regiment should be added 
to the force at Chaih Bridge, and a few regiments 
distributed along the lines, to give confidence to 
our new troops. I agree with him fully, and 
think our fortifications along the upper part of 
our line, on this side the river, very unsafe with 
their present garrisons, and the movements of the 
enemv seem to indicate attack upon those works. 
G. B.'McC, Maj.-Gen. 

Canip near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11.30 a. m. 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. IL, General-in-Chief: — Your 
telegram of 9 a. m. received. Ever since Gen. 
Franklin received notice that he was to march 
from Alexandria, he has been endeavoring to get 
transportation from the quartermaster at Alexan- 
dria, but he has uniformly been told that there 
was none disposable, and his command marched 
without wagons. After the departure of his 
corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some 
extra ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply 
train. Gen. Sumner endeavored, by application 
upon the quartermaster's department, to get wa- 
gons to carry his reserve ammunition, but with- 
out success, and was obliged to march with what 
he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. I have 
this morning directed that all my headquarters 
vagons that are landed, be at once loaded with 



99 



ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they 
will not go far towards supplying the deficiency 

Eighty-five wagons were got together by the 
quartermasters last night, loaded with subsist- 
ence, and sent forward at 1 a. m., with an escort, 
via Aiinundale. Every effort has been made to 
carry out your orders promptly'. The great diffi- 
culty seems to consist in the fact, that the greater 
part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria 
and Washington, has been needed for current 
supplies at the garrisons. Such is the state of 
the case, as represented to me b}^ the quartermas- 
ters, and it appears to be true. I take it for 
granted that this has not been properly explained 
to you. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 

On the morning of the 30th, heavy artillery 
firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court 
House, which I reported to the general-in-chiefj 
At 11 a. ni. the following telegram was sent: 

Camp near Alexadria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11 a. m. 

Have ordered Sumner to leavo one bi-igade in 
vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest 
via Columbia pike on Annandale and Fairfax 
Court House. Is tins the route you wish them 
to take ? He and Franklin are both instructed to 
join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch 
move out also when he arrives ? G. B. Mc, Maj^ 
Gen. 

Maj.-Gen. H., Washington. 

On the same day I received the following J- 
Washington, Aug. 30, 1862, 1.45 a. m. 

Maj-Gen. McC, — Ammunition, and particularly 
for artillery, must be immediately sent forward 
to Centreville for Gen. Pope. It must be done 
with all possible dispatch, 

H. W. H., General in Chief. 

To which the following reply was made : 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug 30, 1662. 2.10 p w. 

I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artil- 
lery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance offi- 
cer, to load up all the wagons sent to him, I 
have already sent all my headquarters wagons. 
You will have to see that wagons are sent frooi 
AVashington. I can do nothing more than gi.Ve 
the order that every available wagon in Alexafiv 
dria shall be loaded at once. The order to the 
brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain nc%r 
Chain Bridge and Tenallytown should go from 
your headquarters, to save time. I understand 
you to intend it also to move. I have no sharp- 
shooters except the guard around my camp. I 
have sent off every man but those, and will now 
send them with the train as you direct. I will 
also send my only remaining squadron of caval- 
ry with Gen. Sumner. I can do no more. You 
now have every man -of the army of the Poto- 
mac who is within my reach. 

G. B. McC. to Maj.Gen. H. W. H. 

At 10.30 p, M. the following telegram was sent : 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 10.30 p, 
M. — I have sent to the front all my troojjs, with 
the exception of Couch's division, and have giv- 
en the orders necessary to insure its being dis- 
posed of as you directed. I hourly expect the 
return of one of my aides, who will give authen- 
tic news from the field of battle. 

I cannot express to 3'ou the pain and mortifica- 
tion I have experienced to-day in listening to the 



100 



distant soima of the firing of my men. As I can 
be of uo furtlier use here, I respectfully ask that 
if there is a probability of the conflict being re- 
newed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to 
the scene of battle with my staff merely to be 
with my own men ; they will fight none the 
worse for my being with them. If it is not 
deemed best to intrust me with the command 
even of my own army, I simph' ask to be per- 
mitted to share their fate on tlie field of battle. 
Please reply to this to-uight. 

I have been engaged for the last few hours in 
doing w^hat I can to make arrar)gements tor the 
wounded. I have started out all the ambulances 
now landed. 

As I have sent my escort to the front, I would 
be glad to take some or Gregg's cavalry with me 
if allowed to go. 

G, B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H. Comd'g U. S. 
A., Wasliington, D. C. 

To which on the following day I received this 
answer : 

Washington, Aug. 31, 1862. 9,18 a. m. 

Maj-Gen. McC, — I have just seen your telegram 
of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to 
me when received, but 1 did not know that you 
asked for a reply immediately, I cannot answer 
without seeing the President, as General Pope is 
in command, by his orders, of the department. 

I think Couch's division should go forward as 
rapidly as possible, and find the battle-field. 
ys H. W. H., General in Chief, 

On the same day the foUowhig was received : 
Washington Aug. 31, 1862. 12.45 p. m. 

Maj-Gen. JifcC. — The subsistence department 
are making Fairfax Station their prnicipal depot. 
It sliould be well guarded. The oflicer m charge 
Bhould be directed to secure the depot b}' 
abattis against cavalry. As many as possible of 
the new regiments should be prepared to take 
the field. Perhaps some more should be sent in 
the vicinitv of Chain Bridge. 

H. W. H., General in Chief. 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC REMOVED 

FROM GEN. McCLELLAN'S COMMAND. 

At 2.30 P.Jh the following (|ispatch Avas tele- 
graphed . 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 2.30 p.m. 
-^Major Haller is at Fairfax Station, with mypro- 
ost and headquarters guard and other troops. I 
nave requested four more companies to be sent 
at once, and the precautions you direct to be 
taken. 

I have no control over the new regiments ; do 
not know where they are or anything about 
them, except those near here. Their command- 
ing officers and those of the works are not under 
me. Where I have seen evils existhig under my 
own eye I have corrected them. I think it is 
the business' of General Casey to prepare the new 
regiments for the field, and a matter between him 
and General iJarnard to order others to vicinity 
of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my 
command, and by the War Department order I 
have no right to give them orders. 

Gen. IT., Washington. G. B. McC; ' 

To which the following is an answer : 

Washington, Aiagust 31, 1862, 10.7 p.m. 

Major-Gen. McC. — Since receiving your dis- 



patcli, relating to command, I hare not been able 
to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have 
not seen the order as published, but will write 
to 3'ou in the morning. You will retain the com- 
mand of everythhig in this vicinity not tcmpora 
rily to be Pope's army in the field. 

I beg of you to asaist me in this crisis witV 
3'our ability and experience. T am entirel.y tiref' 
out. • II. W, H., Gen.-in-(i]iet. 

The order referred to in the preceding di. 
patches was as follows : 

^Var Department, August 30. 1862.— The fo: 
lowing ai'e the commanders of the armies opera: 
ing in Virginia : 

General Burnside commands his own corps, 
except those that have been temporarily detached 
and assigned to General Pope- 

General McClcllan commands that portion of 
the Army of the Potomac that has not been eeit 
furward to Gen. Pope's connnand. 

General Pope commands the Array of Virginia 
and all the forces temporarily attached to it. 

All the forces are under command' of l^Iajo; 
Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

E. D. TowNSEND, Assistant-Adj-Gen. 

I was informed bj' Col- Townsend that the 
above was published by order of the Secretary 
of War. 

At 11.30 p.M I telegraphed the following : 

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 11.30 
P.M. — The squadron of the 2d Regular Cavalry tiiat 
I sent with Gen. Sumner was captured to-day, 
about 2 P.M., some three miles from Fairfax 
Court House, beyond it on the Tattle River Pike, 
by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and three 
light batteries. I have conversed with the 1st 
sergeant, who says that when he last saw them 
they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had 
no troops on that road, this squadron getting 
there by mistake. There is nothing of otirs on 
the right of Centreville but Sumner's corps. 
There was much artillery firing dtiring the day. 
A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels 
had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the 
road is filled with Avagons and stragglers coming 
towards Alexandria. It is clear, from the ser- 
geant's account, that we were badlj' beaten yes- 
terday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. 

I recommend that no more of Couch's division 
be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought 
here as soon as practicable, and that everything 
available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, 
includhig the mass of the troops on the railroad. 
I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this 
time, occupied Fairfa!s; Court-llouse, and cut off. 
Pope entirely, unless he falls back«to-night via 
Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think these or- 
ders should be sent at once. I hate no confi- 
dence in the dispositions made, as I gather them 
To speak frankly, and the occasion requires it, 
there appears to be a total absence of brains, and 
I fear the total destruction of the army. I licwe 
some cavalry here that can carry out anj' orders 
you may have to send. The X)ccasion is grave,; 
and demands grave measures. The question ia*' 
the salvation of the country. I learn that ou't' 
loss yesterday amounted to 15,000- We cannot 
afford such losses without an object. It is my 
deliberate opinion that the interests of the na- 



101 



tion demand that Pope should fall back to-mght 
if possible, and not one moment is to be lost I 
will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. 
Please answer at once. I feel confident yon can 
rely upon the information I give you- I shall be 
up all night, and ready to obey any orders you 
give me. 

G. B. ]\rcC., IM-G.. to M.-Gen. H., Washington. 

To which this reply was received : 

Washington, Sept. 1, '62, 1 .30 p.m. 

Maj.Gen, McC? :— Burnside was ordered up 
very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder 
of Couch's forces, aiid make arrangements to stop 
all retreating troops in line of works, or where 
you can best establish an outer line of defense. 
My news from Pope was up to 4 p.m., he was then 
all right. I must wait for- more definite informa- 
' tion before I can Order a retreat, as the falling 
back on the line of the works must necessarily 
be directed, in case of a serious disaster. 

Give me all news that is reliable. I shall be 
up all night, and ready to act as circumstances 
may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of 
the crisis, and have been for weeks. 

II. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief. 

It will be seen from what has preceded that I 
lost no time that could be avoided in moving the 
army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the 
support of the army of Virginia ; that I. spared 
no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops 
at Fort Monroe, Newport News and Xoi'^*^"""'"- 
remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass 
of the army had sailed ; and that after my arrival 
at Alexandria I left nothing in my power undone 
to forward supplies and reinforcements to Gen. 
Pope. I sent with the troops that moved all the 
cavalry I could get hold of, even my personal 
escort was sent out upon the line of the railway 
as a guard, with the provost and camp guard at 
headquarters, retaining less than 100 men, many 
of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of 
bands, etc. ; all the headquarter teams that ar- 
rived were sent out with supplies and ammuni- 
tion, none being retained even to move the head- 
quarters camps. The squadron that liabitually 



rating with and supporting Gen. Pope, that he 
had " always been a friend of mine," and no-w 
asked me, a's a special favor, to use my influence 
in correcting this state of things. I replied, sub- 
stantially, that I was confident that he was mis- 
informed, that I was sure, whatever sentiment tho 
armv of the Potomac might entertain towards 
Gen. Pope, that they would obey his orders, sup- 
port him to the fullest extent, and do their whole 
duty. The President, who was mucli moved, 
again asked me to telegrapb to "i^itz John 
Porter or some other of my friends," and try to 
do away with any feeling that might exist, adding 
that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else 
could. I thereupon told him that I would cheer- 
fully telegraph to Gen. Porter, or do anything 
else in my power, to gratify his wishes and re- 
lieve his anxiety, upon which he thanked me 
very warmly, assured me that he could nevei 
forget my action in the matter, etc., and left. 

I then wrote the following telegram to Gen. 
Porter, which was sent to him by the general-in- 
chief : 

Washington, Sept. 1, 1862. 

]\Iaj.-Geu. Porter :— I ask of you for my sake, 
and that of the country, and the old army of the 
Potomac, that you and all my friends, will lend 
the fullest and most cordial co-operation to Gen. 
Pope, in all the operations now going on. The 
destinies of our country, the honcr of our army, 
are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheer- 
ful co-operation of all in the field. This week is 
the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my 
friends in tlie army of the Potomac, and that the 
last request I have to make of them is, that for 
their country's sake they will extend to Gen. 
Pope the same support they ever have to me. ~ 

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, 
and am doing all I can -to render your retreat 
safe, should that become necessary. G. B. McO. 

To which he sent the following reply : 
Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m., Sept. 3, 1862. 

" Tou may rest assured that all your friends, 
as w.ell as every lover of his country, will ever 
give, as they have given, to Gen. Pope their eor- 



served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth J cUal ce-operatiou and constant support in tue ex- 
- - ~ ^-^ i ., , , ^ . , . ■ ^^^^tion of all orders and plans. Our killed, 



with Gen. Burnside, as he was deficient in cav 

^ ^^' FOURTH PERIOD. 

On the 1st of September I went into Washing- 
ton, where I had an uiterview Avitli the general- 
in-chief, who instructed me verbally to take 
command of its defences, expressly limiting my 
jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and 
prohibiting me from exercising any control over 
the troops'" actively engaged in front under Gen. 
Pope. During this interview, I suggested to the 
general-in-chief tho necessity of his going in 
person, or sending one of his personal staff, to 
the arm/ under Gen. Pope, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He 
sent Col. Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general. 

During the afternoon of the same day. I re- 
ceived a message from the general-in-chief, to 
the effect that he desired me to go at once to his 
house to see the President. The President in- 
formed me that he had reason to believe that the 
army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-ope- 



woijnded. and enfeebled ti-oops attest our devoted 
dutv." F. J. Porter, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Gen. G. B. i\IcO., Washington. 

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor 
at anv other time, did I think for one moment 
that Gen. Porter had been, or would be in any 
manner, derelict in the performance of his duty 
to the riation and its cause. Such an impression 
never entered my mind. The dispatch in ques- 
tion was written purely at the request of the 
President. 

On the morning of tlie 2d, the President and 
Gen. Halleck came to my house, when the Presi- 
dent informed me that Colonel Kelton had return- 
ed from the front ; that our aflaira were in bad 
condition ; that the army was in full retreat upon 
the defen-ses of Washington ; the roads filh d 
with stragglers, &c. He instruoted me to t^lce 
steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers," to 
place the works in a proper state of delense.and 
to go out to meet and take command of the ar-, 



102 



my ■when it approached the victnity of the works; 
then to put the troops in the best position for 
defense ; committing everything to my hands.* 

I immediately took steps to carry out these or- 
ders, and I sent an aide to General Pope with 
the following letter : 

Headquarters, Washington, Sept 2, 1362. 
ifaj.-Gren. J. Pope, Oom'g. A. V. : 

fieneral, — Gen, llalleck instructed me to re- 
peat to you tlie order he sent tliis moi'ning to 
Washington without unnecessary delay. lie 
feared that his messenger might miss you, and 
desirt3d to take this double precaution. 

In order to bring troops npon ground witli 
which they are already familiar, it would be best 
to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it 
may occupy Hall's Hill, etc. ; McDowell's to Up- 
ton's Hill ; Franklin's to the works in front of 
Alexandria ; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity ; 
Coixch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the; 
Chain Bridge ; Sumner either to Fort Albany or 
to Alexandria, as may be most convenient. 

In haste. General, very truly yoiirs, 

G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 

In the afternoon I crossed tlie Potomac and 
rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the ad- 
vance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals 
Pope and McDowell. After getting what infor- 
mation I could from them, I sent the few aids at 
my disposal to the left, to give instrirctions to the 
troops approaching in the direction of Alexan- 
dria ; and hearing artilleiy firing in the direction 
of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the 
corps of Sumner, Porter and Sigel were returnmg, 
and learning from Gen. Pope that Sumner was 
probably engaged, I went with a singe aide and 
three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that 
column. I reached the column after dark, and 
proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became 
satislied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be 
able to reach its intended position without any 
serious molestation. I therefore indicated to 
Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were 
to occupy, sent instructions to Gen. Sumner, and 
at a late hour of the night returned to Waslung- 
ton. - 

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, 
and was engaged in rectifying the positions of 
the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure 
the issuing of tlie necessary supplies, etc. I felt 
sure on this day tliat wo could repulse an}' at- 
tack made by the enemy on the south side of the 
Potomac. 

.=) THfe MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

• On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from tlie 
front of Washington, and tlie information which 
I received induced me to believe that he intend- 
ed to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. 
This materially clianged the aspect of affairs and 
enlarged the sphere of operations, for in c;is'^ of 



* The following', which was ths only Oider issuo't apuu 
the subject, was published on the 2d September. It was 
acciilenfallv omitted in preparing the report. 
War Departmeut, Adjutant GENERAii'i Ofeice, 

WAsuiNGTOx, Sept. 2, 1862. 
JI;ij oi-Cleneral McClelhin will have command of the for- 
tiftcalions of Washington, and df all the troops for the 
defense of the capital. By or.ler of 

M'tj -Gen IIallkck, 
• E. n. Tbwnsenh, .ias't Adj't Gencrui. 



a crossing in force, an active campaign would be 
necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the inva- 
sion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. 

I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and 12tl> 
Corps to Tennallytown, and the 9th Corps to a 
pomt on the 7th Street Road near Washington, 
and sent such cavalry as was available to the 
fords near Poolesvillo, to watch and impede the 
enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. 

On the .5th the 2d and 12th Corps were moved 
to Rockville, and Couch's division (the only one 
of the 4th Corps that had been»brought from the 
Peninsula) to Offut's Cross Roads. 

On tlie 6th the 1st and 9th Corps were ordered 
to Leesboro, the 6th Corps and Syke's division of 
the 5th Corps to Tennallytown. ■ 

On the 7th tlie 6th Corps was advanced to 
Rockville, to which place my headquarters were 
moved on the same day. 

All the necessary arrangements for the defence 
of the city, under the new condition of things, 
had been made, and General Banks was left in 
command, having received his instructions from 
rae. , • 

I left Washington on the 7th of September. 
At this time it was known that the mass of tluj 
rebel army bad passed up to the south side of 
the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and 
and that a portion of that army had crossed into 
Maryland ; but whether it was their intention tu 
cross their whole force, with a view to turn 
Washington by a flank movement down the north 
bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltiriiore, or 
to invade Pennsylvain'a, were questions which 
at that time we bad no means of deterniining. 
This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy 
obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to marxh 
cautiously, and to advance the army in sucli 
order as to continually keep Washington, ainl 
Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold 
the troops well in hand, so as to be able to con- 
centrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took 
the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the 
defence of Washington, if, as was greatly feared 
by the authorities, the enemy should be merely 
making a feint with a small force to draw off out- 
army, while with their mahi forces they stood 
ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to 
attack the capital. 

In the meantime the process of reorganization 
rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects 
of the disastrous campaign upon the otlier side 
of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing, the 
troops were regaining confidence, and their for- 
mer soldierly appearance and discipline was fast 
returning. My cavalry was pushed out continu- 
ally in all directions, and all ])0H8ible steps taken 
to learn the positions and movements of the 
enemy. 

The following table shows the movements of 
the army from day to day, up to the 14th of Sepi;- 
ember. 

[See next page.] 

The right wing, consisting oi the 1st and 9th 
Corps, under the command of Major-General 
Buruside, moved on Frederick, the 1st Corps via 
Brookville, Cooksvillc and Ridgeville, and the 
yth Corjjs via Damascus and New Market. 

The 2d and 12th Corps, forming tlie centre. 



103 
under the command of General Sumner, moved 
on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and 
Urbana. and the 12th Corps on a lateral road be- 
tween Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining 
the communication with the right wing, and cov- 
ering the direct road from Frederick to Wash- 
ington. 1 r ,~i 

The 6th Corps under the command of General 
Franklin, moved to Buckeystown viaDarnestown, 
Da^vsonville, and Barnville, covering the road 
from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, 
and being in a position to connect with and sup- 
port the centre should it have been necessary (as 
was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. 
Couch's division moved by the "River Road," 
covering that approach, watching the fords of 
the Potomac, and ultimately following and sup- 
supporting tbe 6th Corps. 

The following extracts f i om telegrams received 
by me after my departure from Washington will 
show how little was known there i^bout the ene- 
my's movements, and the fears which were enter- 
tained for the safety of the capital. 

On the 9th of September, General Halleck tele- 
graphed me as follows : 

"Until we can get better advices about the 
numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think vre 
must be verv cautious about stripping too much 
the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the 
enemv's object to draw off the mass of our forces, 
and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side 
of the Potomac. Think of this." 

'Again on the 11th of Sept., Gen. Ilalleck tele- 
LTaphed me as follows : , o -t 

'^ " Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel ? 1 
thing the main force of the enemy is m your 
front ; more troops can be spared from here." 

This dispatch, as published by the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the 
o-eneral-in-chief. reads as follows : " Why not or- 
der forward Porter's or Sigel's ? If the main 
force of the enemy is in your front, more troops 
can be spared from here." 

I remark that the original dispatch as received 
bv me from the telegraph operator, is in the 
words quoted above : ■• I thmk the main force, of 
the enemy, ct'c." 

In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on 
the same day, that all the troops that could be 
r^pared should at once be sent to reinforce me ; 
but none came. 

On the the 12th I received the following tele- 
gram from his Excellency the President : 

" Governor Curtin telegraphs me : ' I have ad- 
vices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at 
Williamsport, and probably the -whole rebel 
army will be drawn from Maryland.'" The Pre- 
sident adds : " Receiving nothing from Harper's 
Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive infor- 
mation from Wheeling, that the line is cut, corro- 
borates the idea that the enemy is recrossing 
the Potomac. Please do not let him get off with- 
out being hurt." 

On the 13th Gen. TTalleck telegraphed as fol- 
lows ; 

" Until you know more certainly the enemy s 
force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in 
thus uncovering the capital. 1 am of the opinion 



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104 



^'at tlie enemy will send a small column towards 
Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direc- 
tion, then suddenly move on Washington with 
the forces south of the Potomac, and those he 
may cross over." 

Again, on tho 14th, Gen. Halleck telegraphed 
me that "scouts report a large force still on the 
Virginia side. of the Potomac. If so, I fear you 
are exposing your left and rear." 

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the 
most positive evidence that Lee's army was in 
front of us, I received the following : 

War Department, Sept. 16, 1862, 12.30 p. m. 

Maj.-Geh'. McC. :— Yours of 7 a. m. is this ino- 
ment received. As you ^ive me no information 
in regard to the position of j^our forces, except 
those at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. 
I think, however, you will find that the whole 
force of the enemy in your front has crossed the 
river. I fear now more than ever tliat they- will 
recross at Harper's Jerry or below, and turn 
your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. 
This has appeared to me to be a part of their 
plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A 
heavy rain might prevent it. H. W. H., General- 
in-Chief. 

The importance of moving with all due cau- 
tion, so as not to uncover the national capital, 
until the enemy's position and plans were de- 
veloped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; 
and as my troops extended from the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, with the ex- 
treme, left flank moving along that stream, and 
with strong pickets left in rear to watch and 
guard all the available lords, I did not regard my 
left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- 
pears from the foregoing telegrams that the 
general-in-chief was of a different opinion, and 
that my movements were, in his-judgment, too 
precipitate, not only for the safety of Washing- 
ton, but also for the security of my left and rear. 

The precise nature of these daily injunctions 
against a precipitate advance may now be per- 
ceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony 
before the " Committee on the Conduct of the 
War," gays : " In respect to Gen. McClellan's 
going too fast, or too far from Washington, there 
can be found no such telegram from me to him ; 
he has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I 
sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going 
too far, not from Washington, but from the Po- 
tomac, leaving Gen. Lee the opportunity to come 
down the Potomac and get between him and 
Washington. I thought Gen. McClellan should 
keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his 
left rather than his right, so as the more readily 
to relieve Harper's Ferry." 

As I can find no telegram from the general-in- 
chief recommending me to keep my left flank 
nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe 
that when he gave this testimony he had forgot- 
ten tho purport of the telegrams above quoted ; 
and had also ceased to remember the fact, well 
known to him at the time, that my left, from the 
time 1 left Washington, always rested on the Po- 
tomac, and that my centre was continually in po- 
sition to reinforce the left or right as occasion 
might require. Had I advanced my left (lank 



along the Potomac more rapidly than the other 
columns marched upon the roads to the right, ] 
should have thrown that flank out of supporting 
distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed 
it. And if I had marched the entire army in one 
column along the banks of the river, instead of 
upon Ave different parallel roads, the column, 
with its trains, would have extended about fifty 
miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
advance before the rear could have reached the 
scene of action. Moreover, such a movement 
would have uncovered the communications with 
Baltimore and Washington dn our right, and ex- 
posed our left and rear. 

I presume it will be admitted by every milita- 
ry man that it was necessary to move the army 
in such order that it could at any time bo con- 
centrated for battle, and I am of opinion that this 
object could not have been accomplished in any 
other way than the one employed. Any other 
disposition of our forces would have subjected 
them to defea't in detached fragments. 

On tlie 10th of December, I received from my 
scouts information which rendered it quite pro- 
bable that Gen. Lee's army was in the vicinity of 
Frederick, br,t whether his intention was to move 
towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then 
known. 

On the 11th I ordered Gen. Burnside to push a 
strong reconnoissance across the National Road 
and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad towards 
New Market, and if he learned that the enemy 
had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on 
rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops cbnstant- 
ly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corres- 
ponding movement of all the troops in the centre 
and on the left was ordered in the direction of 
Urbana and Poolesville. 

On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered 
Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts 
of the city and in the streets. On the 13th the 
main bodies of the right wing and centre passed 
through Frederick. 

It was soon ascertained that the main body of 
the enemy's forces had marched out of the city 
on the two previous days, taking the roads to 
Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering 
it necessaiy to force the passes through the Catoc- 
tin and South ^fountain ridges, and gain posses- 
sion of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before any 
relief could be extended to Col. Miles at Harper's 
Ferry. 

On the 13th- an order fell into my hands issued 
by Gen. Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, and 
I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigor- 
ous forward movement. 

The following is a copy of the order referred 
to:,,,.., , 
Ileadq's, Army of North'n Virginia. Sept.. 9, '(^2. 
Spkcial Ordkrs, No. 191. 

The army will resume its inarch to-morrow, 
taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's 
command will form the advance, and after passing 
Middletown, with such portions as he may select, i 
will take theroute towards Sharpsburg, cross the 
Poioinac at the most convenient point, -and by 
Friu.iy niglit take possession of the Baltimore 
and dliio Railroad, capture sucli oi l^lie enemy as 



105 



may be at MArtinsburg. and intercept such as 
may attempt to escape from Harper s Ferry. 

Gen. Long-street's command will pursue the 
same road as far as Boonsboro' where it will hal 
with the reserve, supply, and baggage trams ot 

^Gen""iiicLaws, with his own division and that 
of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Long- 
street. On reaching Middletown, he will take 
the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morn- 
ing possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and 
endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper s Ferry 

■ and vicinity. ,. . . r.. ^^ 

Gen Walker, with his division, after accom- 
plishing the object in which he is now engaged, 
^iU cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its 
rieht bank to Lovettsville, take possession ot 
Loudon Heights if practicable, by Friday morn- 
ing IKeyes' ford on his left, and the roadbetween 
theend of the mountain and the Potomac on his 
ri<^ht He will, as far as practicable, co-operate 
wTth Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson, m inter- 
cepting the retreat of the enemy. 

Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form the rear 
c-uard of the armv. pursuing the road taken by 
the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, 
and supply trains, &c., will precede Gen llill. 
; Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron ot cayah-y 
to accompany the commands ot Gens. Longstreet 
Jackson, and McLaws, and with the mam body ot 
the cavalry will cover the route of the army, ana 
bring up all stragglers that may have been left 
behind. , ^^ ^ i 

The commands of Gen. Jackson, McLaws, and 
Walker, after accomplishing the objects tor which 
they have been detached, will join the mam body 
of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 

Each regiment on the march, will habitually 
carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons^ 
for use of the men at their encampments to pro- 
cure wood, &c. , 

By command of Gen. R. E. Lee, R- H. Chilton, 
\ A. G., to xMai.-Gen. D. H. Hill, C. D. 
HARPERS FERRr. 
In the report of a military commission, of 
which-Maj.-Gen; D. Hunter was President, which 
convened at Washington, for the purpose ot in- 
vestigating the conduct of certain officers m con- 
nection with the surrender of Harpers i^erry, 1 

find the following : , , r i n ^ 

" The commission has remarked Irccly on boi. 
Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the 
service of his country, and it can not, irom any 
motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those 
in high command, when it thinks such censure 
deserved. , 

"The general-in-chief has teptihed that (xcn. 
xVfcC. after having received orders to repel the 
er.emv invading the State of Maryland, marched 
only six miles per da,y, on au average, when pur- 
suing this invading enemy. „ , - , . 

"The general-in chief also testifies that, in his 
opinion, he could and should have relieved and 
protected Harper's Ferry; and hi this opinion 
the commission fully concur." 

I have been greatly surprised that this com- 
mission, in its investigations, never called upon 
me. ivH- upon any officer (g my statl, nor, so tar ; 



as I know, upon any officer of the army of the 
Potomac, able to give an intelligent statement of 
the movements of that army. But another para, 
graph in the same report makes testimony from 
such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows : 
" By a reference to the evidence, it will be 
seen that at the very moment Col. Ford aban- 
doned Maryland Heights, his little army was in 
reality relieved by Gen. Franklin's and Sumner's 
corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of 
his position." 

The corps of Gens. Franklin and Sumner were 
a part of the army which I at that time had the 
honor to command, and they were acting under 
ray orders at Crampton's Gap, and elsewhere, and 
if as the commission states, Col. Ford's " little 
army Avas in reality relieved" by those officers, it 
was relieved by me. . .1 r i 

I had, on the morning of the 10th, sent the tol- 
lowlng dispatch in relation to the command at 
Harper's Ferry : ,„... „.r 

Camp near RockviUe, Sept. 10, 18b2, 9.45 a v 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C. :— OoL 
Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I under- 
stand, with nine thousand troops. He can do 
nothing where he is, but could be of great ser- 
vice if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be 
ordered to join me by the most practicable route. 
G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 

To this I received the follciwing reply : 
" There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at 
present ; his only chance is to defend his works 
till you can open communication with him. H. 

W. il." . , . ,. 

It seems necessary for a distinct understanding 
of this matter, to state that I was directed on 
the 12th to assume command of the garrison of 
Harper's Ferry, as soon as I should open commu- 
nication with that place, and that when I received 
this order all communication from the direction 
in which I was approaching was cut off. Up to 
that time, however. Col. :Miles could, m my judg- 
ment have marched his command into Pennsyl- 
vania, by crossing the Potomac ^ Wilhamsport 
or above, and this opinion was confirmed by the 
fact that Col. Davis marched the cavalry part of 
Col. J\liles' command from Harper's Ferry on tho 
14th takuig the main road to Hagerstown, and 
he encountered no enemy excepting a small 
picket near the mouth of the Antielam. 

Before I left Washington, and when tliere, 
there certainly could have been no enemy to 
prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Col. 
Miles. I recommended to the proper authorities 
t^iat the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be 
withdrawn via Hagerstown, to aid in covering 
the Cumberland Valley, or that, taking up the 
pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad 
brido-e it should fall back to tho JIaryland 
Heights, and there hold out to the last. In this 
position it ought to have maintained itself many 
(lavs It was not deemed proper to adopt either 
of tliese suggestions, and when the matter was 
left to my discretion it was too late tcr me to do 
anything but endeavor to relieve the garrisor.. I 
accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our 
advance, at frequent intervals, as a signal that 
relief was at hand. This was done, and as 1 at- 



106 



terward.s leaniod, the reports of the cannon were 
distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confi- 
dently expected that Col. Miles would hold out 
until we had carried the mountain passes, and 
were in condition to send a detachment to his 
relief. The left was therefore ordered to move 
through Crampton'e Pass- in front of Burketts- 
ville, while the centre and right marched upon 
Turner',3 Pass in front of Aliddletown. 

It may be asked by those who are not acquaint- 
ed with the topography of the country in the vi- 
cinity of Harper's Ferry, wliy Franklin, instead 
of marching his column over the circuitous road 
fmm Jefferson via Burkettsville and Brownsville, 
and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It 
was for the reason that I had received informa- 
tion that the enemy wei-e anticipating our ap- 
proach in that direction, and liad established 
batteries on the south side of the Potomac which 
commanded all the approaches to Knoxville ; 
moreover the road from that point winds direct- 
ly along the river bank at the foot of a precipi- 
tous mountain, where there was no opportunity 
of forming in line of ])attle. and where the ene- 
my could have placed batteftes on both sides of 
the river to enfilade our narrow approaching 
columns. The approach through Crampton's Pass 
which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of 
Maryland Heights, was the only' one which of- 
fered any reasonable prospect of carrying that 
formidable position. At the same time the troops 
upon the road were in better relation to the main 
body of our forces. "> 

On the morning of the 14th a verbal message 
reached me from Col. Miles, which was the first 
authentic intelligence I had received as to the 
condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The mes- 
senger informed me that on the preceding after- 
noon Maryland Heights had been abandoned by 
our troops after repelling an attack of the rebels 
and that Col. Miles's entire force was concentra- 
ted at Harper's Ferry : the Maryland, Loudon, 
and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by 
him, and occupied by the enemy. The messen- 
ger also stated %at there was no apparent reason 
for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, 
and that Col. ililes instructed him to say that he 
could hold out with certainty two days longer. 
I directed him to make his way back, if possible, 
with the information, that I was approaching rap- 
idly, and felt confident I could relieve the place. 

On the same afteriiocai I wrote the following 
letter to Col. Miles, and dispatched three copies 
by three different couriers, on different routes. 
I did not, however, learn that any of these men 
succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. 

Middletown, Sept. 14, 1862. 

Col. D. S. Miles, — Colonel : The army is being 
rapidly concentrated here. We are now attack- 
ing the ])as9 on tho Itagerstown road, over the 
Blue Ridge, A coliunu is about attacking the 
Burkcstsville and T.oonsboro' Pass. You may 
count on our making every effort to relieve you ; 
you may rely upon my speedily accomplishing 
that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If 
it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights, 
with your whole force. If you can do that, I will 
certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoc- 



tin Valley is in oiu- possession you can safeljr 
cross the river at BcrUu or its vicinity, so far as 
opposition on this side of the river is concerned. 
Ilold out to the last. 

G. B. McC, Maj-Gen. Corad'g. 

On the previous day I had sent Gen. Franklin 
the following instructions : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Frederick, Sept. 13, 1862, 6.20 p.m. 
Major-Gen. W. B. Franklin, Com'g 6th Corps. 

General, — I have now full information as to 
movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson 
has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture the , 
garrison at Martinsburg, and cut off Miles's re 
treat toward the west. A division on the south 
side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon Heights, 
and cut off his retreat in that direction. McLaws, 
with his own command and the division of P. II. 
Anderson was to move by Boonsboro' and Piohr- 
ersville to carry the ^Maryland Heights. The 
signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleas- 
ant valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds 
out. Longstreet was to move by Boonsboro',^ v 
and ther^ halt with the reserve trains, D. II. Hill 
to form the rear guard, Stuart's cavalry to bring 
up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all the 
cavalry, this side the mountains, and north of us. 
The last I heard from Pleasonton he occupied 
iliddletown after several sharp skirmishes. A 
division of Burnside's started several hours ago 
to support him. The whole of Burnside's com- 
mand, including Hooker's corps, march this even- 
ing and early to-morrow morning, followed by the 
corps of Sumner, and Banks's and Sykes's divi- 
sion upon Boonsboro', to carr}^ that position. 
Couch has been ordered to concentrate his divi- 
sion and join you as rapidly as possible, Without 
waiting for the whole of that division to join 
you, you will move at day-break in the -morning 
by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to 
llohrersville ; I have reliable information that 
the mountain pass by this road is practicable for 
artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occu- 
pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as 
practicable, and debouch upon Piohrersville in 
order to cut off the retreat of or destroy MoLaw's 
command. ' If you find this pass held by the ene- 
my in large force, make all your disi^ositions for 
the attack, and commence it about half an hour 
after you hear severe firing at the pass on the 
Hagerstown pike, where the main body will 
attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will 
be first to cut off, destroy, or capture Jlc'l-aws 
command, and relieve Colonel Miles. If you 
effect this you will order him to join you at once 
with all his disposable troops, first destroying 
the bridges over the Potomac, if not already 
done, and leaving a sufficient garrison to prevent 
the enemy from passing the ford ; you will then 
return by Rohrersville on the direct road to 
Boonsboro' if the main column has not succeeded 
in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road 
from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Williams- 
port, in order either to cut off the retreat of Hill 
and Longstreet towards the Potomac, or to pre- 
vent the repassagc of Jackson. My general idea 
is to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail. 
I believe I have sufilcLcntly explained my iuion- 



107 



tioii3. I ask of you at this important moment all 
your intellect, and the utmost activity that a gen- 
eral can exercise. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. Com. 

Aorain on the 14th I sent him the following : 
Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Frederick, Sept. 14, 1862. 2 p. m. 

Maj.-Gen. Franklin :— Your dispatch of 12.30 
just received. Send Lack to hurry np Couch. 
Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any 
cost. We shall liave strong oi>position at both 
passes. As fast as the troops come up, I will 
hold a reserve in readiness to support yon. If 
you find the enemy in very great force at the 
pass, let me know at once, and amuse them as 
best you can, so as to retain them there. In that 
event I will probably throw the mass of the army 
on the pass in front of here. If T carry that, it 
will clear the way for you, and you must then fol- 
low the cnemv as i-apidly as possible. 

G. IJ. McC, :Maj.-Gcn. Com. 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 

General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly for- 
ward towards Crampton's Pass, and at about 12 
o'clock on the 14th arrived at Burkettsville, '-im- 
mediately in rear of which he found the enemy's 
infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, 
with artillery- in strong positions to defend the 
api^roaches to the pass. 

Slocum's division was formed upon the right 
of the road leading through the gap, and Smith's 
upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and 
Torbet's brigades, supported by Newton, whose 
activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily npon 
the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy 
were driven from their position at the base of the 
mountain, wdiere they were protected by a stone 
wall, and -steadily forced back up the slope until 
they reached the position of their batteiy on the 
road well up the mountain. Here they made a 
stand. The}' were, however, driven back, retiring 
their artillery in echelon, until, after an action of 
three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy 
hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. 

On the left of the road Brooks's and Irwin's 
brigades of Smith's division, formed for the pro- 
tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- 
tain in the same steady manner, driving the ene- 
my before them until the crest was carried. 400 
prisoners from seventeen dilferent organizations, 
700 stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three 
colors, were captured by our troops in this bril- 
liant action. It was conducted by Gen. Franklin 
in all its details. These details are given in the 
report of Gen. Franklin, herewith submitted, and 
due credit awarded to the gallant officers and 
men engaged. The loss in Gen. Franklin's corps 
was 11.5 killed, 41G wounded, and 2 missing. The 
enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's 
position was such that our artillery could not be 
used with any effect. ♦ 

^The close of the action found Gen. Franklin's 
advance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the 
14tli, within three and a half miles of the point 
on Maryhin^l Heights, (where he might on the 
same night, or on the morning of the 15lh, have 
formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's 
Ferry, had it not been previously withdrawn 
from M:ivyland Heights,) and within six miles of 
ILuper's j'\>rry. 



On the nigiit of the 14th the following dispatch 
was sent to Gen. Franklin : 

Boliviir, Scpc. 15, 1 a.m. 

General, — . . . . The commanding general di- 
rects that you occupy with your command the 
road fromRohrersvilie to HariJcr's Ferry, placing 
a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that po- 
sition, in case it should be attacked by the enemy 
from IBoonsboro'. Endeavor to open communica- 
tion with Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking 
and destroying such of the enemy as 30U may 
find in .Pleasant Vallo^'. Should you succeed in 
opening communication with Col. Miles, direct 
him to join you with his whole command, with 
all the guns and public property he can carry 
with him. The remainder of the guns will be 
destroyed ; the rest of the public property will 
also be destroyed. You will then proceed to 
Boonsboro', which place the commanding gener;U 
intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main 
body of the army at that place. Should you find, 
however, that the enemy has retreated from 
Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburgh, you will en- 
deavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat. 

By command of ilaj.-Gen. McClellan. 

G. D. R.,Ool. & A. D..C.,'to Gen. F. 

On the 15th the following were received from 
Gen. Franklin : 

At the foot of the Mountain in Pleasant Valley, 
3 m's. from Rohrersvide, Sept. 1 5, 8.50 a.m.)| 

General, — My command started at daylight this 
morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up 
here. Gen. Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last 
night. I have ordered one of his brigades and 
one battery to Rohrersville, or to the strongest 
points in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up 
in line of battle about two miles to our front, 
— one brigade in sight. As soon as I am 6iu*e 
that Rohrersville is occupied, I shall move 
forward to attack the enemy. This may be two 
hours from now. If Harper's Ferry is fallen, and 
the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has. 
it is my opinion that I should be strongly rein- 
forced. . . . 

W. B. F., M.-Gen. Com. Gth C, to Gen. G. B. McC. 
Sept. 15; 11 A. M. 

General : — I have received your despatch by 
Capt. O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force in 
my front, in two line's of battle stretching across 
the valley, and a large column of artillery and in- 
fantry on the right of the valley, looking towards 
Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to 
one.' It of course will not answer to pursue the 
enemy under these circumstances. 1 shall com-. 
municate with Burnside as soon as possible. In 
the meantime I shall wait here until 1 learn what 
is the prospect of reinforcement. I have not the 
force to justify an attack on the force I Bee in 
front. I have had a very close view of it, and 
its position is very strong. Respectfully, W. B. 
Franklin, Maj.-Gen. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC, Comd'g. 

Col. Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. 
m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the flrinc: indi- 
cated, and Gen. Franklin was ordered to remain 
wlicrc he was, to watch the large force in front 
of him, and protect our left and rear, until the 
night of the ICtii, when he was ordered to join 



108 



the niaiu lodj ol' tho acmy at Keedysvillc, after 
sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights. 

While the events which have just been de- 
scribed were taking place at Crampton's Gap, 
the troops of the centre and right vising, which 
had united at Frederick on the 13th, were en- 
gaged in the contest for the possession ot Turn- 
• er's Gap. 

On the morning of the 13th, Gen. Pleasonton 
was ordered to send McRej'nolds's brigade and 
:i section of artillery in the direction of Gettys- 
burg, and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson, to 
ommunicate with Franklin, to whom the 6th U. 
.■^. Cavalry and a section of artillery had previous- 
ly been sent, and to proceed with the remainder 
of the force in the direction of Middletowu in 
pursuit of the enemy. 

■ After skirmishing with the enemy all the 
tnorning and driving them from several strong 
positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South 
Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy 
in force, and apparently determined to defend 
the pass. He sent back for infantry to General 
Burnside, who had been directed to support him, 
and proceeded to make reconnoissauce of the 
position. 

The Sonth Mountain is at this point about 1000 
feet in height, and its general direction is from 
north-east to south-west. The National Road 
from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly 
at right angles from Turner's Gap, a depression 
which is some 400 feet in depth. The mountain 
on the north side of the turnpike is divided into 
two crests or ridges by a narrow valley, which, 
though deep at the pass, becomes a slight de- 
pression at about a mile to the north. There are 
two country roads, one to the right of the turn- 
pike, and the other to the left, which give access 
to the crests overlooking the main road. The 
one to the left, called the " old Sharpsburg 
road," is nearly parallel to, and about half a mile 
distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the 
crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the 
left. 

The other road, called the " old Hagerstown 
road," passes up a ravine in the mountaui, aboiit 
a mile from the turnpike, and, bending to the 
left over and along the first crest, enters the 
turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit 
of the pass. 

On the night of the 13th the positions of the 
afferent corps were as follows : 

Reno's corps, at Middletown, except Rodman's 
■livision at Frederick. 

Hooker's corps, on the Monocacy, two miles 
iVom Frederick. 

Sumner's Corps, near Frederick ; Banks' Corps, 
ditto ; Sykes's Division, ditto ; Franklin's Corps, 
at Buckeystown ; Couch's Division, at Licksville. 

The orders from headquarters, for the march 
■n the I4th, were as follows : 

13th, 11.20 V k: — Hooker to march at daylight 
to Middletown. 

13th, 11.30 P.M. — Sykcs to move at 6 a. m., af- 
ter Hooker, on the Middletown and Hagerstown 
roao. 

14th, 1 A. M., — Artillery lleserve to follow Sykes 
closely. 



L3th, 8.45 r. ii — Sumner to move at 7 a. .vi. 

14th, 9 A. M. — Sumner ordered to take the 
Shookstown road to Middletown. 

13th, C.46 p. M. — Couch ordered to move to 
Jefferson with his whole division. 

On the 14th, Gen. Pleasanton continued his re- 
connoissauce. Gibson's battery, and afterwards 
Benjamin's battery, (of Reno's corps), were placed 
on high ground io tha left of the turnpike, and 
obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position in 
the gap. 

General Cox's division, which had been 'or- 
dered up to support Gen. Pleasonton, left its biv- 
ouac near Middletown, at 6 a. m. The first brig- 
ade reached the scene of action at 9 a. m., and 
was sent up the old Sharpsburg road by Gen. 
Pleasonton, to feel the enemy and ascertain if he 
held the crest on that side in strong force. This 
was soon found to be the case, and Gen. Cox hav- 
ing arrived with the othpr brigade, and infor- 
mation having been received from Gen. Ptcno 
that the column would be supporfed by the 
whole corps, the division was ordered to assault y 
the"'i)osition. «^ 

Two 20-pound Parrotts of Simmons's battery 
and two sections of McMullin's battery were left 
in the rear, in position near the turnpike, where 
they did good service during the day against the 
enemy's batteries in the gap. 

Col. Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, 
well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope 
to the left of the road, with the object of turning 
the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in 
gaining the crest and establishing itself there in 
spite of the vfgorous resistance of the enemy, 
who was posted behind stone walls and in the 
edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which 
poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment 
on the right of the brigade. 

Col. Crooke's brigade marched in -column, a< 
supporting distance. A section of I\IcMullin's 
batter}^ under Lieutenant Croome (killed while 
serving one of his guns), was moved up with 
great difficult}'', and opened with canister at very 
shoi't range on the enemy's infantry, by whom 
(after having done considerable execution) it 
was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. 

One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now de- 
ployed on Scammon's left, and the other two in 
his rear, and they several times entered the first 
Ihie and relieved the regiment in front of them 
when hard pressed. A section of Simmon's bat- 
tery was brought up and placed in an open space 
in the woods, where it did good service during 
the rest of the day. The enemy several times 
attempted to retake the crest, advancing with 
boldness, but were each time repulsed. They 
then withdrew their battery to a point more to 
the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. 

Il was now about noftn, and a lull occurred in 
the co.jtcst, which lasted about two hours, dur- 
ing which the rest of tlie corps was coming up. 
Gen. AVilcox's division was the first to arrive. 
When he reached the base of the mountain. Gen. 
Cox advised him to consult Gen. Pleasonton as to 
a position. The latter indicated that on the right, 
afterwards taken up by Gen. Hooker. Gen.AVil- 
cox was in the act of moving to occupy this 



ground wlieii he received an order from Gen. 
Kcuo to move up the old Sharpsburg road, and 
take a position to its right, overlooking the turn- 
pike. Two regiments Avcre detached to support 
Gen. Cox, at his request. One section of Cook's 
battery was placed in position near the turn of 
the road (on the crest), and opened fire on 
the enemy's batteries across the gap. The divi- 
sion was proceeding to deploy to the right of the 
road when the enemv suddenly opened (at 150 
yards) with a battery, which enfiladed the road 
at that point, drove otf Cook's cannoneerswith 
their limbers, and causing a tc^nporary panic, in 
which the guns were nearly lost. .But the 79th 
New York and ITtli Michigan promptly rallied, 
changed front nnder a heavy fire, and moved out 
to protect iho guns, with Avhich Capt. Cook had 
remained. Oixler was soon restored, and the di- 
vision formed in line on the right of Cox, and was 
kept concealed as much as possible under the 
hill-side until the whole line advanced. It was 
exposed not only to. the fire of the battery in 
front, but also to that of the batteries on the 
other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily. 

Shortly before this time Generals Burnsidc and 
Reno arrive.d at the base of the mountain ; and 
the former directed the latter to move up the di- 
visions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the 
crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon 
the enemy's position with his whole force as soon 
as he v.-as informed that Gen. Hooker (who had 
just been directed to attack on the right) was 
advanced up the mountain. Gen. Reno then 
went to the front and assumed the direction of 
affairs, the positions having been explained to 
. him by Gen. Ir'leasonton. 

Shortly before this, time I arrived at the point 
occupied by Gen. Burnside, and my headquar- 
ters were located there untd the conclusion of 
the action. 

Gen. Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p.m., and 
reached the scene of action about half past three 
p,M. Clark's battery of his division was sent to 
assist Cox's left, by order of Gen. Reno, and two 
regiments (2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) 
were detached by Gen. Reno and sent forward a 
little distance on the left of the turnpike. His 
division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rod- 
man's division was divided, Col. Fairchild's V^S" 
i ade being placed on the extreme left, andTJol. 
Harland's under Gen. Rodman's, personal super- 
I- vision -on the right. 

My order to move the whole lino forward, and 
take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was 
f executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a 
desperate resistance, charging our advancing 
lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere 
routed, and tied. Our chief loss fell on '\Vilcox's 
division. The enemy's battery was found to be 
across a gorge .and beyond the reach of our in- 
fantry, but .its. position was untenable, and i{ was 
hastily removed and not again put in position 
near us. But the batteries across the gap still 
kept a fire of shot and shell. , • , 

Gen. Wilcox praises very higlily the conduct 
of tlic 17th Michigan in this advance— ^a regin^ent 
which had been organized scarcely' a month, but 
which charged the advancing enemy in flank in a 



109 



manner worthy of veteran troops ; and also tiiat 
of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met 
them in front. 

Cook's battery now reopened fire ; Sturgis's 
division was moved to the flank of Wilcox's, oc- 
cupying the new ground gained on the further 
side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the 
batteries across the gap. The enemy made an 
effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- 
IHilsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's bat- 
tery. 

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another 
effort to regain the best groiind, attacking along 
Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire 
was kept up until nearly nine o'clock, several 
charges being made by the enemy and repulsed 
with slaughter, and we,finally occupied the high- 
est part of thQ mountain. Gen. Reno was killed 
iust before sunset, while making a reconnoissance 
to the front, and the command of the corps de- 
volved upon Gen. Cox. 

In Gen. Reno the nation lost one of its best gen- 
eral olficers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave 
and honest man. 

There was no firing after ten o'clock, and tlie 
troops slept on their arms, ready to renew the 
fight at daylight ; but the enemy quietly retired 
from the front during the night, abandoning their 
wounded and leaving their dead in large numbers 
scattered on the field. 

While these operations were progressing on 
the left of the main column, the right, under Gen. • 
Hooker, was actively engaged. His corps left 
the Monocacy early in the morning, and its ad- 
vance reached the Catoctin Creek about 1 p. m. 
Gen. Hooker then went forward to examine the 
groimd. 

At about 1 o'clock Gen. Meade's division was 
ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. 
The following is the order sent : 

September 14. 1 p. m. 
Maj.-Gen. Hooker, 

General, — General Reno requests that a division 
of yours may move up on the right (north) of tlie 
main road. General McClellan desires you to 
comply with this request, holding your whole 
corps in readiness to support the movenicnt, and 
taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and 
Banks's corps have commenced arriving. Let 
General McClellan be informed as soon as you 
commence your movement. 

Geo. D. Ruggles,Col.,A.-A.-G & A.-D.-C. 
Meade's division" left Catoctin Creek about 2 
o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main 
road on the old Ilagerstown road to ]\Iount 
Taber Church, where Gen Hooker was, and dc- • 
ployed a short distance in advance, its right rest- 
ing about one and a half miles from the turnpike. 
The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on 
the mountain side, but did no considerable dam- 
age. Cooper's Battery "B," 1st Pennsylvania 
Artillery, was placed in position on high ground 
at about half-past three o'clock, and fired at the 
enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of 
Gen. Hooker, and the position of our lines pre- 
vented any further use of artillery by us on this 
part of the field. The 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 
was sent xip the valley to the right to observe 



no 



tlie movements, if any, of tho enemy in that di- 
rection, and one regiment of Meade's Division, 
posted to watch a road coming in in tlie same di- 
rection. The otlier divisions were deployed as 
they came up. General Hatch's on the left, and 
General Iticketts', which arrived about 5 r. m., in 
the rear. 

General Gibbon's brigade was detached from 
Hatch's division by General Duriiside for the pur- 
pose of making a demonstration on the enemy's 
centre up the main road, as soon as the move- 
ments on the right and left had sufficiently pro- 
grossed. 
: The 1st Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Sey- 
mour's brigade, were sent forward as ekirmishers 
to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was 
in force. Meade was then directed to advance 
his division to the right of the road, so as to out- 
flank them if possible, and then to move forward 
and attack, while Hatch was directed to take, 
with hie division, the crest on the left of the old 
Hagerstown road, Kickett's division being held 
in reserve. 

Sej^mour's brigade was sent up to the top of 
the slope on the right of the ravine, through 
which the road runs, and then move along the 
summit parallel to the road, while Col. Gallagher's 
and Col Magilton's brigades moved in tlie same 
direction along tlie slope and in the ravine. The 
ground was of the most difficult character for 
the movements of troops, the hillside being very 
steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls, 
fences, and timber. The enemy was soon en- 
countered, and in a short time the action became 
general along the whole front of the division. 
The line advanced steadily up the mountain side, 
where the enemy was posted behind trees and 
rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. 
Duriiig this advance Col. Gallagher, commanding 
3d brigade, was severely wounded, and the com- 
mand devolved upon Lieut. -Col. Robt. Anderson. 

General Meade, having reason to believe that 
the enemy were attempting to outflank him on 
liis right, applied to Gen. Hooker for reinforce- 
ments. General Duryea's brigade, of Rickett's 
division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive 
until the close of the action. It was advanced 
on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could 
open fire before the enemy retired, and darkness 
intervened. General Meade speaks highly of 
General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade 
on tho extreme right, securing by his manoeuvres 
tlie great object of the movement, the outflanking 
of the enemy, 
t While Gen. Meade was gallantly driving the 
enemy on the right. General Hatch's division Avas 
engaged in a severe contest for the possession of 
the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up 
the mountain in the following order : twe regi- 
ments of General Patrick's brigalle deployed as 
skirmishers, with the other two regiments of the 
same brigade supporting them : Col. Phelps's bri- 
gade in line of battalions in mass at deploying 
distance : General Doubleday's brigade, in the 
game order, bringing up the rear. The 21st New 
York having gone straight up the slope, instead 
of around to the right, as directed, the 2d United 
.States Sharpshooters was sent out in its place. 
Pholpa's and Doubleday's brigades were de- 



ployed in turn as they reached the woods, which 
began about half way up the mountain ; Gen. 
Patrick, witli his skirmishers, soon drew the fire 
of the enemj', and found him strongly posted be- 
hind a fence which bounded the cleared space on 
the top of the ridge, having in bis front the 
M'oods, through which our line was advancing, 
and in his rear a cornfield, full of rocky ledgce, 
which afforded good cover to fall back if dis- 
lodged. 

Phelps's brigade'gallantly advanced imder a hot 
fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen 
minutes of heavy firing on both sides, (in which 
Gen. Hatch was wounded while urging on his 
men), the fence was carried by a charge, and our 
line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat 
sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doubleday's 
brigade, now under the command of Lieut.-Col. 
Hotfinan, (Col. "W^aimvright having been wound- 
ed), relieved Phelps's, and continued firing for an 
hour and-a-half, the enemy, behind ledges of rcxks 
some thirty or forty paces in our front, making a 
stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge on 
the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Col- 
onel Christian's brigade, of Rickett's division, 
came up and relieved Doubleday's brig-ade, whicli 
fell back into line behind Phelps. Christian's 
brigade continued the action for thirty or forty 
minutes, when the enemy retired, after having 
made an attempt to flank us on the left, which 
was repulsed by the 7Cth Now York, and Ith 
Indiana. 

The remaining brigade of Rickett's division, 
(General Hart6uft"'s), was moved up in the centre, 
and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's 
right. We now had possession of the summit of 
the first ridge, which commanded the turnpike 
on both sides of the mountain, and the troops 
were ordered to hold their j^ositions until furtlier 
orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the af- 
ternoon, General Gibbon, with his Itrigade, and 
one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th U. S. Ar- 
tillery), was ordered to move up the main road 
on the enemy's centre. He advanced a regiment 
on each side of the road, preceded by skirmish- 
ers, and followed by the other two regiments in 
double column ; the artillery moving on the road 
unti' within range of the cnemy'a guns, which 
wefJI'firing on the column from the gorge. The 
brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy be- 
fore it from his positions in the woods and behind 
stone walls, until it i-cached a point well up 
towards the top of the pass ; when the enemy, 
having been reinforced by three regiments, open- 
ed a heavy fire on the front, and on both flanks. 
The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy 
being entirely repulsoii ; and the brigade, after 
having sut^ered severely, and having expended 
all its ammunition, including even the cartridges 
of the dead and wounded, continued to hold tho 
ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'eiock. 
when it was relieved by General Gorman's bri- 
gade, of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps, 
(excej)t the Cth* Wisconsin, which remained on 
the field all night.) (]en. Gibbon, in his delicate 
movement, .handled his brigade with as much 
precision and coolness, as if upon parade, and the 
bravery of bis troops could not be excelled. 

The 2d Corps, (Sumner's), and tJie 12th Corpg, 



Ill 



(Williams), reached their final positions shortly 
nfter dark. General Richardson's division was 
placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position 
to support our right if necessary ; the 12th Corps, 
and Sedgwick's division, bivoucked near Bolivar, 
in a position to support our centre and left. 

Gen. Sykes's division of regulars, and the artil- 
lery reserve, halted for the night at Middletown, 
so that, on the night of the 14th, the Vfhole army 
was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, 
in readiness to renew the action the next day, or 
to move in pursuit of the esemy. At daylight 
our skirmishers were advanced, and it was found 
that he had retreated during the night, leaving 
his dead on the field, and his wounded uncared 
for. About fifteen hundred prisoners were taken 
r>y us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy 
in killed, was much greater than our own, and 
probably also in wounded. It is believed that 
the force opjiosed to ua at Turner's Gap, con- 
sisted of D. II. Hill's corps, (15,500), and a part, 
if not the whole of Longitreet's and perhaps a 
portion of Jackson's ; probably some '30,000 in 
all. We went into action with about 30,000 men, 
and our losses amounted to 1,568, aggregate ; (312 
killed, 1,234 wounded, 22 missing.) 

On the next day I had the honor to receive the 
following very kind dispatch from hig Excellency 
the President : 
War Dep't. Washington, Sept. 15, '62, 2.45 p.m. 

Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless 
you, aiid all with you. Destroy the rebel army 
if possible. A. Lincoln. 

To Maj.-Gen. McC. 

A N T I E T A M. 
On the night of the battle of South Mountain, 
orders were given to the corps commanders to 
press forward their pickets at early dawn. This 
advance revealed the fact that the enemy had 
left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was 
ordered ; the cavalry under Gen. Pleasonton, and 
the three corps under Gen's. Sumner, Hooker and 
Mansfield, (the latter of whom had arrived that 
morning and assumed command of the 12th [Wil- 
liams's] corps,) by the national turnpike and 
Boonsboro' ; the corps of Gen's. Burnside" and 
Porter (tho latter command at that time consist- 
ing of but one weak division, Sykes's) by the old 
Sharpsburg road ; and Gen. Franklin to move 
into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a 
detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's 
Ferry. 

Gen's. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the 
road from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville, were to re- 
inforce Frankliri or to move on Sharpsburg, ac- 
cording to circumstances. 

Franklin niovei towards Browrteville, and 
Found there a foroe of the enemy much superior 
in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong po- 
sition to receive him. 

At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's 
Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. 

The cava'"-/ overtook the enemy's cavalry in 
Boonsboro, made a dashing charge, killing and 
wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners 
and two guns. 

Gen. Richardson's division, of the 2d Corps, 
pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, 



passed Boonsboro and Keadysville, and came up 
on the main body of the enemy, occupying in 
large force a strong position a few milos beyond 
the latter place. 

It had been hoped to engage the enemy on>th© 
15th, accordingly instructions were given that if 
the enemy were overtaken on the march, they 
should be attacked at once ; if found in heavy 
force and in position, the corps in advance should 
be placed, in position for attack, and await my 
arrival. On reaching the advance position of our 
troojis, I found but two divisions, Richardson's 
and Sykes's, in position, the other troops were 
halted in the road, the head of the columa some 
distance in rear of Richardson. 

The enemy occupied a strong position on the 
heigbts, on the West side of Antietam Creek, dis 
playing a large force of infantry and cavalry, with 
numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on 
our columns as they appeared in sight on tho 
Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, which fire 
was returned by Captain Tidball's light battery, 
2d United States Artillery, and Pcttit"s battery, 
1st New York Artillery. 

The division of General Richardson, following 
close on the heels of the retreating ■ foe, halted 
and deployed near Antietam River, on the right 
of the Sharpsburg road. Gen. Sykes, leading ob 
the division of regiUars on the old Sharpsburg 
road, came up and deployed to the left of Gen. 
Richardson, on the left of the road. 

Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by 
four stone bridges, the upper one on the Keadys- 
ville and Williamsport road ; the 2d on the 
Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two 
and a half miles below ; the third about a mile 
below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharps- 
burg road ; and the fourth near the mouth of 
Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Har- 
per's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles be- 
low the third. The stream is sluggish, with few 
and difficult fords. 

After a rapid examination of the position, / 
found that it was too late to attack that day, and 
at once directed the placing of the batteries of 
position of the centre, and indicated the bivouacs 
for the difterent corps, massing them near and on 
both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps 
were not all in their positions until the next morn- 
ing after sunrise 

On the morning of the ICth it was discovered 
that the eneniy had changed the position of Jus 
batteries. The masses of his troops were, liow- 
ever. still concealed behind the opposite heights. 
Their left and centre were upon and in front of 
the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden 
by woods and irregularities of the ground ; their 
extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence 
near the cross roads to the north of J. Miller's 
farm, their left resting upon the Potomac. Their 
hue extended south, the right resting upon the 
hills to the south of Sharpsburg, near Siiavcley'a 
farm. 

The bridge over the Antietam, described as 
No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by 
riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fencrs. Sec, 
and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front 
of tliis line consisted of undulating hills, their 



\V2 



crests in Lurn counuaiuicd by others in their rear. 
Oil all favorable points the enemy's artillery was 
posted, and tJieir reserves, hidden from view by 
the hills on wiiich their line of battle was formed, 
could maufeuvre unobserved by o'.ir army, and 
from the shortness of their line, could rapidly re- 
inforce any point threatened by our attack. Their 
position stretching across the angle formed by 
the Totornac and Antietam, their tianks and rear 
proteced by these streams, was one of the strong- 
est to be found in this region of country, which 
is well adapted to defensive warfare. 

On the right near Keadysville, on both sides of 
the Bharpsburg turnpike were Sumner's and 
Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the 
turnpike, and near the Antietam river, Gen. 
Jlichardson's division of Gen. Sumner's corps was 
posted. Gen. Sykes' division df Gen. Porter's 
corps was on the left of the turnpike, and in line 
v,'ith Gen. Richardson, protecting the bridge, No. 
2, over the Antietam. The left of the line oppo- 
site to, and some distance from bridge No. 3, was 
occu])ied by Gen. Burnside's corps. Before giv- 
ing Gen. Hooker his ordei's to make the movement 
wiiich will presently be described, I rode to the 
left of the line to satisfy myself that the troops 
were properly posted there to secure our left 
Hank from any attack made along the left bank of 
the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry 
bridge No. 3. 

1 found it necessary to make considerable 
changes in the position of Gen. Burnside's corps, 
and directed liim to advance to a strong position 
in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and to 
reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge care- 
fully. 

In rcarof Gens. Sumner's and Hooker's corps, 
near Keadysville, Gen. i[ansfield's corps was 
massed ; the cavalry on the turnpike in rear of 
Keadysville. On the ridge of the first line of hills 
overlooking the Antietam, and between the turn- 
pike and Fry's house, on the right of the road, 
■svero placed Capts. Taft's, Languor's, Von 'Klei- 
7.er'6, and Lieut, Weaver's batteries of 20-pouuder 
Parrot guns. On the crest of the hill, in the rear 
and right of bridge No. 3. Capt. Weed's 3-inch 
and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder batteries. 
Gen. Ftanl^iin's corps, and Gen. Couch's division 
held a position in Pleasant Valley, in front of 
Brownsville, with a strong force of the enemy in 
their front. Gen. iforeirs division of Porter's 
corps was en route from Boonsboro', and Gen. 
Humphrey's division of new troops, en route 
from Frederick, iid. About daylight on the 16th 
the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery On our 
guns in yjosition which Avas promptly returned, 
i'heir lire was silenced for the xime, but was 
frequently renewed during the day. In the lieavy 
lire of the morning, Major Ariidt, commanding 
'-;t battalliou 1st New York .A.rtillery was raor- 
dly wounded, while directing the operations of. 
his batteries. 

It was aftei noon before I could move the troops 
to their positions for attack, being compelled to 
spend the morning in reconnoitering the new 
position taken up by the enemy, examining the 
ground, lindiiig fords and clearing their ap- 
proachofl, and hurrying up the ammunition and 



suj)ply trains, wliich had been delayed by the 
rapid march of the troops over the few practica- 
ble a)iproaches from Frederick. These had been 
crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and 
artillery, pressing on with the hope of overtaking 
the enemy before he could form to resist an at- 
tack ; many ot the troops were out of rations, on 
the previous day, and a good deal of their ammu- 
nition had been expended in the severe action of 
the i4th. 

My plan for the impending general engagement 
was to attack the eiiemy's left with the corps of 
Hooker and Mansfield, supj'orted by Sumner's, 
and if necessary, Franklin's, and as soon as mat- 
ters looked favorably there to move the corps of 
Gen. Burnside agauist the enemy's extreme right, 
upon the ridges running to the soiith and j:car of 
Sharpsbiu-g, and having carried their position to 
press along the crest towards our right; and 
whenever either of these flank movements should 
be successful to advance our centre with all their 
forces then disposable. 

About 2 P.M. Gen. Hooker, with his corps con- 
sistuig of Gen. Piickett's, ileade's and Double- 
day's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antie- 
tam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1 a short dist- 
ance above, to attack, and if possible turn the 
enemy's left. Gen. Sumner was ordered to cross 
the corps of Gen. Mansfield (the 12th) during the 
night, and hold his own (the 2d) corps ready to 
cross earl}' the next moiTiing. On reaching the 
vicinitj' of the enemy's left, a sliarp contest com- 
menced with the Pennsylvania Pieserves, the ad- 
vance of Gen. Hooker's corps, near the house oi 
Dr. Miller. The enemy was driven from the strip 
of woods where he was first met, the firing lasted 
until after dark, when Gen. Hooker's corps rested 
on their arms, on ground won from the enemy. 

During the night Gen. Mansfield's corps, con- 
sisting of Gen's. Williams's and Green's divisiont, 
crossed the Antietam at the same ford and bridg« 
that Gen. Hooker's corps had passed, and bivou- 
acked on the farm of J. Poffenberger, about a 
mile in rear of Gen. Hooker's position. At day- 
light, on the 17th, the action was commenced by 
the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. 
The whole of Gen. Hooker's corps was soon en- 
gaged, and drove the enemy from the open field 
in front of the first line of woods, into a second 
line of woods beyond, Avhich runs to tlie eastward 
of and nearly parallel to the Sharpshurg and 
Hagerstown turnpike. 

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops 
advanced the opposition became more dctermin 
ed, and the numbers of the enemy greater. Gen 
Hooker then ordered up the corps of Gen. Mans 
fiejd, which tmoved promptly towards the scene 
oi action. The 1st division. Gen. Williams, was 
deployed to th.e right on approaching tlie enemy; 
Gen. Crawford's brigade on the right, its right 
resting on the Hagerstown turnpike, on his left 
Gen. Gordon's brigade. The 2d division, fJcii 
Green's, joining the left of Gordon's, extended ; ■• 
far as the burnt buildings to the north and easl 
of the white church on the turnpike. During Iho 
dcyil'.iyinent that gallant veteran, General Mans- 
field, fell mortally wounded while examining the 
gromid in front of his troops. General Hartsuif, 



113 



•f Hooker's corps, was severely wounded while 
bravely pressing forward his troops, and was 
taken from the field. 

The command of the 12th corps fell upon Gen. 
Williams. Five regiments of the 1st division of 
this corps were new troops. One brigade of the 
2d division was sent to support Gen. Double- 
day's. The 121tli Pennsylvania Volunteers were 
pushed across the turnpike into the woods be- 
yond J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the 
position as long as possible. 

The line of battle of this corps was lormcd,aiid 
it became eng'aged at about 7 a.m., the attack 
being opened by Knapp's Pennsylvania, Cothran's 
New York and Hampton's Pittsburg batteries. 
To meet this attack the enemy had pushed u 
strong column of troops ihto the open fields in 
front of the turnpike, while he occupied the 
woods on the west of the turnpike in strong force. 
The woods (as was found by subsequent observa- 
tion.) were traversed by the out-cropping ledges 
of rock. Several hundred yards to the right and 
rear was a line which commanded the debouche 
of the woods, and in the fields between was a 
long line of stone fences, continued by breast- 
works of rails, which covered the enemy's m- 
flmtry from our musketry. The same woods 
formed a screen, behind which his movements 
were concealed, and his batteries on the hill and 
tlie rifle works covered from the fire of our ar- 
tillery in front. 

For about two hours the battle raged with 
varied success, the enemy endeavoring to drive 
our troops into the second line of wood, and ours 
ic. turn to get possession of the line in front. 
Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the 
enemy back into the woods near the turnpike. 
Gen. Green, with his two brigades, crossing into 
the woods to the left of the Dunker church. 
During this conflict Gen. Crawford, commanding 
1st division after Gen. Williams took command of 
the corps, was wounded, and left the field. Gen. 
Green, being much exposed and applying for re- 
inforcements, the 13th New York and 27th Indi- 
ana, and the 3d Maryland, were sent to his sup- 
port with a section of Knapp's battery. 

At about 9 o'clock a.m.. Gen. Sedgwick's divl- 
■iori of Gen. Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the 
ford previously mentioned, this division marched 
in three columns to the support of the attack on 
the enemy's left. On nearing the scene of action 
the columns were halted, faced to the front, and 
established by Gen. Sumner in three parallel lines 
by brigade, facing towards the south and west ; 
Gen. Gorman's brigade in front. Gen. Dana's se- 
cond, and Gen. Howard's third, with a distance 
between the lines of some seventy paces. 

The division was then put in motion, and 
moved upon the field of battle under fire from 
the enemy's concealed batteries on the hill be- 
yond the woods, passing di-.gonally to the front 
across the open space, and to the front of the 
1st division of Gen. William's corps— this latter 
division witlidrcv/. 

on the west of the tnrn- 
encmv before them, the 



Entering the v/uoi!s 
pike, and drivhig the 
first line was met by a 



leavy fire of musketry and 



Bliell from the enemy's breastworks and the bat 



teries on the hill commanding me exit liom the 
woods. lifeantime a heavy column of the enemy 
had succeeded in crowding back the troops of 
Gen. Green's division, and appeared in rear of 
the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of 
Gen. Sumner, Gen. Howard faced the third line 
to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to 
meet the column advancing on the left, but this 
line now suCfering from a destructive fire both in 
front and on its left, which it was unable to re- 
turn, gave way towards the right and rear incon- 
siderable confusion, and was soon followed by the 
first and second lines. 

Gen. Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of 
Gen. Dana's, soon rallied and checked the advance 
of the enemy on the right. The second and third 
lines now formed on the left of Gen. Gorman's 
brigade, and poured a destructive fire upon the 
enemy. ■ . _ 

During Gen. Sumner's" attack, ho ordered Gen. 
Williams to support him. Brig.-Gen. Gordon, with 
a portion of his brigade, moved forward, but 
when he reached the woods the left of Gen. 
Sedgwick's division had given way, and finding 
himself, as t!ie smoke cleared up, opposed to the 
enemy in force, with his small command, he with- 
drew to the rear of the batteries at the second 
line of woods. As Gen. Gordon's troops un- 
masked our batteries on the left, they opened 
with canister, the batteries of Capt. Cothrrn 1st 
New York, and "1," IstU. S. Artillery, ccn^^m iid- 
ed by Lieut. Woodruff, doing good service. Un- 
able to stand this deadly fire in front tiiid the 
musketry fire from the right, the enemy again 
sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond tlie 
turnpike. 

During this assault Gen's. Sedgwick and Dana 
were seriously wounded and taken from the field. 
Gen. Sedgwick, though twice wounded and faint 
from loss of blood, retained command of his di- 
vision for more than an hour after his first wound, 
animating his command by his presence. Gen. 
Howard assumed command after Gen. Sedgwick 
retired. 

At the time of Gen. Sedgwick's advance. Gen. 
Hooker, while iirging on his command, was se- 
riouslv wounded in the foot and taken from the 
field. " The repulse of the enemy offered ojipor- 
tunity to re-arrange the lines and re-oiganue the 
commands on the- right, now more or l-'^s in con- 
fusion. Tiie batteries of the Pennsyivrtuia Re- 
serve,x)n high gromid near I. Pofi'enburger's house, 
opened fire and checked several attempts of the 
enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, 
to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. . _ 

While this conflict was so obstinately raging 
on the right. Gen. French was pushing his divi- 
sion against the enemy still further to the left. 
This division crossed the Antietam at the same 
ford as Gen. Sedgwick, and immediately in his 
rear. Passing over the stream in three cohnnns, 
the division inarched about a mile from the ford, 
tlicu facing to the left, moved in tlireo lines 
towards the enemy. Gen. Max Weber's brigace in 
front, Col. Dwight Morris's brigade ot raw troops, 
undrilled and moving fon- the lirst time under fire, 
in the second, and Gen. Kimball's brigade in the 
tliird. The division was first assailed by a fire of 



artillery, but steadily advanced, driving the ene- 
my's skirmishers, and encountered the infantry in 
some force at ihe group of liouses on Roulette's 
farm. Gen. "Weber's brigade gallantly advanced 
with an imwavering front, and drove the enemy 
from their position about the houses. 

While Gen. Weber was hotly engaged with the 
first line of the enemy, Gen. French received or- 
ders from Gen. Sumner, his corjis commander, to 
push on with renewed vigor to make a diversion 
in favor of the attack on the right. Leaving the 
now troops who had been thrown into some con- 
fusion from their inarch through corn-fiels, over 
fences, &c., to form as a reserve, he ordered the 
brigade of Gen. Kimball to the front, passhig to 
the left of Gen. Weber. The enemy was pressed 
back to near the crest of the hill, wliere he was 
encountered in greater strength, posted in a 
smikon road nuniing in a north-westerly direction 
and forming a natural rifle-pit. In a corn-field in 
rear of this road were also strong bodies of the 
enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill, 
a gallant fire was opened on it from the sunken 
road and corn-field. Here a terrific fire of 
musketry burst from both lines, and the battle 
raged along the whole line with great slaughter. 
The enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, 
but were met by the 7th Virginia and 132d Penn- 
sj'lvania Volunteers, and repulsed. 

Foiled in this, the enemy made a dermined as- 
sault on the front, but was met b}' a charge from 
our lines, which drove him back with severe loss, 
leaving in our hands some 300 prisoners, and sev- 
eral stands of colors. The enemy having been 
repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries 
and tlie musketry fire on the extreme right, now 
attempted to assist the attack on Gen. French's 
division, by assaulting him on his right, and en- 
deavoring to turn his flank, but this attack was 
met and checked by the 14th Indiana and Stli 
Ohio volunteers, and by canister from Capt. Tom- 
kins's battery, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Hav- 
ing been luider an alimost continuous fire for 
nearly four hours, and tlicir ammunition being 
nearly exhausted, the division now took position 
immediately below the crest of the heights on 
which they had so gallantly fought, the enmy 
makmg no attempt to regain tlieir'lost ground. 

On the left of Gen. French, Gen Richardson's 
division was hotly engaged. Having crossed the 
Antietam about 9.30 a.m., at the ford crossed by 
the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved 
on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and 
formed in a ravine behind the high gromuls over- 
looking Roulette's house. The 3d (Irish) brigade, 
commanded by Gen. Meagher, on the right, the 
2d brigade, connnanded by Gen. Caldwell, on his 
left, and the brigade commanded by Col. 13rooks, 
53d Peiuisylvania Volunteers, in support. As thu 
division moved forward to take its position on 
the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery 
against it, but owing to the irregularities of the 
ground, did but little damage. 

Meagher's brigade advancing steadily, soon 
became engageil with the enemy }>osted to the 
left and in front of Iloulette's house. It continu- 
ed to advance under a heavy fire nearly to the 
crest of the liill overlooking Piper's house, the 



1L4 

enemy being posted in the continuation of the 
sunken road and corn-field, before referred to. 
Here the brave Irish brigade opened upon tlie 
enemy a terrific musketry fire. All of Gen. Sum- 
ner's corps was now engaged, Gen. Sedgwick's 
on the right. Gen. French in the centre, and Gen. 
Richardson on the left. The Irish brigade sus- 
tained its well earned reputation. After suffer- 
ing terribly in officers and men, and strewing the 
ground with their enemies as they drove them 
back, their ammunition nearly expended, and their 
commander. Gen. Jileagher, disabled by the fall 
of his horse, shot luider him, this brigade was 
ordered to give place to Gen. Caldwell's brigade, 
which advanced to a short distance in its rear. 
The lines were passed by the Irish brigade, break- 
ing by company to the rear, and Gen. Caldwell's, 
by comi)any to the front, as steadily as on drill. 
Colunel Brook's brigado now became the second 
line. 

The ground over which Gen's. Richardson's 
and French's divisions were fighting was very 
irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills 
covered with growing corn, enclosed by stone 
walls, behind- which the enemy could advance 
unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. 
Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted 
to gain the riglit of Richardson's position in a 
corn-field, near Roulette's house, where the divi- 
sion had become separated from that of General 
French. A change of front by the .52d New 
York and 2d Delaware Volunteers, of Colonel 
Brook's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the 
attack made by the 52d Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
sent further to right by Col. Brooks to close this 
gap in the line, and tlie movement of the 152d 
Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia Volunteers, of Gen. 
French's division, before referred to, drove the 
enemy from the corn-field, and restored the line. 

The brigade of General Caldwell, with deter- 
mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back op- 
l)osite the left .and centre of this division, but 
sheltered in the sunken road they still held oiu- 
forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Col. 
Barlow, commanding the 61st and 64th New 
York regiments, of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a 
favorable opportunity, advanced these regiments 
on the left, taking the line on the sunken road in 
flank, and compelled them to surrender, captur- 
ing over three hundred prisoners, and three 
stands of colors. 

The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 
66th New York regiments of Col. Brooks's bri- 
gade, who had moved these regiment^ into the 
first line, now advanced with gallantry, driving 
the enemy before them in confusion into the 
corn-field beyond the sunken road. The left of 
the division was now well advanced, when the 
enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, en- 
deavored to turn its left and rear. Col. Cross. 
5tli N. IT., by a change of front to the left and 
rear, brought his regiment facing the advancing 
line. Here a spirited contest arose to gain a com- I 
inaiiding height — the two opposing forces, mov- j.^ 
ing parallel to each other, giving and receiving ' 
fire. The 5th, gaining the advantage, faced to 
the right and delivered its volley. The enemy 
staggered, but rallied and advanced desperately 



115 



at a charge. B..Miig reinforced by tUc Slst Peim- 
sylvania regiment, these regiments met the 
advance by "a counter charge. The enemy fled, 
leaving many killed, ^vonnded,and prisoners, and 
the colors of the 4th North Carolina in our hands. 
■ Another column of the enemy, advancing un.ler 
shelter of a stone wall and corn-field, pressed 
down on the right of the division; but Col. Bar- 
low again advanced the Gist and G4tli New York 
against these troops, and. with the attack of Kim- 
ball's brigade on tlie right, drove thorn from this 
position. 

Our troops on the left of this part of the line, 
having driven the enemy far back, they, with 
reinforced numbers, made a determined attack 
directly m front. To meet this, Col. Barlow 
brought his two regiments to their position in line, 
and drove the enemy through the cornfield into 
the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of mus- 
ketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of 
artiUcrj-. in the orchard and a battery further to 
the right, throwing shell and case-shot. This 
. advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the 
' strong point contended for by the enemy at this 
part of the line, it being a defensible building, 
several hundred yards^in advance of the sunken 
road. 

The musketry fire at this point of the litie now- 
ceased. Holding Piper's house. General Richard- 
son withdrew the line a little way to the crest of 
a hill, a more advantageous position. Up to this 
time this division was without artillery, and in 
the new position suffered severely from artillery 
Are, which could not be replied to. A section 
of Robertson's horse battery, commanded by 
Lieut. Vincent. 2d U. S. Artillery, now arrived 
on the ground, and did excellent service. Sub- 
sequently a battery of brass guns, commanded by 
Capt. Graham, 1st U. S. Artillery, arrived, and 
was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon 
silenced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy 
■ fire soon ensued between the battery further to 
right and our own. Captain Graham's battery 
■was bravely and skillfully served, but, unable to 
reach the enemy, who had rilled guns of greater 
range tiian our smooth bores, retired by order of 
Gen. Ric'iardson, to save it from useless sacrifice 
of men and hor..i;s. The brave general was him- 
self mortally wounded while personally directing 
iUi fire. 

G on. Hancock Avas placed m command of the 
livisiou after the fall of General Richardson, 
t; .'u. Meaghei-'s brigade, now commanded by Col. 
Burke of the 63d New York, having refilled their 
• cartridge boxes, was again ordered forward, and 
took position in the centre of the line. The di- 
vision new occupied one line in close proximity 
to the enemy, who had taken up a position in the 
rear of Piper's house. 

Col. Dwight iMorris, with the 14th Connecticut 
and a detachment of the 108th New York, of Gen. 
French's division, w.as sent by Gen. French to 
the support of Piichardson's division. This com- 
mand was now placed in an interval in the line 
between Gen. Caldwell's and the Irish Brigade, 
f ho requirements of the extended line of battle 
had >o engaged the artillery that the api)lication 
of G'.neral Hancock for artillery for his division 



conld not be complied with immediately by the 
chief of artillery, or the corps commanders in hii 
vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the 
vroops, Gei!. Haucook felt confident that he could 
hold ids po.sition, although suffering from tho 
enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, aa 
the great length of the line he was obliged to 
h(dd prevented him from forming more than ouo 
line of battle ; and, from his advanced position, 
this line was already partly enfiladed by the bat- 
teries of the enemy on the right, which were 
protected from our batteries opposite them by 
the woods at the Dunker church. 

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on somo 
of our troops to the left of his position. General 
Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from Gen. 
Fmnklin's corps, wdiich assisted materially in frus- 
trating this attack. It also assisted the attack of 
the 7th Maine of Franklin's corps, which, without 
other aid, made an attack against the enemy's lino 
and drove in skirmishers who were annoying our 
artillery and troops on the right. Lieut. Wood- 
ruff, with battery " I," 2dU. S. Artillery, relieved 
Capt. Hexamer, whose ammunition was expended. 
The enemy seemed at one time to be about mak- 
ing an attack in force upon this part of tho line, 
and advancing a long column of infantry towards 
this division, but, on nearing the position, Gen. 
Pleasonton opening on them with sixteen guns, 
they hailed, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, 
closing the operations on this portion of the field. 

To return to the incidents occurring still fur- 
ther to the right. 

Between 12 and 1 p. m.. Gen. Franklin's corps 
arrived on the field of battle, having left their 
camp near Crampton's Pass at 6 a. m., leaving 
Gen. Couch with orders to move with his division 
to occupy Maryland heights. ' 

Gen, Smitli's division led tho column, followed 
by General Slocum't'. 

It was first intended to keep this corps in re- 
serve on the east side of the Antietam, to operata 
on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances 
might require. But, on nearing Keadysville, tho 
strong opposition on the right, developed by the 
attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it neces- 
sary to send this corps at once to the assistance 
of the right wing. On nearing the field, hearing 
that one of our batteries (" A ," 4th U.S. Artillery), 
commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who occupied 
the same position as Lieut. Woodruff's battery in 
the morning, was hotly engaged, without sup- 
ports, Gen. Smith sent two regiments to its relief 
from Gen. Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the 
ground. General Smith ordered tbe other regi- 
ment of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and 
Cowen's batteries, 1st New York Artillery, to the 
threatened position ; Lieut. Thomas and Capt. 
Gothran, commanding batteries, bravely held their 
positions agaiiist the advancing enemy, handling 
their batteries with skill. 

Finding the enem}' still advancing, the 3d bri- 
gade of Smith's division, commanded by Colonel 
Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania Volunteer.«>, was ordered 
up, and, passing through Lieut. Thomas's bat- 
tery, charged upon the enemy and drove back 
tho advance until abreast ot the Dunker Churuh. 
As the riirht of the brigade came oDDOsitc the 



116 



iroodB, it received a des'trnctive firo which 
checked the advance and threw the brijijade 
somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind 
a rise of ground in the open space in advance of 
the batteries. General French liaving reported 
to General Franklin that his ammunition was 
^ nearly expended, tliat otFicer ordered General 
JBrooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. Gen. 
Brooks formed his brigade on the right of General 
French, where they remained during the remain- 
der of the day and niglit, frequently under the 
fire of the enemy's artillery. It was soon after 
the brigade of Col. Irwin had fallen behind tlie 
rise of ground that the 7th Maine, by order of 
Col. Irwin, made the gallant attack already re- 
ferred to. • 

The advance of General Franklin's corps was 
opportune. The attack of the enemy on the' 
position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, 
jnust have been disastrous, had it succeeded in 
piercing the line between Gen. Sedgwick's and 
French's divisions. 

Gen. Franklin ordered two brigades of Gen. 
Slocum's division, Gen. Newton's and Col. Tor- 
bert's, to form in column to assault the woods 
that had been so hotly contested before, by Gen's. 
Sumner and Hooker ; Bartlett's brigade was or- 
dered to form as a reserve ; at this time Gen. 
Sumner having command on the right, directed 
further offensive operations to be postponed, as 
the repulse of this, the only remaining corps 
available for attack, would peril the safety of the 
•whole army. 

Gen. Porter's corps, consisting of Gen. Sykes's 
division of regulars and volunteers, occupied a 
position on the east side of Antietam Creek, up- 
on the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and 
directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. 
This corps filled the interval between the riglit 
■wing and Gen. Burnside's command, and guarded 
the yiain approach from the enemy's position to 
our trains of supplies. 

It was necessary to watch this part of our line 
■with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should 
take advantage of the first exhibition of weak- 
ness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for 
the purpose of piercing our centre and turning 
our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our 
supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, 
the enemy's passage to our rear could have met 
■with but feeV)ie resistance, as there were no re- 
ECrves to reinforce or close up the gap. 

Towards the miildle of the afternoon, proceed- 
ing to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, 
and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. 
Several general oflicers had been carried from the 
field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs 
"was anything but promising. At the risk of 
greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two brig- 
ades from Porter's corps, the only available 
troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of 
Sykes's regulars had been thrown across toe An- 
tietam bridge on the main road, to attack and 
drive back the enemy's sliarpsliootcrs, Avho were 
annoying PIcasonton's horse l)atterics in advance 
of the bridge. Warren's brigade, of Porter's 
corps was detached to hold a pvsition on Burn- 
side's right and rear, bo that Porter was left at 



one time with only a portion of Sykes's division, 
and one small brigade of Morell's division (but 
little over three thousand men) to hold his im- 
portant position. 

Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided opin- 
ion against another attempt during that d-ay to 
assault the enemy's position in front, as portions 
of our troops were so much scattered and demo- 
ralized. In view of these circumstances, after 
making changes in the positions of some of the 
troops, I directed the different commanders to 
hold their positions, and, behig satisfied that this 
could be done without the assistance of the two 
brigades from the centre, I countermanded the . 
order which was in course of execution. 

Gen. Slocum's division replaced a portion of 
Gen. Sumner's troops, and positions were selected 
for batteries in front of the woods. The enemy 
opened several heavy fires of artillery on the j^o- 
sition of our troops after this, but our batteries 
soon silenced them. 

On the mornuig of the 17th Gen. Pleasonton, 
with his cavalry division, and the horse batteries*^ 
under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lieut. 
Haines, of the 2d U. S. artillery, was ordered tc 
advance on the turnpike towards Sharpsbnrg 
across bridge No. 2, and supjiort the left of Sum- 
ner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire of 
artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers 
were thrown out, and Capt. Tidball's battery ad- 
vanced by piece, and drove o3 tlio sharpshooters 
with canister sidhciently to establish the batter- 
ies above mentioned, which opened on the enemy 
with effect. The firing .was kept up for about 
two hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, the 
batteries were relieved by Randall's and Van 
Reed's batteries, U. S. Artillery. About 3 o'clock 
Tidball, Robertson and Haines returned to their 
positions on the west of Antietam, Capt. Gibson 
havirg been placed in position on the east side to 
guard the approaches to the bridge. These bat- 
teries did good service, concentrating their fire 
on the column about to attack Gen. Hancock's 
position, and comiaelling it to find shelter behind 
the hills in rear. 

Gen. Sykes's division had been in position since 
the 10th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and 
sharpshooters. 

Gen. ]\[orell had come up on the IGth, and re- 
lieved Gen. Richardson on the right of Gen. 
Sykes, and, continually under the vigilant watch 
of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point. 

The position of the batteries under Gcn.Pleas- 
anton being one of great exposure, the battalion 
of the 2J -and 10th United Slates Infantry, under 
Capt. Dwyer, 4th U. S. Infantry were sent across 
to assist in driving off the sharpshontt^rs of the 
cnemv. 

Tiic battalion of the 2d and 10th U. S. Infantry 
advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the 
cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon 
their guns. Few in lunuber and unsn^jported, 
(hoy were unable to bring them off. The heavy 
loss of this small body of men attests tl;eir gal- 
lantry. ■ t 

The troops of Gen. Burnside lield the left of 
the line oi»posite bridge No. 3. The attack on 
the ris^ht was to have been suooorted bv an at- 



in 



' ick on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on 
ho evening of the 16th, Gen. Burnsidc'a corps 
was moved forward and to the left, and took up 
i position nearer the bridge. 
' I visited Gen.J3urnside'8 position on the IGtli, 
and after jiointing out to him the proper dispo- 
sitions to be made of his troops during the day 
md niglit, informed him thatuie would probably 
be required to attack the enemy's right on tiie 
following morning, and directed him to make care- 
ful reconnoissancos. 

Gen. Burnside's corps, consisting of the divis- 
ionsjof Gens. Cox, Wilcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, 
was posted as follows : Col. Brooks's brigade, 
Cox's division, on the right, Gen. Sturgis's divis- 
ion immediately in rear. On the left was Gen. 
Rodman's division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade. 
Cox's division in support. 

Gen. Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 
The corps bivouacked in position on the right 
of the 16th. 

Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered 
Gen. Burnside to form his troops, and hold them 
in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, 
and to await further orders. 

At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by 
Lieutenant Wilson, To})ographical Eengineers to 
carrj' the bridge, then to gain possession of the 
heights beyond, and to advance along their crest 
upon Sluirpsburg and its rear. 
After some time had elapsed, not hearing from 
' him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had 
been done. The aid returned with the informa- 
tion that but little progress had been made. I 
then sent him back with an order to Gen. Burn- 
aide, to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at 
' ill hazards. The aide returned to me a second 
■■.ime, with the report that the bridge was still 
in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I 
directed Col. Sackett, Inspector General, to deliv- 
er to Gen. Burnside my positive order to push 
forward his troops without a moment's delay, 
and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point 
of the bayonet, and I ordered Col. Sackett to re- 
main with Gcu. Burnside and see that the order 
was executed jn-omptly. 

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was 
carried at 1 o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 
51st New York and .'ilst Pennsylvania Volunteers. 
I Other troops were then thrown over and the op- 
posite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the 
heights beyond. 

A halt was then made by Gen. Burnside's ad- 
vance until 3 P.M., upon hearing which I directed 
• one of my aides — Col. Key — to inform Gen. Burn- 
side that I desired him to push forward his troops 
with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's jio- 
sition on the heights; that the movement was 
vital to our success ; that this was a time when 
we must not stoj) for loss of life if a great ol)joc1: 
could be thereb}- accom])lished. That if, in his 
judgment, his attack would fail, 1o inform me so 
at once, Ihat his tro(i])S might be withdrawn and 
used elsewhere on the field. He replied tliat he 
would soon advance, and would go up the hill as 
far as a battery of the enemy on the left would 
permit. Upon this re])ort 1 again iminedialely 
sent Col. Key to Geu. Burrside, with orders to 



advance at once, if possible, to flank the battery 
or storm it and carry the heights, repeating thai 
if he considered the movement impracticable to 
inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. 
The advance was then gallantly resumed, th« 
enemy drivenfrom their guns, the heights hand- 
somely carried, and a portion of the troops even 
reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By thi» 
time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforce 
ments just then reaching the enemy from Har» 
pcr's Ferry, attacked Gen. Burnside's troops oil 
their left flank, and forced tliem to retire to a lower 
line of hills nearer the bridge. 

If this important movement had been consum» 
mated two hours earlier, a position would liava 
been secured upon the heights from which our 
batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of 
the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear. 
Our victory might have been mncl» more decisive^ 
'J'he following is the substance of Gen. Burn- 
side's operations, as given m his report: 

Col. Crook's brigade was ordered to storm th« 
bridge. This bridge. No. 3, is a stone structure 
of three arches, with stone parapets. The banka 
of the stream on the opposite side are precipi- 
tous, and command the eastern approaches to 
the bridge. On the liill side immediately by the 
bridge was a stone fence running parallel to the 
stream, the turns of the roadway as it wound up 
the hill were covered by rifle pits and breast- 
works of rails, &c. These works and the woods 
that covered the slopes were iilled with the ene- 
my's riflemen, and batteries were in position to 
enfilade the bridge and its approaches. 

Gen. Rodman w^as ordered to cross the feud b®- 
low the bridge. From Col. Crook's positioa it 
was found impossible to carry the bridge. 

Gen. Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from 
liis division for that purpose. He sent forward 
the 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. These 
regiments made several successive attacks in the 
most gallant style, but were driven back. 

The artillery of the left were ordered' to con- 
centrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. 
Col. Crook brought a section of Capt. Simmon's 
battery to a position to conmiand the bridge. 
The 51st New York, and 51st Pennsylvania, were 
then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking ad- 
vantage of a small spur of the hills which ran 
parallel to the river, they moved towards the 
bridge. From the crest of this spur thoy rushed, 
witii bayonet fixed, and cleared the bridge. 

The division followed the storming iiarty, also 
the brigade of Col. Crook, as su]iport. The enemy 
withdrew to still higher ground, some live or six 
hundred yards beyond, and o])ened a fire of ar- 
tillciy on the troops in the new positions on tli© 
crest of the hill above the bridge. 

Gen. Rodman's division succeeded in crossing 
the ford, after <i shaip fire of musketiy and ar- 
tillery, and joined on the loft of Sturgis; Scam- 
mon's J)rigade crossing as su])port. Gen. Wil- 
cox's division was ordered Across to take position 
on (ien. Sturgis's right. ~ 

Tliese dispositions being completed about 3 
o'clock, the command moved forward, except Stur- 
gis's division loft in reserve. (Ilurk's and Oarreiri 
batteries accoinpaniod R.odman'8 division ; Cook'* 



ll« 



lottery with Wilcox's division, and a section oi 
Biraraons's battery with Crook's brigade. A sec- 
tion of Simmon's battery, and Mullcuburgli's and 
McMulllii's batteries were in position. The order 
for the advance was obeyed by tlie troops with 
alacrity. Gen. Wilcox's division, with Crook ni 
support, moved up on both sides uf tlie turn- 
pike leading from the bridge to Sliarpsburg. 
Gen. Rodman's division, supported by Scam-, 
mon's brigade, on the left of Gen. Wilcox. The 
enemy retreated before the advance of the trooiis. 
The 9th New York, of Gen. Hodman's division, 
captured one of the enemy's batteries, and held 
it for some time. As the command was driving 
tbe enemy to the main heights on the left of the 
town, the light divi urn of Gen. A. P. Hill arrived 
fipon the field of ba tie, from Harper's Ferry, and 
-with a heavy artillery lire made a strong attack 
on the extreme left. To meet this attack, the left 
division diverged from the line of march intended, 
and opened a gap between it and the right. To 
fill np this, it was necessary to order the troops 
from the second line. Daring these movements. 
Gen. Rodman was mortally wounded. Col. Har- 
land's brigade, of Gen. Hodman's division, was 
driven back. Col. Scammon's brigade, by a change 
of front to rear on bis right flank, saved the l(;ft 
from being driven completely in. The fresh 
troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumu- 
lation of artillery against this command, destroyed 
all hope of its being able to accomplish any thing 
more. ^ 

It was now nearly dark. Gen. Sturgis was v,r- 
dered forward to support the left. Notwithstand- 
ing the hard work in the early part of the day, 
his division moved forward Avith spirit. With 
its assistance, the enemy were checked and held 
at bay. 

The command was ordered to fall back by Gen. 
Cox, wdio commanded, on the field, the troops 
engaged in this attack beyond the Antietam. The 
artillery had been well served during the day. 
Ni-^ht closed the long and desperately contested 
battle of the 17th. Nearly 205,000 men, and 500 
pieces of artillery, Avere for fourteen hours en- 
gaged in this memorable battle. We had attack- 
ed the enemy in a position selected by the ex- 
perienced engineer then in person directing their 
operations. "We had driven them from their line 
on one ilank. and secured a footing within it on 
the other. The army of the Potomac, notwith- 
standing tlie moral cOect incident to previous re- 
verses, had achieved a victory over an adversary 
invested with the prestige of recent success. 
Our soldiers slept that night, conquerors, on a 
field won by their valor, and covered with the 
dead a".d wounded of the enemy. 
CONDITION OF THE ARMY AFTER ANTIE- 
'K TAM. 

The night, however, brought with it grave re- 
8ponKii)ilitifs. Whether to renew the attack on 
the ISlli, or to defer it, even with the risk of the 
enemy's retirenioiit, was the question befors me. 
After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full 
and careful eurvcy of the situation and condition 
of cm army, and the streiiglh and jiosinon of the 
enemy. I concluded that the bucccss of an attack 
on the 18th vsas not certain. 1 am aware of the 



fact, tiiat under ordiii.i'.y circumsiaucts, a general 
is expected to risk a battle if )ic liaH a reasonable 
pr(jspe'-.t of success ; but at this critical juncture, 
I should have had a narrow view of the condition _ 
uf the country, had I been willing to hazard an- 
other battle with les.s than an absolute as.^^urance 
of success. At that moment — Virginia^ lost. 
Washington menaced, Maryland _ invaded — the 
national cause could afford no risks of defeat. 
One battle lost, and almost all would have been 
lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it 
pleased on "Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
or New York. It could have levied its supplie.- 
from a fertile and undevastatod country;, extorted 
tribute from wealthy and poitulous cities; and 
nowhere east of the Alleghanies, was there an- 
other organized force able to arrest its march. 

The following are among the consideration?; 
which led me to doubt the certainty of success 
in attacking before the 19th. 

The troop.s were greatly overcome by the fa- 
tigue and eshaustion attendant upon the long 
continued and severely contested battle of the ' 
17 th, together with the long day and night marin- 
es to wiiich they had been subjected during n . 
previous three days. 

The supply trains were in the rear, and man^s 
of the troops had suffered from hunger. They re- 
quired rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's, and all of Hooker'^ 
corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiant- 
ly for several hours, been overpowered by nuni- 
bers, driven back in great disorder, and mud. 
scattered ; so that they were for the time so::: - 
what demoralized. 

In Hooker's corps, according to the returr 
made by Gen. Meade, commanding, there wen 
but 6729 men present on thelSth: whereas, o;. 
the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 mei. 
present for duty m the same corps, showing th;.t 
previous to, and durhig the battle, CoG4 men wei'. 
separated from their command. 

Gen. Meade, in an official communication upo;. 
this subject, dated Sept. 18, 18G2, says: "I enclose 
a field return of the corps made this afternoon, 
which I desire you will lay before the conunand- 
ing-general. I am satisfied the great reductior. 
in the corps since the recent engagements, is not 
due solely to the casualties of battle, and that a 
considerable number of men are still in the rear, 
some having dropped out on the march, and 
many dispersing and leaving yesterday during 
the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so 
far as it goes good. To resist an attack in our 
present strong position, I think they may be de- 
pended on ; and I hope they will perform dutv 
in case we make an attack, though 1 do not think 
their morale is as good for an offensive as a d( 
fcnsive movement." 

One division of Sumner's Corps had also been 
overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and 
demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps 
commander, in iiropcr condition to attack the 
enemy vigorously the next day. ^ , , , 

Sumo of the new troops on the left, although 
many of them *.ught well during a part of the 
battle, and are entitled to great credit, were, at 



119 



«io dO30 of the action, driven back, and their I 

"^V^^t, of.the 18th, Gen.. Burnside re 
quested me to send him another Jvision to ass t 
Si holding his position on the other side of t e 
Sitietam and to enable him to .s'lthdraw his 
^rpTinx'e should bo attacked by a superior force 
He gave me the impression that if he ^veie a. 
Scked again that morning, he .v'ould not be able 
S make a very vigorous resistance I visited Ins 
position early, detemined to send General Mc^- 
Fell's division to his aid, and directed that it should 
be placed on this side of the Antie am, in order 
that ii-might cover the retreat of his own corps 
from the other side of tlie Antietam, shonld that 
become necessary, at the same time it was in po- 
sition to reinforce our centre or right, if tha ^^ele 
needed. Late in the afternoon, I found that al- 
though he had not been attacked, General Burn- 
side had withdrawn his own corps to this siceot 
the Antietam, and sent over Morell s division alone 
to hold the opposite side. . 

\ A larere number of our heaviest and most effi- 
cient batteries- had consumed all their ammuni- 
tion on the 16th and Hth, and it was impossible 
to supply them until late on the following day. 

Supplies of provision and forage had to be 
brought np and issued, and infantry_ammunition 
distributed. , , ^ , , ^^^ 

Finally reinforcements to the number of 1-1,0UU 
men, to say nothing of troops from Pennsylvania 
had not arrived, but were expected during the 

^The 18th was therefore spent in collecting the 
disnersed eiving rest te the fatigued, removing 
the wounded, burying the dead and the necessary 
oreparations for a renewal of the battle. 

Of the reinforcements, Couch's division,. march- 
ing with commendable raT)idity, came up into po- 



sition ai a late hour in the morning. Humphrey 8 
division of new troops, in their anxiety to par- 
ticipate in the battle, which was raging when 
they received the order to march from Frederick, 
at about half past 3 p. M-on the 17tb, pressed for- 
ward during the entire night, and the mass ot the 
diviston reached the army on the following morn- 
iiio- Having marched more than twenty-three 
mfles after 4 1-2 o'clock on the preceding after- 
noon, they were of course greatly exhausted, and- 
needed rest and refreshment. Large remforce- 
ments expected from Pennsylvai;j- never arrived. 
During the 18th, orders were given for a re- 
newal of the attack at daylight on the ^^tb. 

On the night of the 18th, the enemy, after pass- 
ing troops in the latter part of the day from the 
Virginia shore, to their position behind Sharps- 
burg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the 
design of abandoning their position aud retreat- 
ing across the river. , . ,. , r o. 
As their line was but a short distance from the 
river, the evacuation presented but httle difficul- 
ty, and was effected before daylight. t 

About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under 
the direction of Major Davis, assistant-inspector- 
general, counted and buried upon the battle-beld 
of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been 
previously buried by the enemy. This is conclu- 
sive evidence that the enemy sustained much 
greaterlossthanwe. 

Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
fifteen thousand stand of small arms, aud more 
than six thousand prisoners, were the. trophies 
which attest the success of our arms m the 
battles of South Mountain, Cramptons Gap, and 

Antietam. , , .i. „^ 

Not a single gun or color wo^ lost by our army 
during these battles. 



120 



Tabular Report of Ga&uoilie* in (he Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Aniieiam, on th«^ 

IG^/i and ll'th of September, 1862. 



f " ' ' 

1st Corps. 

JIAJ.-GEy. HOOKER. 

1st Division 


r ' 

General 
Officers 


Other 
Officera 


Enlisted Men 


Aggregate 


Grand 

Aggreg. 


^3 


B 

o 




'a 
o 


O 


o 




•73 

a 

98 

153 

97 


o 

p: 

669 
898 
449 


"m 
.22 

7^ 




95 
137 

23 


862 

1188 

569 


2d Division 


3d Division 


Total 
















348 


2016 


255 


2619 


2d Corps. 

.4AJ.-GEN. SUMNER. 

1st Division 





1 
2 
1 

4 


20 

21 
41 

1 
1 


39 

.50 
89 



2 


192 
355 

272 

819 

13 

7 

20 


860 
1577 
1271 

3708 

92 
13 

105 


24 
.321 
203 

548 

1 
1 


212 

355 
293 

860 

13 

8 

21 


900 
1579 
1322 

3801 


24 

321 

•203 

548 


1136 
2255 
1818 


2d Division 


3(] Division. 


Total 


5209 


5th Corps. 

MAJ.-GEN. F. J. PORTER. 

1st Division. 


94 
13 

107 


1 

1 

2 


108 
22 

130 


2d Division 




Artillery Reserve 


Total 






5fh Corns. 

._ MAJ.-GEN. FRANKLIN. 

1st Division 








5 
65 


58 

27: 


2 
31 


65 
373 


2d Division 


Total 
















70 


33£ 


33 


438 


9 th Corps. 

MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE. 

1 st Division 





— 


2 • 
7 
8 
5 

22 

9 
6 

1.5 


20 

29 

40 

7 

3,5 
2G 

"cT 

1 


44 
121 
212 

33 

410 

15! 

107 

1 

259 


264 
493 
743 
145 

1645 

.^27 

481 

15 

1323 

8 


7 
20 
70 
23 

120 

54 

30 

1 

""85 


46 
128 
220 

38 

432 

160 
113 

1 

274 
5 


281 


7 
on 


337 

670 

1073 

213 


2d Division 




783 "^^ 


4tk Division 


152 
1741 

862 

.507 

15 

1384 

9 
23 


23 
120 




2293 


12th Corps. (Gen. Banks.) 

iriUG.-GEN. WILLIAMS, Com'g. 

1st Division 


54 
30 

1 
•85 


1076 

650 

17 

1743 

9 

28 


2d Division 


Artillery 


Total 


:maj.-gen. COUCH'S 

Division 


BRIG. -GEN. PLEASONTON'S 
Cavivlry Division 


Grand Total 
















U)10 


9416 


1043 


12469 



121 



Head-Qnavters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Sharpsburg, Sept. 29, 1862. 
Official S. W., As«isti«it Adj't Gen. 

An estimate of the forces under tho confeder- 
ate General Lee, made up by direction of Gen. 
Banks from information obtained by the exaninia- 
ion of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous 
to the batte of Antietam, is ,as follows : 

Gen. T. J. Jackson's Corps, - 24.778 Men 

'■ James Longstrecet's Corps, 23,342 " 

•' D. II. Hill's 2 Divisions, 15,52o " 

" J. E. B. Stuart's Cavairy, 6,400 " 

" Riuisom's and Jcnkin.s's Brigades, 3,000 || 
Forty-six Reg'ts not inciud'd in above, 18,400 " 
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns, - -*- 6,000 " 

Total, 97,445 " 

These estimates give tlio actual numbers of 

men preset and fit for duty. 
Our own forces at tho battle of Antictam were 

as follows : 

1st Corps, 14,856 Men 

2nd Corps, - - 18.813 '| 

5tli Corps, (one division not ar'd,) 12,930 

6th Corps,--- 12,300 " 

9th Corps, : 13,819 " 

12th Corps, 10,126 |'^ 

Cavalry Division, 4,320 

•Total inaction, 87,164 " 

OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 
When our cavalry advance reached thenvcr on 
the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that 
nearly all the enem\s forces had crossed into Vir- 
ginia during the night, their rear escaping under 
the cover of eight batteries, placed in strong po- 
sitions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite 

bank. - , n 

General Porter, commanding the oth Corps, or- 
dered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes's 
brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river 
at dark and carry the enemy's batteries. This 
Nv'as gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. 
Several guns, caissons, etc., were taken, and their 
supports driven back half a mile. 

The informal ion obtained during the progress 
.if this affair, indicated that the mass ol the ene- 
my had retreated on the Charlestown and Mar- 
(.insburg roads towards Winchester. To verify 
his, and to ascerlain how far the enemy had re- 
u;ca('tcd. General Porter was authorized to detach 
f.om his corps, on the morning ot the 20th, a re- 
. ounoilering party in greater force. This detacli- 
ncnt crossed the river, and advanced about a 
nilo, when it was attacked by a large body ot 
:ho enemy lying in ambush in tlie woods, and 
driven back across tiic river with considerable 
loss. Tliis recomioisance showed that the euemy 
was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Po- 
tomac. prejKvred to resist our fivtlier advance. 

It wa> reported to me on the 19th tliat General 
Stuart had made his appearance at Wiiliamsport 
Willi some four thousand cavalry and six pieces 
of artillery, and tliat ten thousand infantry were 
marching on the same peuit from the direction o ' 
Winchester. I ordered General Coucli to march 
at once with his division, and a part of Plca-an- 
ton's cavalry, witli Frankiin's corps within bud- 



porting distance, for the purpose of endeavoring 
to capture this force. General Couch made a 
prompt and rapid march to Wiiliamsport, and at- 
tacked tho enemy vigorously, but they made their 
escape across the river. 

I dispatched the following telegraphic report to 
the general-in-chief : 

Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Sharpsburg, 
Sept. 19. 1862. 

Maj.-Gcn. It. W. Halleck, Comd'g. U. S. Army,— I 
have tho honor to report that Maryland is entirely 
freed from tho presence of the enemv, who has 
been driven across the Potomac. No fears need 
now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. 
I shall at once occui)y Harper's Ferry. 

G. B. M'cClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
On tho following day I received this telegram: 

Wasliington, Sept. 20, 1862. 2 p.m. 
Maj.-Gen. G. B. ]\icC,— AVe are still left entirely 
in the dark in regard to your own movements and 
those of the enemy. Tiiis should not be so. You 
should keep me advised of both, so far as you 
know them. II. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief. 

To which I answered as follows: 
Headq's, Army of the Potomac, near Sharpa- 
burg, Sept. 20. 1862. 8 l.M. 

Maj.-Gen. Ilallcv^k, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington. 
Tour telegram ot to-day is received. I telegraphed 
you yesterday all I knew, and had uothi'ng more 
to inform you of until this evening. Williams's 
corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland Heights at 1 
P.M. to-day. The rest of the army is near here, 
except Couch's division, which is at this moment 
engaged with the enemy in front of Wiiliamsport. 
Tlie enemy is retiring via Charlestown and Mar- 
tinsburg on Winchester. He last night re-occu- 
pied Wiiliamsport by a small force, but will bo 
out of it by morning. I think, he has a force of 
infantry near Sharpstown. 

I regret that you find, it necessary to couch 
every dispatch I have the honor to receive from 
vou, in a spirit of faultfinding, and that you have 
not yet found leisure to say one ^ord "in commen- 
dation of the recent achievements ot this army, or 
even to allude to them. 

I have abstained from giving the number of 
guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, 
until I could do so wnth some accuracy. I hope 
by tc-morrow evening to be able to give at least 
an approximate statement. 

G. B. iMcClellan, Maj.-Gcn. Comd'g. 
On the same day I telegraphed as follows: 
Headq's. Armv of the Potomac. Se].t. 20, 1802, 
Mai -Gen. H. \V. Halleck, Comd'g U. S. Army. 
As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of 
the Potomac, must in a great measure be depen- 
dent for supplies of ammunition and provisions 
upon llicluuoiid,! would respectfully suggest that 
General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry 
IV.rce to cut their supply communications oppo- 
site Washington. 'J'ins would seriously cmbarass 
their operatmiis. and will aid this army materially. 
G. 15. iMeClellaii,J\Iaj.-Geu. Conurg. 
Maryland Ile'ghts were occupied by Gen. Wil- 
liams's corps on this day, and on the 22d Gen. 
Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry. •. 

It will be remembered that at the time I was 
assicned to the command of the forces for tlie do- 



122 



feiisu ol' the national capital, on the 2d day of Sep- 
Icinbcr, 18G2, the greater part of all the available 
troops were suffering under tUe disheartening in- 
Hiiences of the serioiis defeat they had encoun- 
tered during the brief and unfortunate campaign 
of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly re-» 
duced by casualities — their confidence was much 
shaken, and they had lost something of that esp7'il- 
du-corps which is indisi^ensable to the efficiency 
of an array. Moreover they had left behind, lost, 
or worn out the greater part of their clothing and 
camp equipage, which required renewal before 
they could be in proper condition to take the field 
again. 

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing 
the Potomac into Maryland, was received in Wash- 
ington on Ihe 4th of September, and the Army of 
the Potomac was again put in motion, under my 
direction, on the following day — so that but a 
very brief interval of time was allowed to reor- 
ganize, or procure supplies. 

The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and 
Antietam, fougiit by this Army a few days after- 
wards, with tlie reconnoissances immediately fol- 
lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general offi- 
cers, many regimental and company ofHcers, and a 
large number of enlisted men ;' amounting in the 
aggregate to 15,220. Two army corps had been 
badly cut up, scattered and somewhat demoral- 
ized in the action of the 17th. 

In Gen. Sumner's corps alone, 41 commissioned 
ofiicers and 819 enlisted men had been killed ; 4 
general officers, 89 other commissioned officers, 
and 3,708 enlisted men had been wounded; be- 
sides 548 missing ; making the aggregate loss of 
this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 
5,209. 

- In Gen. Hooker's corps the casualities of the 
same engagement amoimted to 2619. 

The entire army had been greatly exhausted by 
unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, 
and want of slofip and rest, previous to the last 
battle. 

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into 
Virginia, the means of transportation at my dis- 
posal were inadequate to furnish a single day's 
supply of subsistence in advance. 

Many of the troops were new levies, some of 
whom had fought like veterans, but the morale of 
others had been a good deal impaired in those 
severely contested actions,and they requii'cd time 
to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary 
drill and discipline. \ 

Under these circumstances, I did not feel au- 
thorized to cross the river Avith the main army, 
over a very deep and dillicult ford in pursuit of 
the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force 
on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, 
which was liable at any time to rise above a ford- 
ing stage, between my army and its base of supply. 

I teleg aplicd on the 22d to theGeneral-in-cliief 
as follows : 

" As soon as the d^igencies of the service will 
admit of it, this army should be 'reorganized. It 
is absolutely necessary to secure its efiiciency, 
that the old skeleton regiments should be filled 
up at once, and officers appointed to supply the 
nuiiierou.-* existin«r vacancies. There are instances 



where captains are commanding regiments, and 
companies are without a single commissioned offi- 
cer." 

On the 23d, the following was telegraphed to 
the General-in-chief : 

Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Near Shepherds- 
town, Sept. 23, 1862. 9.30 a.m. 

Maj.-Gem H.W. IIalleck,Gen.-in-Chief, Wash'n. 

From several different sources, I learn that Gen. 
R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Lees- 
town, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, 
and that Gen. Jackson is on the Opequan Creek, 
about three miles from its mouth, both with large 
force. Theiis are also indications of heavy rein- 
forcements moving towards them from Winches- 
ter and Gharlestown. I have therefore ordered 
Gen. Franklin to take position with his corps at 
the cross roads, about one mile northwest of Ba- 
kersv'ille, on the Bakersvillc and Williamport road, 
and Gen. Couch to establish his division near 
Downsville, leaving sufiicient force at Williams- 
port to watch and guard the ford at that place. 
The fact of the enemy remaining so long in our 
front, and the indications of an advance of rein- 
forcements, seem to indicate that he will give us 
another battle with all his available force. 

As I rnentioned to you before, our army has 
been very much reduced by casualities in the re- 
cent battles, and in my judgment all the reinforce- 
ments of old troops that can possibly be dispensed 
with around AVashingtou and other places, should 
be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. 
A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our 
cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy 
will bring any forces to bear upon Washington 
till after the question is decided here, but if they 
should, troops can soon be sent back from this 
army by rail to reinforce the garrison there. 

The evidence that I have that reinforcements 
are coming to the rebel army, consists in the facts, 
that long columns of dust extending from Win- 
chester to Charlestown, and from Gharlestown jc 
this direction, and also troops moving this way, 
were seen last evening. This is corroborated by 
citizens. Gen. Sumner, with his corps and Wil- 
liams's (Banks's), occupies Harper's Ferry, and the 
surrounding heights. I think he will be able to 
hold his position until reinforcements arrive. 
G. B. McClellan, Maj-.Gen. 

On the 27tli I made the following report: 

Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Sept. 27, 1862. 
10 A.M- 

Ma!.-Gcn. Ilalleck, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington- 
All the hiformation in my possession, goes to 
prove that the main body of the enemy is concen- 
trated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops 
at Charlestown, not many in VVinchcster. Their 
movements of late, have been an extension towards 
our right, and beyond it. They are receiving re- 
inforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of 
conscripts, perhaps entirely so. 

Tiiis army is not now in condition to undertake 
another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, 
unless great advantages are offered by some mis- 
take of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies 
render it necessary. We are greatly deficient i'. 
officers. Many of the old regiments are reduc ^ ' 
to mere skeletons; the new regiments need v.- 



vs. 

struction. Not a do-y shuuld be lost in lillmg the 
old regiments— our main dependence ; and m sup- 
plying vacancies among the officers by pronu>tion. 
My present purpose is to hold the army about 
as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and 
watching the river closely, intending to attack tlic 
enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. 

Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the 
eacat advantage of a secure dcbouche, but we 
cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad 
bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise 
supply a greater number of troops than Ave now 
have on the Virginia side at that point. When 
the river rises so that the enemy eannot cross in 
force I purpose concentrating tlie army some- 
where near Harper's Ferry and there acting ac- 
cording te oircumstances, viz ; moving on Win- 
chester, if from the position and attitude of the 
enemy, we arc likely to gain a great adv.antage by 
doing so, or else devoting a roasonable time to 
the organization of the army instri>etion of the 
new tioops, preparatory to an advance on what- 
ever line may be determined. In any event I re- 
gard it as absolutely necessary to send new regi- 
ments at once to the old corps, for purposes of in- 
struction, and that the old regiments be fillecl at 
once. I have no fears as to an attack on Wash- 
ington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harp- 
er's Fe.iry as I do. they will not run the risk oi 
an attack on their flank and rear, while they have 
tlie garrison of Washington in their front. 

I rather apprehend a renewal of the attemp' 
on Jfaryland, should the rfver remain low for a 
great length of time, and should they receive 
considerable addttion to their force. 
^ I woukl be glad to have Peck's division as soon 
as possible. I am sin-prised that Sigel's men 
should have been sent to Western Virginia, with- 
- out my knowledge. The last I oeard from you 
on the subjecr, was, that they were at my dispo- 
sition. In »the last battles, the enemy was un- 
doubtedly greatly superior +<:> us in number, and 
it was only by very hare fighting that we gained 
the advantages we did. As it was the result at 
one period was very doubtful, and we had all we 
could to win the day. If the enemy receives con- 
siderable reinforcements, and we none, it is possi- 
ble that I may have too much on my hands in the 
next battle. 

]\Iy own view of the proper policy to be pur- 
sued, is, to retain in Washington merely the force 
nece.?sary to garrison it, and to send everything 
else available to reinforce this army. The rail- 
ways give us the means of promptly reinforcing 
Washuigton. should it become necessary. If I 
am r inforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my 
owe course, I will hold myself responsible for 
the city of Washington. Several persons, recent- 
ly from Richmond, say that there are no troops 
there except conscripts, and they few in number. 
I hope to be able to give you details as to late 
battles by this evening. I am about starting 
again fur Harper's Ferry, 

Ot. D. McCi.i-:i.i.A.v. Maj-Gen. Comd'g. 
REORGANIZATION AND HUl'l'LTES- 
The work of reorganizing, drilling, and Br.]>- 
plying the army I began at the earliest momee.t. 
The different corps were etationed along the riv- 



er in the l.^'si pvtiiu.iutH cu covei- ana guaraihe 
fords. The greul exleiil ot ihe river front, tron> 
near WashingUm to Cmabcrland, (some one liuii- 
drcd and litly miles), together with the hn« ot 
the Eullimoro and Uhio Ilaihoad was to bo care- 
fully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possi- 
ble tho enemy's rayls. Reconnqissanccs upon 
the' Virginia side of the river, for the purpose oi 
learning the enemy's positions and movements, 
were mado frequentlv, so that our cavalry, which, 
from the time we left Wasliington, had perform 
ed the most laborious service, and had from the 
commeucement been deficient in numbers, was 
found totally Inadequate to tne requirements ot 
the army. , ^, , 

This overwork had broken down the greater 
part of the horses, disease had appeared among 
them, and but a very small portion of our or.gi 
nal cavalry force was fit for service. 

To such an extent had this arm become reduced 
that when Gsd. Stucfi't made his raid into rennsyl- 
vania, on the 12th of October with 2,000 men, 1 
could only mount 800 men to follow him. 

Harper's Fer.Ty was occupied on the 22d, and 
in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the 
one which had happened to Col. :Milcs, I iinmedi- 
ately ordered Maryland. Bolivar, and London 
Heights to bo strongly lortified. This was dona 
as far as the time and mefcs at our disposal per- 
mitted. ,1 • J- 

The main army of the enemy during this timo 
remained in the vicinity of Martlnsburg and 
Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and 
coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, 
forcibly takng their property where it was not 
voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroy- 
ing railroads. , 

On the first day of October, His Excellency the 
President, honored the army of the Potomac with 
a visit, and remained several days, during which 
he went through the different encampments re- 
viewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields 
of Pouth Mountain and Antietam. I had the op- 
portunity during this visit to describe to htm tiio 
operations of the army since the time it lelt 
Washington, and gave him my reasons for not 
following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac. 
On the 5th of October the division of General 
Cox (about 5,000 men,) was ordered from my 
command to Western Virginia. . 

On the 7tli of October I received the following 

telegram : ^y^g|^ij,gtoj,_ d. q., Oct. G, 1862. 

Mai -Gen. McClehan:— I am instructed to tele- 
graph you as follows : The President directs that 
you cross the Potomac and give battle to tlio 
enemy, or drive him south. Your army must 
move now, while the roads are good. If you 
cross the river between the enemy and Washing- 
ton and cover the latter by your operations, yon 
can' be reinforced wiUi 30,000 men. If you move 
up tlie valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 
12 000 or 15,000 can be* yit to you. The Presi- 
dent advises the interior nne between Washington 
and tho enemy, but does not order it. He is vciy 
desirous that your army move as soon as pos!?il)l('. 
You will immediately report what lino you adi..pt, 
and when vou intend to cross the river. Also, ru 



124 



what point the reinforcementa are to be sent It 
is necessary that the plan of your o|ieruiiuns be 
positively determined on before orders are given 
for building bridges and repairing railroads. I 
»m directed to add, that the Secretary of War and 
the Geiieral-in-chief fully concur ivith the i'rcdi- 
dont in these instructions. ^ 

II W. H., General-in-Chief. 
At this time Gen. Avcrell, with the greater part 
of our efficient cavalry, was in the vicinity of 
Cumberland, and Gen. Kelly, the commanding 
pfficer, liad that day reported that a large force 
of the enemy was advancing on Col. Campbell at 
St. John's Run. This obliged me to order Gen. 
Averill to proceed with his force to the support 
of Col. Campbell, which delayed his return to the 
army for several daj's. 

On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river 
at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and a bat- 
tery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, making it iTecessary to use all 
our cavalry against him. This exhausting ser- 
vice completely broke down nearly all of our 
cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely 
indispensable, before we could advance on the 
Bnemy. 

The following were the dispositions of troops 
made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid. 

Gen. Averell, then at Green Spring, on the 
Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly 
iown upon the north side of the river, with all 
[lis disposable cavalr}', using every exertion to 
jet upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up 
rigorously. 

Gen. Pleasonton, with the remaining cavalry 
force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, 
Earmon'a Gap, and Mcchanicsville, and cut off 
he retreat of the enemy, should he niake for any 
)f the fords below the position of the main army. 
His orders were to pursue them with the utniost 
•apidity, not to spare his men or horses, and to 
iestroy or capture them if possible. 

Gen. Crook, at that time commanding Cox's 
livision at Hancock, en route for Western Vir- 
ginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, 
ind remain in readiness to move to any point 
ibove, should the enemy return in that di- 
•ection, keeping his scouts well out on all the 
.-oads leading from the direction of Chambers- 
burg to the Upper Potomac. 

The other commanders between Hancock and 
[larpcr's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigi- 
ant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to 
prevent the escape of the rebels within these 
limits. 

Gen. Burnslde was ordered to send two bri- 
gades to the ilonocacy crossing, there to remain 
in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any 
point on tlio railroad to which Stuart might be 
aiming. AV'hile Col. Rush, at Frederick, was di- 
rected to keep his lancers scouting on the ap- 
proaches from Chiuubersbiiv?, so aa to give timclv 
notic-o to the comniavido^T the two brigades at 
the MoiiO'Mcy crossing. 

C«;-n. Soii'iaan, whoso head-quarters wer': then 
at I'oolrsvillo, occupying wuh hi" division the dif- 
ferojit f'irdd on the river btlow the mouth of tlis 
Monocacy. was directed to keep hia cavalry v/cll 



out on the approaches from the direction of 

Frederick, so as to give him time to mass hi« 
troops at any point where the enemy might at- 
temjit to^ cross the Potomac in his vicinity. Ho 
was informed of Gen. iieasontons movements. 

Aticr the orders weiu given for covering all 
the fords upon the river, 1 did not think it pos- 
sible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that tho 
capture or destruction of his entire force was 
perfectly certain, but owing to the fact that my 
orders were not in all cases carried out as I ex- 
pected, he effected his escai^c into Virginia with- 
out much loss. 

Tiie troops sent by Gen. Burnside to the Mono- 
cacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the ne- 
cessary orders to the commander, instead of re- 
maining at the railroad crossing as I directed, 
marched four miles into Frederick, and there re- 
maiued.'until after Stuart had passed the railroad 
only six miles below, near which point it was 
said he halted. for breakfast. 

Gen. Pleasonton ascertained, after his arrival 
at ^lechanicstown, that the enemy v/ere only 
about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty re- 
treat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. He 
pushed on vigorously, and near to its mouth over- 
took them with a part of his force, having march- 
ed seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, and 
hiving left many of his horses broken down upon 
the road. He at once attacked Avith his artillery, 
and the firing continued for several hours, during 
which time, he states that he received the sup- 
port of a small portion of Gen. Stonen)an's com- 
mand, not sufScient to inflict any material damage 
upon the enemy. > 

Gen. Stout^nan reports, that in accordance with 
his instructions, he gave all necessary orders for 
intercepting the return of the rebels, and Col. 
Staples, commanding one of the brigades, states 
that he sent two regiments of infantry to the 
mouth of tho Monocacy, and one regiment to 
White's Ford. Tiiat on tlic morning of the 12th, 
about 10 o'clock he, by Gen. Stoneman's order, 
inarched the remaining three regiments of his 
command from Poolesvire towards the mouth of 
the Monocacy ; that before getting into action, 
he was relieved by Gen. Ward, who states that 
he reported to Gen. Pleasonton with his command 
while the enemy was crossing the river, and was 
informed by him (Gen. Pleasonton) that he was 
too late, and that nothing could be done then. 

Gen. Pleasonton, in his report of this affair, 
says : 

" It was at this time that Col. Ward reported 
to me from Gen. Stoneman's division, with a bri- 
gade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry,- and a sec- 
tion of artillery. I told him that his command 
could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed 
the river. These are the only troops th.at I knew 
of, that were in that vicinity, and this was tho 
first intimation that I received that any troops 
v/ere cjidcavoring to assist me in capturing tho 
rebels. I suco'-ided in prevcntiiig the enemy 
from cios!.-;i;i;; at tho- month -'f t;if ^I'mocacy. and 
drove liim to Whirl's F<>rd. tlui-*; mih.-s i-d.iw. 
Had AVhitc's Fov.l br-oii oc^.-n'.iod by i.nv f..rpc of 
ours previous to tli-' ti.n^c .-f liio •>,;'>np:iii(ii! by ilie 
enemy, the capture of Stuarfd vviiolo iurco uo'iIJ 



125 



have be«a certain and inevitable ; but with my 
small force, ^vllich did not exceed one-fourth of 
the enemy's it was not practicable for nie to 
occupy that ford, while the enemy was in front." 

It would seem from the report of Gen. Stone- 
man that the disposition he made of his troops 
previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. 
He sUitioned two regiments at the mouth of the 
Mouocacy, and two regiments at White's Ford, 
the latter in the very place where the crossing 
was made, and the former only three miles off, 
with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, 
ionio six miles distant. Gen. Plcasonton's report 
shows that from tlte time the firing commened, 
untif th& enemy were across the river, was about 
four and a-half hours. Gen. Stoneraan states, that 
he started the reserve from Toolesville at about 
9 o'clock ; but it appears from the report of Gen. 
Pleasonton, that it did not reach him till half-past 
one. 

^ At the time I received the order of October 6th 
to cross the river and attack the enemy, the ar- 
my was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large 
part of our troops were in want of shoes, blank- 
ets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, 
notwittistanding all the efforts that had been made 
since the battle of Autietam, and even prior to 
that date, to refit the army with clothing as well 
as horses! I at once consulted with Col. Ingalls, 
the chief quartermaster, who believed that the 
necessary articles could be supplied in about 
three days. Orders were immediately issued to 
the different commanders who had not already 
Bent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all 
the necessary steps were forthwith taken by me 
to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The 
requisitions were forwarded to the proper de- 
partment at Washington, and I expected that the 
articles would reach our depots during the three 
days specified ; but day after day elapsed, and on- 
ly a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps 
commanders, upon receiving notice from the 
quartermasters that they might expect to receive 
their supplies at certain dates, sent their trains 
for tliem, which after waiting, were conopelled to 
return empty. Several instances occurred Avhere 
these trains went back and forth, from the camp 
to the depots, as often as four or five different 
times, without receiving their supplies; and I 
was informed by one corps commander, that his 
wagon train had travelled over l.oO miles, to and 
from the depots, before he succeeded in obtain- 
ing his clothing. 

The corps of Gen. Franklin did not get its 
clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, 
and was moving into Virginia. 

Gsii. Reynold's corps was delayed a day at Ber- 
lin to com[)lete its supplies, and Gen. Porter only 
completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harp- 
sr's Ferry. 

^I made every exertion in my power, and my 
quartermaster did the same, to: nave these sup- 
plies hurried forward rapidly, and I was repeat- 
edly told that they had filled tlie requisitions at 
Washington. and that the supplies had been for- 
warded. Bat they did not come to ns, and of 
course were inaccessible to the army. I did not 
fail to tnake frequent representations of this con- 



dition of things to the General-in chiet.and it ap- 
pears that he referred the matter to the quarter- 
master-general, who constantly rei)licd tliat the 
supplies had been promptly ordered : notwith- 
standing this they did not reach our depots. 

The following extracts are from telegrams up- 
on this subject. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, October 
11,1 §62 
.\[aj-Geu. Ilalleck, General.in-cliief, Washington: 

. . . " We have been making every effort to 
get supplies of clothing for this army, and Col. 
ingalls has received advices that it has been for- 
warded by railroad, but owing to bad manage- 
ment on the roads, or from some other cause, it 
comes in very slowly, and it will take a much 
longer time than was anticipated, to get articles 
that are absolutely indispensable to the army, un- 
less the railroad !j4anagers forward supplies more 
rapidly." G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, October 
11, 1862. 

Maj-Gen. H. W. H — "I am compelled agam to 
call yonr attention to the great deficiency pf shoes 
aiid'other indispensable articles of clothing that 
still exist in some of the corps of this army. 
Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, 
who based his calculations upon information re- 
ceived from W^ishington, that clothing would be 
forwarded at certain times, corps connnanders 
sent then- wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's 
Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and 
has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are 
taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these 
supplies, there will necessarily be a correspond- 
ing delay in getting the army ready to move, as 
the men cannot march without shoes. 

" Every thing has been done that can be dons 
at these headquarters, to accomplish the desired 
results." Geo. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
October 15, 7.30 p. m., 1862. 

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H.,Gen.-in-Chief : "I am using 
every possible exertion to get this army ready to 
move. It was only yesterday that a part of our 
shoes and clothing^arrived at HagcrstowMi. It is' 
being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible.' 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
October 1.5, 1862, 7.30 p. m. 

Col. R. Ingulls, care Col. Rucker, Quarter-Mas- 
ter, Washington: "Gen. Franklin reports that 
there is by no means as much clotiiing as was called 
for, at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had 
better have additional supplies, especially of 
shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as 
possible." B. B. M., Chief-of-Stalf. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
October 16, 18 ;l'. 

Col. R. Ingalls, Care Col. Rucker, Quarter- Mas- : 
ter, AVashington : Gen. J.. F. Reynolds just tele- ' 
graphs as follows : " My quarter-master reports j 
?hat there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knap- \ 
sacks, at Hagerstown. He was aide to procure ■ 
only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, i 
with a few socks, drawers, and coats. Ttiis j 
leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My | 
requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes." j 



126 



Pleaso pasli the sli;ies aiul etoclilngs up to 
Harper's Ferry aa fast, as |)OH.sibk'. 

R. 15. M., aiief-of-Stuff. 
Headquarters, Army of tlie rotoraac, 
Camp near Kiioxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862 
Col. C. G. Sawtelle, Depot Quarter-Master, 
Washington : You did right in sending clothing 
to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send 
too much or too quickly. We want blailkets, 
shoes, canteens, &c., very much. 

R. Ingalls, Lt.-Col. & A. D. C, C. Q, M. 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862. 
(/apt. Augustus Boyd, Quarter-Master, Philadcl- 
plra: Shipments to Hagerstown must be made 
direct through, to avoid the contemptible delays 
at Harrisburg. If Col. Grossman was ordered to 
aend clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the sufftr- 
ing and impatience are excessive. 

R, I., Lt. Col. k A. D. C, C^ief Qr.-Master. 
Headquarters Army of tlie Potomac. 
I' Camp near Knoxville, Oct. 13, 1862. 

' Capt. Geo. II. AVeeks, Depot Quarter-Master, 
Hagerstown : Has the clothing arrived yet? if 
not, do yon know where it is ? What clothing 
was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg ? Did 
they capture any property that was en route to 
you ? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg ? 
Send an agent over the road to obtain information, 
»nd hurry un the supplies. Reply at once. 
R. I., Lt.-Col. & A. D. C. Chief Qr.-Master. 
Sharpsburg, Oct. 10, 1862. 
Gen, Ingalls, — I have just returned from Ha- 
gerstown where I have been for the clothing for 
this corps. There was nothing there but over- 
coats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and 
socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts 
or shelter tents. AVill you please tell me where 
and when the balance can be had ? Shall I send 
to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The 
corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 
hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. 

Will you please to inform me if I can get them 
at Harper's Ferry ? 

Fielding Lowry, Capt. and Quartermaster. 
Hagerstown, Oct. 15, 1862. 
Col, Ingalls, Quartermaster, — I want at least 
ten thousand suits of clothing, in addition to 
what I have received. It should be here now. 
G. W. Weeks, Acting Quartermaster. 
Harper's Ferry, Oct. 22-1862. 
GEn. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, &c. — We 
have bootees 12,000 : great coats, 4,000 ; drawers 
and shirts are gone ; blankets and stockings near- 
ly so. 15,000 each of these four articles are 
wanted. Alex. Bliss, 

Captain and Acting Quartermaster. 
McClellan's Headquarters, Oct. 21, 11 a. m. '62. 
Captain D. G. Thomas, Military Storekeeper, 
Washington, — Please send to Capt. Bliss at Harp- 
er's Ferry 10,000 blankets; 12,000 caps; 5,000 
overcoats; 10,000 pairs bootees ; 2,000 pairs ar- 
tillery and cavalry boots ; 15,000 pairs stockings; 
15,000 pairs drawers ; 15,000 pairs pants. 

The clotliing arrives slowly ; can it not be hur- 
ried along faster. May I ask you to obtain au- 
thority for this sliipment. Rufus Ingalls. 
Lt.-Col. and A. D. C, Cliief Quartermaster. 



Hagerstown, Oot. 30. 

Col. Ixgai.lr, — Clothing has arrived this morn- 
ing. None taken by rebels. Shall I supply 
Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and Rey- 
nolds until called for. G. W. Weeks, 
Capt. and Ass't Quartermaster. 

The following statement taken from a report of 
the chief quartermaster with the army, will 
show what progress was made in supplying the 
army with clothing, from the 1st of September, 
to the date of crossing the Potomac on the Slat 
of October, and that the greater part of the cloth- 
ing did not reach our depots until after the 15th 
of October. 

[See next page.] 

Col. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his report 
upon this subject says : 

" There was great delay in receiving our cloth- 
ing. The orders were promptly given by me, and 
approved by General Aleigs, but the roads were 
slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland 
Valley Road. 

"For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown 
on the 7th October for the corps of Franklin, 
Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there until 
about the 18th,' and by that time, of course there 
were increased wants, and changes in the position 
of troops. 

"The clothing of Sumner arrived in great 
quantities near the last ot October, almost too lat« 
for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. 

"We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, 
pai'tly on the cars just arrived, and partly in 
store." 

The causes of the reduction of our cavalry 
force have already been recited. The difticultj 
in getting new supplies from the usual sources 
led me to apply for aud obtain authority for the 
cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their 
own horses. The following are the telegrams 
and letters on this subject : 

Headquarters, Army oF the Potomac, 
Oct. 12, 1862, 12.45 p.m. 
Muj.-Gen. IT., Gen.-in-Chief : 

It is absolutely necessary that some energetic 
means be taken to supply the cavalry of this ar- 
my with remount horses. The present rate of 
supply is 4050 per week for the entire army here 
and in front of Washington. From this number 
the artillery draw for their batteries. 

G. B. Mctl, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 

The general-in-chief, in a letter to me, dated 
Washington, D.C., Oct. 14tii, 1862, replies to this 
dispatch in the following language : 

" I have caused the matters complained of ih 
3'our telegrams of the 11th and Tith to be inves- 
tigated." .... 

" In regard to horses, you say that the present 
rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire 
army liere and in front of Washington. I find 
from the records that the issues for the last six 
weeks has been 8,754, making an average per 
week of 1459." 

1050 is the number staled in the origin.al dis- 
]iatch now in my possession, and as not only 
figures were used, but the number was written 
out in full, I can hardly see how it is possilile for 



StMement of Clothing and Equijiaga received at 
the different Depots of ike Army of the Polo- 
mac, from the \st of September, 1862, 
to the ^Ut of October, 1862. 



127 



v 



H 
c 

0] 


From Sept. 
Ist to Oct. 
6th 

From Oct. 
6th to Oct- 
15th 

From Oct. 
15th to 
Oct. 25th.. 

From Oct. 
25th to 
Oct. 31st. . 


Received at 
the Depots. 


-J 
-J 

o 

o 


CO 

o 
o 

o 

o 


o 

o 
o 
o 


I—" 

O 

o 

o 


o 
-J 

o 
o 


Drawers 


to 

or 

O 

o 




1— ' 
to 

o 
o 
o 


(— ' 

1— ' 

o 
o 
o 


o 
o 
o 


Forage Caps 


to 

to 

to 


CO 

o 

o 
o 


o 
«^ 
to 

o 
o 


to 
to 

o 
to 

or 


to 

o 
o 


Stockings 


o 
o 


1—' 
to 

o 


Sack Coats 


ro 

tn 
O 


o 
o 


to 

o 


O 

o 


to 

o 
o 
o 


Cav'y. Jackets 


to 
oo 
to 

to 


to 

o 
o 
00 


to 

o 
o 
o 


»— ' 
o 
to 
to 


Ol 

o 

o 
o 


Canteens 


C5 

o 


to 
to 

o 
o 


1—' 
00 

00 

•-a 


00 
CO 

to 

CJt 


en 
ti 

o 

o 


Flannel Shirts 


CO 

to 

00 

oo 
«o 

to 

o 


to 

o 
o 


o 
o 

c 


to 

to 

00 

to 


C5 

o 
o 
o 


Haversacks 


o 
o 
o 


to 

o 
o 


I—" 
o 
o 


to 

o 

o 


Trowsers 
(.Mounted) 


to 
to 
00 


to 

o 

o 

o 


to 

o 
o 


o 
o 
o 

o 


to 

o 
o 


Boots 


1 to 

i to 
1— ' 

o 




o 
o 
o 
o 


CO 

o 
o 
o 
o 


1— ' 
o 
o 


Shelter Tents 


Co 
o 




00 


CO 

o 
to 


to 

to 


Camp Kettles 






tn 

o 
o 


to 

o 

o 


to 

o 
to 

o 


Mess Pans 


to 
-J 

o 




-J 
-I 

o 


1—' 
to 
o 
o 
o 


CO 

yl 
o 

o 


Overcoats 
(Foot) 


tTl 


1— ' 

o 
o 
o 


tJi 

o 


CJi 

o 

o 


1— ' 
to 

o 
o 


-ivtillery 
Jackets 


cc 


tn 

O 

o 




to 

o 


Blankets 


'-a 


to 

o 


CO 
tn 

O 

o 


00 


1— ' 
to 

o 
o 


Overcoats 
(Mounted) 








o 
o 

o 


to 

lO 

o 


Felt Hats 


■f>- 


-1 

o 
o 


to 
to 

CJ» 

o 

o 


I—" 
to 
o 

en 
o 


to 

o 

<rr> 


Infantry Coats 


■M 


to 

o 
o 

o 


to 
o 
to 

o 


to 

o 
o 


to 
o 

<o 

o 


'I'rowsers 

(Foot) 


vO 




o 

o 
o 


-T 

o 
o 

o 


to 

o 
o 

o 


Bootees 






KS 

to 


to 




Knit Shirts 



the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake 
in the transmission of the message. 

Headquarters Ann}- of tlie Potomac, 
October 14, 18C2. 7 p. m. 
Major. -Gen. H. W. II., Commander-in-Chief: 
Wich my small cavalry force it is impossible for 
me to watch the line of the Potomac properly, 
or even make the reconnoissancca that are neces- 
sary for our movements. This makes it necessary 
for me to weaken my line very much, by extend- 
ing the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. 
Tliis will continue uutil the river rises, and it will 
be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry 
raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, 
should be largely and immediately increased 
under any hypothesis, whether to guard the 
river or advance on the enemy, or both. 

Geo. B. MoC.. Major-Gen oral. 
The following is an extract from the official re- 
port of Col. Ingalls : 

" Immediately after the battle of Autietara, 
efforts were made to supply deficiencies in cloth- 
ing and horses. 

•' Large requisitions were prepared and sent 
in. The artillery and cavalry required large 
numbers to cover losses sustained in battJe, on 
the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms 
were deficient when they left Washington. 

" A most violent and destuctive disease mnde 
its appearance at this time, which put nearly 
4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported 
perfectly well one day, would be dead lame the 
next, and it was difficult to foresee where it 
would end or wdiat number would cover the 
loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. 
No one seemed able to account for the appearance 
of this disease. Animals kept at rest would 
recover in time, but could not be icorked. I made 
application to send West and purchase horses at 
once, but it was refused on the ground that the 
outstanding contracts provided for enough ; but 
tliey were not delivered siifficienthf fast, nor in 
sufficient numbers, until late in October and early 
in November. I was authorised to buy 2,500 
lato in October but the delivery was not com- 
pleted until late in November, after we had reach- 
ed Warrenton." 

In a letter from Gen. Meigs, written on the 
14th of October, and addressed to the general-in- 
chicf, it is stated, "There have been issued, 
therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the 
battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 
9,254." 

What number of horses were sent to General 
Pope before his return to Washington, I have no 
means of determining, but the following state- 
ments, made upon my order by the chief quarter- 
master witli the army, and who had means for 
gaining accurate information, forces upon my 
mind the conclusion that the quarter-master-gcn- 
eral was in error : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 

0. Q. M., Office, October 31, 1862. # 
llorscs. 
Horses purchased since 6th Sept. 1862, by 

Col. Ingalls, Chief Quarter-master, and 

issued to the forces under the immc- 

ditite command of Major-General Goo. B. 

McClcilan 1,200 



128 



IsRiied aiul turned out to the above force 
by Cai^t. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter- 
master (in Wasliington) ----- 2,261 
iBSuod to forces at and near Washingion, 

wliieli have since joined this command 3o2 
Totalpurchased by Col. Ingalls, and issued 
and turned over by Capt. Dana to the ^ 
forces in tliis immediate connnand - - 3.L13 
Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quar- 
ter-master, t) the forces in the vicunty 

of Washii gto'i • , - 3,363 

Grand total purchased by Col. R. Ingalls, 
Chief Quarter-master, and issued and 
' turned over .by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assis- 
tant Quarter-master, to the entire ariny 
of the rotomac and the forces around ^ ^ 
Washhi-ton ..------- (,li 6 

About 3,000 horses have been turned over to 
the quarter-master department by ofliccrs, as un- 
fit for service. Nearly 1,500 should now be 
turned over also, behig worn out and diseased. 
Respectfully submitted, 

F. j\I., Lt.-Col. & Quarter-master. 
This official statement made up from the re- 
ports of the quarter-masters who received and 
distributed the horses, exhilnts the true state of 
the case, and gives the total nimiber of horses 
received by the army of the Potomac and the 
troops around Washington, during a period of 
eio-ht weeks, as 7,176, or 2,078 less than the num- 
biTr stated by the qnarter-master-general. 

Supposing that (1,500) fifteen- hundred were 
issued to the army under Gen. Pope previous to 
its return to Washington, as Gen. ileigs states, 
there would still remain (578) five hundred and 
eeventy-eight horses which he does not account 

The letter of the gcneral-in-chief to the Secre- 
tary of War, on the 28th of October, and the let; 
ter of Gen. Meigs to the general in-chief, on the 
14th of October, convey the impression that, upon 
my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry 
and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, 
I liad reoeived a much greater number than was 
really the case. , ,, ^ „ 

It will be seen, from Col. l^Iye* report, that all 
of the horses alluded to by Gen. Meigs, only 
(3 813) three thousand eight hvnulred and thirteen 
came to the army, with which I was ordered to 
follow and attack the enemy. Of course the re- 
mahider did not in the slightest degree contribute 
to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of this 
army with which I was to cross the river, neither 
did they in the least facilitate any preparations 
for carrying out the order to advance upon the 
enemy, as the gcneral-iu-chicf's letter might seem 

to' imply. 

Durin'^ the same period that we were receiving 
the hordes alluded to, about (3,000) three thou- 
sand of our old stock were turned into the quar- 
ter-master's department, and 1,500 more reported 
as in such condition that they ought to be turned 
in as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army 
Gom:^ 700 short of the number required to make 
good existing deliciencies, to say nothing of pro- 
vidin<«- remounts for men whose horses had died 
or been killed during the campaign, and those 
previously dismounted. 



Notwithstanding all the elforts made to obtam 
a remount, there were, after d( ducting the force 
engaged in picketing the river, but about a thou- 
sand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day 
of October. 

In a letter, dated October 14th, 1862, the gene- 
ral-in-chief says : " It is also reported to me that 
the number of' animals with your army in the field 
is about 31.000. It is believed that your present 
proportion of cavalry and of animals is much 
larger than that of any other of our armies." 

What number of animals our other armies had 
I am not prepared to say, but military men in 
European armies have been of the opinion that 
an army to be efficient, while carrying on active 
operations in the field, should have a cavalry 
force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to one- 
fourth of the infantry force. ]\ly cavalry did not 
amount to one-twentieth part of the army, and 
hence the necessity of giving every one of my 
cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. 

Cavalry may be said to constitute the antennas 
of an army; It scouts all the roads in front, on 
the flanks, and in the rear of the advancing 
columns, and constantly feels the enemy. The 
amount of labor falling upon this arm during tho 
Maryland campaign was excessive. To personi 
not familiar with'the movements of troops, and 
the amount of transportation required for a large 
army inarching away from water or railroad com- 
munications, the number of animals mentioned 
by the general-in-chief may have appeared unne- 
cessarily large, but to a military man who takes 
the trouble to enter into an accurate and detailed 
computation of the number of pounds of subsist- 
ance and forage required for such an army as 
that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 
animals were considerably less than was abso- 
lutely necessary to an advance. As we were re- 
quired to move througli a country which could 
not be depended upon for any of our supplies, it 
became necessary to transport every thing _ in 
wagons, and to be prepared for all emergencies. 
I duLnot consider it safe to leave the river with- 
out subsistence and forage for ten days. 

The official returns of that date show the aggre- 
<-ate strength of the army for duty to have been 
about 110,000 men of all arms. This did not in- 
clude teamsters, citizen employees, officers ser- 
vants &c., amounting to some 12,000 men, which 
cvives' a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence 
alone of this armv, for ten days, required for its 
transportation 1,830 wagons at 2,000 pounds to 
the waijon, and 10,980 animals. 

Our cavalry horses, at that time, amounted to 
5 046 and our artillery horses to 6,836. 

' To transp(u-t full forage for these 22 8G2 ani- 
mals for ten days required 17,832 additional ani- 
mals, and this forage would only supply the en- 
tire number, (40,694) of annuals with a RmaL 
fraction over half allowance for the time spcci- 

^It will be observed that this estimate does not 
embrace the animals necessary to transport quar- 
termaster's supplies, baggage, camp-eqnipage, 
ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage tor olU- 
cer's horses, etc. etc, which would grearly aug- 
ment the nocessixry transportatioiv 



V 



1-29 



It rnaj very truly bo said that we did iiiaku the 
marcl) witii the means at our disposal, but it will 
be reinoinl5ered that wc met with no serious op- 
position from t!iG. enemy, neither did we encoun- 
t-sr delays fi-qm a,!!}- other cause. The roads were 
in excellent condition, and tlie ti-oops marched 
with the most commendable order and celerity. 

If we. had met. with a determined resistance 
from the enem^', and onr progress had been very 
much retarded tl\ereby, we would have constnned 
our supplies before ihey could have been renewed. 
A proper estimate of my responsibilities as the 
commander of that army did not justily me in 
basinjj my preparations for the exhibiHon npon 
the supposition tliat 1 was to have an'uninterrupt- 
ed march. On the contrary it was mj'' duty to 
be prepared for all emergencies, and not the least 
important of my responsibilities was tlie duty of 
making ample provision for supplying men and 
animals with rations and forage. 

Knowing the solicitude of the President for an 
early movement, and sharing with him fnlly his 
anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of Octo- 
ber I telegraplied to the General-in-chief as fol- 
lows : 

Headqnarte.ts, Armv of the Potomac, October 
21,1862. 

iftij-Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, 
Washington. — Since tlie receipt of the President's 
order to move on the enemy, I have been making 
every exertion to get this army supplied with 
clothing absolutely necessary for marcinnfr. This 
I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished ; 
I have also, during the same time repeatedly' urged 
upon 3'on the importance of supplying cavalry 
and artillery horses, to replace those broken down 
by hard service, and steps ha,vo been taken to in- 
sure a prompt delivery. Oar cavalry, even when 
well suppled with horses, is much inferior in 
numbers to that of the enemy ; but in efficiency 
has proved itself superior. So forcibly has tliis 
been impressed upon our old regiments by repeat- 
ed successes, that the men are full}' 'persuaded 
tiitt they are equal to twice tUeir number oi reb- 
el cavalry. 

Exclusive of tht> cavalry force now engaged in 
picketing Ihc river, I have not at present over 
about cue tliousand horses for service. Officers 
have been sent in various directions to pui'chase 
liorsea, and I expcoi liiem soon. Without more 
cavalry horses our communications, from the mo- 
ment we march, would be at the mei'cy of the 
large cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would 
not be possible for us to cover our flaid^s proper- 
ly, or to obtain the necessary information of the 
position and movements of the enemy in such a 
way as to insure success. Jfy experience has 
shown the necessity of a large and efficient cav- 
alry force. Under the foregoing circumstances I 
beg leave to ask whether the President desires 
me to march on the enemy at o'nce, or to await 
the reception of the new horses, every possible 
step having been taken to insure their prompt 
arrival. G. B. McClellan, Maj-Gen. Comd'g. 

On the same day Gen. Ilalleck replied as fol- 
lows : ^ 
WashingUm. Oct. 21, 1862. 3 p. ji. 

Your telegraph of 12 m. has been submitted to 



the President. He directs me to say.'thst he naa 
no change to make in his order of tlio 6th inst. 
If you have not been, and are not now in condi- 
tion to obey it, you Avill be able to show such 
want of ability. The President does not expect 
impossibilities ; but he is very anxiou-? that all 
this good weather should not be wasted in iiiao 
tivity. 

Telegraph when you will move, and on what 
linos you propose to march. 

H. \V. IL, Gen.-in-Chief. 
}Iaj--Gen. G. B. JtcClellan. ^ * 

From the tenor of th'.g dispatch I conceived 
that it was left for mj' judgment to decide • 
whether or not it was possible to move witli 
safety to the army at that time, and this respou- 
sibility I exercised with the more confidence ill 
view of the strong assurances of his trust in rhd 
as commander of that army, with which the 
President had seen fit to honor me during his last 
vielt. ■ '"' • ■ - 

■ The cavalry requirements -syithout which an 
advance would have been in the highest degrco 
injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. 

The country before us was an enemy's country, 
where the inhabitants fi^-iiished to the enemy 
every possible assistance, providing food for men 
and forage for animals, giving All information con- 
cerning our movements, and rendering every aid 
in their power to the enemy's cause.. ' ; '• • ' 

It was manifest that we should find- it, as we' 
subsequently did, a hostile district, where avo 
could derive no aid from tlie inhabitants that 
would justify dispensing with the active co-opera- ' 
tion of an efficient cavalry force. AccordingI)', I 
fixed upon the 1st of November as the earliest \ 
date at which the forward movement could well 
be commenced. • 

The general-in-chief, in a letter lo.the-Secrefary 
of War on the 28th of October, says: "In my 
opinion there has been no sucli want of supplies 
in the army under Gen. McCkdlan, as to prevent 
his compliance with the orders to ad vancfe against 
the enemy." . 

Notwithstandinp- this opinion expressed by 
such high authority', I am compelled to S;)y again 
that tlie delay in the reception of necessary sup- 
plies up to that date, had left the aimy in a con- 
dition totally unfit to a^lvance against the enemy j 
that an advance under the existing circumstances 
would, in my judgment, have been attended with 
the highest degree of peril, with great sutTcring 
and sickness among the men, and with iirmiincnt 
danger of being cutoff from our supplies l)y the 
superior' cavalry force of the enemy, and with no 
reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage 
oyer him. 

I dismiss this subject with the remark, that I 
have .fou'iid it imjiossiblc to resist the force of 
my own convictions, that the commander of an 
army, who, from the time of its organization, has 
for eighteen months been inconstant coinnuuiica- 
tion with its ofliccrs and men, the greater part of 
the time engaged in active service in the fieUl, 
and who has exercised this command in manv 
battles, must certainly be considered coinpefcii't 
to determine whether his ami}' is in ])roper con- 
dition to advance ou the enemy or not ; and he 



130 



aanst necoesarily possess greater facilities for 
forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants 
of Ills men, and the condition of his supplies, 
tlian the general-in-chief in his oflice at Washing- 
ton City. 
I ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. #• 

The movement from Washington into Maryland, 
■which culminated in the battles of South Moun- 
tain and Antietam, was not apart of an offensive 
campaign, with the object of the invasion of the 
enemy's territory, and an attacli upon his capital, 
but was defensive in its purposes, although often- 
sive in its character, and would be tcchnlLally 
called a " defensive-offensive campaign." 

It was undertaken at a time when our army 
had experienced severe defeats, riiid its object was 
to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, 
to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to 
drive the enemy out of Maryland. These pur- 
poses were fully and finall}'' accomplished b}' the 
tattle of Antietam, which brought the army of 
the Potomac into Avliat might be termed an acci- 
dental position on the upper Potomac. 

Having gained the immediate object of the 
campaign, the first thing to be done was to insure 
Maryland from a return of the enemy ; the second, 
to prepare our own armjr, exhausted by a series 
of severe battles, destitute to a great e-xtent of 
supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cav- 
alry horses, for a definite offensive movement, 
and to determine upon the line of operations for 
a further advance. 

At the time of the battle of Antietam the Poto- 
jnao was very low, and presented a comparatively 
weak line of defense, unless watched by large 
masses of troops. Ths re-occupation of Harper's 
Perry, and the disposition of troops above that 
point, rendered the line of the Potx>mac secure 
against everything except cavalry raids. No time 
■was lost in placing the army in proper condition 
for an advance, and the circumstances which 
caused the delay after the battle of Antietam have 
teen fully enumerated elsewhere. 

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity 
as a proper base of operations for a movement 
•upon Richmond. I still considered the line of the 
Peninsula as the true approach, but, for obvious 
reasons, did not make any proposal to return to it. 

On the 6th of October, as stated above, I Avas 
ordered by the President, through the general-in- 
chief, to cross the Potomac and givQ battle to the 
enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were pre- 
sented for my choice: 1st. Up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 
to 15,000 addi.ional troops : 2d. To cross between 
the enemy and AVa«hington, that is, east of the 
Blue Ridge, in which event I was to be reinforced 
with 30,000 men. 

At first 1 determined to adopt the line of tlic 
Shenandoah, lor these reasons : The Harper's Fcr- 
Tj' and Winchester Railroad, and the various turn- 
pikes converging upon Winchester, afforded su- 
perior facilities for supplies. 

Our cavalry being weak, this line of communi- 
cation could be more easily protected. There 
•was no advantage in interposing, at that time, the 
Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah between the eue- 
vay and lu^eelf. 



At the period in question the Potomac was stil 
very low, and I apprehended that if I crossed the 
river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy would 
promptly check the movement by recrossing into 
Maryland, at the same time covering his rear byoc- 
cupying in strong force the passes leading thi-ough 
the Blue Ridge fiom the southest into the She- 
nandoah Valley. 

I anticipated, as the result of the first course, 
that Lee would fight me near W^inchester, if he 
could do so under favorable circumstances ; or 
else that he would abandon the lower Shenan- 
doah and leave the army of the Potomac free to 
act upon some other line of operations. If he 
abandoned the Shenandoah, he would naturally 
fall back upon his railway communications. I 
have since been confii-mcd in the belief, tliat if I 
had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in 
the early part of October, General Lee would have 
recrossed into jHaryland. 

As above explained, the army was not in condi- 
tion to move until late in October, and in the mean- 
time circumstances had changed. 

The period had arrived when a sudden and 
great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at 
any time ; the season of bad roads and difiicult 
movements was ajiproacliing, which woidd natu- 
rally deter the enemy from exposing himself voa-y 
far from his base, and his movements all appeared 
to indicate a falling back from the river towards 
his supplies. Under these circumstances 1 felt at 
liberty to disregard the posibility of the enemy 
recrossing the Potomac, and determined to select 
the line cast of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced 
that it would secure me the largest accession of 
force, and the most cordial support of the Presi- 
dent, whose views from the beginning were in 
favor of that line. 

The subject of the defense of the line of the 
upper Potomac, after the advance of the main 
army, had long occupied my attention ; I desired 
to place Har]>er's Ferry and its dependencies in a 
strong state of defense, and frequently addressed 
the general-in-cliief upon the subject of the erec- 
tion of field-works and permanent bridges there, 
asking for the funds necessary to accomplish the 
purpose. Alth-ougli I did my best to explain as 
clearly as I was able that I did not wish to erect 
permanent works of masonr3',and that neither the 
works nor the ijermanent bridges had any refer- 
ence to the advance of the army, but solely to the 
permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry, I could 
never make the General-in-chief understand my 
wishes, but was refused the fuiids necessary to 
erect the field-works, on the ground that there 
was no appropriation for the erection of perma- 
nent fortifications; and was not allowed to build 
the pcrmaneid. bridge on the ground that the main 
army could not be delayed in its movements until 
its completion. Of course I never thought of de- 
laying the advance of the army for that purpose, 
•end so stated repeatedly. 

On the 25th of October I sent the General-in- 
chief the following telegram; 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, October, 
25, 1862. 10.45 p. m. 

Maj-Gen. Halleek, General in chief, Washing- 
ton, — As the moment is at hand for the advance 



131 



of the army, a qiiestjon arises fur the decision of 
the general in chief; which ;ill:hnngl\ perhaps im- 
plicitly decided by the IVesfdcntin his letter nl 
tho 13th, should be clearly presented ijy me, as I 
do not regard it as in my province to determine 
it. This question is the extent to wliich the line 
of the Potomae should be guarded, after the ar- 
ray leaves, in order to cover Maryland and Penn- 
sylvania, from invasion by large or small parties 
of the enemy. It will always be somewhat difticult 
to guard tlie immediate line of the river, owing 
to its great extent and the numerous passages 
which exist. It has long appeared to me that the 
best way of covering this line would be by occu- 
pying Front pLoyal, Strasburg. Wardensville and 
.Moretields, at the debouches of the several val- 
'eys in which they are situated. These points, 
or suitable places iji their vicinity, should be 
strongly inti-enched and permanently held ; and 
great advantage of this arrangement would be 
tlie covering the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, 
and an essential part of the system would be the 
construction of tlie link of railway from Win- 
chester to Strasburg, aud the rebuilding of the 
Manassas Gap Railway bridge over the Shenan- 
doah. 

The intreuchmcnt of Manassas Junction would 
complete the system for the defense of the ap- 
proaches to Washington and the Upper Potomac. 
Many months ago I recommended this arrange- 
ment, in fact gave orders for it to be carried into 
effect. I still regard it as essential under all cir- 
cumstances. 

The views of the chief engineer of this army 
in regard to the defenses and garrison of Harp- 
er's Ferry and its dependencies are in your pos- 
session. 

The only troops under my command outside of 
the organization of the army of the Potomac, are 
the Maryland Brigade, nnder Gen. Kenly, the 
64:th Pennsylvania, Col. Voss ; 12th Illinois Cav- 
alry, and Col. Davis's 8th New York cavalry ; to- 
tal, 2,894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 
cavalry men. There are also two of my regi- 
ments of cavalry, (about 650 men) guarding the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, between Hancock 
and Cumberland. 

As I have no department, and command simply 
an active army in tho field, my responsibility for 
the safety of the line of the Potomac and the 
States north of it, must terminate the moment I 
advance sofarbej'ond that; line as to adopt anoth- 
er for my base of operations. The question for 
the general in chief to decide, and which I ie- 
gai'd as beyond ni}' province, is this : 

1st. Shall the p-.ifety of Harper's Ferry, and the 
line of the Potouitic, be regarded as assured by 
the advance of the army south of the Blue Ridge 
and the line left to take care of itself ? 

2d. If it is deemeed necessary to hold the line 
or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, 
how many troops shall be p aced there, at what 
points, and in wiia>, numbers, and of what compo- 
fiition at each, and whence shall they be supplied, 
i. e. from this aamy or from other sources ? 

Omitting the detached troops mentioned above, 
and the small garrisons of Hoonsboro and Fred- 
erick, the last returns shww the sti-ength of tliis 



army for duty, to be about i->ne hunilrcd a.id six- 
ti'on thou,-aiid oilioers and men. This ir. eludes 
the ilivisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does 
not include Heiutzelman, Sigel and Bayurd. 

If Harper's Ferry and the river above are ren- 
dered fully secure, it is possible tiiat the active 
army, if it sppplies the garrisons, may be reduced 
so much as to be inadequate to the purposes con- 
templated ; if is is preserved intact, Marylan.d, 
Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore ;uid Ohio" Rail- 
road may be unduly exposed. 

1 leave the decision ol thi-se grave questions to 
the general in chief. 1 know notning of the num- 
ber of troops in Baltimore, &c. 

.•in important element in the solution of this 
problem, is the fact that a great portion of Bragg'a 
army is probably now at hberty to unite itself 
with Lee's command. 

I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the 
morning, and must ask a prompt decision of thci 
questions proposed herein. 

G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Cora, 

To which I received tho following reply : 

Washington, Oct. 26, "02, 1.35i'.si. 
Maj.-Gen. G. B. iMcC : 

In addition to the command which you had 
when I came here, you also have the greater part 
of that of Maj.-Gen. Pope, iloreover, yf)U have 
been authorized to use any troops within your 
reach in Gen. Wool's department, and in Western 
Virginia. Gen. Banks's conmiand is also u)»der 
your direction, with the single restriction, that 
he is not to remove troops from Washington, im- 
til he has notilied me of his orders. Since j'ou 
left Washington, I have advised and suggested 
in I'elation to your movements, but I have given 
you no orders. I do not give you any now. The 
government has intrusted you with defeating and 
driving back the rebel army in your front. I 
shall not attempt to control you in the measures 
you may adopt for that purpose ; you are inform- 
ed of my views, but the President has left you at 
liberty to adopt them or not, as you may deem 
best. You will also exercise your own discretion 
ill regard to what points on the Potomac, and the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied 
or fortified. I will only add that there is no ap 
propriation for permanent intrenchments on that 
line. Moreover, I think it will be tune enough 
to decide upon fortifying Front Ro3'al, Strasburg, 
Wardenville and Morcfiehl, when tho enemy is 
driven south of them, and they come into our 
possession. I do not think that we need have 
any immediate fear of Bragg's army. You are 
within 20 miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant 
about 400 miles. 

H. W. JL, Gen.-in-Chief. 

And on the 29th I sent the following': 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Oct. 29, 'G2, 1.15 p.,M. 

JLaj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washingtoji : 

On the 25th instant, I sent you a dispatch, re- 
questing you to decide what stejis should be 
taken to guard the line of the Potomac, when 
the army leaves here. To this 1 received your 
reply, that I had been intrusted by tho President, 
witli defeating and driving away tho rcbci army, 
that you had given mo no orders heretofore, did 



132 



not i^ive ma anv then, etc. Under tlieso circum- 
stances, 1 have only to make siich 'arrangements 
for c-narding this extended line sin the means at 
mv disposal will }->ermit, at the same lime keep- 
ing in view the extreme necessity of maintaining 
the moving army in adequate force to meet the 
rebel army before ws. 

Tlie dispositions I have ordered are as tollows, 
viz.: 30,000 men to be left at Harjier's Ferry, one 
brio-ade of infantry in front of ^larpsburg ; K^n- 
ly's brigade of infantry at Williarasport ; Kelly s 
brigade, including Col. CambeU's 54tli Pennsyl- 
vania Infantry, at Cumberland ; and between tluit 
poiJit and Hancock I have also, lei t four sraull 
cavalry regiments, to patrol and watch th« river 
and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cum- 
berland down to Harper's Ferry. 

I do not regard tbis ibroe afi sufficient to cover 
eecm-ely this "great extent of ''line. 'but I do not 
feel iustihed in detaching any more troops from 
my moving cobmms. I would therefore recom- 
inend tliat some new regiments of infantry and 
cavalrv be sent t6 strengtlieii the forces left by 

jne. - ' 

There should be a brigade of infantry and sec- 
tion of artillery m t!ie vicinity of Cherry Run ; 
anotber brigade at Hancock, an additional brig- 
ade at Wiliiamsport, one regiment at llagerstown, 
and one at Cliambersburg, witli a section of artd- 
leryat each place if possible. This is on the 
supposition tliat the enemy retain a considerable 
cavalry force west of the i31ue Ridge. If tliey go 
east of it, the occupation of the points named m 
my disptitch of the 25th inst., will obviate the 
necessity of of keeping many of tliese troops on 

the river. '■,'",'' r' ^ 

There are now several hnndred ofonr wound- 
ed, including Oen. Richardson, in the vicinity of 
Sharpsburg, that cannot possibly bo uiovcd at 

^'^I repeat that ido noi Idok .uiiJofiitbe-forees:! 
have been able to leave from ihir, ar'my, as sufli- 
cient to prevent cavalry raids into I.Iaryland and 
PeTinsylvania, as cavalry is the only det5cripti0Tj 
of troops adequat^e to this service, and lam, as 
you are aware, deficient in thi« arm. 

Goo. B. McClellan, Mai.-Gen. Gomd g. 

To wh'Ch I received, on the 30t.h, this reply : 
Washington, Oct. 30, 1862. 11.30 a.m. 

Mai.-Gen. G. \i McOlellan,— Your- telegram of 
yesterday wa* received late last evenings Tho 
troops proposed for Thorough faro Gap will be 
Bent to thsct piace whenever you are in position 
for their ooii' ration, as previovisly stated ; but no 
new rctrlmenfcs can be $entfrom hero t,o the Up-, 
pp..- Potomac The guarding of tha line is loit 
tc> your own discretion, with the taoops now un- 
der your command. . ^„ . „ 
^ ^ : n. W. IT. Goh.-iivChicf 

I accordingly loft the 12t}» Corps at Harper's 
JVM-ry. detatchiti.; one brigade to the vicnnty of 
SharpHSun.-;. Gen. Mordl waa i)lrtced in com-' 
mao'l of the bne fron) the mou'.b of the Antiet.;im 
to CnmVxiriand. (J?n. Slocuin in command of Har- 
per's Ferry and tho ilnc ea;;t of the mouth ot the 
Antiotarn. 

Tho orders <;ivcn to tlicsc ofncors vrero as Lol- 



Head-Qnartei-K, Army oi the Potomac, \ 

Oct. 29, 18G2. 1 P.M. f ' 

; Gen. II. W. Slocum, Comd'g Army Corps, Har ; 
jier's Ferry, — Tho general commanding directs 
that you send one brigade of your corps, to march 
at once to the position now occupied by Gen. R' 
J. Porter's corps in front of Sharpsburg, to -watck i 
and guard the line of the river from the ford ne^ir 
the I'noutbof the Antietam Creek to the month>of 
the Opequan Creek. The officer in command will 
also take steps to afford proper protection to the 
sick and wounded in the hospitals 'n the vicinity 
of Shar))sburg and Bcyonsborc The regiment 
now at Boonsboro' will be placed under bis or- 
ders. Gen. Kcnly,at Wiliiamsport, will guard the 
river from the mouth of the Opequan above, in- 
chnling the ford at;the moutlr of the Opequan. 

The"commandirg general also directs that you 
take immediate steins to establish tho remainder 
(if'yonr coriisas follows, viz., one brigade on Mary- 
land Heights, one brigade on Lomion lieights,with . 
the remainder on Bohvar Heights -.nd at Harper's 
Ferry... These dis])ositions should" be jnade at 
once, so that Gen. Corrch can move with his corps. 
Please acknowledge receipt of this. 

R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff. 
Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, ). 
October 31, 1862. ) 

Gen. G. W. :N[orell, Comd'g Upper Potomac. . 
General,— I am instructed by the commanding 
general to say to you, that he has selected you to 
perform the highly inqjortant and responsible 
duty of taking charge of, and commanding the 
troops left for tho defence of the line of the Po- 
tomac River, from the mouth of the Antietam to 
Cumberland, as well as any other troops that may 
hereafter be sent for tho yuotection of tho JMary- 
land and Pennsylvania frontier, within tho limits 
of the line herein specified. The force which has 
been left to guard the line, is not deemed ade^ 
qnute to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that 
tlie commanding general feels authorized to de- 
tach iVom the army of the Potomac at the present 
tune, and it devolves upon you to make the best 
use of this force in your power.. Tou wi^l have 
foiu- cavalry regiments under your command, 
wliicb should be distribvded along the river, as 
to watch all the available fords, and give timely 
notice to thb infantry or tlie approach or any force 
of rebels., i.- ■ !■ . '' ■ , ^ 'i. 

You will afford all the protection m your power 
TO the Baltimore and Oliio Railroad. 
. ;Y6u will endeavor to prevent any cavalry_raidB 
uito ilaryland and Pennsvlvania. 

You w"dl take steps to have all the sick and 
wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel 
anny,; wi thin vour lines, properly taken care of, 
until they can be sent to general hospitals, or 
digohaiged or paroled. 

■'You will mako your headquarters at llagers- 
toiwiiy and ocoaisionally viait the different parts of 
ydnrlLiie.- ;■ '.' ,, .^ z, 

iYou will please report promptly to these 
hdadqnarters; everything of importance that oc- 
curs within tho limits of your command. Iho 
tin Of brigades now at Cumberland. Wiliiamsport, .. 
and Biiarp-^burgh. iuchiding the Mth IVnnsylvaina.' 
Voltrnt^'crsncar Cumberland, will be under you^ .k 



; On'ais^I^St'Kof October the portiHon • b)-jfl*^' at i 
Berlin <«i;f c'dnstnicted;' th61-e bciri^ alru\rly ■'ono 
across the Potomac, 'and anotlior aiT'^tes' the 
Slicnaiidoali at Harper'.^ Forry^ , • 

Oii (he 26th two divieiote dr'theOtTiCorfisAnd 
P. leaffdarou's brijji'i'di.' of cnvftliy; 'crtsfeeci a^-Buv- 
J/ii aiKl occupied Lq>oi,Uvi!rq'. '" ! - '{ ;;■ '.' ■' 

' T(i<5 lst,'Gth, and"' DtJi rAifps/trje cavaliy'itiiir 
resp.rve artillery, crds^ed' at Eui-lin, botween the 
2d!.h of October an iflie LM ()t"N(jT6inb'i:'r. 

The 2d and '5th' r*6rp=?ci-o?,seil at Kaii')er's Fcrrj 
between the 29t!.- o1 Gclobcr 'and' 1st of Kovcni- 

h^r-, ■■■'",.■; '■::":'■'■'■■::" ]■ ■ : ■ ' _ 

""■ H^civy-l-aitts'delafed'tK6^' inovemeTit' Cdftsider- 
ab!y inthe beu:intiiiis, and tlie 1st, oth, and' 6tb 
Corps were obliged to halt at least one day at tilie 
crossuigs, to complete, as far as possible, the 
necessary supplies that conld not be prociu'cclat 
an earlier period. 

The plan of campai^ I. aidopted, dnr'jng' the 
advance, iras to move the army -well in hand 
parallol to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrcnton ^as 
ilio point of direction for the main body eeis;ng 
each pass in the Blue Ridge by detachments, as 
*e approached it, and gnardirig them after t^'c 
had passed, as long as they -would enable the 
enemy to tronble onr commnnications with t';c 
Potomac. It was espected tliat we wonld unite 
with the 11th Corps and Sickles's division near 
Thoronghfare Gap. We depended npon Harper's 
Ferry arid Berlin for supplies, niitil the j\faiiassas 
Gap Railway was reached ; when that occurred 
ihe passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and 
the army massed ready for actfon or movement 
in a:ny direction. ■ 

It was my intention, if npon readhing Asbby's, 
or any other pass, I fouiid that the en'emy were 
in force between it and the Potomac, in the valley 
:)f the Shenandoah, to move into tlie valley and 
ondeavor to gain their rear. I hardly boped to 
ac<;omplish tliis, but did not expect that by strik- 
ing in between Culpepper Gotu't House and Little. 
Washington, I could either separate their army 
;ind beat them in detail, or else force them to con- 
•enti-ate as far back as Gordonsville. and thus 
!)Iace the army of the Potomac in position either 
;o adopt the Fredericksburgh line of advance 
upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Penin- 
sula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossi- 
ble to supply it by the. Orange and 'i:lexandna 
Railroad beyond Culpepper., ' ' 

^On the 2Vth of October, the remaining divisions 
of the 9th Corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleason- 
ton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. The con- 
centration of the Gth Corps, delayed somewliat by 
intelligence as to the movements of the enomy 
near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this, 
day ; and the 1st Corps was already in motion 
tor Berlin. 

On the 28tb the 1st Corps and the general 
headquarters reached Berlin. 

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and 

• ..•.imped near Lovettsville ; the 2d Corps com- 

•■.'1 the passage of the Shenandoah; the ^i.h 



cinity 

., . , . , Joona 

omo'.j .fcne SthCorps reauherf Harper's F<irry,one 
divi.iion ei'o;ssir47t,:io Shenandoah.' .:r:,-i 

. On the Ist; of November the IstCoi-ps moved 
to -.Purceflvine -and Hann'Uou ; the 2d Corps to 
y'Q'»dgrOYe ; ili'e.r>t1i Corps to Hiilsborwigh ; th* 
Grh- Corps reaclrei^ Berlin; one division croBsnig'. 
PieasoT^ ton's cAv^i'liy ocenpied Philemon t,: having 
awharpskirmisli tfere, nndatBloomflold. 
• On NdVember 2d the 2d'Cori)s occupied Snicfe 
er'a Gap; the Sth Corps Snickers ville : the 6tli 
Corps crossed the Potoma'c; and encamped near 
Wlieatland ;*■ the 9th Goi'ps advanced to Bloom- 
field,. Union, and Philemont. Pieasonton drove 
the enemy oftt of Union ;■ Averell was ordered f» 
join Pieasonton. The enemy offered no seriotis 
resistance to the occupation of Snicker's Gap, 
but advanced to gain possession of it with a 
column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, who 
were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled 
guns: - , .: : 

On the 3d the 1st Corps moved to Phih^nK. '- 
jUnion, Blorafield, &c. ; the 2d Corps to t e vl- - 
tity of Uppcrvillc ; the 5th Corps remaintd ai 
■Snicker's Gap ; the Gth Corps moved to Purcell, 
ville ; the 9th Corps moved tov/ards Upperville, 
;Plea3ontan drove the enemy out of Uppervilla 
after a severe fight. 

■ On' the 4th the 2d Corps took possession of 
■Ashley 's'Gap ; the Gth Corps reached Union : the 
Oth Corps Upperville ; the cavalry occupied Pied- 
mont. 

On the 5th the Ist Corps moved to Rectortown 
and White Plains ; one division of the 2d Corps 
to the intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with 
the Upperville-and Barber's road ; the 6th Corps 
ito t!;c Aldic turnpike, east of Upperville ; the 
9th Corps beyond the Manassas Road, between 
Piedmont and Salem, with a bridge at Manassaff 
Gap ; the cavalry under Averell had a skirmish at 
Manassas Gap, and the brigade of Pioasontou 
gained a handsome victory over superior num- 
bers- at Barber's cross-roads ; Bayard's cavalry 
had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem. 

Oh the Gth the 1st Corps advanced to AVarren- 
jton ; the 2d to Rectortown ; the 5th Corps com- 
menced its movement from Snicker's Gap to 
White Plains ; the 9th Corps to Waterloo and 
jvicinity, on the Rappahannock ; the 11th Corps 
was aj; New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hope- 
iWcH's Gaps ; Sickles' division guarding the 
prange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas 
IJunction, towards Warrenton Junction ; the ca- 
ivalry near Flint Hill; Bayard to cut off what 
jtiiere might be in Warrenton, and to procf r-d to 
jthe Rappahannock Station. ' Q 

; November 7, Gen. Pieasonton was ordeicd to 
jrnove towards J.ittle Washington and Sperryville, 
and thence towards Culpepper Court House. , 

November 8th, the 2d Corps moved lialf way 
to Warrenton ; the 5th Corps to New Baltimore. 
November 9(h, tlie 2d and 5th Corps reached 
Warrenton ; the Gth Corps New Baltimore. 

Late on the night of the 7tlj, 1 received an or- 
der relieving me from my conunand of the armv 



134 



of tlip I'ntoinnc. find iliioctlng mo M turn it ovci 
U) GoM. Jliinmitlo. \vhicli '<■ ai once aul. 

I liu.l iilrctidv given tlie owlcrs tor llio move- 
ments of tho 8tli ai.ri 9ili ; tlicso orders were car- 
rictl inU> clTocr. witlnnit cliungc. 

'I'ho posltio!. ill which i loft the army, f>.G lUr 
rcBtilt of the ..r-iors 1 hiul Rivc.'ii. was au lollovvs: 

Tlic 1st, 2.1 an..! r,:h Corps, reso.rve ava.ier/, 
and general liea.l-MnartcrP ai Wiirrcntr-.n ; tuc .ai. 
Corps on tlie line of tlio Kuppahannodc. in the 
vicinitv of Waterloo ; the uih Cc.rus at Ncw/.ai- 
tiniorc"; tl:c 1 1 th Corps at New B-..jt;nvM-c, Uaincs. 
ville and 'L'horonghfare Cap ; hick.o.s a flrvidioi, oi 
the 3d Cori.son the Orange una AicNa>idria nal- 
road from M'cinassua Junction to VVarrcr.coii .luric 



iTKule the attempt to divide the enemy, as before 
SiTggeBted, and could, he have been brought to a 
battle within reach --f uiy t^ui.phes, 1 ctinnut doubt 
that the rr-suit would h;..ve Iceu a brjlliaut victo- 
ry for our army. 

' Oil tho luthof Novembor Gon. Fleasoidon was 
ntca<;ked hy fjOV;j:st'.-p>Jt. with one divisiuji of in- 
faxii.rv, and Stuaris ca\ airy, but repulsed the at- 

ta.;ic; 

Thic iudicatcB the rel;divo positum ot our ai- 
lay Lind thai of the enemy at tlio time I was re- 
lieved fr.i-ii the coromund. ^^^^.^n 

OK.GANiZ.vTI0N AND aFA'ER.lL COMDLCT 
Or MILITAi;.Y OPKHATION'S. _ 

It would be iinpo.s.siblc to participate in oper- 



.• ,., T'"'' Z^'Z "^;.^;ir;;;noJir;a • ar^nn. .uci. as those described in the foregoing 

t.on ; l''-so.ao,. ^ og ^l-^^^'^^;' „, ,,,,,3. without forndng llxed opini 



AmisRviile, Je,.^. -.-•■, — , ... . 

Hazel River, facing Longstreet s, six mdes horn 
Culpepper Court Uousc ; Bayard near Kuppahan- 
nock Station. , 

Tiie army was thus massed near A^arrenton, 
ready to act in any requireil direction, perlcctly 
i. hand, and in admirable condition and spirits 
I. lioubt whether during the whole period that 1 
had tlie honor to (command the army ot the 1 00- 
mac, it was in such excellent condition to tight a 

great battle. ,./■>, n 

When I gave up the command to Gen. liuii;.- 
side the best niformation in oui possessioii indi- 
cated that I.ongstreet was immediately m our 
front near Culpepper ; Jackson with one perhaps 
•\)0th of the mils near Chester and ihorntons 
Gaps, with the mass of their forces west ot ihe 
Blue Ridge. The reports from General rieason- 
ton in the advance, indicated the possibility ol 
separating the two wings of the enemy s torces. 
and eitlier beating Longstreet separately or iorc- 
in- him to fall back, at least, upon GordonsviUe, 
to'effect bis junction with the rest of tlie army. ^ 
The foUovviug is from the report ot General 

Phasonlon : ,►,,,- t i 

"At this time, and from the 7Lh mst., my ad- 
vance pickets were on IIuzcl river, within six 
miles of Culpepper, besides havnig my Hank piclc- 
ets towards CUestor and Thorntons (xaps,^extend- 
ed to Gaines's Cross Roads, mid Newbys Cross 
Roads with numerous patrols in the directions 
of WoolviUe, Little Washington, and bperry- 
villc. Tlie information gained by these parties, 
•And also from deserters, prisoners, contrabcnds, 
as well as citizens, established the tact ot Long- 
street with his command beirg at Culpejper. 
while Jackson with D. JL Hill, witli their respect- 
ive commands, were in the Shenandoah \ alley, 
on the Western side of the Blue Ridge, covering 
Chester and ThornU)n's Gaps, and expecluig us 
to attempt to pass through and attack them. As 
late as tlio 17th of November, a contraband just 
from Strasburg came into my camp and reported 
that D. It. iiiU's cori)S was two mdf.s beyonrl 
that place, on the railroad to Mount Jankson. 
Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the 
bridtces under the impression that we intended 
to follow into that valley, and was en route tor 
Staunton. Jackson's corps wai» between btras- 
burg and Winchester. Evvell and A. P. UiU were 

witii Jackson. , t 1 1 i i 

l.bid I remained in coniinaiul, 1 suoulil have 



^ ions upon sub- 

icJds connected with the organi/.ation of our ar- 
mies and the general conduct of military opera- 
tions. , 1 • 1 4. 

This report wouhl bo incomplete without a 
brief allusion to some general considerations which 
have been Ihnily impressed ux)OU mebv the events 
vviiich have occurred. 

To my mind the most glaring defect ni onr ar- 
mies is the absence of system in the appoint- 
ment and promotion of general and other olhcers 
and the want of means for the theoretical instruc- 
tion of the mass of ofHcers. 

The expansion of the army was so great and &o 
rapid at the commencement of the existing war, 
that it was perhaps impossible, in the great^scar- 
city of bistructed officers, to have adopted any 
uthercou.se than that which was pursued ; but 
the time has arrived when measures may be in- 
itiated to remedy ex'sting defectii and provide 
against their recurrence. 
"1 think that the army should be regarded as a 
permanent one. that is to say, its aflairs should bo 
administered precisely as if all who belonged, to 
itha 1 made it their jn-ofessionfor lile: and those 
rules fur promotion &c., which have been found 
necessary in the besl; foreign arm es to excite 
bono: able emulation, produce an espril du corps. 
and secure efficiency, should be followed by us. 

All officers and soldiers should be made to feel 
that merit, that is to say, courage, good conduct, 
the knowledge and performance of the duties 01 
their grade, and fitness to exercise those ot a su- 
perior grade, will ensure to them advancement in 
their profession, and can alone secure it ior them. 
Measures should be adoj.ted to secure the the- 
oretical instruction of stafl' ofiicers at least, who 
should as far as possible be selectea from oOicers 
having a mildary education, or who have seen 
actnal service in the field. '^ 

The number of cade'uS at the military academy 
should he at once increased to the greatest _ex- 
Imi permitted by the capacity of tho institution. 
The re-ular army should be increased an.l 
maintained comidele in numbers and efficieney. 

A well oiganized system of recruiting and ol 
depots for instruction should be adopted, in order 
t,c keep the ranks of the regiment full, and sup- 
l)lv promptly losses arising from batt.e or disease. 
This is especially necessary for the artillery ano 
civalrv arms of the service, which, from the be- 
gumingof tiie war, have rendered great servicr. 



135 



>\'liicii have never been fully appreciated by 
y but their comrades. We need also large bod- 
tejs of well instrncted engineer troops. 

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns, 
the directions should be left to professional sol- 
diers : a statesman may, perhaps, be more com- 
petent than a soldier to determine political ob- 
jects and direction of a campaign, but those once 
decided upon, everything should be left to the 
responsible military head, without interference 
from civilians. In no other manner is success 
probable. The meddling of individual members 
or committees of Congress with subjects which, 
■'from lack of experience, they are of course inca- 
pable of comprehending, and which they are too 
apt to view through the distorted medium of 
partizan or personal prejudice, can do no good, 
and is certain to produce incalculable mischief. 

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to 
the President for the constant evidence given me 
of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to 
sustain the military plans which my judgment 
led me to urge for adoption and execution. I 
cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those 
plans, and to give that support to others which 
was necessary to their success, to any want or 
confidence in me, and it only remains for me to 
regret that other counsels came between the con- 
stitutional commander in chief and the general 
whom he had placed at the head of his armies, 
counsels which resulted in the failure of grear 
campaigns. 

If the nation possesses no generals in service, 
competent to direct its military affairs Avithout 
the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner 
it tinds them and places them in position tUe bet- 
ter will it be for its fortunes. 

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the 
iiemorandum submitted by me to the President 
on the 4th of August, 1861, my letter to him of 
July Tth' 1862, and other similar communications 
to hiinandto the Secretary of War, contained in 
this report. I have seen no reason to change in 
;u)y material regard the views there expressed. 

After a calm, impartial and patient considera- 
tion of the subject, a subject which demands the 
closest thought on the part of every true lover 
oF his country, I am convinced that by the prop- 
er employment of our resources, it is entirely pos- 
sible to bring this war to a successful military 
issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to 
the re-estabiishment of the Union, is the entire 
defeat o" virtual destruction of the organized 
military power of the Confederates, and that such 
a result should be accompanied and followed by 
conciliatory measures ; and that by pursuing the 
political course I have always advised, it is pos- 
sible to bring about a permanent restoration of 
the Union; a reunion by which the rights of 
both sections shall bo preserved, and by which 
both parties shall preserve their self-i'espect 
while tli^jy respect each other. 
CONCLUSION. 
In this report I have confined mj-gelf to a phiiii 
narrative ot such facts as are necessarj'- for the 
purposes of history. Where it was possible I 
liave preferred to give these facts in the lan- 
.■riiag*- of dispatches, written at the time of their 



occurrence, rather tlian to attempt a new reljfc- 

tion. 

The reports of the subordinate commanders, 
hereto annexed, recite what time and apace would 
fail me to mention here, those individual instancea 
of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every 
battle was marked. To them I must especially 
refer, for without thetn, this narrative would be 
incomplete, and justice fail to be done. But I 
omit to tender to my corps commanders and to 
the general officers under them, such ample re- 
cognition of their cordial co-operation and their 
devoted services, as those reports abuudautly 
vouch. 

I have not sought to defend the armj-^ which I 
had the honor to command, nor myself, against 
the hostile criticisms once so rife. 

It has seemed to me that nothing more was re- 
quired than such a plain and truthful narrative, 
to enable those whose right it is to form a cor- 
rect judgment on the important matters involved. 
This report is, in fact, the history of the army 
of the Potomac. During the period occupied ia 
the organization of that army, it served as a bar- 
rier against the advance of a lately victorious 
enemy, while the fortification of the capital was 
in progress, and inider the discipline which it 
theu received it acquired strength, education, and 
some of that experience which is necessary to 
success in active operations, and which enaliled 
it afterward to sustain itself under circumstances 
trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skir- 
mishes occurred along the lines, conducted with 
great gallantry, which inured our troops to tho 
realities of war. .< 

Tho army grew into shape but slowlj'-, and the 
delays wiiich attended on the obtaining of arms, 
continued late into the winter of 1861-2, were no 
less trying to the soldiers than to the peo[)le of 
the country. Even at the time of I lie organiza- 
tion of the Peninsular campaign, some of the 
finest regiments were without rifles, nor were 
the utmost exertions on the part of the military 
authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles 
to active service. 

When at length the army was in condition to 
take the field, tlie Peniiisular campaign was phinr- 
ned,aud entered upon with entliusiasni by officers 
and men. Had this campaign been followed up 
as it was designed, I caimot doubt that it would 
have resulted m a glorious triumph to our arms, 
and the permanent restoration of the power of 
the government in Virginia and North Carolina, 
if not throughout the revolting States. 'It was, 
however, otherwise ordered, and instead of re- 
porting a victorious campaign, it has been my 
duty to relate the heroism of a reduced arn)y, 
sent upon an expedition into an ejiem3''s country, 
there to abandon one, and originate another new 
cami^aign, which might and wonid have been 
successful if sup])orted with n[)iu-eciation of its 
necessities, but which failed because of the re- 
peated failure of promised support, at tlie most 
critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal mo- 
ments. 

That heroism surpasses ordinary dc8cri[>tion. 
Its illustration must be left for the pen of tiie his- 
torian in times of calm reflection, wIkjh tJie nation 



136 



shall be looking back to the, past from the midsit; 
of peaceful da'vs. .m'II 

For ine, now, it is Rufficiont to sajf, thatimy; 
comrades were victors on every field save ,one,' 
and there the endurance, ofya shiglc corps accoiu- 
plished the object of its fightiug.aud by securing^ 
to the army its transit to, the i James, loft to -the 
enemy a ruinous and barren victory. 

The army of the Potomac was first reduced _by 
tlio withdrawal- fro^i my coraiual-id of the division 
o^f Gen. lilenker. which waa ordered to tl\p I^Ioun- 
iain Department, under Gen. FremQnt, , \Ye;had 
scarcely landed on, the Peninsula, when- it was 
further reduced by a dispatch, revoknig a pre- 
vious order giving me command of Fortress Mpn- 
Toc, and ui>der vvdrich I liad expected to take ten 
thousand men from that point, to aid in our oper- 
ations. Then, when under fire. before the i de- 
fences of Yorkfcown, we received the ncv.'s of tlie 
•withdrawal of Gen. McDowell's corps, of, about 
35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of 
the original plan of the campaign. About one- 
third of my ciitire army, (five divisions of out of 
fourteeu, one -of the.. nine reijnainwg being httle 
larger than a ^)rigade), was' thn:; ;;:;;: -a from me.^ 
Instead of a'rapid ,:;vdvajiqe 1 plannea, 

aided by. a. flank nioyementi'. ■ • ,;; •'■''■j;^'®/' ^'' 
was only left to besie^'c YorktoWiL.^ That siege 
was successfully conducted by -the, array,,, and 
■when these strong works at Icngtli yiclcled to our 
approaches, the troops rushed forwayd^to the 
B?J.ng,uinary but successful battle of Willrams- 
bni'p) an^i thus .opened an almost unvcs,i.&tQd ad- 
Trance, to tlie hanl^s of the Ghickahon]iiny._ , Rich- 
mond lay before tliem, surrounded witii fortifica- 
-lions and guarded by an army larger than our 
own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage 
of the brave men who composed iny-cpm}-^iand. 
Relyin'j; still on tlie'. support Avhlch the yaatness 
of our uudcrtakivg, aud'tlie grand results , depend- 
ing on ojjrsucceas, seemed; to dnsure i^s, we 
pressed forward, 'the, ■w.catlie.r v.ms. stormy be-; 
yond precedent, "the, deep soil of the Peninsula 
■wii,s at times one vast morass. The Ghickciho- 
ininy rose to a higher stage t'lan had been known 
for 'years bf^fpre. "Pursuing the advance, the 
cr.9Sflings were ,scized,i and., the tight wing ex-; 
tended to effec'fc.a junction. wi'tJi rciuforcemeDts 
now promised .an.d eariii^stly ^ degircd,- and upon 
ijie arrival of which the complete svtccess of the 
campaign seemed clear. ,' The 'briltiant battle of 
Hanover Court House was fouglit, which opened 
the way fpr tjiC'tirst corps, with the aid ,of which, 
had it come, wo, should then have .gonewvto; the 
enemy's capital. It iueyer^ came. The bravest 
array could not do more,, uiider such overwhelm- 
ing disappointment, than the army ot the Poto- 
mac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage 
and endurance, when they hurled back again and 
again the vastly superior forces of the enemy. 
"'B^it mortal men could not accomplish the miracles 
that seem to liave been expected of them. But 
one course was left; a flank march in the face of 
a powerful enemy, to another and better base, 
one of the most' hz:irdous movements in war. 
Tiie army of the Potomac liolding its o,wn safety, 
and almost the s:;ifety of our cau-se, in its hands, 
was e.cpial to the. occasion.. The ,Sevcn Davs are 1 



classical in American history ; those days in which 
the nol)le soldiers of the Union and the Constitu- 
tion fought an'overwhplming enemy by day, o,nd 
retreated from successive victories by, iiighl, 
through a week of jDattle, , cloising 'the terrible 
scenes of coufiict with tlic ;e,v.er, mcroorable vic- 
toryat' Malvern, wliere they (\wv\i bade, beaten 
and shattered, tlie entire eastevu army of the con- 
federacy, and tluis secured: f<n- Uiemselyesa place 
of'rest,and a'p.oint for a new advance upon th.? 
capital from the banks of tfie -Jamss. 

.Richinond wasstill within oiir grasp, .had the 
array of the Potomac been reinforced' and permit- 
ted to advance. But counsels, \vhich I cannot 
birt think snbsequejit events proved mnvise, prc- 
vadpd in Wasiungton, and ^^ye were ordered to 
abandon,. tKe:campaign. Never did soldiers bet- 
ter deserve tlie.thaiiks of a, nation than the arnr,- 
of the Potomac for the ' deeds of the Pe:iinsuiar 
ca^npaigi!, ai>d although that meed was withheld 
from, them bvtiic 'authorities, I mix'. pcrsuad'.?.d 
tliey have received the applau'se^of 1,he American 
peopl<i. , The.'army of ■the;3Potomac vyas .' i;ecallo-.I 
from within, sight'of pjcj^mond, andi'ncorporatc.l 
v/ith 'li'hc army of Yirghiia. ' Tlio disappouilmci>t;s 
of: the cpmpaigivon 'the :Per4insu!aV,liad not clani])- 
:encd '.their; 'ardor' or d'imii,iishcd tlieiv. jiatrioL-Biii. 
Tlrey foug^it^'well, fai,tbTillly,^gi^lIantly uiiderj^ ;.. 
Pope ; yet ^yere compelled to fall back on V\ ; ,.• 
ingt'oa,'' defecated and' almost demQrali7.ed_ 'I'.u:- 
enemy no longer ocoupied in guarding his ow-. 
capital, poured liis'troops nortliv;ard, entered^ ]s'. - 
rylaud, threatened Pennsylvania, and even V, n. ■ ^ 
ington itself. Elated by his recent victories, -.vr. i 
assurtid'that our .troops -were disorganized au i 
dispirited, he was confident thai the 'seat of war 
was now permaiScntly transferred to, the loyal 
States, and' that Ids own. exhausted soil was to, bo 
relieved from th,e burden of supporting tv/o hos- 
tile armies. But he did not understand the spir- 
it which animated the soldiers of the Union. I 
shall rtot, nor can I living forget tliat, when I was 
iordered to tbt command of the troops for the de- 
fense of tliecapitcd, the soldiers, with whom I. had 
shared so much, of ihp anxiory^and pain and suf- 
jfering of the war ,drad not lost their confidence in 
ine as tlVeir commander. They sprang to my call 
with all their ancient vigc:--. discipline and cojir- 
a"-e. I led them into ]\Iaryland. Fifteen days 
after bhey had fallen back defeated, before ,Wash- 
iu'^rton, they vanrpiished the enemy ou the rugged 
helglits of South Mountain,, jiursued Jiim to tlu^ 
hard fought field of Antietam. and drove hnn 
broken and disap' ' Ihe Potomac into 

Virginia. ,■.!,■ -I'l 

The army had ncci oi r^;,!,. .liter the tcrnbi!^ 



.experience's, of battles and' raarch.es, with scarcely 
an ■ interval of repos'3, 'which they had ^. gone 
through from the tiuie of leaving for the Peum- 
Bula. the return to Washington, t.hc defeat in Vir- 
ginia, the victory at South Mountain, and agaiu 
at Antietam.it was not surprising that they were, 
in a large degree, destitute of the absolute ne- 
cessaries to effective duty. Shoes were worn out, 
blankets were lost, clothing was in rags ; m short 
the army was unfit for active service, and an in- 
to'rval for rest and equii)raent was necessary. 
Wlien the slowly, forwarded supplies came to 



1-h 



x\3, 1 led the 'army across thteriyfeif I'fetl'ovat^l'and 
rofreshed, in good order ,nnd discipline, ai'uV fol- 
lowed the reiireating''l^G t(> -a ^position where! 
was coinlident of 'decisive victory, when in the 
midst of theuiovcinentjWhilemy advanced j!;nard 
was ■actually irt^'bontaGt- with'" the enemy, I was 
removed:from the commands 'i ar'j'l ■• ''' 

I aia devoutiy f^rataful to God thattny last cam- 
paign Avitii this bfave. a,ruiy was- crowned with a 
victory which saved tlioiuitiqu from 'the greatest 
X^eril it had then undergone. 

I have not accomplished my purpose, if, by 
tl^is report, the army of the Potunaap is npt_p]ac(^d 
Migti on tlie iroli of the historic arMea'ofJ the 
world. ,..; I ,;^; , .^ (^ ..j'^O -, ,";A (.'lU '"■ ' 

Its deeds ennolile tho nation "'to '"^lucli it 'be- 
longs. Always: ready for hafetle, ahya3'S'-firm, 
steadfast and trustworthy, I never' called oh Itjn 



vain; rior wiu the pat;6n 'ever have caus^ io. at- 
tribute its want of' sifccc^a, as und6r_ other com- 
manders, to any fiiilurc,hf patriotism or bravery 
iu that noble body of American soldiers. 

No man can justly charge upon, any portion of 
that army, from the commanding general to the 
private, any lack of«devbtion to the service of 
the UnitsJd'ftltStes government, and to the cause 
,of the ..Co.nBtjtAijti'o^Tiand t)io Union. Tl^ey bave 
proved tiieii?' fealty in much eorrow, suffering, 
danger, and through the very shadow of death. 
Their comrades dead on all tho fields where we 
fought, have scayqcly more claim to the honor of 
3, nation's reverence tliati the sut-vlvors to ■ jt]ie 
jus^cQ of a nation's gratitude. ., ^■^i." 

latnsir, very respectfully, yoiit obedient" ser- 
vant, 'i^. f;-:Y I T. L ; V' j \/ ; ► ■ , , 

'GeQkge^. Mi;Ci.^LiiAN,-Maj-Gea. U. S. A, 



APPEN.DIX 



A. 



OKGANIZATiok AKD DISTRIBUTION. 

Tho degig.natioi]s of the different Batteries of Artillery, both Regular and YoliinteeV, folIo"W within 

a few pages. • ■ : ■■.■';;'" • ■ i ;, ,'.;' > . ■ ■,','';^. "■ . .,■• ,.- ' ■ 

• The following distribution of Regiments and Raitteries was'maaaas a preu'ni'iflarY'organit?itl0n of 
the forces at kuid, shortly after my arrival at Washington. ■' • 

The Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry, as fast as collected and brought into primary organisation, 
v/ere assi"-ned to Brigades and Divisions as indicated in the subjoined statements. / ' '■ ■ 



o^:^.n ANiZATr 



THE DIVISION OP THE P0'4:'0MAC. 
August 4th, 1861. 



BRIGADIER-GBNERAL HUN'TER'S BRIGADE. 
23d Regiment New York Volunteers. 
25tli " -■■'■'■ " ■■ • ' '■ " ■' 
35th ■" " " . 

37th 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TIEINTZELMAN'S 
' BRIGADE. ■ 

5th Regiment Maine Volunteers. 
16th- " NewTork " 

26th . " 
27th 

Tidball's Battery {''. A") 2d U. S. Artillery. , 
BRIGADIEll-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN'3 ' 

:,; ; BRIGADE. 
14th Regiment ISTew York Volunteers. 

9th " J^Iassachusctts " 

De Kalb " New York 

4th " Michigan " 

Ilamilton's Battery (" E") 3d U.. S. Artillery. 
Company"!" 2d " Cavalry. 
BRIG.-GBNERAL KEARNEY'S BRIGADE. 

1st Regiment New Jersey Vohmteers. 

ij^a./ . « . -. " . • " w 

'■'3d ■ " "■ ■ •■■ '^''■" 

Green's Battery (' G") 2d U. S. Artillery. 
Companv " G" 2d " Cavalry. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HOOKER'S BRIGADE. 
1st Regiment Ivlassachusetts Volunteers. 
11th 



2d Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers. 
26 th '* Pennsylvania " 

COLONEL KE YES'S BRIGA.DE. 
22d Regiment New York Volunteers. 
24th 

30th' " " « 

l^th " " State Militia. 

BRIG.-GENERAL FRANKLIN'S BRIGADE. 

15th Regiraeiit New York A'^olunteers. 

18th 

31st " " 

32d « " " 

Piatt's Battery (" M") 2d U. S. Artillery. 

Comp'y"C"New York (Lincoln) Cavalry. 

COLONEL BLENKER'S BRIGADE. 
8th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
27th "" -I '^ ' " ^ ■ ■'* 
27th " Pennsylvania '"' 

GaribaldiGaiard', Now York " 

COLONEL RICHARDSON'S RRTGADE. 
12th Regiment New York Valuuteers. 
2d " Michigan " 

3d 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONE'S BBIGADB. . 
34th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
Tammany " " 

Ist " " " 

2d " New York State Militia. 



COLONEL WM. F. SMITirS BRIGADB. 

S(l Rogimeni Vermont Volunteers. 
^ Cth " MaiiiQ " 

2d " Vermont " 

33d " New York " 

Company " 11" 2d U. S. Cavalry. 
Captain ilott's New York Battery. 

COLONEL COUCH'S BRIGADE. 
2d Regiinout Rliode Island Volunteers' 
7th " Massachusetts " 



138 



10th Regiment Maseachusofcta Volunteers. 
36th « New York 
The 2d Regiment Maine Volunteers, 

2d " Wisconsin " and the 

13th " New York " Btationed 

at Fori (Jorcoran. 
The 2l8t Regiment New York Volunteers, 

stationed at Fort Runyon. 
The 17t]i Regiment Now York Volunteers, 
stationed at Fort EUsworth 



By October the new levies had arrived in Bufficient numbers, and the process of organizdtiou was 
BO far carried on, tliat tlie construction of Divisions had been effected. 
The following statement exhibits the composition of the Ai-my, October 15th, 1861. 

ORGANIZATION OF 'THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
October I6th, 18G1. 



BRIG.-GENERAL STONEMAN'S CAVALRY 
COiMMAND. 
6th U. S. Cavalry. 
4th Pemisylvania Cavalry. 

Oneida Cavaliy (1 Company). 
11th Peiuisylvaiiia Cavalry (Uarlans). 

Barker's Illinois Cavalry (1 Company). 
II. 
COL. n. J. HUNT'S ARTILLERY RESERVE. 
Battery " L' 2il U. S. Artillery. 
- « «' A" " " 

" « K" 3 J « " 

CI II T,T> II « « 

" " K" 4th " " 

« "11" 1st" " (Lient Hall) 

" "A" 5th" « 

ITT. 
CITY GUARD, RRTG.-OENERAL ANDREW 

roin'Eii. 

Clavaln/. 
Companies " A" and " E" 4th U. S. Cavalry.. 

Ar tiller 2/. 
Battery " K" 5th U. S. Artillery. 

Infantry. 
Battalion 2d U. S. Infantry. 

" 3d " '' 

Company 8th " " 

1st " 
" Sturgis Rifles (Illinois Volunteers.) 

IV. 
BANKS' DIVISION. 
Cavalry. 
Sdlleg't. N. Y. Cavalry (Van Alen) 4 Companies. 
ArtUlerij. 
Best's Battery " I" 4th U. S.'Artillery. 
Detaclunent i)th N. Y. Artillery. 
Matthew's Battery " F" 1st Peiuisylvania Artillery. 
Tompkins' Buttery '• A" 1st Rhode Island. 

In fat) try. 
Abero'ombie's Brig. /S^^ifes-'.s Brig. Giyi'flo7is Brig. 
12tli Maaa. Vols. 3J Wjs. Vo'ls. 2d MaBS. Vols. 



12 th Ind. " 9 th N. Y. S. M. 28 th Y. Y. « 

16th " « 29th Penn.VoL 19th " « 

30th Pean. " 13th Mass. " 5th Conn. «, 

46th Penn. " 
28 th " « 
IstMd. " 
MCDOWELL'S DIVISION. 
Cavalry. 
2d New York Cavalry (Harris' Light) Col. DaviesJ 

Artillery, 
Battery " M" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
" "G"lst « 

Infantry. 
Keyes's Brig. Waclswortlis Briq. King's Brig. 
14th N. Y. S. M, 12th N. Y. Vols.^ 2d Wis. Vols. 
22d " Vols. 21st " " 6th " 

24th " " 23d " " 7th " 

30th " " 35th " " 19th Ind. " 
HEINTZELMAN'S DIVISION. 
Cavalry. 
let New Jersey. Col. Halstead. 

ArtiUei-g. 
Thompson's Battery " G" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
Infantry. 
Richardson's B. Sedgwick's B. Jameson's B. 
2nd Mich. Vols. 3rd iMaino Vols. 32d Penn. Vola. 
2i-d " " 4th " " 63rd " 

5th " " 38th N.Y. " 61st " 

37th N.Y " 40th " " 45th " 

Ponn. Vols. (Wild Cat Reg't.) 
F. J. PORTER'S DIVISION. 

Cava/ri/. 
3rd Ponn. Cav. [Kentucky Cav.] Col. Averell. 
8th " " Col. Grogg. 

Arlillertf. 
Bat'y "E" 2nd U. S. Artillery. 



'E" 3rd 



MorcWs B. 
14tli N. Y. Vols. 
33rd Penn. " 
4th Mich. " 
9th Mass. '* 



Note. — Transferred to 
Sherman's Exped. 
Infmfry. 
Martindale's B. Butt-erfuMs B. 
13th N. Y. Vols. .'iOth N. Y. Vols. 
2iid Maine " Stockton's I M R 
— N. Y Do K R 83 Punii. Vols. 
18th Mass. Vol. 17th N.Y. Vols. 
2;"Uh " 



FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 
Cavalry. 
lat New York Cavalry. Col. McReynolds. 

Artillery. 
Bat'y "D" 2nd U. S. Art'y. tlexainer's B.N. Y. V. 
" "G" " " 

Infaniri/. 
Kearney's B. Slocmri's B. Neicton's B. 

let N. J. Vols. 16th N. Y. Vols. 15th N. J. Vols. 
2nd " " 26th " " 18th " 
3rd " " 27th " " 31st " 
4th " " 6tli Maine " 32d " 
STONE'S DIVISION. 
Cavalrif. 
6 Companies 3rd N. Y. (Van A ten) Cavalry. 

Artillery. 
Kirby's Bat. "I" IstU. S. Bunting's 6th N. Y. I. B. 
Vaughn's " "B" 1st R. I, 

Infantry. 
Gorman's Brigade. Lander's Brigade. 

2nd N. Y. S. M. lOtli Mass. Vols. 

1st Minn. Vols. , 20 th " " 

— N. Y. Vol. (Tarn. R.) 7th Mich. " 
15th Mass " Com. Mass. Sharpshooters 

34th N. Y. " 

BAKER'S BRIGADE. 

. Penn Vols. [1st Calil'ornia.] 

[2nd California.] 
"alifornia.J 



139 



— " " [3rd 

BU ELL'S DIVISION 

Artillery. 
Battery "D" 1st Penn. Artillery. 
"11" " 

Ivfantry. 
Couch'.'! Brig. Graham's Grig. Peck's Brig. 

2nd R. I. Vols. 23rd Penn. Vols. 13th Penn. Vol. 
"til Mas.s. " 31st " " 21st " 
10th Mass. '■■ C7th N. Y. [IstL. I.] Vols. 

62d N. Y. V. 
Anderson Zou. 
36th N. Y. Vols. 05th N. Y. V (1st U. S.Chass.) 

55th N. Y. Vol. 
McOALL'S DIVISION.* 
Cnvahy. 
Ist Penn. Reserve Cavalry. Col. Bayard. 

ArlilleJ')/. 
Easton's Battery "A" Ist Penn. Artiller3^ 
Cooi)er's " "B" 1st " " 

Kein's " "G" 1st " . « 

In/anlrt/. 

Mendcx Brig. Brig. Brig. 

1st Ritlcs Penn. Res. 5th P. II. Inf. lOtli P. R." Inf. 
4th Penn. Res. luf. Ist " " Cth " " 
3rd " " " . 8 th " " 9 th " « 
7th " '• " 12th "■ " 

ilth " " " 
2„d '■ '■• " 

HOOKER'S DIVISION. 

C'uvcilry. 

8rd Ind. Cav. [6 Companies]. Lieut.-Col. Cartel-. 

Artilleri/. 

Elder's Battery -E" let l3. S. ArtiUeiy. 



Infantry. 

Brigade. Sickles' Brigade. 

1st Mass. Vols. IstReg't Ex. Brig. N. Y. Vols. 
Ilth " " 2nd " " " " " 

2ndN. H " 3rd " " " « « 

20th Penn. " 4th " " " " " 

let Mich. " 5th " " " " « 

SMITH'S DIVISION. 

Cavalry. 

5lhPenn. Cav. (Cameron Drags). Col. Friedman. 

Artillery. 

Ayre's Battery "F" 5th U. S. Artillery. 
Mott's 2nd New York Independent Battery. 
Barr's Battery "E" Ist Penn. Artillery. 

Infantry. 
Brigade. Steven's Brig. IlancocJcs Brig. 

2nd Verm't Vols. 33d N. Y. Vols. 47tli Penn. Vols. 
3rd " " 79th " S. M. 49th " « 
4tli " " 0th Maine Vols 43rd N. Y. " 
5th " " 49th N. Y. " 5th Wis. 

Cos. "B" and "E" Berdan's Slirpshooters.. 

Note.— The 47th Penn. Vols, and the 79tli N 

Y. S.M. transferred to Gen. Sherman's E.xpeditiou- 

CASEY'S PROVISIONAL BRIGADE. 
5th N. J. Vols. — Penn. Vols. (R. II. Reg't.) 
6th « « Battahon D. C. Vols. 

7th " " 40th Penn. " 

8 th " " 4th N. H. " 

Note. — Round Head Regiment transferred to 
Gen. Sherman's Enpedition. 

V. 

GARRISON OF ALEXANDRIA. BRIG-GEN. 

MOiNTGO.MERY. 

Military Governor. 

Penn. Volunteers, (Cameron Guards). 

GARRISON OF FORT ALBANY. 

14th Mass. Volunteers. 

GARRISON OF FORT RICHARDSON. 

4th Connecticut Volunteers. 
GARRISON OF Fort WASHINGTON. 
(Jompany "D" Ist'U. S. Arlilleiy. 

"H" 37th N. Y. Volunteers. 

" U. S. Recruits uuassigned. 

VL 

DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. 

Company Penn. Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Bat'y "1" 2nd U. S. Art'y. 2nd Mass. Batterj. 

" — N. Y. Art'y. 

Infantry. 
3rd New York Volunteers. 
4th 
5th 

17th Mass. " 

25th " " 

21st Indiana " 

6th Michigan " 

4th Wisconsin " 
7th Maine " 

2v.d Maryland Battalion. 
Reading City Guards. 



APPENDIX B. 

I'add a Statement of the Ors;anvzation- and Composition of the Iroops on April xst, commeYiortig 
witli tlie portion of the Array of the Potomac, whijch went to the Peninsula.? -giving alterwards the 
Regiments and Batteries left on the Potomac and ifn i\Mrylaftd, a^d \arguua after, April lat,,i{^t>^. 

'PROOPS OF teE ARMY OF THE jPOio^ilAlC; SENT TO :^B't^M 



• LEY PwEBERVB. BRIG.-Gi:.:>. P.* BT. G. 

'■',:'■ v.; : 600KE. - 

Jimoi-i/'s Brigade. ', • . ; Bhflce's .Brigade. 
5th-U. S. CaYalry. • ■ ls,t II: S;. Cavalry. 
6th ■" " SthPenn. " 

6 til Peu: 1 . " Barker's Bqviaarou Pd. Cav y. 

11. : '''"■■' 

ARTILLERY RE3I^RVE. COL. U. -L ITUNT. 
Gralur: • ^ '•- '" '■^- - '■ '^■' ' ^' !■ - CNapbleon 

' [gans. 
6 " '■ 
2 1 ■• 6 20-pds. 

[Parrott guns. 
2d G 3-in. oi'dnauce 
2d " 6 3-in. ordnance 
[guns. 
2d " 6 3-in ord. , " 
M" 8d " 6 10-pds. Parrott 
[guns. 
■• G" 3d " 6 3-in. ord. " 
= K" 3d" 4 10-pds Parrott 
[guns, 
4th " G'Napoleou " 
4th " 6 

5th " 6 3-in. ord. " 
5j.h " 4 Napoleon " 
olh " 4 10-pds. ^ 

Parrotts V S"ns 
2 Napo'n 
AETILLEP r RESmYB 



Randal'... 
Carlisle's " 

Pobbei'tson's " 

Bonron's " 

t:.. 

Edvv'ard s 

Gihson's " 
Livingston's ' 

Howe's ' 

D0R1!!=!?V'S ' 

Weed's 
Smead"s ' 
AiuesiVi " 



"E" 



M' 



■ C" & ' 

F" k ■ 

" G" 

'•r" 

" K" 

"A" 



Diederick's Bat'y " A' 
Yoegelie's • "■ "B" 
Knieriem's " " C" 
Grimm's " " D" 



BU.6 20-pd.Par- 
' 4 "[rottgns 
' 4 " " 
' 6 32-pdnow 

100 guns. 



]U: 



VaLUNTEER ENGl n^EER TROOPS. "GEN. 
WOODBURY. 
15th New YuiQi Volunteers. 
oOth 
REGULAR ENGINEER TROOPS. CAPT. 
DUANE. 
■ lompanies " A," "B." and " C," V- S. Engineers. 
ARTILLERY TROOPS WITH BIEGE TRAIN. 
IstConnectlcut Heavy Artillery. Gol. Ti/ler. 
INFANTRY RESERVE (Rcgtilar Brigade). 
Gen. Si/Ices. 
9 Go's 2iid U-. S. Infantry. 
7 " 3rd " 
10 " 4th " 
5th Rest. N. Y. Vols. Col. G. K. Warren. 



8 Go's lOth andl7th.B. S- Infentry. 
6 Go's, nth 'U. S. Tnfimtrv. 

8 " 12 th 

9 " 14th 

SECOND CORPS. GEN; SUMNER. 

Ca-oalry.- 
8th IlHnois' Cavalry. Gol. FarnswortJi. 
i One Squadron 6th' New York Cavalry. 

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION. 
Artillery, • 
Clark's Bat'y. " A" & " G" 4tfi U. S. 6 Napoleon g!is 
'Frank's " " G" 1st N.Y. G lO-pds Parrott 

Pettit's " . " B" 1st " 6 " [guns. 
Hogan's " "A" 2d " G " 

Infantry. 
Howard's Brig. Meaglier's Brig. 
'U\\ N. H. Vols. , 69th'N. Y. Vols. 
iSlst Penn. " G3rd " 
61st N.Y. " 88th; « __ 
64th " " ■' --P^'^ 

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION. 
Artillery. 
' I" IstU. S.. 6 Napoleon gns. 
«A"i 4T.T r ^10-pd.Par. 1 .,^„ 
"A lstR.L6 2i2-pd.HoziS"'- 

'' ^'^ ^212-pd.Hozp"^- 
*-6 3-in. ordnance gns 



Frejich-s Brig. 
52d N.Y. Vols. 
57 th " 
66th " " 
53rd Penn. " 



Kirb}'ii Bat'y. 
Tompkin's " 

*Dartlctt s " 
bweu's 



' Infantry. 

Gormwis Brig. , Burn's Brig. . Bana's Brig. 
2d N. Y- S. M. 69th Penn. Vols. 19 th Mass Vols. 
15th Mass. Vol. 71st .'•' " 7th Mich. " 
■M N. Y. "* 72nd '■ " 42nd N. Y. " 
1st Minn. " lOGth " " 20th Mass. " 

Note,— jB/ewfcer's Bivision detached and afi- 
Bigned to the Mountain Bepartmenl ,■•■>: ^ 
SfllRD CORPS. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN. 
i* Cavah'y. 

\ ■• 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry. Col. Aver rU 
t ' ; : .': - : PORTER'S DIVISION 

Griffin's- Ba,t'y "K" 5th U. S. <: lO-pds. Parrott 

Weden's "-("C'R. L — — [m^- 

'^lartiii's " " 0" Mas«. 7 Napoleon Guns. 

tillcn's '• — C 3-in ordn. guns. 



fed Mahie Vols. 14th N.Y. Vols, 
ISthMSiss. " 4th Mich. " 
22nd " " 9th Mass. " 
i25thN. Y. " 82nd Penn. " 
13th N. Y. " 
1st Bcrdau Sharpshooters 



Buiterf/Ms Brirj. 
17thN.Y.,VolB. 
63rd Penn. " 
44th N. Y. " 
Stockton's Mich. 
12th N. Y, Vols. 



HOOKER'S DIVISION. 
Artillery. 

Hah s Bal J. rL IstU. S. 6 ^ i2-pd. How. \ 



14i 



gns 



Sraitivs " 4thN.T.Bat'y.610-pds. Parrott 
Braraliall's 6tli " " 6 3-m ordnance " 
Osboru's "D"lstN:T.A4 " 

Infcmtri/. 

Sickle's Brig. Naff lee's Brig. Col. Starr's Brig. 

Is t Excelsior (N.Y.) 1st Mass. Tols. 5tkN.J.Vols- 



2nd 
3rd 
4lh 
5tk 



nth 

2Gth Ponn. 
2ud N. n. 



6 til 

7 til 

8 th 



HAMILTON'S DIVISION. 

Artillery. 
Thompson's Bat'y " G" 2d US 6 Napoleon gnns. 



Beam's " 

Randolph's " 

.Jameson's Brig 
105th Pe. Vols. 
63rd " " ' 
57th « « 
87feh N. Y. " 



gns. 



2d Mich. Vol 
3]d " 
5 th " 
37th N. Y. " 



2 jNapoieon 

«E"R.I.Gtl?-l'V^'' 

2 Napoleon. 

Infantry. 
Birney's Bri/j 

38 th N.Y. Vols, 
40th " " 
3rd Maine " 
4tli " " 

FOURTH CORPS. GENERAL KEYES.' 
Cavalry. 

COUCH'S DIVISION. 

A rtitlery. 
McCortliy's Bat'y- " C" IstPenn. 4 la-pd Par. gns. 
Flood's " "D'Tst " 6 " " " 

Miller's " "B"lst " 4 Napoleon " 

Brady's " '^ F^' 1st " 4 10-pd. Parrott. 

Infantry. 
Graliain's Brig. P eric's Brig. 

67th N.Y. vis. (1 L.L) 98th Pe. Vis, 
102d " " 
93rd " " 
62d N.Y- " 
55th " " 
S^riTH'S DIVISION. 
Artillerij 

Ayres' Bat'y. " F" 5th U.S. 



65 th " " (I U.S. C) 
23rd Penn. " 

3l8t " " 

6Ist " " 



Brig. 

2d R.I. Vis. 
7 til Mass. 
10th " •' 

SGthN.Y." 



^ 4 10-pd. Par. j 

<5 2 -Napoleon, fg"^- 



, 4 10-pd. Par- 



2 Napoleon 

4 3-in. ordnance. 



77 th 
49 th 



Mott's " 3d N.Y. Bat'y 

Wheeler's "E" 1st N.Y. 

Kennedy's 1st N.Y. Batteay 6 " " " 

Infantry. 
Hancoclcs Bri<j. Brook's Brig. Bnvrdaan's Bri^/. 
5th Wis. Vols.' 2d Verm't Vol. 33d N. Y. Vols. 
49th Penn. " 3d " 
43d N. Y. " 4th " 
6th Maine " 5th " • " 7th Maine " 
6th " 
CASEY'S DIVISION. 

AriiUery. 
Regan's Bat'y, 7th N. Y. Bat'y. 6 3-iHordn. guns. 
Fitch's " 8th " " 6 " " 
Bates' « "A" IstN.Y. Art. 6 Napoleon " 
Spratt's " " H" 1st " " 4 3-iu. ordn. " 

Infanlry. 

Keim's Brig. Palmer's Brig. If^'lff- 

85th Penn. Vol. 85t!i N. Y. Vol. 104Lh Penn. Vol. 
lout " " 98Lh " " 52d- " 



lOSd Penn Vols. 92d N. Y. Vols. 



96th N. Y. 



81st 
93d 



56th N. Y. 
100 th "' 
nth I^laine 



PROVOST GUARD. 
. 2nd U. S. Cavalry. 
Batfah'on 8th and 17th U. S. Infantv)-. 
AT GENERAL HE.VDQUARTERS. 
2 Cos. 4th. U. S. Cav. 1 Co. Oneida Cav. (N.Y. Vol.) 
The following trOops of the army of the Poto- 
mac were left behind, or detached, on and in front 
of the' Potomac for the d«fence of tlvat line, April 
Ist, 1862. Franklin's and McOail's divisions at 
snbseqncnt and different dates joined tlie 
active portion of the army on the Pcninsnla. 
Two Brigades of Shield's division joined at Har- 
2-i.son's Landing. 

FIP^T CORPS. GENERAL McDOWELL. 

■ ■ Cavalry. '■ 

1 $t New.Ybrk Cavalry. 4th New Y'ork Cavaky.! 

2d ' .' ' " IstPciui. " ■ 

Sharpshooters. 

2d Regiment Berdan's Sharpshooters. 

FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 

Artillei-y, 

Pla tt's Bat'y "D" 2d U.S. 6 Napoleon gnns. 



Porter's " 

Hoxamer's 
Wilson's 



"A" Mass. 
"A" N. J. 



Ifewton^s Brig. 
18th N.Y. Vols. 
31ist " 
32d " " 
95 th Penn. " 



j 4 10 pd Parrott ) 

"] 2 12pdHowit's (^"^''^ 

- 1410 pd Parrott | 

^ \ 212pd Howit's fS"» 

F" 1st N. Y. Art'y 4 3-in. ordnance. 

Infantry. 

Slocuiris Brig. 

16th N. Y. Vols 

27th " 

5th .Alaine " 

96th Penn. ** 

McCALL'S DIVISION. 

Ariillery. 

Seymour's Bat'y "G" 5 th U.S. 6 Napoleon guns. 

Eaton's " "A" 1st Penn. 4 " 

Cooper's. " "B" Ist . " 6 10-pd Parrott gns. 

fO" 1 ^+ f( ^ 2 10-pd Parrott ) , 
'C 1st 6 , ,r, 1 u •, r 2: liS. 
412-pdHowits J ° 

Infantry. 

3Ieade's Brig. Ords Brig. 

t. 3d Penn Res. Rgt. 6th Penn L'gt. 

4tli " " " 9 th " 

7th '' " " 10th " " 

8 '■ " " nth " « " 12th « 

1 Perini Reserve Rifles. 

KING'S DIVISION. 

ArllUery. 

Gibbon's Bat'y "B" 4th U.S. 6 Napoleon guns, 

Monroe's " "D" 1st R. L 6 10-pd Pairuttguns. 

Gerrish's '' "A" N. H. 6 Napoleon " 

Durreh's " Penn. 6 10-pd Parrott guns. 

Infantry. 

Brigade. Patriclcs Brig. Avgur^sBrig. 

2d Wis. Vols. 20th N. Y. S. hi. 14th N. Y. S. M. 

6th " " 21st " Vols. 22d " Vols. 

7th " " 23d " "^ 24th " " 

19. hind. « 25th " " 30th " " 

FIFTH CORPS. GENERAL BANKS. . 

Cavalry. 

Ist Maine Cavalry. 5th New York Cavahy. 

1st Vermont " 8th " " 

Ist Michigaa " Keyea's Bat. Penn. Cav'/, 



Kearney's Brig 

LstN. J Vols. 

2d " 

3d " 

4fcli- " • " 



Ke ill's 

Reynold :i Brig. 

1 Penn Res. R" 

2 " " 

5 " " ' 



142 



1st R. I. Cavaky. 18 Cos. Maryland Cavalry. 

j^ 1 Squadron Virginia " 

^ Unattached. 

28tli Pa. Vols. 4th Re^. Potomac H. G. (Md.Vols.) 
WILLIAMS' DIVISION. 

A rtillery. 
Best's Battery "F" 4th U. S. C Napoleon guns. 
Hampton's " Maryland 4 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
Thompson's" " 4 " 

Mathew's " "F" Penn. 6 3-in. ordnance " 
Cothran's " "M ' 1 N. Y. G 10-pds. Parrott " 
Knapp's " Penn. G " 

McMahon's " N. Y. 6 3-in. ordnance " 

Infantry. 
Jbercrombie's Brig. — Brig. — Brig. 

12th Mass. Vols. 9 N.Y. S..M 28 N. Y. Vs. 

2d " " 29 Pa. Vols. 5 Conn. " 

16th Ind. " 27 Ind. " 46 Pa. " 

1 Pot. H. Brig. (Md.Vol.) 3 Wis. " 1 Md. " 
1 Co. Zou. d'Af. (Pa. Vol.) 12 Ind. " 

13 Mass." 
SHIELD'S DIVISION. 

Arlillerr/. 

Clark's Bat. "E"4th U. S, 6 10-pds. Parrott guns. 

T 1) « iit»i tTT ^ 4 10-pds. Parrott )..,,^^, 
Jenk a " "A" 1st Va. G 2 Q_^^^lg a t g^i"« 

Davy's " "B" 1st Va. 2 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
Huiitington's"'A" 1 Ohio 6 I3-pds. James " 
^ ,. , ,, ,,T)>i u /. 2 12-p.How'r ) 
Robmson's ""L"l " G ^ 6-p. guns, f S™^" 
4 Ohio Inf. 1 6-p. gun. 
Infantry. 
Britrade. Brigade. Brigade. 

14th Ind. Vols. 5th Ohio Vols. Tth Ohio Vols. 
4th Ohio " 62d " " 29th " " 
8th " " GGth " " 7th " " 
7th Va. " 13th Ind. " 1st Va. " 
67tl)OhIo " 39th 111. " 11th Penn."- 

84th Penn. " Andrew Sharp's- 

GENERAL WADSWORTH'S COMMAND. 

Cavalry. 
1st New Jersey Cavalry, At Alexandria. 
4tli Pennsylvania " East of the Capitol. 

Artillery and Infantry. 
10th New Jersey Vols. Bladensburg Road. 
104th N. Y. Vols. Kalorama Heights. 

1st Wis. Heavy Art'y. Port "Cass," Va. 
3 Batteries N. Y. " Forts "Ethan Allen" and 

"Marcy." 
Dapot N.Y. Light Art'y. Camp "Barry." 
2d D. C. Vols. AVashington City. 

2GLli Pa. " "G" St. Wliarf. 

2Gth N. Y. " Fort Lyon. 

9r)th " " Camp "Thomas." 

9.ith " " Alexandria. 

88tli Pa. " (Dctaohm't.) " 
91 at " " Franklin Sq. Barracks. 

4lh N. Y. Art'y. Forts "Carroll" and"Gre- 

ble." 
H2th Pa. Vols. Fort " Saratoga." 



76th N.Y. Vols. Fort " Massachusetts." 

59 th " " " "Pennsylvania." 

88th Pa. « (Detachm't.) " " Good Hope." 
99 th " " " "Mahan." 

3d N. Y. Light Art'y. Forts " Ward," " Worth" 

and " Blenker." 
107th Pa. Vols. Kendall Green. 

54th " " " " 

Dickerson's Light Art'v.East of the Capitol. 
86th N. Y. Vols. " " 

88th Pa. " (Dctach't.) " " " 

f Forts "Alban3',""Tel- 
linghast," " Richard- 
14 Mass. "Heavy Art'y -j son,""Runyon,""Jack- 
56 Penn. " | son," " Barnard," 
["Craig," "Scott." 
4th U. S. A r t'y (Detachment) j Fort " Wash'ton. ' 
37th N.Y. VoUDetachraent) \ " 
97th " " Fort " Corcoran." 
101st " " 
12th Va. " 
91st N. Y. " 

IN CAMP NEAR WASHINGTON. 
6th New York Cavalry. Dismounted. 
10th " 

Swaim's " " " 

2d Pennsylvania " " 

(These troops, 3,359 men, were ordered to re- 
port to Col. Miles, commanding Rail Road Guard, 
to relieve 3,306 older troops, ordered to be sent 
to Manassas to report to Gen. Abercrombie.) 
GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND. (BALTIMORE.) 
Cavalry. 
1st Maryland Cavalry. Detachment of Cavalry, 
Purnell Legion. 

Artillery. 
Battery " I" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
" — Maryland Artillery. 
" " L" 1st New York Artillery. 
2 Independent Batteries, Penn. Artillery. 
Infantry. 
3d New York Volunteers. 
4th 

11th Pfennsylvania " 
87th 

111th « " 

21st Massachusetts " (Detachment.) 

2d Delaware " 

2d ]\[aryland " . - „ 

1st Eastern Shore Homo Guards (Maryland Vols.) 
2d " " " 

Parncll Legion 

2 Battalions 

Note. — Mr. Allen Pinkeutox was the trust- 
worthy and efficient chief of the Secret Service 
Corps. He is mentioned under his assumed name 
Mr. E. J. Alljen. 

Capt. G. a. Custar, additional A. D.C. and Lieu- 
tenant U. S. Cavalry, was added to the Staff of the 
Commanding General when on the Chickahominy. 



:• a p I 



t a •:3 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 706 676 2 % 



